The Emergence of the Image of the Patriot Soldier in the Early American (1776-1778) and Early French (1789-1792) Revolutionary Periods

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

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes paintings and prints of the period to better understand the concept of the patriot soldier or citizen in arms which emerged at the beginning of the American Revolution in 1775 and then again at the start of the French Revolution. The patriot soldier is an individual who is seen as putting aside his civilian occupation spontaneously in order to fight for what he sees as a national cause.

While in America contemporary Revolutionary works are little known and not numerous, in France there are thousands of them, spanning genres from history paintings and portraits such as those of Lallemand and Thévenin to periodical illustrations such as those of Prieur and Janinet.

In America, the patriot soldier was the hero of words and images relating to the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill in 1775. But soon thereafter, the Continental Army was formed and subsequent images of even these early battles, such as those of Trumbull, glorified the role of officers rather than that of patriot soldiers.

In France, the taking of the Bastille at the outset of the Revolution generated both words and many images praising and highlighting the role of civilians who had taken up arms against the Government. In contrast with America, a national Revolutionary army did not come together in France until several years later, in 1793-4. However, during the intervening period, a number of events such as the march on Versailles led artists as well as writers to express severe misgivings about the consequences of allowing or depending upon martial activity by citizens in arms. In both France and America, the citizen soldier was a transitional figure who was put aside once the revolution achieved a stable and unified political and military structure.

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Introduction

The category of the patriot soldier or citizen-in-arms has been referenced and frequently praised and idealized since ancient times. We will use these terms to refer to individuals represented in words or images as coming to battle from their civilian employments, motivated primarily by the desire to defend and advance what they see as national interests, rather than personal ones. The farmer chooses to abandon his plow or the artisan his bench to go and risk his life to serve a cause larger than his own.

These men are portrayed as drawn to fight by patriotism rather than by pay, coercion, or a desire for adventure or booty. The patriot soldier may be an independent fighter, or he may be a member of a Massachusetts Militia or of the *Garde Nationale,* but he is not a soldier by vocation and is not identified by military rank or status. If he wears a uniform, it is not the uniform of a standing national army. Such figures appears not only in literature and art, but in works of history and even of military theory.

In the eighteenth century, the re-emergent image of the patriot soldier contrasted sharply with the view of the career soldier that had prevailed in Europe for centuries--which often decried him as motivated by lust for spoils, fighting in the service of an individual aristocratic leader rather than a nation, and disrespectful and wantonly destructive of civilian lives and property as well as riotous and licentious whenever the occasion offered. It was in the early days of the American Revolution that fighters began to be identified in words and images as motivated by patriotism, the defense and advancement of national goals, rather than by mercenary, personal or sectarian interests and necessity. These ideas, some of which had been expressed forcefully in the immediately preceding years by French thinkers, were picked up again and applied at the outset of the French Revolution, drawing on the American experience. Later in these revolutions, as national armies were assembled, the figure of the patriot soldier, a civilian fighter, became less prominent.

Nevertheless, decades after the success of both these revolutions, the patriot soldier came to be widely represented both in words and images as a key author of the revolutionary victories. Leutze's image of *Washington Crossing the Delaware* [1851] is particularly widely recognized. (fig. 0.1) The painting is heroic even in its size, twelve by twenty-one feet. Most of the Americans huddled in the boat are to be seen as patriot soldiers, since they accompany Washington to battle, but wear motley garb, not the identical uniforms characteristic of a professional army.[1] Most viewers know that this scene immediately preceded a great American victory, one that could be seen as having particularly piquant moral significance since it was won over the Hessians (who, in addition to being mercenaries, were thought of as drunken louts). Yet, this work was painted seventy five years after the event it depicts. It cannot be taken as representative of how this event was viewed shortly after it occurred.

Emile-Horace-Jean Vernet's four familiar paintings of battles of the French Revolution and of Napoleon likewise were undertaken and painted decades after the Revolution ended. One of these, *The Battle of Jemappes* [1821], like Leutze's painting, can be read as emphasizing the presence of large numbers of citizens in civilian garb on the revolutionary side. (fig. 0.2) They are on the hill in the foreground with the French generals, and tend to give the impression that this victory depended on the efforts of patriot soldiers. But, this series of paintings was commissioned by the man who later became King Louis-Philippe, and was intended to further his political advancement both by highlighting his own role in fighting for France and by strengthening his populist identification. To say the least, this painting is not necessarily reflective of how these events were typically seen and depicted in 1792 and immediately thereafter.

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[1] For identification of the costumes worn by the individuals in the boat, see David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1f.

What remains true, however, is that for the visual artist the presence or absence of a standard soldierly uniform is almost always the most convenient iconography, but by no means the only one, by which he can distinguish the patriot soldier who has quit his plow or bench from the professional whose job is to fight under orders and for pay. It would not be easy to identify patriot soldiers in action if they were clothed like regular troops. This visual convention of the patriot in mufti carries no implications as to the attitudes either of the patriot soldiers themselves or of army and political leaders regarding the wearing of uniforms by these fighters. Indeed, there were no standard uniforms designated or available during the periods of the French and American Revolutions which are of concern here. What is significant is whether a man wears a uniform (and, of course, on which side he fights)—not the details of the uniform if he is wearing one.

I mention the widely known works of Leutze and Vernet, of which the former at least can be seen as apotheosizing the patriot soldier, specifically for the purpose of distinguishing them from the subject matter of this thesis. My goal here is neither to trace the artistic historiography of these revolutions, nor that of the patriot soldier. Rather, I aim to use visual materials contemporary or nearly contemporary with the two revolutions, illuminated by the written record, to elucidate the emergence, definition and subsequent suppression or disappearance of the figure of the patriot soldier in the thought and expression of the revolutionary periods. Perhaps this figure actually had only a rather brief, transitional role in the revolutionary myth as it unfolded from the tapestry of battle.

The fact that, as Leutze and Vernet may illustrate, the patriot soldier came much later to occupy a prominent place in national pantheons, an icon to inspire political allegiance or national solidarity, is not relevant to this inquiry. Eighteenth century artists, those closest to the events, produced nothing remotely like the Leutze and Vernet works--and contemporary written materials also reveal a far more nuanced and conflicting picture. Inevitably, the

contemporary artists' motivations, whether oriented towards markets or towards the potential impact of art on emerging events, were not identical with those that prevailed in a subsequent generation.

Why revolutionary Americans and Frenchmen gathered to fight against established authority, how well they fought and how much they contributed to victory, to what degree they were motivated by perceived national interest as opposed to personal motives such as aggrandizement and vengeance, or compulsion—all these questions long been and evidently will long continue to be the subject of intense debate. What has not as yet been done and what I will attempt to do here is to bring visual materials of the period systematically into this debate to illuminate contemporary views of the citizen soldier.

Images can be emotionally compelling, partisan or deceptive--as can words. The evidentiary weight to be placed on artistic and verbal materials will inevitably vary, but adducing the visual dimension can only enrich the debate. The body of this thesis (which is followed by a brief concluding chapter) consists of four chapters, the first two devoted to American revolutionary materials and the latter two to the French. The first of each of these two pairs of chapters deals with the earliest events and works.

Perhaps the appearance of the patriot soldier at the outset of these two wars was associated with the emergence of a previously passive national consciousness under conditions of revolutionary conflict. In Great Britain, where, of course, there was no revolution during this period, patriot soldier images did not appear. Soldiers continued to be depicted in the scenes and with the attributes, generally negative, that had characterized earlier representations. Nor did defeat in the American Revolution seem to render the domestic image of the British soldier any more odious.

Indeed, we will see that even before the British were defeated, they were locked in a lengthy struggle over issues of national identity that largely negated any possibility of

recognizing a unified national interest which could be represented by patriot soldiers--any more than such an identity and interest could be embodied in the British army. The integration of the Scots and Irish into Great Britain raised political and economic concerns for many of the English. But the social resistance to viewing what had previously been perceived as different, inferior and frequently hostile peoples as forming a single nation with the English may have been even more influential than any of the practical issues.

In the event, a majority of the British army was recruited not only from non-English areas, but from the less economically developed and more remote parts of Scotland and Ireland, where population exceeded resources and employment alternatives were limited. Within living memory, in 1745, an invading army descending from Scotland had come close to taking London and overthrowing the government. Conflicts in Ireland were recurrent. Hence a British army heavily larded with Scots and Irish could be seen at best as unreliable.

It was far too late for an English patriot, whether or not he was a soldier, to oppose or resist unification. He could evince his discomfort and dissatisfaction in words and images, but even if the occasion arose, which it did not, it would be difficult for him psychologically to rise to defend the interests of a nation which, in substantial part, he held to be artificial, and composed of direly disparate and unequal parts.

This heritage of resentment and division was already evident in Hogarth's *The March to Finchley* (1749-50). Here is a riotous inversion of the motivating theme of the soldier patriot. We see citizens of all ages and both sexes in immediate association with soldiers who, despite being inebriated and exhausted by a night of revels, were supposed to be marching to a crucial battle on which the fate of the nation depended. But whereas the patriot soldier fights and exposes himself to danger to sustain a national purpose--often in active support of regular soldiers—here, the cohorts of civilians who consort so closely with the troops, including harlots, are concerned only with pleasure and gain—though they could

hardly be less prepared to fight than are the soldiers themselves. The idea of soldiers as licentious and undisciplined is deeply traditional, but the ironic representation of the great mass of civilians as their seducers and fellow revelers rather than their victims is more novel. It is said that George II detested this painting because of its unflattering depiction of his soldiers, but what the painting suggested about the loyalties of his civilian subjects was far harsher.

Hogarth does not fail to illuminate the cleavages and disunity underlying this selfish squalor. For instance, as Charles Lamb points out, "The baby riding in its mother's lap...(its careless innocent face placed directly behind the intriguing time-furrowed countenance of the treason-plotting French priest), perfectly sobers the whole of that tumultuous scene."[2] The two women competing for the attention of the central figure of the grenadier may also be taken as representative of the loyalist (Protestant) and the Jacobite (insurgent) parties. Thus, there are still enemies within, and they (and, by association, the Scots) are to be stigmatized as "foreign." Thus, the patriot soldier appears in the American and French Revolutions, but not in British depictions of conflicts in Britain during this period.

In the remainder of this Introduction I will outline briefly the background of thought about the patriot soldier that was present at the opening of the revolutionary period, indicating how this related to experience and events as well as to prevailing artistic theory, and suggesting what we might look for in the immediately ensuing art. In subsequent chapters, I will turn to the earliest and then to slightly later images of the opening battles of the American Revolution, and after that to corresponding initial and later views of the French Revolution. The link between the two revolutions is strong.

French intellectual, political and popular interest in the American Revolution was vibrant and avid. Subsequently, it was frequently cited in France as an inspiring and

[2] Charles Lamb, "On the Genius and Character of Hogarth," in *The Reflector*, II, no. 3 (1811), 61-77.

pertinent model for national liberation, achieved by citizens who took up arms to overthrow established authority—soldier patriots. For instance, "No troops could show more intrepidity than these undisciplined and newly raised men"...An army "entirely formed of citizen soldiers, and similar in this respect to the ancient legions of Rome, ought to make any country the master of victory."[3] Lafayette, a prominent military actor in both revolutions, served for a while as a reminder of the common elements they shared.

Despite this, there are wide differences, both quantitatively and often qualitatively, between the objects that have come down to us from the two revolutions. Paris was a flourishing commercial center with a highly developed artistic community and art markets that long antedated the revolutions. This situation supported rapid and highly professional production of a profusion of revolutionary works—so numerous in their thousands that as yet they remain to be definitively catalogued and subjected to comprehensive analysis.

There was no counterpart to this in America, a provincial domain with much smaller population and wealth, far removed from European artistic institutions and markets. Hence American examples are far fewer, and often less redolent of the artist's familiarity with and understanding of earlier models. These differences in context will accentuate the significance of any parallels that nonetheless can be established between American and French treatments of the patriot soldier.

The events with which we are concerned here have received substantial attention from both the purely historical standpoint and in relation to theoretical models ever since they occurred. Hence I have concentrated in this chapter on a recounting of these prior contributions, many of which have relevance to developments in France as well as in America. Much shorter bibliographical comments on material relevant to particular artists

[3] Hillard d'Aubertuil, *Essais historiques et politiques sur les Anglo-Americains*,(Bruxelles, 1782), Vol. I, pt. 2, 186.

and works are to be found in subsequent chapters. It will be seen that the body of secondary historical literature arising from the French Revolution is far more substantial than that devoted to the American one. One reason for this may be because the French Revolution was far more disruptive of antecedent structures and relationships. Relevant historical views of the French Revolution will be discussed at length in the latter two chapters of this thesis in connection with the events giving rise to the images to be considered there.

The depiction of the American militiamen of 1775 as fighting at the outset of the Revolution for the common good of their people rather than for material inducements or to protect their own property was promoted from the very beginning. This idea had domestic and international persuasive value. MacKenzie points out that "the American Revolution was reported by sympathetic observers and propagandized...[as] the American people in arms, fighting for their natural liberties." Furthermore, "The image of selfless patriots" thinking and acting as independently motivated "citizen-soldiers fighting against selfish mercenary professionals" who mechanically followed orders "allowed Americans to view the Revolution in terms of a vast morality play."[4] We will find that a microcosm of this morality play is encapsulated in American engravings of Lexington and Concord.

Lancaster is among the historians who continue to advance this view: "A call had been sent out, and men by the thousands from all walks of life had answered it. An old order died on the nineteenth of April, 1775, simply because so many ordinary citizens believed so deeply in what underlay that call."[5] According to Cress, "Americans served to defend liberty and order; they fought for freedom and not for hire.[6]

The revolutionaries who were prepared to resist the authority of British law and to fight the British troops often referred to themselves and were referred to by others as

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[4] S. P. MacKenzie, *Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era* (London, 1997), 32.
[5] Bruce Lancaster, *History of the American Revolution* (New York, NY, 2003), 104.
[6] Lawrence Cress, *Citizens in Arms* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1982), 12.

"patriots." For instance, John Adams said that the Boston Tea Party had shown "...A Dignity, a Majesty, a Sublimity, in this last Effort of the Patriots, that I greatly admire."[7] Or, from a less engaged observer, "Our patriots have in general chosen for their leaders the most violent and zealous."[8] Even General Thomas Gage, commander of British troops in Massachusetts and colonial governor, wrote in September 1774, "Tho' the People are not held in high estimation by the [British] Troops, yet they are numerous, worked up to a Fury, and not the Boston Rabble but the Freeholders and the Farmers of the Country."[9]

However, identification of the militiamen of 1775 as "patriots," implying that they acted selflessly in what they perceived as the cause of their people, seemingly fails to explain at least some of the reported facts. In Concord, for example:

"The Provincial Congress set a quota for the town of one hundred men – about one quarter of the men of military age. First enlistments fell far short of that number. The problem was money. Potential soldiers were not attracted by the wages their frugal townsmen had offered: one shilling, four pence for drilling two half-days a week, at a time when a common laborer could earn two shillings a day."[10]

Evidently not many were adequately motivated by factors other than attractive wages—for instance, by patriotism. Later, the town increased the pay offered. Enlistments rose. But after the first skirmishes resulted in casualties, "within a few weeks less than half of these men were still willing to serve."[11]

This general pattern of behavior, and specifics such as the events in Concord, suggest the possible prevalence of material and practical over patriotic and idealistic motives in attracting and driving many Americans who fought in these early battles--though it does not rule out the possibility that some fought to defend their own individual property and liberty

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[7] Diary 19, entry for 17 December 1773 from Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
[8] "Letters from Philadelphia, to Mr. Rivington, New York, March 15, 1775" in Peter Force ed., *American Archives* (Washington, 1837-1853), II:133.
[9] Quoted in Charles Hambrick-Stowe and Donna Smerlas, *Massachusetts Militia Companies and Officers in the Lexington Alarm* (Boston, MA, 1976), v.
[10] Robert Gross, *The Minutemen and their World* (New York, 1976), 60.
[11] John Ferling, *A Wilderness of Miseries* (Westport, CT, 1980), 14.

and that of their neighbors. Indeed, although it is difficult to identify either American or British historians who have argued explicitly that American soldiers fought primarily for motives of individual advantage, that is what George Washington believed: "The few...who act upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the Ocean."[12] His view was that an army could be attracted and maintained only by providing attractive pay and, if possible, land as inducements.

Recent historians have approached this question of American motivation to fight from three different directions. One point of view which remains current was expressed very early by Crevecoeur, a Frenchman who migrated to America and considered himself American—before he left the country never to return after his farm was burned in the Revolution and his American wife died there. Although he was sympathetic to the revolutionary cause, Crevecoeur spoke for a group that we seldom hear: those who lost all they held dear during the eight years of war, and therefore concluded that this war could never have been worth fighting.

In Crevecoeur's view, several distinctive factual or circumstantial elements led to the presence of American militia in the early battles of the Revolution.[13] Even earlier, in 1775, Peale had offered a very similar analysis as a basis for confidence in American victory.[14] One favorable element identified by both writers is that an unusually high percentage of Americans were landowners, hence, from the beginning, motivated to defend their property against invasion by the British, who were viewed as foreigners. A second is that a very high proportion of Americans had guns and used them to hunt or protect their property. This enabled them to fight (though not necessarily with skill or discipline) in militia units without

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[12] Washington to Hancock, September 24, 1776 in *The Writings of George Washington*, ed. John Fitzpatrick (Washington, 1932), VI, 108.

[13] J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur, *Letters From an American Farmer*, reprinted from the original ed., with a prefatory note by W.P. Trent and an introduction by Ludwig Lewisohn (New York, NY, 1904).

[14] Letter, Charles Willson Peale to Thomas Allwood (August 30, 1775) collections of the American Philosophical Society.

the need for much further training or equipment. Finally, Americans were accustomed, from the Great War for Empire (which ended in 1762) and other conflicts to the need to serve in militias to defend their frontiers against encroaching enemies. Thus Crevecoeur saw the militiamen of 1775 as drawn by a natural but misguided impulse to defend their individual property and way of life.

As Morgan puts it: "Americans generally owned guns and knew how to use them." Furthermore, "Every colony trained its able-bodied men in a militia system for defense against Indians or foreign invasion."[15] But, in opposition to the assertion that landowners competent with firearms readily filled militia ranks, it is pointed out that " 'laborers,' not 'landowners'...formed the largest single occupational group in the army, over a third of the men whose occupations are known."[16] Furthermore, "volunteers as often as not did not know how to take proper care of either their weapons or themselves."[17]

At best, the argument that gun-toting farmers who were motivated to protect their homesteads flowed readily into militias is more helpful in explaining how it was possible for the militiamen to come and fight in 1775 than in explaining why they actually did so. After all, British military actions around Boston posed no immediate threat to the land and personal property of the great majority of these American fighters. The British had neither the resources nor any motive to invade even the whole of Massachusetts and lay it waste or confiscate property on a large scale.

A second framework of historical interpretation, primarily economic and political, has sought to formulate a more compelling answer to the question of why these men fought. This alternative analysis focuses on the economic interests of the American upper classes and the political interests of their leaders, which were seriously challenged by more assertive and

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[15] Edmund S. Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic 1763-1789* (Chicago, IL, 1992), 79; 68.
[16] Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts soldiers and society in the Seven Years' War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984), 53.
[17] MacKenzie, op. cit, 23.

then coercive British policies beginning in the 1760s in the aftermath of Britain's heavy investment in fighting the Great War for Empire in North America. This viewpoint is based ultimately on arguments analogous to Charles Beard's assertions about the economic motivations of revolutionary leaders.[18] According to the British commander, General Gage, "The infatuated multitude...have long suffered themselves to be conducted by certain well known incendiaries and traitors,"[19] referring particularly to John Hancock and Samuel Adams. Of course, rich and powerful "incendiaries and traitors" were not unknown to fairly recent British history, either, so such a threat was familiar and credible.

This analysis could also help to explain why wealthy and powerful citizens led New England towns to pay and supply militia companies that would be used to attack the British. Thus, for instance, Alden describes Samuel Adams as "a remarkably skillful manipulator of Massachusetts committees and town meetings...he assailed Britain at every opportunity after 1768."[20] These committees and meetings raised the militia and determined their manning and pay.

Finally, a more recent development in historical thinking is represented by the work of Jon Butler. According to Butler, long before 1775, even before 1760, Americans had created a culture of thought, behavior and material objects that had diverged very far from contemporary British models. In effect, they had created a nation, and with it, a national consciousness.[21] The American nation was defined most relevantly by its difference from the nation with which it was unavoidably in the most intimate and continuing contact and conflict: Great Britain.

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[18] Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (New York, NY,1913).
[19] Proclamation of Thomas Gage, June 12, 1775, reprinted in J. Hammond Trumbull, *The Origin of M'Fingal* (Morrisania, NY, 1868), 15.
[20] John R. Alden, *A History of the American Revolution* (New York, NY, 1989), 128f.
[21] Jon Butler, *Becoming America* (Cambridge, MA, 2000).

If Butler is correct, then the Americans who fought at Lexington and Bunker Hill, whether or not they fought for pay and in defense of immediate personal interests, were also fighting for a national ideal. They were patriots in the sense that they raised their guns to defend what they saw as their own nation against what they now identified as invasion by a foreign and hostile Great Britain whose identity and interests differed markedly from their own.

Military theorists and military historians have developed another view of why men engage in battle. Using data from numerous armed conflicts, analyses beginning with S.L.A. Marshall's classic study have identified unit cohesion as the element that is most predictive of the ability to get soldiers to the battlefield and to get them to stand there and fight.[22] Unit cohesion is the individual soldier's perceived need to protect and cohere with the men who have trained and are fighting with him. "I know that if he dies and it was my fault, it would be worse than death for me."[23] The men of Lexington's militia fought beside their fellow townsmen, whom they knew well. The man who ducked or ran could expect his behavior to be recounted to his family, friends and neighbors—possibly for years to come.

Military historians of the Revolution also arrive at this view. According to Anderson, "...pecuniary motivations readily coexisted in soldiers' minds. Another element seldom mentioned in their journals but probably more important on the whole than either faith or greed, was peer pressure."[24] Other recent historians who have contributed to the debate about the motivation of Revolutionary soldiers within the frameworks discussed above include Higginbotham, Galvin, MacKenzie and Mackesy.[25]

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[22] S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (1947, rprt. Oklahoma City, OK, 2003).
[23] Leonard Wong, et al., *Why They Fight* (Carlisle, PA, 2003), 10.
[24] Anderson, 159.
[25] See for instance: Don Higginbotham ed., *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War* (Westport, CT, 1978); John Galvin, *The Minute Men* (Washington, D.C., 1989); MacKenzie, op. cit., Piers Mackesy, *The War for America* (Lincoln, NE, 1992), 30.

Despite this considerable historical debate, there has been no art historical study focused directly on the perceptions and images of the common soldier and his motives during the American Revolution. Furthermore, with the exception of Jonathan Trumbull, publications relating to individual artists have been primarily biographical rather than art historical in focus. It is notable, however, that the bulk of these biographical works rely heavily on two early and seminal studies of American artists by Dunlap and Stauffer.[26] We will discuss works relating to individual artists as we introduce the output of these artists.

A few books provide valuable general background to the art history of this time and place, although they do not include any or much analysis of the works we will be discussing. Silverman is essential in understanding the cultural context underlying the creation of the works that we will discuss, and provides remarkable insight into the world of the visual, performing, and literary arts throughout the revolution.[27] Both Dolmetsch and Fowble provide orientations to the print market on the eve of the American Revolution and the visual language that Colonists developed throughout the eighteenth century and with which they would approach depictions of the battles of the American Revolution.[28]

Purcell's fascinating study of perceptions of the American Revolution between 1775 and the mid-19th century establishes the context for the mythology that arose in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Bunker Hill, as well as illuminating the political and social conditions that gave rise to hagiographic artistic and literary treatment of dead military officers in this period, which was followed by a shift back towards a focus on the common

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[26] William Dunlap, *History of the Rise and Progress of the Arts of Design in the United States*, ed. Alexander Wyckoff (1834, rpt. New York, NY, 1965); David Stauffer, *American Engravers upon Copper and Steel* (New York, NY, 1907).

[27] Kenneth Silverman, *A Cultural History of the American Revolution* (New York, NY, 1976).

[28] Joan Dolmetsch ed., *Eighteenth-Centry Prints in Colonial America* (Williamsburg, VA, 1997); E. McSherry Fowble, *Two Centuries of Prints in America: 1680-1880* (Charlottesville, VA, 1987).

soldier. The book is, however, extremely broad in scope, and Purcell's discussion emphasizes the literary and sculptural production, rather than prints and paintings.[29]

The Bicentennial in 1976 spawned a wealth of exhibitions relating to the American Revolution both in the U.S. and abroad. Although the resulting catalogues are useful in providing good reproductions of the objects, most did not include notable scholarly essays or detailed catalogue entries. Exhibitions presenting a broad range of prints, maps, and other visual objects were held at the Clements Library, Worcester Art Museum, and the British Library.[30] More recently, an exhibition was held at the Nassau County Museum of Art.[31]

In sum, despite some art historical attention to American revolutionary artists and the considerable documentary and verbal evidence that historians and military scholars have brought to this discussion, there has been very little scholarly analysis of what contemporary images can reveal about the perceived motivation of the American militiamen (and those of the French revolutionaries). That is the question that will be addressed here. The question is not how many men enlisted, came to the field, or fought (or deserted), nor is it whether these men are to be seen as heroic in their conduct. Rather, it is whether those who fought are portrayed as doing so for patriotic, or rather for personal and even mercenary motives.

Perceptions of the American Revolution in France were influenced by works produced in the preceding decades which drew on classical authors such as Cato and Pliny as well as Machiavelli. In Rousseau's view, "Every citizen shall be a soldier from duty; none by profession. Every citizen shall be ready, but only when need calls for it."[32] Guibert view of citizen soldiers in 1771 was similar, "Someone has come to insult this happy and pacific

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[29] Sarah Purcell, *Sealed with Blood* (Philadelphia, PA, 2002).
[30] Arlene Kleeb, ed. *Lexington and Concord: Rationale for Independence*, exhibition catalogue from the William L. Clements Library (Ann Arbor, MI, 1975); Rodger Parker, *Wellsprings of a nation: America before 1801*, exhibition catalogue from the Worcester Museum of Art (Worcester, MA, 1977); *American War of Independence, 1775-83*, exhibition catalogue from the British Library (London, 1975).
[31] *Revolutionary War*, exhibition catalogue from the Nassau County Museum of Art (Roslyn Harbor, NY, 2000).
[32] Quoted in Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (London, 1959), 77.

people. He arises, leaves his fireside, he will perish, in the end, if necessary; but he will obtain satisfaction."[33]

Thus, in France, "The belief prevailed that only a call from Washington to the People was necessary for recruitment and that even 'in the most rude of season, the volunteers [would present] themselves for the defense of their country.'"[34] In America, the volunteers, formed into a militia representing the interests of a vaguely defined but geographically constituted "people," would rise to throw off the yoke of an oppression that was viewed as externally imposed rather than arising from a faction of the people themselves. But these fighters were not seen as citizens who pick up a pike, musket or rock to fight in the city square. They were militiamen led by officers.

Joseph Servan, an officer who was briefly to become Minister of War at the end of the Girondins' period of dominance in 1792, pointed out in his pamphlet *Le Soldat-Citoyen* in 1780 that a professional soldier could also be a citizen, identified with the interests of his fellow citizens, but only if his status was very different from that of the soldiers of line regiments of the *Ancien Régime*. In Servan's view, "It was indispensable that the soldier be fully integrated into civil society...a citizen first and foremost, and only in this way, by performing the normal tasks and duties of a citizen...could the soldier command the respect due to him."[35] It was precisely the integration of professional soldiers into civil society, their fraternization with it (for instance, the quartering of many of the *Gardes Françaises* in private dwellings in Paris rather than garrisons) which was to facilitate soldiers' identification with the interests of civilians and which undoubtedly contributed heavily to the

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[33] (Quelqu'un doit venir insulter ce peuple heureux et pacifique. Il se lève, abandonne son foyer, il perira, à la fin, si nécessaire; mais il obtiendra la satisfaction) Jacques-Antoine-Hyppolite de Guibert, *Essais Général de la Tactique* (Liege, 1771), 9.

[34] Gazette de Leyde, Supplement, 18 April 1777, quoted in Orville T. Murphy, "The French Professional Soldier's Opinion of the American Militia in the War of the Revolution." *Military Affairs* 32 (1969):192.

[35] Alan Forrest, *The Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Durham, NC, 1990), 41.

individual and mass defections of line troops that were critically important to the success of the insurrection in July, 1789.

Recent historians, such as Furet and Tulard, in analyzing the military course of the French Revolution generally describe and account for what happened in this period by distinguishing line and militia units, and their individual soldiers who fought on one side or the other, from non-soldiers of various classes who took up arms at particular times and places. They do not see these events in terms of the category of *citoyen-soldat*. Thus, Furet makes 40 references to the army in his first volume, and 10 to *citoyenneté*, but he does not include *citoyen-soldat* or any similar rubric among the over 200 items in his *Index Thématique* – nor does he highlight it in his analysis of revolutionary events and movements.

Likewise, a recent historical dictionary of the revolutions contains an incisive discussion of the *citoyen actif*, the *Garde Nationale* and *armée*, as well as the *sans-culottes* (a term in widespread use only beginning in 1792) and the *bourgeoisie* (a much older term for relatively prosperous and settled city dwellers). It has no listing for the *citoyen-soldat*.[36] The *citoyen-soldat*, even more than the Minuteman, has been eclipsed by history. Perhaps he was a mythical creation, identified from time to time with different and in some ways dissimilar groups. However, some scholars have argued for the power of patriotic motives in relation to particular events.

The institutional situation in 1792 and earlier, to be discussed in more detail below, indeed made it difficult to view soldiers as citizens (hence as potential patriots). There has nonetheless been heated debate over what motivated the men of 1792 to sign up, in the first mass army recruitment of the French Revolution, triggered by the *Déclaration de la Patrie en Danger*. This controversy has been raging at least since 1798, when Chef de Bataillon

[36] Jean Tulard, Jean-François Fayard and Alfred Fierro, *Histoire et Dictionnaire de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1987).

Liger published the first account of the revolutionary wars.[37] Emmanuel Hublot rather simplistically summed up the course of subsequent analyses of military recruitment and performance in 1792, distinguishing between two distinct schools of historians.[38] In Hublot's model, scholars such as Soboul, who argue stridently in favor of the power of patriotism to motivate enlistment and service, might be seen as overly idealistic, and impermeable to contrary evidence.[39] For example, Jean-Paul Bertaud, who follows Soboul, asserts the importance of ideas of patriotism and national duty in making national recruitment successful, describing it as a spontaneous and somewhat miraculous event: "The idea had political content...In extreme peril, the people take up their own sovereignty, of which the weapons were the symbol."[40] This view is consistent with Goethe's famous claim that Valmy, which he observed later in 1792 and in which some of the July recruits fought, represented "a new era in the world's history," implying that the Revolution was the first modern "people's war."

John Lynn's more recent article, pursuing the same thesis, argues that an "army of virtue" emerged which, motivated solely by patriotism, won at Valmy and Jemappes.[41] Lynn notes the remarkable rapidity with which this change in the perceived motives of the enlisted man was effected—which to others might suggest the appropriateness of a more nuanced interpretation of these events. Inaccurately dating the initial formulation of the concept of the citizen soldier only to 1789, he neither questions it nor seeks to explain the process by

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[37] A. Liger, *Campagnes des Français pendant la Révolution* (two volumes, Blois, 1798).
[38] "S'il est vrai que les historiens de 1792 sont les uns de tendance conservatrice et les autres de sympathie révolutionnaire, il n'est pas étonnant que les premiers aient le pessimisme naturel à droite et les seconds l'exagération optimiste habituelle aux gens de gauche. Les pessimists ont tort quand ils rabaissent le miracle en donnant à l'événement des causes mesquines et sordides, les optimists se trompent quand ils attribuent le succès de Valmy au seul pouvoir d'un ideal exaltant ses défenseurs" Hublot, *Valmy ou la defense de la nation par les armes* (Paris, 1987), 381.
[39] Albert Soboul, *Les Soldats de l'An II* (Paris, 1959).
[40] (L'idée avait d'abord un contenu politique...Dans le peril extreme, le peuple reprenait sa souveraineté, donc les armes qui en étaient le symbole.) Jean-Paul Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée* (Paris, 1979), 114.
[41] John Lynn, "Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815." *French Historical Studies* XVI:1 (1989): 152-173.

which it became operative and effective in France.[42] Lynn does not give attention to the fact that at the level of concepts and ideals, Diderot and others had formulated an imperative for the citizen soldier decades earlier. Indeed, a provocative article by Murphy highlights the extent to which French opinion, in part politically motivated, had repeatedly interpreted events of the American Revolution as exemplifying and vindicating the natural ability of the *soldat citoyen*, even if barely trained, to triumph over mercenary enemy armies.[43]

The debate elicited by Lynn is exemplary of the frailty of arguments largely founded on public discourse that was aimed, among other things, at inspiring practical consequences. Owen Connelly's critique of Lynn's article rightly points out that arguments primarily based on such evidence are particularly prone to error.[44] Connelly is not alone in seeking to reduce the weight accorded to public, hortatory discourse in assessing the forces driving recruitment. Mona Ozouf and Francois Furet argue that the reliance on the language of revolutionaries produces a history which is "incantatory rather than explanatory."[45] But this argument can be applied with comparable force to all public discourse, from speeches in the *Assemblée* to articles in Royalist and Revolutionary newspapers. It is possible to interpret much of this expression as aimed at persuasion rather than either "incantation" or objective description and analysis. If so, such writing can nonetheless reveal individual ideas, goals and motives which may have been prevalent.

Other evidence, closer to the individual decisions which resulted in army recruitment and performance, may be helpful. Alan Forrest, who proposes to rethink some of the previously prevalent assumptions about the French Revolutionary army, highlights the many

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[42] John Lynn, *Bayonets of the Republic* (Boulder, CO, 1996), 63.
[43] Orville Murphy, "The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of Levée en Masse." *Military Affairs* XXIII:1 (1959): 13-20.
[44] Owen Connelly, "A Critique of John Lynn's 'Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815." *French Historical Studies* XVI:1 (1989), 174-179.
[45] Mona Ozouf, "War and Terror in Revolutionary Discourse." *The Journal of Modern History* CVI:4 (1984), 580. See also François Furet, *Penser la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1978).

difficulties encountered by the local authorities in raising troops, even if some districts greatly exceeded their quotas.[46] Forrest stands out from the other historians in his attention to the daily lives of the men who became common soldiers and his reliance on their letters and diaries, rather than public utterances, to make his point.[47] Alvin Coox brings forward the views of contemporary military commentators in re-evaluating the extent to which patriotic motives brought recruits into the army and then to Valmy and Jemappes, and inspired their fighting in these battles. He argues persuasively that the men who determined the outcome of these engagements were not the new "patriotic" recruits, but largely the well-trained and more disciplined remnants of the old royal army.[48] But this leaves open the issue of what motivated these professional soldiers—could it at this point have been patriotism, rather than greed and fear, or personal attachment to a commanding officer? Unfortunately, Coox does not seek to explain the success and effects of the recruitment and conscription in 1792.

A provocative alternative viewpoint aims at exactly these points. In a much more recent essay, Bertaud defines national recruitments as a "means of political acculturation."[49] In other words, no matter why men signed up, the fact that so many did marked and at least in part caused both a shift in perceptions of the army, and the politicization of "the people" who were called to fight and their families. This suggests a more synthetic approach which brings together military and social events and causes, recognizing that civilian attitudes could greatly influence, as well as be influenced by, the perceptions and motives of the soldiers

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[46] "It was no accident that, at the very moment when the new volunteer battalions were full to overflowing, the recruiting-officers for the line regiments were complaining of a shortfall of 50,000 men, or that the volunteers knew, or thought they knew, that their period of service was limited to a single campaigning season, after which they fully expected to be restored to the routine of village life." (Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters* (Oxford, 1989), 21).

[47] Alan Forrest, *The Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Durham, NC, 1990) contains an entire chapter devoted to the journals and correspondence of the common soldiers.

[48] Alvin D. Coox, "Valmy." *Military Affairs* XII:4 (1948), 196.

[49] (moyen d'acculturation politique) Jean-Paul Bertaud, "De la Levee en Masse a la Requisition," in *1793: La Patrie en Danger, Actes du 2eme Colloque International organize par les Archives départementales de l'Oise* (Conseil Général de l'Oise, 1996), 67.

themselves. In a similarly integrative perspective, Gunther Rothbenerg, in his review of several books, asserts that in the past, a massive divide between "drum and trumpet" military historians and socio-political historians prevented the development of a comprehensive analysis of the French revolutionary wars. This disjunction has been resolved, he claims, by younger historians who attempt to balance the values of both schools of thought in their work.[50] But it is a caricature to imagine a sharp, one dimensional split between military and cultural historians or between left- and right-wing historians,.

It likewise may be excessively reductive to imagine the Revolutionary France of 1792 as united in thought and action. Rothenberg cites with favor the venerable Louis Gottschalk, who aimed to show that:

> "The tremendous effects of the French revolution...were not caused so much by new military methods or concepts as by radical changes in policy and administration, by the new character of government, the altered condition of the French people...The people became a participant in war, instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance."[51]

But, the people and soldiers became "participants in war" in part by battling each other—for instance, at Nancy in 1790, and in Paris in 1792. Rothenberg's review demonstrates, perhaps as much by its contradictions and incoherences as by the force of its argument, how difficult it is to evaluate the first major step towards a national army in all its social, cultural, political, and military complexity. The changing intersection points through which the army and the civil society influenced and communicated with each other remain the crux of the issue. And in saying this we must acknowledge, that, contrary to Gottschalk's implications, which might be viewed as teleological, on the whole there remained substantial disparities between these two groups in 1792. The iconic "soldier" was not nearly identical

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[50] Rothenberg cites the books of John Lynn, Jean-Paul Bertaud, Emmanuel Hublot, and Samuel Scott as examples of this new type of scholarship.

[51] Louis Gottschalk cited in Gunther Rothenberg, "Soldiers and Revolution: The French Army, Society, and the State, 1788-1799." *The Historical Journal* XXII: 4 (1989), 983.

to the iconic "citizen," and these groupings were often referred to as if they did not significantly overlap.

In the view from 1799, France had a national army, and its soldiers defended the nation. That was not at all how things looked in 1792, even though philosophical and political lip service to the ideal or myth of the citizen soldier had begun decades earlier, before Servan and Rousseau. The reality of 1792 was envisaged at the time as different from this ideal in several important ways.

One disparity was that in 1792, prior to the 1793 *Amalgame*, there were multiple armies in France, prone to represent different class interests. While orators backing conflicting programs claimed to speak for the Revolution--as military leaders in armed conflict claimed to act for the Revolution--it was hard to imagine in 1792 an equation of all citizens with all soldiers, given that, as was true at the Champ de mars and then at the Tuileries, both soldiers and secondarily citizens were in lethal conflict among themselves--identifying with differing classes and centers of authority.

The only trained military force in 1792 was the *Armée de ligne*. Even this was not a unified body. It had been recruited on a regimental basis, generally by officers who belonged to the nobility and who drew men from the areas of their ancestral holdings or from territories that had become traditionally identified with the regiments. The men were sternly disciplined, poorly paid, mostly drawn from the lowest class of agricultural laborers, and were expected to make the army their career. Nevertheless, some historians praise these soldiers and give them great credit for the ensuing victories of 1792.[52]

The good order and loyalty of this army and particularly of its officers to any civil authority other than the King or, indeed, other than the commanders of the respective regiments, was frequently denied or held suspect through 1792. Years earlier, Dubois-

[52] Bernard Deschard, *L'Armée et la Révolution: du service au roi au service de la nation* (Paris, 1989).

Crancé asked: "Is there a father who does not tremble to abandon his son, not to the hazards of war, but to a mob of unknown brigands?"[53] Indeed, even before the Revolution, French theorists, drawing also on the American example, held that a standing army, such as the *Armée de ligne*, was inevitably "dangerous to liberty."[54] Nonetheless, in the evident interests of immediate military efficacy against the Austrians, the *Assemblée* decided in July that more than half of the recruits would be destined for *Armée de ligne*, which had been undermanned by at least 50,000 men even in the previous year.

Much of the longstanding popular disrespect and distrust for "the army" was aimed at this body. The Army's problems were longstanding, and severe criticisms and proposals for reform had been put forward frequently, back to the defeat by the Prussians at mid century. "In the present state of things, armies can only be composed of the slime of the nation and of all that is useless to society."[55] According to Guibert, the mercenary soldier could not "count himself among the other orders of citizens" because, antithetically to the citizen soldier, he was needed only when there was no honor involved in the fighting.[56] At the height of the American Revolution, the *Gazette de Leyde* argued, "the man who fights for lucre (a vile mercenary), what is he?".[57] In the military debate following adoption of the Declaration in July, 1792, Carnot proposed to "make all citizens soldiers," arming them with pikes, in part because this would "deliver the final blow to the spirit of inequality, by eliminating the last and terrible body known as the *Armée de ligne*."[58]

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[53](Existe-il un père qui ne tremble point d'abandonner son fils, non aux dangers de la guerre, mais à la foule de brigands méconnus?) See Théodore Iung, *L'armée et la Révolution, Dubois-Crancé, mousquetaire, constituant, conventionnel, général de division, ministre de la guerre, 1747-1814* (Paris, 1884), II: 23.

[54] (dangereuse à la liberté) Hiliard d'Abuberteuil, *Essais historiques et politiques sur les Anglo-Americains* (Bruxelles, 1782), Vol. 2, pt. 1, 95.

[55] (Dans l'état présent, les armées ne peuvent être composées que des restes de la nation et tout ce qui ne peut être utile à la societé.) Le Comte de St. Germain, Minister of War, 1775-7, quoted in M. Delarue, *L'éducation politique à l'armée du Rhin, 1793-1794*, Mémoire de maitrise, l'Université de Paris-Nanterre, 1967-68, 207.

[56](Ne peut se compter parmi les rangs des citoyens.) Guibert, 9

[57] (celui qui combat que pour le lucre (vil mercenaire), qu'est-il ?) Gazette de Leyde, 19, September, 1777.

[58] (rendre tous citoyens soldats... délivrer le coup de grâce à l'esprit de l'inégalité, en éliminant ce corps terrible qu'on appelle l'armée de la ligne.) *Archives Parlementaires*, xlvii: 361-364.

Even in 1792, soldiers could become *citoyens actifs* only after 16 years of service. In practice, under army discipline, they did not exercise the rights of citizenship. Thus there were substantial obstacles to gaining widespread acceptance for the idea of the soldier of 1792 as citizen and patriot. Superficially, in fact, this idea was a ridiculous denial of long-standing reality, known to all.

The longstanding situation of the *Armée de ligne* was further complicated beginning in 1789 with the emergence of the *Garde Nationale*, with Lafayette as its first commander. In Paris, over forty thousand men were recruited who were commonly viewed as having been raised and remaining under the control of the bourgeoisie, with the mission of protecting their property interests against Revolutionary disturbances.[59] Even earlier, militia units throughout France were seen as protecting the interests of the bourgeoisie against the common people. "For well-to-do and wealthy people, the *milice bourgeoise* was in some ways their surest guarantee of peace...against the excesses and unpredictable outbursts of the populace."[60] To the extent that the militias were soldiers, they were not seen as representing the citizenry as a whole.

Nonetheless, elements of the *Garde* participated in the taking of the Bastille and even some line units sided at that point with the revolutionaries. Other cities and towns emulated the Parisian example in raising units of *Gardes Nationales*. Thereafter, with the emergence of an independent-minded *Assemblée* bent on controlling the military, loyalties fractionated further. The *Garde Nationale* functioned only at the local level, as a militia.

The dispatch of the twenty thousand *Fédérés* from the provinces to Paris to come together on July 14, 1792, voted by the *Assemblée* in June, prior to the *Déclaration de la Patrie en danger*, and ineffectually vetoed by the King, was particularly intended to

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[59] See *Journal de marche du grenadier Greber*, Archives de la Guerre, Vincennes, X 3.

[60] (Pour les gens aisés et nantis, la milice bourgeoise était en quelque sorte le plus sûr garant de leur tranquilité...contre les débordements ou les revendications imprévisibles de la populace.) Michel Garcin, *La Patrie en Danger* (Etoile-sur-rhone, 1991), 9.

neutralize the tendency of indigenous troops in Paris such as the *Garde* to come under bourgeois and even royal influence. The *Assemblée* stated that with line regiments moving to the frontiers, these men were needed in Paris specifically to discourage "enemies of the public good who plot conspiracies within the country."[61] The *Fédérés* could be viewed by some as an army of occupation, by others as an army of liberation. The presence of this new formation in fact proved to be decisive. It was they who took the Tuilleries and thus precipitated "the foundation of the Republic."

The *Fédérés* were chosen locally by provincial magistrates, generally from among members of existing *Garde* units who had volunteered.[62] In many cases they were chosen for their radicalism. Indeed, conservatives might be happy to send their most determined Revolutionaries out of town. The radicalism of the *Fédérés* chosen to serve away from home might also be explained by the argument that "The nobles of the *Ancien Régime* were willing to fight and die for France, but the bourgeoisie sent the sons of the poor to war."[63] As an ad hoc and temporary formation, the *Fédérés*, although pictured in images of the Champ de Mars and Tuileries battles, received little independent artistic attention.

Marked differences between the *Armée de ligne* and the other units continued. These included pay, discipline, arms, qualifications (for instance, required height), military organization (into regiments vs. battalions), method of selection of officers, geographical as well as class origin, and even color of uniform (white vs. blue)—at a time when large segments of the French population did not even speak the same language. In many units outside the *Armée de ligne*, soldiers elected their own officers.[64] There was also a

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[61] (ennemis de la chose publique qui trament des complots dans l'intérieur) Journal Militaire, July 1792, IV:367.
[62] La Feuille Vilageoise, 38 (Jeudi 14 Juin 1792) : 285.
[63](L'aristocratie de l'Ancien Régime étaient prêts à combattre et mourir pour la France, mais la bourgeoisie envoyaient les fils des pauvres à la guerre) Michel Auvray, *Objecteurs, insoumis, déserteurs* (Paris, 1983), 88.
[64] As far back as 1779, this practice on the part of American militia units had been praised in France and vaunted as helping to explain the patriotic spirit and efficacy of these units. See for instance Gazette de Leyde, 10 Aug., 1779.

widespread belief, although it had already been proven to be largely unjustified, that armies would simply follow the commands of their superior officers, even commands which were suicidal or which disobeyed the national political authority. Since almost all the men qualified by experience for high command in 1792 were, like Lafayette, of aristocratic origin, the scarcity of "citizen" officers complicated the question of how to make the army trustworthy and, indeed, how to assure that it would perform in a way that was representative of the citizenry.

Given the diversity of the armies in 1792 before they were amalgamated into a single structure, it is not surprising that most commentators held one or more of them, and sometimes all, in fear or contempt. While one may simplistically imagine that the *Déclaration* and its resultant enrollment gave rise to a citizen army, motivated to serve the nation as a whole and effective in doing so, few people in 1792 could have counted on such an outcome, and of course it did not occur.[65] General Kellerman wrote to Servan that "Most of these soldiers, without arms, without powder, and dressed in rags in the most pitiful manner, could not be, nor would they know how to be, of any use."[66]

Whatever the merits of the structures created in 1792 and of the men who entered them, the pre-1792 formations either had to be maintained as such, or their members had to be transferred more or less wholesale to the new organization. In fact, the *Armée de ligne*, unlike the *Garde Française* of 1789, was retained, and its units included most of the trained

[65] A Parisian magistrate went so far as to implore a body of July recruits to remain "toujours éloignés de renouveller les scenes de Nancy, de la Chapelle & du Champ de Mars: scenes d'horreurs..." and thus to extinguish "les brandons d'une guerre civile." Le Gendre, Président de L'Assemblée du 3 Juillet, *Adresse des Citoyens de la Section du Louvre à leur Concitoyens armés, le 20 Juin 1792* (Paris, 1792).

[66](La plupart de ces soldats, sans armes, sans gibernes, et déguenillés de la manière la plus pitoyable, ne peut et ne saurait être de la moindre utilité.) Letter dated 23 august 1792, cited in Camille Rousset, *Les Volontaires* (Paris, 1892), 188.

soldiers who fought at Valmy and Jemappes later in that year. The new troops played a minor role. [67]

When the decision to amalgamate all the armed bodies into a single structure was taken, in February, 1793, it was followed by the wholesale replacement of officers of the *Ancien Régime*, some of whom, such as General Custine, commander of the *Armée du Nord*, were soon guillotined. As seen from the perspective of 1793 and later, when a print by Prieur on this subject appeared, the armies of 1792 were not national and were not under the control of the Revolutionary state.

Another reason why the 1792 recruits were unlikely to be wrapped in the flag of soldier patriots is that many of them were known to have enlisted, not for any unselfish reason, but because they were paid to substitute for a man who had been called up and who could pay for a replacement. [68] Even prominent *Girondin* political-military figures such as Carnot found this arrangement repugnant, and referred to it in a way that impugned the value of the 1792 enlistees. "Human beings are being bought and sold...Not only has the replacement deprived and denuded the battalions...wives have sold everything they own, even their clothes...to buy soldiers who are unworthy of the name."[69] These men were mercenaries.

In any case, since the new units were to be better paid than those of the *Armée de ligne*, it would have been difficult to presume that their motives would be any less pecuniary or mercenary than those of the older units. Many recruits also believed that they had signed up only for brief or local service, and from the beginning the desertion rate was known to be

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[67] According to Gen. Biron, writing at the time of Valmy, "The volunteers of the most recent levy are more trouble than they are worth. All the généràls to whom I wish to allocate them are afraid of them rather than keen to have them.' Cited in Gilbert Bodinier, *L'Armée de la Révolution et ses transformations* (Paris, 1995), 238.

[68] It was only in the following year, with the Levée en Masse, that there was "plus d'exemption frauduleusement extorquée, plus de rachat possible." "Rachat" was the practice of paying a substitute. Jean-Paul Bertaud (1996), 65.

[69] Letter of Carnot, Delbrel, and de Sacy, quoted in Soboul, 111-112.

high.[70] It was particularly problematic for the peasants, who were needed on the farms where 80% of the population grew food for the country.[71] Only in subsequent years were these inconsistencies and weaknesses in army recruitment to be reduced.

In addition, the army convoked by the Declaration was conceived as the creature of an *Assemblée* that was to be humiliated, overturned and replaced by the *Commune* in the immediate aftermath of August 10. The prevailing view, that of the *Jacobins,* was that: "The fatherland is in danger and who will save her? ...It certainly won't be the *Assemblée Nationale*, since they are merely four hundred and six villains."[72] If the *Assemblée* was no longer seen as representative of the people (with a new, and hopefully more "representative" body yet to be elected), then the army that this *Assemblée* had raised and which was dependent on the *Assemblée*'s authority would likewise be viewed pejoratively rather than glorified.

Visual evidence may help to resolve these contradictions. As yet, however, there has been little progress by contemporary art historians in assimilating the plethora of graphics depicting Revolutionary scenes and placing them within the context of thought and motive from which they derived. Hunt's comment in 1980 that "The prints of the revolutionary era have never been systematically studied by either art historians or historians of France" remains valid to some extent twenty-five years later.[73] The difficulty of accessing, identifying and copying this material for scholarly purposes remain prodigious. Nevertheless, since that time, a number of valuable works have appeared, such as those by Hould and Roberts.[74] Hould's book is especially useful for information regarding both the

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[70] Forrest (1989), 21. See also Emmet Kennedy, *A Cultural History of the French Revolution* (New Haven, CT, 1989), 370.
[71] Gabriel Noël, letter of february 6 1792, *Lettres d'un Volontaire de 1792* (Paris, 1912).
[72] (La patrie est en danger et qui la sauvera...ce ne sera certainment pas l'assemblée nationale, puisqu'il y a quatre cents six scélérats.) Martel, L'Orateur du Peuple XIII :49 (1792) : 305-6.
[73] Lynn Hunt, "Engraving the Republic." *History Today* 30 (1980), 13.
[74] Claudette Hould, *La Révolution Francaise par la Gravure* (Vizille, 2000) and Warren Roberts, *Jacques-Louis*

publication history and the dissemination of this print series throughout Europe. Roberts's work provides useful historical background as well as reproductions of a number of prints from other sources, offering interesting comparisons. Each is too tight in focus to provide a sufficiently broad basis for analysis of the citizen soldier.

Hence, the endeavor to trace the origin and progress of the citizen soldier personage and type through Revolutionary images, must cut new ground both in bringing forward works which have been little studied and scantily analyzed up to now, and also in seeking to interpret them, perhaps for the first time in recent decades, in relation to a concept and icon of the citizen soldier which in itself inevitably underwent change as well as considerably varying interpretation and depiction in the early months and years of the revolutions.

Most of the surviving images are graphics rather than paintings. However, there was an increasing tendency during this period to paint historical subjects with a primary eye to the profitability of selling the derivative prints--as well as a propensity to show prints along with paintings in academic settings, subjecting them to academic criticism. Hence prevailing ideas and conventions that were focused initially on history painting are important to the understanding of at least some of the graphic works to be considered here.

La Font de St.-Yenne expounded the moral mission for history painting. In 1754, he affirmed the necessity for history painting to present "Heroes to posterity, through great actions and the virtues of famous men."[75] Hence, "in growing number, from the 1760s on, the exemplum virtutis—the work of art that was intended to teach a lesson in virtue—began to dominate iconographical choice."[76] Prints made after paintings of course provided the occasion for teaching these lessons to larger numbers of viewers or buyers.

David and Jean-Louis Prieur: Revolutionary Artists (Albany, NY, 2000).

[75] (des Héros à la postérité, par les grandes actions et les vertus des hommes célèbres.) La Font de Saint-Yenne, *Réflexions sur quelques causes de l'état présent de la peinture en France, avec un examen des principaux ourvrages exposés au Louvre le mois d'Aout 1746* (1747, rprt. Geneva, 1970), 8.

[76] Robert Rosenblum, *Transformations in Eighteenth Century Art* (Princeton, NJ, 1967), 56.

Establishing a common purpose for all historical writing and for all historical art, surely including prints, Diderot consistently applied his influence as an art critic in service of the same goal. "Make virtue agreeable, vice odious, the ridiculous salient, that is the project of any honest man who takes up the pen, the paint brush, or the chisel."[77] Applied to painting, this was a point of view that was put forward (though not exemplified) by Joshua Reynolds, then President of the Royal Academy, for which substantial funding had been provided by George III (these funds had come from privy purse and were hence not a court expense, much less a government expense).[78] Reynolds held that to achieve his purpose the artist must arouse an instinctive response in the viewer, an admiration of and desire for moral virtue, by depicting "some eminent instance of heroick action or heroick suffering...which powerfully strikes upon the publick sympathy."[79] By definition, such a hero must be grand and noble in his action, and hence distinguished in his birth.

To this end, Reynolds had particularly advocated use of subject matter from Classical history, arguing that current reality could not be as readily idealized with universal appeal. In this view, admiration for heroism would increase with distance in time.[80] Accuracy of depiction would not need to be an issue in illustrating mythic scenes. Recent events, on the other hand, would be more difficult to detach from more partisan, material or other extrinsic features and ideas that could detract or distract from the moralizing purpose of the art and even excite controversy. The engravings illustrating Raymond's *New, Universal, and Impartial History of England* (1785) followed this model. Each scene was intended to incite

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[77] (Rendre la vertu aimable, le vice odieux, le ridicule saillant, voilà le projet de tout honnête homme qui prend la plume, le pinceau ou le ciseau.) Denis Diderot, "Essai sur la Peinture" (1765, published 1796). In *Oeuvres completes de Diderot*, ed. Assézat and Tourneux (Paris, 1875-77), X, 502.
[78] For an excellent discussion of George III's interactions with the Royal Academy see Holger Hoock, *The King's Artists* (Oxford, 2003).
[79] Joshua Reynolds, "Discourse IV" (1771). In *Discourses*, ed. Pat Rogers (London: 1992), 117.
[80] Robert C. Alberts, *Benjamin West: A Biography* (Boston, 1978), 107.

and satisfy patriotic urgings, and the heroes of these scenes were presented as leaders, great men.

Particularly in relation to the British market, and more broadly for prominent or academic artists, this norm could present a substantial impediment or even a bar to production of works glorifying the patriot soldier who was not of distinguished birth or rank. Nevertheless, prevailing academic models could be and were adapted or extended to encompass representation of revolutionary events which fell outside the strict, formal norms. We will see this adaptive propensity, for instance, in the works of Trumbull and Lethière. Moreover, outside the mainstream of critically accepted art and particularly during the long period of unsettled conditions in revolutionary France, the normative effect of academic standards might be greatly diminished.

Fig. 0.1: Emmanuel Leutze, *Washington Crossing the Delaware*, 1851, oil on canvas, Metropolitan Museum of Art

Fig 0.2: Emile-Horace-Jean Vernet, *Battle of Jemappes,* 1821, oil on canvas, National Gallery, London

Chapter I: The Appearance of the Soldier-Patriot: 1775

"Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob will find himself much mistaken"[81]

1. Introduction

Prior to 1775, the common infantryman, whether regular soldier or militia member, had typically been represented in Great Britain and France as a mercenary and wastrel. The initial images of the first battles of the American Revolution, in 1775, broke decisively from this pattern. Insurgent fighters began to be shown instead as patriots defending and advancing a national cause.

After George Washington took command, he demanded a more professional army. It became clear that material incentives were essential in order to assemble and retain these men. Later, it was the officer rather than the common soldier who came to be depicted as a noble and patriotic figure. These subsequent developments will pose a sharp contrast with the early images discussed in this chapter, where officers are either marginalized or are stigmatized as unreliable in either competence of loyalty. The less positive the role of the officer, the greater the appreciation and glory that is to be accorded to the common soldier seen here as an autonomous, self motivated patriot.

This chapter will seek to show how the Revolutionary soldier was initially pictured, during the months after the start of the Revolution, as a patriot acting by individual choice as opposed to by group pressure or coercion. The four Doolittle engravings, of which the first was *The Battle of Lexington* [1775], are the earliest works to be considered. (fig. 1.1) The representation of the revolutionaries in the foreground as brave, rather unmilitary, self-led but greatly outnumbered victims is readily apparent.

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[81] Acting Brigadier Général, Lord Hugh Percy, unofficial report to Gen. Harvey on the Battle of Lexington, April 20, 1775, in *Letters of Hugh Earl Percy from Boston and New York 1774-1776*, ed. Charles Knowlton Bolton (Boston, 1902), 52. Here and elsewhere in his writings, Percy may be magnifying the American military threat in order to claim greater credit for his own martial accomplishment.

The Revolution in America was of very great interest to many people in France, who were prone to see them, from a great distance, in particularly stark and idealistic terms. The notion of insurgents as freedom fighters had special appeal to the French, as their nation joined the Americans in opposing the British. In later chapters we will see how this identification of civilian and uniformed rebels as patriots appeared again in the initial period of Revolutionary activity in France, beginning in 1789. It will be possible to hypothesize how both similarities and differences in circumstances in the initial framing of the two revolutions could have led to this result.

The present chapter will be particularly concerned with two early depictions of the first battles of the American Revolution. On April 5, 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, which operated in illegal opposition to British authority, adopted a resolution asserting that an army of "observation and defense" might be needed because "the late cruel and oppressive Acts of the British Parliament...are evidently designed to subject us and the whole Continent to the most ignominious slavery."[82] On April 19, two weeks later, informed that British troops were coming inland from Boston to destroy American stores of munitions, hundreds of militiamen from numerous towns converged on Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. Many of them fought against the British during the course of that long day, though never in pitched battle.

Two months later, again in Massachusetts, thousands of such militiamen converged on Cambridge and Charlestown, some from as far away as Connecticut and New Hampshire. Once again, many of them fought the British, this time in a battle from a hastily fortified position that lasted for more than two hours, a conflict known as the Battle of Bunker Hill. The question this chapter and the following one address is how these men, whom we will refer to for convenience as "Americans," have been depicted, in conjunction with or in

[82] Force ed., I: 1351.

contrast to their British opponents—and, how these depictions changed during the early years of the Revolution.[83]

To trace the evolving view of the motives of the men who fought against the British at Lexington and Bunker Hill, we will consider both early and later depictions of these events, with particular attention to works of four engravers. Of these sets of works, two, one by Doolittle constituting a series of four engravings, and a later engraving by Tiebout, are of Lexington and Concord. The other two engravings, one by Romans and a later one by Trumbull, are of Bunker Hill. Decades later, Trumbull gained the strong support of the first generation of political leadership of the United States in his endeavor to create images of the Revolution for immediate sale and for posterity, which has made him loom larger in apparent importance and staying power than the other three artists.[84] All four of them used the line engraving medium. The Doolittle and Romans' works were the earlier ones and are the focus of this chapter. I will argue that the later works, to be considered in the following chapter, reveal a sharp change in how Revolutionary soldiers were viewed.

2. An Initial View of "The Shot Heard 'Round the World.

The Doolittle engravings, including *The Battle of Lexington*, were advertised for sale on December 13, 1775. We will identify conceptual and iconographic similarities between *The Battle of Lexington* (and the other three engravings in Doolittle's series), and those of Hogarth's succession of series depicting how the wealthy, heedless and vicious can lose their

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[83] We will refer to those who saw themselves as making their homes in North America (outside of Canada) as "Americans," and to those who had their homes in Great Britain as "British." The term "Americans" was used extensively as early as 1762 in Parliament. In the 1774 debate on the Coercive Acts, Général Conway asked: "Are the Americans not to be heard?" In the same debate, Sir Richard Sutton, quoting a letter from one of the royal governors: "If you ask an American who is his master he will tell you he has none, nor any Governor but Jesus Christ." (*Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England* (London, 1804), 73) In the same year, Patrick Henry opened the first Continental Congress by stating "I am not a Virginian, but an American." (cited in Benson Lossing, *Our Country* (New York, 1882), II, 124) However, use of the term here for identification is not intended to invest it with or to presume it to have specific political or social meaning. The national consciousness of the "American" of 1774 cannot be equated with that of today's American—even less than would be the case for his British counterpart.

[84] John Trumbull, *Autobiography, Reminiscences and letters of John Trumbull, from 1756 to 1841* (New York, 1841), 262.

wealth and lives. Although Hogarth's works were very popular in America (Benjamin Franklin had a large collection of them), it cannot be demonstrated that Doolittle or Earl had seen them, though this seems very likely.

Doolittle's *Battle of Lexington* depicts the initial conflict between the British and the Americans on Lexington Common. It is one of the earliest American images illustrating the outbreak of the Revolution. (There is an earlier illustrated map by J. De Costa dated July 29, 1775 (fig. 1.2) and an anonymous caricature published in London on June 19 of that year).

During the early morning hours of darkness on April 19, a column of British troops detached from the force occupying Boston went by boat to Cambridge and then marched towards Lexington on their way to find and destroy military supplies accumulated by the residents near Concord.[85] Their written orders, issued by Gen. Gage, seem deliberately vague as to what should be done if, as Gage had reason to expect, the redcoats should be opposed or held back by local American militias.[86] It is not surprising that Gage was ambivalent: the Cabinet in London had disregarded his warnings about the strength of colonial resolve, refused the 20,000 additional troops he requested, and required that he make a show of strength with the 4,000 men that he had.[87] [88] As *The Battle of Lexington* suggests, 250 redcoats came to Lexington.[89]

The intentions of the armed Americans, most of whom came out of the Tavern and assembled on Lexington Common as the British approached, were even more ambiguous that those of Gen. Gage. Since the road from Lexington to Concord did not run through the

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[85] Ian Christie and Benjamin Labaree, *Empire or Independence* (Oxford, 1976), 242.
[86] For the text of Gage's ambiguous final order, as well as an earlier and more explicit draft, see Galvin, 101.
[87] Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington* (Boston, MA, 1925), 14.
[88] On January 27th, 1775 Dartmouth wrote to Gage, urging action: "the violence committed by those, who have taken up arms in Massachusetts, have appeared to me as the acts of rude rabble, without plan, without concert, without conduct; and therefore I think that a small force now, if put to the test, would be able to conquer them, with greater probability of success, than might be expected of a larger army, if the people should be suffered to form themselves upon a more regular plan." *England and America, volume for 1775-1776*, Bancroft Transcripts, New York Public Library, quoted in French, 15.
[89] Victor Brooks, *The Boston Campaign* (Conshohocken, PA, 1999), 52.

Common, it is possible that the militiamen sought merely to make a show of martial readiness while not actually obstructing the passage of the troops or provoking hostilities. The official American version, which is false, was that they had come together only for the purpose of "exercising with arms."[90] The British saw the presence of American militia on their flank as threatening and they were unwilling to leave this unreduced force at their rear as they marched on to Concord.[91]

Whatever the intentions of those who set it in motion, this resort to arms between British and Americans was immediately recognized at least by some American leaders as denoting a critical moment of change. "It was these volleys...which Samuel Adams heard two miles away, when he exclaimed 'Oh, what a glorious morning is this!' "[92] What mattered most to him was that war had started—not who had started it. The significance thus accorded by Americans to the fighting at Lexington and Concord remained pivotal. In the overblown but curiously paradoxical language of later myth, it was here that "the embattled farmers stood, and fired the shot heard 'round the world."[93] The American dispatches produced shortly after the battle state with fervor that it was the British who fired first, thereby committing an aggression which justified war.[94] In line with this, Fig. 1.1 suggests

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[90] "Extract of a letter from Boston" printed in *Postscript to the Pennsylvania Gazette No. 2418*, Philadelphia (April 27, 1775). John Dickinson reported a lengthier version of this story to Arthur Lee: "At this place they [the British] found some Provincials exercising. The commander of the party ordered them to disperse. They did not. One of them said he was on his own ground; that they injured no person, and could not hurt any one, for they had no ammunition with them." John Dickinson to Arthur Lee, April 1775, in John Rhodehamel ed. *The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence* (New York, NY, 2001), 21.

[91] "...command of the two most forward companies fell to young lieutenant Jesse Adair. While the provincials were making no attempt to interfere with the British advance, Adair became convinced that" leaving them there would be "an intolerable breach of security, and he ordered his men to march across the common and then deploy into a line of battle perhaps 50 yards from the militiamen." Brooks, 52.

[92] French, 140.

[93] Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Concord Hymn,* sung at the dedication of the Concord Monument, July 4, 1837.

[94] The question of who initiated the hostilities was of concrete importance. The First Continental Congress had voted in October 1774 that if Boston would avoid aggressive action but was nonetheless attacked, the other colonies would come to its support. This was accomplished by the Congress' adoption of the *Suffolk Resolves,* of which Art. 12 states that "we are determined to act merely upon the defensive." The Massachusetts Committee of Safety duly reported to the Governor of Connecticut on the day after the battle that "As the Troops have now commenced hostilities, we think it our duty to exert our utmost strength to save our Country

that only the British fired initially. But the prevailing American view as to who took the initiative to engage at Lexington was going to shift as independence became firmly established and the separation from England came increasingly to be seen as the historically inevitable and highly desirable result of choices made by Americans in control of their own destiny. In this later view, it was necessary and praiseworthy for the Americans to take the initiative to attack the British and ultimately drive them from the country.

Three months later, the British, bottled up in Boston by increasing numbers of colonial militia, continued to try to disrupt American military preparations. The result, in July, 1775, was the Battle of Bunker Hill. It was the first major engagement of the Revolutionary War, and once again the British incurred staggering losses and were ultimately compelled to retreat after gaining their tactical objectives.[95]

These early Revolutionary battles nourished the highly motivated social and political doctrine that presented the rebellion as a spontaneous popular movement that motivated masses of men to join militias and fight. By the time that Doolittle's engravings were published, in December, 1775, this propagandization was already well underway. All men of military age were being urged to take up arms against the British. Months later, Tom Paine, in a pamphlet which achieved the highest sales ever attained up to that time in America, possibly 500,000 copies, trumpeted: "...the whole continent must take up arms...every man must be a soldier."[96] For a fairly brief period, Paine attracted a large audience and convinced many of his readers. William Smith identifies Paine's writings as one of three factors that

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from absolute slavery." quoted in Andrew McLaughlin et al., *Source Problems in United States History* (New York, NY, 1918), 14.

[95] Lynn Montross, *Rag, Tag and Bobtail* (New York, 1952), 35.

[96] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (1776, rprt. London, 1976), 91.

resulted in independence.[97] In later years, as a quasi-professional revolutionary in Britain, France and again America, he came to be seen as little more than a crank.[98]

According to Benjamin Rush, in America there were Whigs (who favored independence), Tories (Loyalists), and neutrals--who increasingly tended to side with the Whigs. As the trend towards war gathered speed and force, many prospective Tories became Whigs. Beginning early in his career, George Washington had shared the friendship and interests of people descended from aristocratic British families with Tory tendencies, including the family of Lord Thomas Fairfax, who was Proprietor of his region of Virginia until independence.[99]

As exemplars of the freedom fighter persona, the Americans who fought the British in the first battles of the Revolution were typically described by Whigs as Americans, minutemen, or farmers, but not as soldiers, even though they were militia members.[100] This form of expression, which was more prevalent immediately after Lexington than it was later in the Revolution, seemingly aimed at encouraging American cohesion, civil as well as military, against the British, drawing a bright line to de-legitimize Tories.[101] Such characterization could also aim to attract foreign support to what could be represented as a just struggle for national liberation.[102] Even members of the French aristocracy could leverage the idea that common citizens were fighting for nationhood in America, using it

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[97] William Smith, *History as Argument* (The Hague, 1966), 60.

[98] See for instance Richard H. Popkin, "The Age of Reason versus The Age of Revelation," Two Critics of Tom Paine: David Levi and Elias Boudinot," in *Deism, Masonry, and the Enlightenment: Essays Honoring Alfred Owen Aldridge*, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay (Newark, 1987), 158-170.

[99] As late as 1778, in the midst of the Revolution, Washington continued to acknowledge Fairfax's rights as Proprietor. See letter from Washington to Fairfax, Dec. 17, 1778. George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, Series 3h, Letterbook 1, Image 198f.

[100] When Benjamin Franklin was examined before the House of Commons in 1766, he was asked "Do the Americans pay any considerable taxes among themselves?" But in his responses, Franklin carefully avoided the term (since he sought to witness the identity of colonists with the Crown) in favor of such circumlocutions as "the people in America," or more commonly "they" or "we." Benjamin Franklin, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard W. Larabee (New Haven, CT, 1986).

[101] Colonial leaders "sought to define the community as a holistic and virtuous entity and Tories as offenders against the public good." See Robert Calhoon, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781* (New York, NY, 1973).

[102] Galvin, 101.

perhaps in the expectation that this interpretation would help to advance their particular political agendas in France.[103] The purported demand of the "people" for "liberty," already asserted by the Parlementaires in opposing the King's absolutism, could add rhetorical weight to Ségur's arguments on behalf of more restricted royal powers, thus supporting an expanded political role for his own class.

Viewing militia members as self-mobilized civilians rather than professional soldiers is consistent with the undeniable fact that few of those who fought for America in 1775 had had regular, full time army experience.[104] In fact, many years had passed since the most recent significant military action on American soil. George Washington's last active service against enemy troops had been sixteen years earlier.

Powerful resistance to the notion of the ideal American fighter as a military amateur, a minuteman, was quick to emerge. As soon as he was selected as American Commander in Chief by the Continental Congress in July, 1775, Washington expressed strong opposition to the idea that the Revolution should be fought primarily by volunteer militias. He believed that he could defeat the British only by attracting and training a unified army enlisted and subjected to military discipline for long periods or for the duration. These men were to be motivated principally by material rewards, rather than by patriotism. According to Washington, "To place any dependence upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff."[105]

The army that Washington assembled after Bunker Hill was intended to fight as European armies fought, on the open field, not as guerillas or as practitioners of the

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[103] The Comte de Ségur said: "I was far from being the only one whose heart palpitated at the sound of the growing awakening of liberty, seeking to shake off the yoke of arbitrary power." Cited in A. Cobban, *A History of Modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 1963), I, 122. Ségur fought in the American Revolution in 1781.

[104] 35% of the officers in Connecticut's first through eight regiments in 1775 had had prior full time army experience. See Harold Selesky, *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut* (New Haven, CT, 1990), 232.

[105] Washington to Hancock, September 24, 1776, George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress. Series 2, Letterbook 10, 263.

"wilderness fighter" tactics that Washington had observed during the Great War for Empire. But independent volunteers and town militiamen such as the Americans shown in Doolittle's *Battle of Lexington*, however great their bravery, could not form the backbone of Washington's military program because they were undisciplined, lacking in conventional military skills, and unreliable.[106] As such, even if they had won the War, they would have had the potential to become more of a threat to the established American class structure than they had been to the British enemy. It was the deep-seated and lasting fear of an ungovernable military that caused Washington's final renunciation of his commission and the resulting dispersal of his army (the subject of a study and print in Trumbull's series of Revolutionary scenes) to arouse strongly-felt emotions of relief and gratitude. [107]

It was, then, for the strictly limited purpose of winning independence that Washington, beginning immediately after Bunker Hill, brought together a professional army, paid to fight and equipped with uniforms and standard-issue weapons. But to assemble train, and pay for this army took years. (Indeed, the uniforms were designed only in 1779.)[108] The Americans who fought at Bunker Hill in July 1775 constituted a rag-tag assemblage of mobilized local militias, from several different states. They were not much better prepared or more effectively commanded, in fact, than the "minutemen," led by part time officers, who fought at Lexington.

Contemporary images of these battles made predominant use of the line engraving medium. In America and Great Britain in the late eighteenth century, this medium was often used to shape and deliver images of distant places, including those where important events

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[106] Militia units performed well during the Saratoga campaign (1777) in the North and at King's Mountain and Cowpens in the South (1781). Mark Kwasny, *Washington's Partisan War: 1775-1783* (Kent, OH, 1996).

[107] Trumbull said "I have thought that one of the highest moral lessons ever given to the world, was that presented by the conduct of the commander-in-chief, in resigning his power and commission as he did, when the army, perhaps, would have been unanimously with him, and few people disposed to resist his retaining the power which he had used with such happy success, and such irreproachable moderation. I would recommend, then, the resignation of Washington.' After a momentary silent reflection, the president [Madison] said, 'I believe you are right; it was a glorious action." Trumbull (1841), 263.

[108] Katcher, 93.

occurred. Such prints could provide visual descriptions of recent occurrences, hence disseminate news and a point of view about contemporary history.

Although the print market in America was much less well provided with product and distribution than was the case in England in 1775, demand was shaped by the fact that Americans inhabited a developing region with frontiers, distant from the rest of the developed world.[109] They were particularly eager consumers of topographical views, especially maps, which could even take the form of ladies' fans.[110]

Both the quality and quantity of prints available was substantial. Every large city had at least one bookshop where "gentlemen for furniture, and shopkeepers to sell again, may be furnished with a very neat assortment of new and useful Maps, from Four Pounds cash to Three and Nine-pence each; curious and entertaining prints...Glazed Pictures in the present English taste...Amongst which are, scriptural, historical, humorous, and miscellaneous designs."[111] Prints were easy and quick to ship. Delivery was rapid, often within a few weeks of order. "It is recorded that Paul Revere received a copy of the London Magazine of May 1, 1774 in time to engrave a copy of *The Able Doctor, or America Swallowing a Bitter Draught* for inclusion in the 'Royal American Magazine'...for June of that year."[112]

The issuance of prints showing the sites of recent events was particularly important in the colonies, where newspapers, with just one exception, were weeklies, sold only small print runs and were not illustrated.[113] To say that such prints communicated about recent events does not, of course, imply that the images were either unbiased or accurate. Such prints could be used to arouse or to pander to the sentiments of their intended audience.

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[109] Fowble, 10.
[110] Timothy Clayton, *The English Print* (New Haven, CT, 1997), 150.
[111] Peter Parker and Stephanie Winkelbauer, "Embellishments for Practical Repositories," in Dolmetsch, 74.
[112] Fowble, 7.
[113] Francis Walett, *Massachusetts Newspapers and the Revolutionary Crisis* (Boston, MA, 1974), 11

A piquant example of such a print is Revere's well known engraving of a 1770 confrontation known as *The Boston Massacre* [1770]. (fig. 1.3) It was on sale within a few weeks of the event, and sold in very large quantities.[114] This print is telling a dramatic story, though not necessarily with fairness or accuracy. The print is of interest here because of its association with Doolittle's *Battle Lexington.*

The Riot in Broad Street, 7 June 1780 [1790] engraved by J. Heath after Francis Wheatley, depicting the Gordon Riots in London in 1780, is similar to Revere's in showing the line of London militia farther back from the picture frame than the civilians.[115] (fig. 1.4) Houses are burning, people are descending from windows, and at least some of the men and women in the foreground seem to be victims rather than participants in the rioting. The militia is just coming onto the scene, and the viewer will know that they were effective in ending several days of destructive and dangerous insurrection, some of the effects of which are shown by the flames and the survivors coming out from the windows.

It is intriguing that a pro-militia image such as this one places the militia at a distance from the disorder and de-emphasizes their use of force. In fact, prevailing British opinion, from the 17th century onwards, was at best ambivalent towards the use of soldiers or militiamen to control riots or put down rebellion.[116] Fear of a militarily-imposed tyranny

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[114] Revere charged Edes and Gill 5 pounds for the first print run of 200. The design was reused in a number of later impressions. Of particular note is its use in Bowdoin, Warren, and Pemberton's *A Short Narrative*, which was printed in 1773 and aimed at a British audience. See Clarence Brigham, *Paul Revere's Engravings* (New York, 1969), 52-3 and Paul Brandes, *John Hancock's Life and Speeches* (Lanham, MD, 1996), 81.

[115] "The scene is of 7 June when the London mob, which had rioted unchecked by the law for several days, was now confronted with the forces of the City of London militia under Sir Bernard Turner, who with discipline and humanity brought the disorder under control. The print was made from a painting commissioned by the great print publisher Alderman Boydell shortly after the event, probably to show the public spirit of the City merchants and the inadequate response of the government to the Gordon Riots. The painting was destroyed in a fire apparently before the engraving was completed, and it was only published in 1790." David Bindman, *The Shadow of the Guillotine* (London, 1989), 82.

[116] John Trenchard's *An Argument Showing That a Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government* (London, 1697) is an example of the many anti-Army pamphlets published throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.

lingered from the era of Cromwell.[117] Hence an image showing the militia performing more aggressively might well have aroused resentment or fear rather than appreciation.

Henry Pelham, a Boston engraver, subsequently alleged that Revere's print, which seemingly achieved the highest volume of sales among at least three nearly contemporaneous engravings of the Massacre, was the product of Revere's appropriation of a drawing by Pelham.[118] Later, in mid-March 1775, immediately prior to the Battle of Lexington, Pelham was visited by a friend, Ralph Earl.[119] Earl was then a youthful and little-known artist (age 24). Later he was to study in England, after which he became a successful American portraitist, with over 100 preserved works to his credit. He may well have seen the print, or Pelham's drawing, during his visit to Pelham.

Soon after the battle, Earl apparently went to Lexington with another friend, Amos Doolittle, who had been mobilized with a Connecticut militia unit but had not been present at the battle.[120] Based at least in part on discussions with participants, Earl is said to have made four drawings depicting the hostilities at Lexington and Concord on April 19, of which one may have resulted in a painting that survives.[121] Perhaps relying at least partially on these drawings, Doolittle cut his four engravings, of which *The Battle of Lexington* was the first, and they were published on December 13, 1775. He endeavored to sell the engravings from a store in New Haven, and advertised them in the local newspaper.[122]

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[117] "Frequent use of soldiers to suppress civil commotions, has an evident tendency to introduce military government, than which there can not be a more horrible Evil of State." (Barrington to John and Robert Andrew (1 August 1765), cited in Tony Hayter, *The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian England* (London, 1978), 28.

[118] The Chief difference between the two plates is the inscription above and below. In a letter dated March 29, 1770, Pelham accused Revere of "taking undue advantage [...] of the confidence and trust" reposed in him and felt as if Revere had "plundered [him] on the highway." Brigham, 52-3.

[119] Elizabeth Kornhauser, "Ralph Earl The Face of the Young Republic," in Kornhauser ed., exhibition catalogue from the Yale University Art Gallery (New Haven, CT, 1991), 14.

[120] Doolittle had trained as a silversmith but had moved to New Haven and begun to work as an engraver on copper shortly before the outbreak of the Revolution. See William Beardsley, *An Old New Haven Engraver and his Work: Amos Doolittle* (1910), 3-4.

[121] See William Sawitzky, "Ralph Earl's Historical Painting, 'A View of the Town of Concord.'" *Antiques* (1935): 98. Because the dependence of the Doolittle engravings on extant or lost paintings by Earl has been doubted, we will associate the engravings with Doolittle's name rather than with Earl's.

[122] Connecticut Journal and New Haven Post-Boy, December 13, 1775.

At the time, popular opinion in Connecticut, and in New Haven in particular, was strongly sympathetic to the Americans at Lexington. This was evidenced by the dispatch of numerous town militias to assist Massachusetts.[123] As was the case for Revere's engraving of the Massacre, Doolittle's treatment suggests that the Americans at Lexington were innocent victims of an unjustified attack by a powerful, disciplined military combine with vastly disproportionate resources. Although Doolittle, unlike Revere, depicts the Americans as armed, his image indicates that they have not fired at the British and will not do so. This does not look at all like a battle—any more than the 1770 event was truly a massacre. Here, as in *The Bloody Massacre*, the British are in the background, inviting identification with the Americans. This was a reasonable choice, since Americans would have been a much larger immediate market for these engravings than would Britons. Although only a small percentage of Americans served in militias these events were of great interest to civilians also.[124]

Doolittle's print, naïve in execution, seems to draw in part on the tradition of topographical or perspective drawing. A topographical print can depict an overall scene with identifiable physical features. It is little concerned with depicting recognizable individuals. Topographical views had frequently been used to depict military subjects in British art.

In a topographical view of a battle, individual soldiers are not distinguished from each other, although senior officers may stand out, sometimes in an elevated foreground group. An anonymous engraving, *The Battle of Culloden* [1797], is an example of late 18th century British topographical treatment of battle scenes. (fig. 1.5) The contour of the mountainous hump in the right background of this view is also found in other artists' paintings of the

[123] Shortly after hearing about Lexington & Concord, Governor Trumbull called a special session of the Assembly which, on April 26th, authorized the raising of 6,000 soldiers for seven months. A further 1,400 was authorized in July. In all, the colony was successful in raising a remarkable 93% of the authorized number of troops. See Selesky, 230-1.

[124] Although proportionally the largest army yet authorized there, it constituted a mere 3% of the overall population. Selesky, 230.

battle: it is a specific geographic feature. Buildings and other man-made as well as natural landscape elements can also be used to give a sense of exact place. Although the topographical image may at times seem to offer greater verisimilitude than the grand manner history genre, it is at least equally adaptable to expression of the ideas or desires of the artist in a manner that can be accorded with the perceived preferences of his intended audience. This may well be the case for *The Battle of Lexington.*

Doolittle's engraving, like Revere's, is topographical in that it sets a broad but visually specific scene. His view of Lexington would have been seen as reasonably accurate by anyone who had visited there near the time of the battle. As was true of Revere's print also, the prominence of the buildings, which loom large relative to the men in the foreground, accentuates the jarring incongruity of the action. Here is a seemingly prosperous, bucolic and calm town. The print asks the viewer how it could come about that so many soldiers would come to so peaceful and normal a place, so evidently safe a town, and then fire massed volleys at a few militiamen.

There are errors in locating buildings and men. The structures on the left, the Buckman Tavern and its outbuildings, were actually situated across the road from the common, whereas the meeting house in the center and the belfry on the right were, indeed, on the common. The caption states that the Royal Grenadiers were engaged, but they were not. It was the light infantry that Pitcairn led against the militia. The image also fails to show that the road from Boston to Concord ran around rather than through the Common, though this fact significantly supports the American position that the British went out of their way to confront and then attack the militiamen.[125]

American reports indicate that Pitcairn was in front of his men, closer to the Americans than they were, rather than off to one side as depicted by Doolittle. Doolittle does

[125] Ian Quimby, 87.

not show the eight American fatalities. He shows the Americans as no more organized than the chance assemblage of unarmed urban civilians shown by Revere. Although he gives prominence to Maj. Pitcairn, the British tactical commander, who is seemingly ordering the firing, he shows no identifiable American officer--despite the fact that the identity and presence of the Lexington militia commander, Capt. Isaac Parker, were well known. American reports of the battle had nothing much to say about Parker. Neither his leadership qualities nor his heroism were praised. His deposition does not clarify his role.[126]

Doolittle served as a common militia member, not an officer, and his focus is on the minutemen rather than on their leader. We will see that Trumbull and Romans, who both had held appointments as senior officers, as well as Tiebout, give much greater prominence to officers than does Doolittle. Doolittle's individuation of the Americans is much greater than is found in many topographical battle scenes such *The Battle of Culloden.*

This differentiation is facilitated by the militia's lack of uniforms, and by the small number of Americans shown. It is notable that he places each of them in a different pose and disengages them from each other in a manner that highlights their apparent autonomy. To achieve this, "according to Amos [Doolittle], he sometimes acted as a model for Earl when making the pictures, so that when he [Earl] wished to represent one of the provincials as loading his gun, or crouching behind a stone wall when firing on the enemy, Amos [Doolittle] would put himself in such a position."[127] If this is true, it suggests that Earl, followed by Doolittle, composed the human details of the scene, the militiamen and their poses, probably with the conscious intention of conveying a point of view about these people and their actions. Had historical exactitude been the aim, then presumably the eyewitnesses

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[126] Parker, who had fought with Rogers' Rangers, was already sick with consumption on the day of the battle. He was described by contemporaries as "gaunt" and "feverish." By the summer of 1775, he was too ill to command his men at the Battle of Bunker Hill and died on September 17, 1775. See Brooks, 58.

[127] William Doolittle, *The Doolittle Family in America* (Cleveland, OH, 1903), III, 241.

and participants available to Earl during his visit could have described or acted out the poses to Earl's satisfaction.

In fact, however, militiaman Ebenezer Munroe states that "About seventy of our company had assembled when the British troops appeared," a far cry from the mere dozen or so depicted by Doolittle.[128] Another American participant estimates the number at 100.[129] It would have been much more difficult for Doolittle to invest the Americans with individual identity and freedom of action if he had had to show 70 or 100 of them. Furthermore such a portrayal would have conflicted with Doolittle's intention to show the British as using vastly excessive force. So, Doolittle simply did not include most of the Americans who were present under arms.

There seems to be a peculiar casualness or lack of tension (hence, innocence) about the American figures depicted, and it is particularly emphasized by the contrast between them and the massed, uniformed and synchronized British. The militia's attitude seems to fall somewhere between bravery and foolish heedlessness in the face of danger. However, according to a later narrative by a British junior officer who fought at Lexington, the actual engagement was quite different in this respect also. He said that the Americans were "drawn up in regular order." After being told to disperse, "they gave us a fire then run off to get behind a wall."[130] This is not what Doolittle shows—even the running "to get behind a wall." His treatment is, instead, roughly consistent with the quasi-official American version published later in April, according to which "This small party of inhabitants...were determined to be peaceable spectators...immediately on the approach of Colonel Smith with

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[128] Richard Wheeler, 'Voices of Lexington and Concord.' in *American Heritage* XXII:3 (1971): 13.

[129] Affidavit and deposition of Thomas Rice Willard, taken at Lexington on April 25, 1775 and published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, May 17, 1775. It would have been in the propagandistic interest of the Americans who took these depositions to underestimate rather than overestimate the size of the provocative American presence on Lexington Common.

[130] Jeremy Lister, 'The Lister Narrative', in *Concord Fight,* ed. Humphrey Milford (Cambridge, MA, 1931), 23.

the detachment under his command they dispersed; But the detachment, seeming to thirst for BLOOD, wantonly rushed on, and first began the hostile scene by firing on this small party, in which they killed eight men on the spot." [131]

What both sides acknowledge is that the British ordered the Americans to disperse; firing began; and the Americans moved back. Doolittle reserves the American riposte, the targeting of the British by the Americans, for the later prints in his series of four. Thus, he emphasizes and dramatizes his message that the Americans did indeed shoot at and kill the British, but only after they had been the victims of an unprovoked and deadly assault against which they offered no defense. This is a message that the people of New Haven could be expected to find credible, appealing and motivating.

At the cost of departing from what was probably the actual course of events, Doolittle has convincingly conveyed the distinction between the self-actuated American volunteers, who are headed off in different directions in disorder but not panic, and the almost robotic British, who, with the sole exception of their officer, seem to be drawn from a template. This portrayal also tends to belie any claim that the well ordered Britons could possibly have begun firing without an explicit order from Pitcairn – a variant (the truth of which Pitcairn himself always insisted upon) that would have tended to exculpate the British.[132]

Perhaps quite consciously, Doolittle also illustrates one of the principal reasons why a soldier patriot militia could not constitute a realistic and viable military model for America: The British won this first "battle," dispersing the Americans and killing some of them, not only because of vastly superior numbers, but also because they were organized and led

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[131] See *A Narrative of the Excursion and Ravages of the King's Troops Under the Command of Général Gage, On the Nineteenth of April, 1775. Together with the Depositions taken by the Order of Congress, to support the Truth of it.* (Worcester, MA, 1775). Thomas had published a newspaper in Boston and removed to Worcester after the British occupation of Boston.

[132] "Major Pitcairn who was a good Man in a bad cause, insisted upon it to the day of his Death, that the Colonists fired first: & that he commanded not to fire & endeavored to stay & stop the firing after it began" Ezra Stiles, *The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles*, ed. F. B. Dexter (New York, 1901), I: 604.

effectively, while the Americans were not. Doolittle, like other militiamen, would quite quickly recognize once battle had been joined that weak leadership was potentially fatal.[133] Soldiers fight not only more purposefully but with greater stoutness and effectiveness when they follow leaders in whom they believe, rather than in the situation of leadership vacuum depicted in *The Battle of Lexington.*

The apparent casualness, the lack of coherent position and movement, and the absence of uniforms all distinguish Doolittle's treatment of the Americans from other contemporary representations of soldiers. Other military scenes, such as *The Battle of Culloden*, even in depicting seemingly disorganized hand-to-hand combat or headlong flight, generally made it apparent that soldiers moved towards a common objective, which is not the case for the Americans in this Doolittle view. But it is the lack of uniforms which most dramatically marks the Americans as non-military.

Another anonymous caricature, *The Yankie Doodles Intrenchments Near Boston 1776* [1776], shows some Americans who look like prosperous merchants and politicians.[134] (fig. 1.6) But it has as its most prominent figure, defending this diverse group and mounting watch atop the entrenchments, a quite stolid and stupid-looking American, whose long and matted hair and ragged buckskin dress is reminiscent of representations of Indians. This figure is obviously not an Indian, as shown by his trimmed moustache and beard and his boots and cap. Rather, he is a degenerate American who has taken on Indian ways or who has purposefully undertaken to imitate Indians—including an insistence on "Liberty," like the Indians who lived without the constraints of European civilization.

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[133] "The Cowardice of a single Officer may prove the Distruction of the whole Army" George Washington, July 7, 1775, Général Orders, George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 3g Varick Transcripts, Letterbook 1, 9.

[134] For an alternative but complementary analysis of this print, see Tamara Hunt, *Defining John Bull* (Aldershot, 2003), 69.

The text at the bottom of this print refers to Gen. Israel Putnam. The suggestion is that American fighters are not soldiers any more than they are Indians. They are riff-raff who fight like Indians. This was a view that could appeal to Tories, implying that the Americans were unworthy but unscrupulous foes, who should be treated harshly and with contempt. Even if a Tory acknowledged the fact that the British Army was by now predominantly composed of Irishmen and Scotsmen whom he held in contempt, he might still have no doubts as to the moral and military superiority of such an army over one that had been tainted by Indian habits and lifestyle. In prior years, the Tory party had favored minimizing danger from the Army by keeping it small in peacetime.

In *The Battle of Lexington*, Doolittle has taken pains to distinguish the Americans he depicts from both Indians and well organized militia units. The Americans are respectably dressed and they carry rifles, though neither uniformed nor in formation. What was demonstrated later on April 19 was the fact that a column cannot march without flanker protection down a road through hostile country with vegetation and terrain, without risking heavy casualties. This was known to professional European officers long before they ever encountered Indians. It was a lesson that Gage himself had very expensively learned when, as a lieutenant colonel, he had failed to protect Braddock's flank in 1755 at the battle of the Monongahela, resulting in almost 1000 casualties out of 1450 troops.[135] He applied this lesson in Boston by assigning light infantry to each regiment to be used in protecting their flanks. But Smith did not protect his flanks on the road back to Boston.

After the engagement at Lexington, Smith's troops rejoined Pitcairn's and the British moved on towards Concord, where they had been informed that they could find the military stores that they had come to destroy. Although Concord, like Lexington, had been warned of their approach, the British encountered no resistance, occupied the town, and sent a

[135] Howard Peckham, *The Colonial Wars* (Chicago, IL, 1964), 144-7.

detachment to a house where they expected to find some of the munitions. This scene, with the British in uncontested possession of Concord, is shown in the second of Doolittle's four engravings, *A View of the Town of Concord, with the Ministerial Troops Destroying the Stores* [1775]. (fig. 1.7)

What is conspicuous again here is the very large number of British troops, and their military professionalism. Since they bleed off at least one side of the print and probably both, they seem both innumerable and in motion, on the march—an irresistible force. A few scattered Americans seem to be watching, beyond the troops to the right, and at left center, but they are not armed and do not seem hostile. The small British detachment sent to find the stores at the house in the town is at the upper left. Thus, the British columns are in organized motion, while the Americans seem static and few. Among the troops, there are no clearly identified officers, and there is no one on horseback.

A strange and very prominent scene occupies the right foreground: two British officers standing in the cemetery, perhaps on elevated ground. These are Lt. Col. Smith and, with the binoculars, Maj. Pitcairn. Pitcairn seems fairly businesslike, but Smith is leaning on what seems to be a walking stick and looking neither towards Pitcairn nor in the direction of Pitcairn's gaze, but rather out towards the viewer, away from the town and the troops. He is the picture of nonchalance, with his right hand cocked against his waist. Depicted (correctly) as physically absent from the scene at Lexington, he is shown as not only emotionally absent but also managerially disconnected from the events in Concord. In order to give any orders, he and Pitcairn would presumably have to run back through the cemetery. Both men, like almost all serving British infantry officers, had horses. (Pitcairn's is shown in *The Battle of Lexington.*) Remaining mounted would have allowed them to see further as well as to communicate more rapidly with their subordinates. Although Pitcairn had allegedly been fired on by the Americans only a few hours earlier, the two senior officers are now

completely unprotected. Either they are simply heedless of their own safety, or they regard the British military machine, and hence themselves, as completely invulnerable. The latter seems more likely.

Particularly when contrasted with familiar, more positive ways of placing officers in foreground groups of battle scenes, such as *The Battle of Culloden*, where a commanding officer is shown in close proximity to several subordinates who could be dispatched to carry his orders to different units, this depiction of the two commanders is virtually caricatural. Where Pitcairn was denigrated in *The Battle of Lexington* by being shown as giving the order to fire, both he and Smith are disparaged here by being shown as irresponsible, distracted and careless. The common element is that in both images, actions are afoot which place American lives at risk—and British commanders are indifferent to the harm that will result. The cemetery, the darkest element of the print and occupying more than half of the foreground and over one quarter of the picture space, adds a ghoulish reminder of lethality—to which the officers are also indifferent. Since neither Earl nor Doolittle were present when the troops came to Concord and none of the surviving eyewitness accounts mention a palaver in the cemetery, this feature could well be an invention, perhaps designed to further intensify the anger of American viewers.

Such viewers would have known that as the British troops held Concord, hundreds of American militia were approaching the town from several different directions. Pitcairn is looking for trouble, and he is going to find it. Through his glass, he is likely to see many armed Americans coming to attack him. And Smith, as an American viewer would surely know, will very soon be a great deal less nonchalant. In fact, he will be fleeing for his life. All this is implied by Doolittle's second image, showing the British in what they take, wrongly, to be a moment of complete success.

At Concord, the commanders detached five companies with orders to cross the North Bridge and destroy stores expected to be found on the other side. (Some of these troops are probably shown at the right side of the second engraving.) Three companies were left to guard the bridge and the other two crossed to approach the American Col. Barrett's house, where they intended to search for the supplies. At this point, however, the British became aware, without any more need for Pitcairn's field glass, that 450 American militiamen had arrived and were descending from surrounding hills towards the far end of the bridge, headed towards Concord. There was firing at the bridge, and the British (first the bridge guards, then the forward companies) retreated across it back to Concord.

This is the moment depicted by Doolittle in the third engraving of the series, *The Engagement at North Bridge in Concord* [1775]. (fig. 1.8) Here, the action is simple, clear and depicted without nuance. Large numbers of British soldiers, closely packed together, retreat towards Concord on the right. Some of them run off the road in disarray, towards the houses of the town. A few mounted officers are at the front and rear of the column. The thick cloud of smoke above indicates that they are firing heavily.

Pursuing the British, a much smaller number of Americans approach the bridge from the far side. They are not coming down the hillsides as in an ambush, but rather are headed straight up the road. Because the Americans are less well armed as well as less numerous, they are not generating much smoke. Some of the bodies of both the British and the Americans are shown slanting forward, to emphasize their haste and motion. Doolittle's treatment of the Americans is consistent with his first two images. There are still no officers distinguishable amongst them, and the militia does not take any military formation.

Thus, as Doolittle recounts the event, the British have turned tail when faced by inferior American numbers and firepower. The panic proved to be contagious, and the retreat continued all the way back to Boston, with a halt in Lexington. The last in Doolittle's series,

The South Part of Lexington Where the First Detachment Were Join'd By Lord Piercy [1775], shows the overwhelming size of the British contingent still further enhanced during the afternoon by the junction of the companies retreating from Concord with Lord Percy's reinforcements, including artillery, that Gen. Gage had belatedly dispatched from Boston. (fig. 1.9) *The South Part of Lexington* depicts the Americans as firing from behind stone walls and harassing the redcoats. In writing his father that he had "had the happiness...of saving them from inevitable destruction,"[136] Lord Percy may not have greatly overstated the danger they faced. In this image, the British stragglers in the middle ground seem to be ignominiously leaving their dead and wounded behind them as they withdraw.

Conspicuous here are three houses which have been set afire by the British, who asserted that this was done because the houses were within their defense perimeter and were liable to be used by snipers. Americans considered this a despicable act of vandalism and inaptly directed revenge. The prominence given by Doolittle to these houses, which must have been occupied by families, again suggests a contrast between the humanity of the Americans, including women and children whose lives and homes were in jeopardy, and the British – men who were paid to execute orders no matter how cruel or wrongful they might be.

Doolittle is consistent in all four of the prints in showing the Americans as neither organized nor led. For him, they are at all times citizen soldiers, with no hierarchy of rank. The hero is the anonymous citizen soldier who rises with his fellows to the demands of the day by risking his life to attack the invading British.[137] Indeed, Percy pays tribute to this heroism, saying that American snipers attacked again and again at close range, " 'tho they

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[136] Acting Brigadier Général, Lord Hugh Percy, letter to his father, April 20, 1775, in Bolton, ed., 54.
[137] "Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to repulse it." Thomas Paine, *The American Crisis* (Philadelphia, PA, 1776), No. I.

were morally certain of being put to death themselves in an instant."[138] While Percy surely had some motivation to magnify the threat he faced and the glory of his shepherding most of the troops back to safety, Doolittle is not alone in attributing individual and even self-sacrificing bravery to the Americans.

Doolittle's eye is at least as much on the British as on the Americans. His treatment of them is reminiscent of Hogarth's series, showing, in the case of *The Rake's Progress,* a progression from a conscious affection of at least a localized omnipotence and omniscience, through luxury and excess to destruction. Indeed, American voices such as those of Crevecoeur and Paine asserted that in contrast with American self-sufficiency, simplicity and moral strength, the excessive privilege and luxury of the British upper class had rendered it degenerate, vile and dangerous to Americans. Adams in 1774 refers to "...the universal Spirit of Debauchery, Dissipation, Luxury, Effeminacy and Gaming which the late ministerial Measures are introducing, &c. &c. &c...How much Profaneness, Leudness, Intemperance, &c. have been introduced by the Army and Navy...by the british Politicks of the last 10 Years?"[139] It is these faults that brought Hogarth's Rake to disgrace and ultimately to relegation to Bedlam. This is a Bedlam over which Hogarth in 1764, the year of his death, set a maddened Britannia to reign—just as she held sway over the troops who came to Lexington.

The British began with bright uniforms, seemingly limitless excess of men and guns, and professional leadership. But they stretch and waste their resources senselessly, without any vision of the consequences, and as a result they are driven from the pinnacle of their advance and ultimately they are irredeemably humiliated and punished. Indeed, they begin at

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[138] Cited in Bernhard Knollenberg, *The Growth of the American Revolution* (New York, 1975), 240.
[139] John Adams to Abigail Adams (July 5-6, 1774), p. 3, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

Lexington with wanton cruelty and some of them are, in Doolittle's depiction, condemned to a hideous death. This is the scenario also for Hogarth's *Four Stages of Cruelty.*

Some Britons also saw April 19 as having this discreditable result, though they attributed it to other causes—indeed, to other people. A British Whig caricature, *The Retreat From Concord to Lexington of the Army of Wild Irish Asses Defeated by the Brave American Militia* [1775], distorts the Americans at Lexington into well-uniformed, trained and disciplined soldiers and even provides them with an officer on horseback. (fig. 1.10) Revolutionary fervor or humanity are not distinguishing characteristics of the Americans in this portrayal, which was published in London just two months after the battle, on June 19, 1775—considerably prior to Doolittle's publication in New Haven. The striking point of this caricature is that despite the pseudo realistic treatment of the Americans, which transforms them into regular soldiers, the British troops, here less numerous than the Americans, have been equipped with asses' heads. Although the British have put the whole town to the torch, this has done them no good, and they are compelled to retreat under fire. This is a greatly exaggerated but recognizable treatment of the British retreat from Lexington towards Boston.

The insistence that the British troops are "wild Irish asses" reflects the 18th century British tendency to identify the Army with the poorer and incompletely integrated Irish and Scottish components of what was still a fairly new and somewhat feared and resented model of Great Britain as a unitary nation.[140] This view was reflective of demographic reality: it was easier to find takers of "the King's shilling" in the poorer and wilder areas of Scotland and Ireland. In 1757, " 'English' recruits–a term embracing Welshmen–contributed just 30 per cent of the man power."[141] Hence, the longstanding less than enthusiastic popular view

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[140] See Linda Colley's chapter "Manpower" in *Britons: Forging the nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven, 1992) for a discussion of the role of the Army in creating national unity in the 18th century

[141] Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: the British Soldier and War in the Americans 1755-1763* (Cambridge, 2002), 171.

of the Army in England was now further darkened by an actual ethnic composition seen by many English as both "foreign" and unreliable, if not, indeed, traitorously anti-English.[142]

The message of this print appears to be that the British might as well give up: they are militarily over-matched by the Americans. From the British point of view, the Americans are formidable if they have an organized and equipped army, as shown here. Indeed, since the Americans are in origin overwhelmingly English, they can be expected to beat a "British" army that is actually Irish (hence, weak and craven).

The Scottish component of the British Army, which had expanded after Culloden, also excited fear and contempt in England. *The Scotch Butchery* [1775], published in London, speaks of "butchery" in Boston. (fig. 1.11) It blames this violence rather extravagantly on Lord Bute, a Scotsman whose ministry in London introduced early repressive measures against the colonies in 1763 (but who then retired from public life later that year). In fact, Scottish representation in posts of leadership in Britain had increased (which, in itself, excited resentment), but still fell well short of the fraction of Scots among the educated population of Britain.[143]

In this print, Scottish troops in traditional dress are shown as ready to move to attack the Americans, whereas English soldiers are restrained by their officer. This clearly conveys that what was happening in Massachusetts was bad for England—and that it should be blamed on the Scots, both Lord Bute and Scottish officers and soldiers.

Thus, in the period following Lexington, Americans cast blame upon the British, and some English cast it back upon Irish and Scots. The inhumanity of the British troops was contrasted, by Doolittle and others with an emergent American insurgency characterized as

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[142] Général Lee to his brother Richard Henry Lee, in London, 13 July, 1775, "If they get men at all, it must be from Scotland, or among the Irish Roman Catholics, for the American war is really so odious and disgusting to the common people in England, that no soldiers or sailors will inlist." Charles Lee, *Life and memoirs of the late Major Général Lee* (New York, 1813), 297.

[143] Murray Pittock, *Inventing and Resisting Britain* (New York, 1997), 129.

imbued with human qualities which the British lacked. If these Americans, unlike the British, were not merely paid to thoughtlessly carry out orders imposed by their officers, then they could be perceived as soldier patriots, impelled by higher, unselfish motives rather than by military discipline and pay. Thus inspired, it was hoped that they would fight with a power greatly disproportionate to their numbers. "The King of England never had such an army. Here are men who act as common soldiers, worth 100,000."[144]

3. Bunker Hill—Viewed From Afar.

Doolittle's print of *The Battle of Lexington*, can be usefully contrasted with another American topographic print, this one the *Battle of Bunker Hill* [1775] by Bernard Romans, published in Philadelphia in October, 1775 at a price of five shillings, and in London on June 4, 1776. (fig. 1.12) Since Romans was an American who was employed by the British Crown as a surveyor up to the time he did this engraving, it is reasonable to consider that in designing this image, he may have been interested in both the American and the British markets. We will observe how he may have adapted his work to the preferences of either or both of these markets. The initial version of the print was engraved by Romans himself in copper and measured 11 by 16 inches, suitable for framing. (At approximately the same time, a less expensive print of John Hancock was offered in the same newspaper, in a 20 x 16 frame with "grown glass," for 20 s 6. The framing cost considerably more than the prints.)

In this section, I will analyze how Romans presented, and in some crucial respects distorted, the events of this battle, with a view to discerning how Romans's image could influence or establish perceptions of the motives of the American militiamen and officers who fought at Bunker Hill. In the following chapter, I will contrast this treatment with the far different depiction of Bunker Hill offered later by Trumbull.

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[144] Charles Willson Peale to Benjamin West, August 31, 1775, in C. Sellers, *The Artist of the Revolution: The Early Life of Charles Willson Peale* (Hebron, CT, 1939), 122.

Bunker Hill was the first major battle of the Revolution. After Lexington, Gen. Gage had declared martial law in Massachusetts on June 12, "...whereas the infatuated Multitudes, who have long suffered themselves to be conducted...in a fatal Progression of Crimes, against the constitutional Authority of the State, have at length proceeded to avowed Rebellion."[145] Gage had planned to protect his position in Boston by fortifying heights which commanded the city from both South (Dorchester and Roxbury) and North (Charlestown and Bunker Hill), beginning in the South on June 18. Members of the Provincial Congress received word of this plan and its Committee of Safety recommended unanimously to the Council of War on June 15 that "Bunker Hill be maintained by sufficient force being posted there." As a result, militiamen were dispatched on the night of the 17th with orders to fortify Bunker Hill. Men on board a British ship in the vicinity, the *Lively,* became aware of this in the early morning hours of the 18th. Since the American position was becoming stronger as the entrenchment proceeded, Gen. Gage ordered an immediate attack.

In general layout, Romans's depiction appears at least superficially to follow that of many other battle scenes of this period, of which *The Battle of Prague* [1765] by an anonymous artist is an example. (fig. 1.13) Both prints show a few officers on a height in the left foreground, with orderly lines of cookie-cutter troops fighting below. Both artists found it desirable to include text in order to explain what happened in the battle.

Romans's text is substantially inaccurate. It underestimates the number of American combatants by a factor of at least two, identifying them wrongly as an "advanced party." It very greatly overstates the number of British killed and wounded. (The British reported that they had suffered 1054 casualties, of whom over 200 were killed.) These errors, taken

[145] Kleeb, 25.

together, seem flattering to the American side, which lost the battle and was driven from the hill.

Unlike the novices Earl and Doolittle, Romans was an experienced mapmaker and engraver, born in Europe (probably in Holland), who might well have been exposed to contemporary battle painting. In the advertising for his work, Romans was referred to as "the most skillful draughtsman in all America."[146] In 1775, he was probably 55 years old. Earlier in the year had served for a time with the rank of captain in the Connecticut expedition to take Fort Ticonderoga, where his fairly brief and intermittent participation had been both praised by Col. Benedict Arnold and criticized by others. Romans has been characterized as consistently sympathetic to the American cause, but it may be fairer to see him as less interested in causes than in opportunities.[147] Both British and American interest in Bunker Hill furnished him with opportunities.

Romans first responded to the American interest in the Boston area inspired in part by Bunker Hill by publishing quickly on, July 12, 1775, less than a month after the battle and in advance of the publication of the battle print, *A COMPLETE and ELEGANT MAP, from BOSTON to WORCESTER, PROVIDENCE, and SALEM. Shewing the SEAT of the present unhappy CIVIL WAR in NORTH AMERICA.*[148] (fig. 1.14) It measures approximately 16" x 18" and was engraved by Abel Buell. In a convenient space left by the contours of Massachusetts Bay at the right, Romans inserted an inset, advertised as showing "Charlestown in flames, Bunker & Breed's Hill, and the Provincial and Enemy Lines." (fig. 1.15 is an enlargement of this inset.) At the bottom of the map is another inset, showing the British fortifications around Boston. It seems almost certain that work on the map was well

[146] Rivington's New York Gazeteer, Aug. 31, 1775.
[147] Lincoln Diamant, *Bernard Romans: Forgotten Patriot of the American Revolution* (Harrison, NY, 1985).
[148] Advertisement in Rivington's New-York Gazetteer for August 3, 1775. The price was 5 shillings, uncolored. A similar map was published in the "Pennsylvania Magazine" for July, 1775, described as showing also the "Provincial Camp."

under way before Bunker Hill, but at least the right inset must have been added after the battle, to make the map more topically appealing.

To refer to the conflict as a "civil war" was likely to appeal much more to Tories than to Whigs, since the latter preferred to see a united America resisting aggression by the British. (Gen. Gage had previously spoken of the dangers of "a Civil War.") However, reference to the British lines as "enemy lines" on the face of the inset (near Roxbury) clearly marks the map as primarily destined for a market sympathetic to the Whigs.

The inset on the right shows the British lines, as they existed after Bunker Hill, in red and the militia lines in blue. It is remarkably inaccurate in its depiction of Boston. For instance, Boston Common is incorrectly shown at the water's edge. This probably reflects the inset's hasty preparation after the battle. The geography of the Charlestown peninsula, including Bunker and Breed's hills, is, however, reasonably accurate, with Charlestown at the southern end of the peninsula in flames. Two redoubts are shown on Bunker Hill, but none on Breed's Hill. The inset projects a sense of war.

This image is an excellent example of how a map or topographical print, depicting a locus of recent action of great interest to the public, could respond to the resultant widespread demand for a visual context for this action, without actually illustrating the action itself. Romans' map illustrates how a map could project not merely a spatial but a social, political and indeed military perspective.

Interest in such maps was particularly intense from the summer of 1775 onwards, and extended beyond New England. The June issue of the Pennsylvania Magazine included a map of Boston Harbor, with a note about the burning of Charlestown and a "Eulogium" to Maj. Gen. Warren, killed in the battle. The July issue contained another map of Boston, engraved by Robert Aitken, showing the American and British lines. The August issue contained Aitken's *Exact Plan of Gen. Gage's Lines*, as well as instruction for making "Salt

Petre" for gunpowder. Finally, the September issue included Aitken's reduced size re-engraving of the Romans engraving of the battle.[149] (fig. 1.16) During the same period, competing, similarly war-oriented maps of the Boston area were published.[150] In the ensuing three years Romans successively published maps of the Southern colonies, Connecticut, and Philadelphia, all of which were to figure in Revolutionary events.

In issuing his proposal for the Pennsylvania Magazine, Aitken had foreseen the importance of prints to its success, announcing that "A copper-plate will be given with every number." The magazine was highly successful. Indeed, Parker and Winkelbauer observed more generally that "the American magazines with the longest publishing histories were generally those with the most numerous plates. We concluded that illustrations increased a publisher's chances for success."[151]

In *An Exact View of the Late Battle of Charlestown,* the battle print issued after the map, Romans showed Americans in the foreground, with Charlestown (set on fire by the British), Boston, the harbor and ships – larger, scene-setting elements – clearly distinguishable at a greater distance. His desire to establish specificity of place is witnessed by the large tree at the left of the print, a well-known Harbor landmark at the time.[152] The burning of Charlestown, like the earlier burning by the British of three houses in Lexington, was trumpeted by American Whigs as probative of British barbarism. Had Charlestown been located where Romans shows it in this engraving rather than where it was (accurately) shown on his earlier map inset, then its burning would not seem to have served any military purpose

[149] These illustrations are in Vol. I of the Pennsylvania Magazine, opposite pages 241, 292, 358 and 406, respectively.
[150] For examples see James Wheat and Christian Brun, *Maps and Charts published in America before 1800: A Bibliography* (New Haven, CT, 1969), 45.
[151] Peter Parker and Stephanie Winkelbauer, "Embellishments for Practical Repositories: Eighteenth-Century American Magazine Illustration," in Dolmetsch, ed., 73.
[152] Diamant, 66.

for the British. The distorted positioning of Charlestown in the battle print thus contributes to an impression that the British had been wantonly destructive of American homes.

As to the role of American artillery, Prescott says very simply that when the British landed, he sent his two guns and accompanying infantry to go to oppose them, but they "marched a different course...I suppose to Bunker's Hill," that is, away from the British and towards the rear.[153] Romans does not identify the artillerymen who are so conspicuously featured at the left of his image, other than to label one as a "Broken Officer." This man seems to be waving his hat in the direction of the British, while putting his hand in front of the muzzle of the gun to dissuade his colleague from firing it. It is tempting to identify this figure with the artillery captain described by American Private Peter Brown who participated in the battle. According to Brown, this American officer, whom he does not name, fired a few shots and then ceased firing; waved his hat three times to the British; and when later ordered to advance, instead left the field, "for which he is now confind and it is expected must suffer death."[154] It turned out, however, that no one was executed for cowardice or disobedience after Bunker Hill. But according to Amos Farnsworth, who fought in the redoubt, "Heard that the Capt. Of our artilerry did not behave valiantly. Some suspected him of treachery."[155]

Brown and Farnsworth are almost surely describing the same officer that Romans pictures so prominently. The "broken officer" is Capt. John Callender and the other officer shown near the gun is Capt. Samuel Gridley. It is Callender who was, according to George

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[153] William Prescott to John Adams (August 25, 1775), manuscript in the collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
[154] Letter from Private Peter Brown to his mother Sarah Brown (June 25, 1775), in collection of Massachusetts Historical Society.
[155] Amos Farnsworth, *Diary*, in Samuel A. Green, ed. *Three Military Diaries Kept by Groton Soldiers in Different Wars* (Groton, MA, 1901), 90.

Washington, the only officer "broken." He was "tried by court martial, and...cashiered for disobedience and for being a poltroon."[156]

Romans's image, with its label, suggests disloyalty, particularly by Callender's waving of his hat--evidently a signal to the British--and makes this disloyalty a major focus of attention by according it an especially conspicuous place in his image. Romans or his publisher thought the "Broken Officer" sufficiently important to be mentioned in advertisements for the engraving in Philadelphia. See also *A Plan of the Battle on Bunkers Hill* [1775], a 1775 British plan of the battle.[157]

In fact, however, Gridley and Callender and their gun were stationed, not behind the redoubt as they are shown by Romans--but rather at the position of the other American gun, which Romans shows being fired near the breastworks, to the right. Thus, Romans further emphasized this incident by moving it to the extreme foreground of his image. The exaggeratedly conspicuous positioning of Callender, Gridley and their cannon in the Romans print can only have been intended to draw attention to the unsatisfactory or traitorous conduct of these officers. Such emphasis would suggest that the Americans lost the battle at least in part because of the misconduct or disloyalty of their officers. This would tend to ennoble the American common soldiers, who fought and died for a cause which their officers disgracefully failed.

Very near the artillery in the foreground, Romans shows the American redoubt, which participants agree was at the crest of the hill. It is depicted as protected by walls, and crammed with riflemen. The redoubt was the key to possession of the hill. It was commanded throughout by Col. Prescott, who had overseen its construction the previous

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[156] Benson Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution* (New York, 1850-1852), xxiii; George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 3g Varick Transcripts, Letterbook 1, 9.

[157] "A Plan of the battle, on Bunkers Hill fought on the 17th of June 1775, by an officer on the spot" (London: R. Sayer & J. Bennett, 1775).

night and morning. Maj. Gen. Joseph Warren may have fought in the redoubt as a simple volunteer, until he was killed when the redoubt was ultimately overrun. (The redoubt is referred to in the Sayer and Bennett map as "Warren's Redoubt".) It is striking that Romans did not choose to depict and identify either of these senior officers, though they figure prominently and positively in contemporary accounts and in later images of the battle and could readily have been placed in the foreground. In fact, Romans shows all the men in the redoubt as identical. The emphasis here is again on the fighting activity of the common soldiers, not the officers, but the soldiers are not individuated or humanized. This is a very different vision from Doolittle's.

The moment Romans shows probably occurred late in the second of the three British attacks, when they advanced uphill towards the fortifications particularly the redoubt and breastworks, and were forced to retreat with heavy losses. Romans shows the redcoats who are closest to the breastworks and redoubt running and those behind them walking away from the front lines. This was the battle's most favorable moment for the Americans, but it was to be followed by their rout when the British launched a third charge. Romans chose to show a moment when the American side seemed to be successful in repulsing the assaults, and this enables him to feature the commitment and steadfastness of the American soldiers—while showing them fleeing later in the day would have carried the exactly opposite implication.

Furthermore, Romans's topography serves to make the British burning of Charlestown an act of vengeance, unmotivated by any direct military relevance. However, as the Sayer and Bennett map shows, the houses in Charlestown actually ran near to the base of the hill at the redoubt. As that map shows, in attacking the redoubt, Pigot's men had to move between these houses. The houses were used as firing points by the Americans, which probably explains why (like the houses in Concord) they were burned by the British—with this fire later spreading through the town. (Indeed, Page's map, op. cit., indicates a "Line of

Rebels in the Houses" for the row of houses closest to the redoubt.) There is no reason to doubt the words of General Burgoyne, who was at the batteries in Boston:

> "Charlestown...is now rubbish. [Our men] were...very much hurt by the musketry from Charlestown...Howe sent us word by a boat, and desired us to set fire to the town, which was immediately done. We threw a parcel of shells, and the whole was instantly in flames."[158]

Thus, a topographic image, even drawn by a mapmaker, could condense and warp space, just as it could condense and warp time. Both verisimilitude and incisive representation of the impact of geography on events was desirable, but in at least some instances, Romans subordinated even rough accuracy to compositional, communicative and, indeed, persuasive considerations.

Also significant in the Romans's *Battle of Charlestown* is the presence at the breastworks of Gen. Israel Putnam, identified by name, on a white horse. Putnam, who had been a working farmer and tavern keeper for more than a decade, was the American commander of the troops beyond Charlestown Neck. (It is intriguing that Putnam named his tavern "The Gen'l Wolfe.") He was subordinate to Gen. Artemas Ward who had been appointed commander of the State Militia by the Provincial Congress and who commanded the assembled multi-state militia units without leaving his house in Cambridge, miles from the battle. Putnam's role, like that of Parker at Lexington, was apparently far from brilliant. He stayed back from the line most of the time and he failed to accomplish resupply of munitions and reinforcements, even failing to move some units forward after they had gotten as far as Bunker Hill. The result was that the American defenders of the redoubt were reduced to defending against bullets with stones before they finally retreated from the third, ultimately successful, British assault. According to a British observer:

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[158] Quoted in David Pulsifer, *An Account of the Battle of Bunker Hill* (Boston, 1872), 71-5.

> "Many of the provincials were destitute of bayonets, and, as they affirm, their ammunition was expended, a number of them fought desperately within the works, and were not drove from them without difficulty."[159]

However, Romans shows Putnam seemingly storming through the American line in pursuit of the retreating British. (In a colored version of the print, the horse is brown.) Indeed, it appears from the engraving that Putnam and the artillery piece, with some possible help from the redoubt, have scored a signal success in inflicting heavy casualties and putting to rout the element of the British force (Gen. Pigot's command) that had attacked the breastworks and redoubt—while the British force attacking the American left wing (Gen. Howe) holds its own against the American line. In fact, however, Howe faired as badly as Pigot in the first two charges. Furthermore, there was no breach in the American line through which Putnam could ride.

Thus, Romans has engaged in exaggeration and invention to make Putnam appear as the hero of the day, or at least of this picture—a view not expressed in the aftermath of the battle. Romans's choice of Putnam as hero may reflect the fact that Putnam was the highest ranking American officer who made himself visible on the open field. Another possible reason for this choice is that Putnam was the American officer who at the time was best known to Britons as a result of the events of the Great War for Empire, most particularly for his exploits while serving with Gen. Jeffrey Amherst. As an example of the implications of this familiarity, the text accompanying *The Yankie Doodles Intrenchment* [1776], which was intended for a British audience and published in London, inaccurately cites Putnam as American Commander in Chief.[160] (fig. 1.6)

Putnam's depicted gallantry is a counterbalance to Callender's cowardice or treachery, which Romans renders at least equally conspicuous. But for Romans, as for

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[159] "History of the Present War." A Repository of History, Politics, and Literature (May 1779): 199-201.
[160] "See Putnam that Commands in Chief Sir / Who looks & Labours like a thief sir / To get them daily Bread & Beef sir." Putnam had never been commander in chief.

Washington, the American officers are at best a mixed bag, whereas he shows the common soldiers all fighting bravely (which they did not all do). This is a viewpoint strongly sympathetic to the soldier-patriot, but also highly consistent with Washington's report on the battle: "The principal failure of the Duty that day, was in the Officers, tho' many distinguished them selves by their gallant Behaviour, but the Soldiers generally shew'd great Spirit and Resolution."[161]

Riding his horse at the front line, unaccompanied by staff, Putnam was not in a position either to see or to lead the overall American effort. Like Smith and Pitcairn as depicted by Doolittle in the Concord cemetery, Putnam could not obtain prompt execution of orders. He could not address the delays in getting reinforcements and munitions across Charlestown Neck and even down the last part of the route, from Bunker to Breed's Hill. Putnam was not an effective commander, and Romans reveals this. Had he stood with his staff in the position where Romans places the Broken Officer, Callender, Putnam would have been in a position to see and command.

As he shows them fighting, Romans seems to endow the Americans at Bunker Hill with discipline. They are shown in close ranks, apparently firing in unison at the British advancing up the hill. In fact, the American fire was "ragged," but deadly because the Americans obeyed orders to shoot only when the British came very close—a tactic which Romans not only does not depict but negates, since he shows no British soldiers or casualties close to the redoubt. He attempts no individuation of the American riflemen, any more than of the men in the redoubt. They look like a set of toy soldiers—who fight on an equal footing with the British. Although selected American officers are the principal individual subjects of this image, that does not necessarily imply that they or their friends are the most probable

[161] George Washington, Letter to Continental Congress July 20, 1775, George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, Series 2, Letterbook 7, 19.

potential purchasers of the print. No viewer would see this print as critical of the Americans' fighting qualities.

Although Doolittle stressed the contrast between the un-uniformed Americans and the neatly uniformed British, Romans, who sought to depict the American soldiers as comparable to the British in discipline and skill did not do so. The uniformity of the soldiers in the redoubt, particularly in headgear, suggests that they wore uniforms. A colored version of the print in the John Carter Brown library shows the Americans in blue and the British in red, but it is impossible to know whether the color was applied before or after sale.

Bunker Hill was tactically an American defeat, but British casualties were massive, and the strategic result was that the British were unable to advance further and remained pinned down, now dividing their forces between Boston and the Charlestown peninsula, untenable positions, vulnerable to artillery bombardment, which they subsequently had to evacuate. Britain lost more officers in this one day than in the remaining eight years of the War.[162] One of Percy's companies was reduced to eight men.

The futile arrogance of the British battle plan is quite clearly stated on the Sayer and Bennett map, which shows "Hither the Ships ought to have come" in the water on the southwest side of the Neck. This map, in contrast with Romans', shows four British ships by name, all of them South of Charlestown and far from the Neck, as well as indicating the very short (but ultimately disastrous) route taken by "Boats with the troops," including Burgoyne's and Clinton's reinforcements. Romans is less explicit, but anyone viewing his engraving would be impelled to ask what could possibly have led Gage to order a frontal attack against a hill protected by a line of fortifications, rather than use his Naval supremacy to attack from behind or from the flanks.

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[162] Ronald Paulson, "John Trumbull and the Representation of the American Revolution." *Studies in Romanticism* 21 (Fall 1982): 350-1.

Romans' *Battle of Charlestown*, in fact, unlike the Sayer and Bennett Map, gives no hint of the battle's conclusion or consequences. Nonetheless, it proved, like some of Romans's maps, to be highly popular. It was re-engraved not only for sale in London, but also, in approximately half size, for a magazine in Philadelphia.

There is little or nothing in Romans' *Battle of Charlestown*, unlike the Doolittle prints, which would allow one to infer that the Americans depicted here are fighting because of individual commitment to a patriotic ideal—or, indeed, that this image was created by an American. Romans, though referred to by his biographer as loyal to the American cause, was under salary by the Crown for geographical work in the Southern colonies, an appointment that was renewed by Parliament even while Romans was participating in and depicting the Revolution.[163]

Bunker Hill was seen by some of the British (especially participants, and those in contact with them) as demonstrating the surprising "fanaticism" of the Americans, their tenacity and fighting skills, and their ability to inflict severe casualties on the British in close combat. As depicted by Romans, Bunker Hill established American ability to stand fast against the enemy at close quarters. As early as July 9, less than a month after the battle, a minister in Philadelphia delivered a sermon to that city's militia on "The Duty of standing fast in our spiritual and temporal liberties."[164]

For Whigs in London, Romans's print, while to some extent exaggerating American prowess, might have been appealing. Even Tories of the "war party," could have seen this as supporting their argument that greater resources should be invested in the conflict. Contrariwise, the depictions of Putnam and the "Broken Officer," the burning of Charlestown and unchallenged British naval strength introduced ambiguity which might well comfort

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[163] Lee Phillips, *Notes on the Life and Works of Bernard Romans* (Deland, FL, 1924), 52.
[164] Jacob Duché, *Sermon Preached in Christ-Church, July 7th, 1775, before the first battalion of the city and liberties of Philadelphia* (1775, rprt. London, 1775), 20.

those who felt that the Americans lacked the cohesiveness, leadership and resources necessary for prolonged resistance to British rule and might. The text's reference to the Americans as "provincials" was far better attuned to British than to revolutionary American sensibilities and preferences.

The smaller, Aitkens print after Romans's does not appear to have been engraved with the systematic use of optical or mechanical aids to reproduction. Aitkens cuts with a heavier, seemingly cruder line. His changes to the scene are mostly simplifications, but sometimes introduce meaningless complications. For instance, Romans shows a single sailing vessel between Boston and his erroneously-located representation of Charlestown. There are hints of the masts of smaller vessels on the Boston side of the channel. Aitken adds a second ship between the first one and Boston. Likewise, Aitkens has complicated the structure of the roof of the house in the foreground. Aitken also has greatly changed the depiction of the big tree at the upper left, rendering the branches and leaves both more regular and less delicate, with a loss of perspective effect. He is a less skilled engraver.

Aitken shows only a single row of seven men in the redoubt, firing horizontally, where Romans has more men, seemingly more than a single row of them, firing upwards. Aitken eliminates the gun's protective shield and hence reduces the conspicuousness of the artillery piece firing near Putnam. But Aitken does not seem to have made material changes in the principal communicative elements of the composition. The numbers and the legends at the top have been eliminated, perhaps because a Pennsylvania readership would have been less interested in these specifics, or because of this version's smaller size.

By the time that Romans' print appeared in Philadelphia, then the seat of the Continental Congress, in September, 1775, it was already clear that American military doctrine and policy, steered by Washington, had moved back from the patriot soldier model to a view which tended to commoditize soldiers and to assign greater and more critical value

to their commanders. Washington sought to assemble officers with professional experience, rather than amateurs such as Gridley, Callender and Warren. Romans, though himself a former amateur officer, seems to anticipate this in his depiction of the officers at Bunker Hill.

Romans's depiction, while reinforcing the idea that American soldiers were at least equal in fighting ability to British regulars, does not echo Doolittle's individuation and humanization of them and so does not speak to their motivation. It echoes concerns raised at all levels from Washington down to common militiamen as to the effectiveness and even the loyalty of American officers, implying that defeats could be blamed on officers rather than common soldiers, and that better leadership could bring future victories. Interestingly, Romans also casts considerable blame upon and gives very little credit to the British senior officers. This view of events would have been appealing to British opinion leaders and to the British public: they had suffered heavy losses not because their cause was unjust, their policies unsound or their troops cowardly, but primarily because their military leaders were not up to the job. Given more effective generals, they might hope to achieve less Pyrrhic victories.

Fig. 1.1: Amos Doolittle, *The Battle of Lexington, April 19th, 1775, Plate 1*, 1775, engraving, Clements Library, University of Michigan

Fig. 1.2: J. De Costa, *A Plan of the Town and Harbour of BOSTON*, July 29, 1775, engraving, John Carter Brown Library, Brown University

Fig. 1.3: Paul Revere after Henry Pelham, *The Bloody Massacre Perpetrated in King Street, Boston on March 5, 1770 by a Party of the 29th Reg*, 1770, hand colored engraving, Massachusetts Historical Society

Text on the bottom:

Unhappy BOSTON! see thy Sons deplore, Thy hallowe'd Walks besmear'd with guiltless Gore: While faithless --- and his savage Bands, With murd'rous Rancour stretch their bloody Hands; Like fierce Barbarians grinning o'er their Prey, Approve the Carnage, and eniov the Dav.

If scalding drops from Rage from Anguish Wrung If speechless Sorrows lab' ring for a Tongue, Or if a weeping World can ought appease The plaintive Ghosts of Victims such as these; The Patriot's copious Tears for each are shed, A glorious Tribute which embalms the Dead.

But know, FATE summons to that awful Goal, Where JUSTICE strips the Murd'rer of his Soul: Should venal C-ts the scandal of the Land, Snatch the relentless Villain from her Hand, Keen Execrations on this Plate inscrib'd, Shall reach a JUDGE who never can be brib'd.

The unhappy Sufferers were Messs. SAM. L GRAY, SAM.L MAVERICK, JAM.S CALDWELL , CRISPUS ATTUCKS & PAT.K CARR Killed. Six wounded two of them (CHRIST.R MONK & JOHN CLARK) Mortally

Fig. 1.4: J. Heath after Francis Wheatley, *The Riot in Broad Street, 7 June 1780*, 1790, engraving, British Museum

Fig. 1.5: Anonymous Artist, *The Battle of Culloden*, 1797, engraving, British Museum

Fig 1.6: Anonymous English Artist, *The Yankie Doodles Intrenchments near Boston, Published as the Act Directs*, 1776, etching, British Museum

Fig. 1.7: Amos Doolittle after Ralph Earl, *Plate II. A View of the Town of Concord*, December 13, 1775, engraving, Clements Library, University of Michigan

Fig. 1.8: Amos Doolittle after Ralph Earl, *Plate III. The Engagement at North Bridge in Concord*, December 13, 1775, Winterthur Library, Winterthur, DE

Fig. 1.9: Amos Doolittle after Ralph Earl, *Plate IV. View of the South Part of Lexington*, December 13, 1775, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 1.10: Anonymous English Artist, *The Retreat From Concord to Lexington of the Army of Wild Irish Asses Defeated by the Brave American Militia*, June 19, 1775, engraving, John Carter Brown Library, Brown University

Fig. 1.11: Anonymous English Artist, *The Scotch Butchery*, April 18, 1775, engraving, British Museum

Fig. 1.12: Bernard Romans, *An Exact View of the Late Battle at Charlestown, JUNE 17th 1775,* October 1775, engraving, National Archives

Fig. 1.13: Anonymous Artist, *The Battle of Prague, 1757*, N.D., engraving, Private Collection

Fig. 1.14: Abel Buell after Bernard Romans, *A COMPLETE and ELEGANT MAP, from BOSTON to WORCESTER, PROVIDENCE, and SALEM. Shewing the SEAT of the present unhappy CIVIL WAR in NORTH AMERICA*, August 1775, engraving, Massachusetts Historical Society

Fig. 1.15: Abel Buell after Bernard Romans, *Charlestown in flames, Bunker & Breed's Hill, and the Provincial and Enemy Lines*, detail of Fig. 1.14, August 1775, engraving, Massachusetts Historical Society

Fig. 1.16: Robert Aitken after Bernard Romans, *An Exact View of the Late Battle at Charlestown*, Pennsylvania Magazine, September, 1775, engraving, Massachusetts Historical Society

Chapter II: Lexington and Bunker Hill Viewed as Recent History

"How are the might falen"[165]

1. Introduction

The principal works considered in the preceding chapter were produced in the immediate aftermath of Lexington and Bunker Hill, while the future course of the Revolution remained highly unclear and images as well as words could be used to mobilize opinion, emotions and, indeed, enlistments. In the following years, as the Revolution was won and a new nation sought to bring both past and future into focus, both communicative needs and art markets underwent considerable change. In this chapter I will seek to analyze how some of these changes were shaped and expressed, with particular reference to the work of two artists, the prominent John Trumbull and the much less well known Cornelius Tiebout. Their works contrast sharply with those of Doolittle and Romans in focus, expression and message. Trumbull glorified the officer class, in sharp contrast to Doolittle and Romans, producing an image that could be pleasing not only to Washington and the Federalists, but even to the British. Tiebout subsequently returned to what would prove to be a lasting American infatuation with a figure of the heroic patriot soldier that was increasingly divorced from the specificity of real events.

2. Trumbull: A Narrower Focus.

Although seemingly intended to depict events occurring at a single point in time, Romans' *Battle of Bunker Hill* [1775] , discussed in the previous chapter, covers much ground. (fig. 1.15) It undertakes to show the entire field of battle, and even more, including Charlestown and Boston. It is topographic in its attention to relative locations and physical features, though it embodies significant inaccuracies that appear intentional. Romans has

[165] Nathaniel Ober, *Diary of American Pvt. Nathaniel Ober*, entry for June 17, 1775, referring to the heavy British losses at Bunker Hill, Manuscript in the Collection of Massachusetts Historical Society.

chosen to picture a moment when the fortunes of the Americans were at highest flood, with the British retreating from the vicinity of the redoubt and suffering heavy losses. We have seen that in doing this, Romans gives credit to both the quantity and quality of the American militiamen as soldier patriots, while casting doubt on the loyalty and effectiveness of their officers. This contrasts with Doolittle's series of four engravings, which includes the first of our four works. Doolittle seems to vaunt the success of the minutemen in ultimately repelling the British, seemingly without any officer leadership, while holding up the British officers to ridicule.

A very different battle scene, a close up without distinct topographic reference, is John Trumbull's *Study for The Death of General Warren at Bunker's Hill*, [1786]. (fig. 2.1) Trumbull referred to the image under this name in 1827, calling it his "first considerable historical work."[166] The prints engraved after this *Study,* and indeed the *Study* itself, had been previously referred to by Trumbull under the quite different name of *The Battle of Bunker's Hill (Near Boston).*[167] The *Study* was intended to serve and much later did actually serve as the basis for the first of a series of engravings based on Trumbull's paintings of scenes relating to the military in the Revolution. There were to be twelve of these engravings, including the deaths of Gen. Montgomery at Quebec and of Gen. Mercer at Princeton.

Painted in the London studio of Trumbull's teacher and friend, the American, Benjamin West, the *Study* aimed to fulfill the criteria established for grand manner history painting, as practiced there by West and Copley. Trumbull, like West, sought to apply prevailing aesthetic theory and practice which dictated that such a history painting must

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[166] John Trumbull, *Description of the Four Pictures from Subjects of the Revolution* (New York, 1827).
[167] Apart from its title, medium and date of production, the engraving is substantially identical to the *Study* in the Yale Art Gallery.

inspire the viewer morally by awakening his appreciation of an individual example of heroic virtue.

It was West and Copley who extended the role of history painting from that of praising only mythic and antique heroes, to that of commemorating more recently deceased heroes such as General Wolfe as well. At first, as Wind put it, in reference to West's *Wolfe,* "Historical accuracy was extended from patriotic scenes of the remote past to contemporary patriotism in distant countries."[168] Great distance in space and culture sufficed, without the need for great distance in time. Copley's *Chatham* then brought the depiction of recent events home, even to London. The underlying conception of rendering one man's rare and heroic virtue and suffering admirable remained the same.

It was Alderman Boydell who commissioned the engraving of *Wolfe* by Woollett, achieving a signal financial success which alerted artists to the possibility of achieving wealth by painting works which could be engraved and sold in quantity. "By 1790, Boydell's total receipts amounted to fifteen thousand pounds. The print created a new popular taste and market for historical pictures."[169] Trumbull, who had no access to family wealth when he painted *Bunker Hill*, must have found this an inspiring example--particularly since Reynolds, West and others had at least in some respects compared his work favorably with that of West.

Trumbull said that his intention had been to show "the Point of Time when...the British Troops became completely successful, and Masters of the Field."[170] Thus it is not altogether surprising to find that the *Study*, unlike Romans' work, was executed in London. Like Doolittle and Romans, Trumbull has nonetheless shown the action from the American

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[168] Edgar Wind, "The Revolution of History Painting." *Journal of the Warburg Institute* II: 2 (1938): 118.
[169] Charles Mitchell, "Benjamin West's 'Death of Général Wolfe' and the Popular History Piece." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 7 (1944): 33.
[170] John Trumbull, *Explanation of the Two Prints representing the Battle of Bunker's Hill and the Attack of Quebec* (London, 1798).

side, with the Americans closer to the viewer, as the British attack up the slope. We will see that Trumbull, probably even more than Romans, consciously departed from the known events of the day. In 1785-6, Trumbull worked in the light of hindsight, in a political and commercial context greatly changed from that of 1775, when the battle took place.

What is immediately striking in comparing the Trumbull image with Doolittle and Romans is that whereas Doolittle and Romans emphasize the role of the common American soldier, this character is scarcely to be seen in Trumbull's *Study*. Trumbull's scene is crowded with officers, and he shows a battle seemingly fought between the officers of the two armies. Furthermore, his focus is on an event, the death of Gen. Warren, to which Romans gives no attention whatever. Our analysis will endeavor to find differences in motivation, timing, point of view and circumstances between the artists that could help to explain these disparities in their respective representations of common soldiers and officers.

There is far more information available about John Trumbull than about the other American artists discussed here, due both to the strong contemporary and subsequent public interest in his works, and to the wealth of information he left behind, in the form of letters, (primarily held at Yale University and at the Connecticut Historical Society), and an autobiography, which, while it is not always credible, is a very valuable reflection of how Trumbull chose in the end to present himself. [171] Trumbull's autobiography was written in response to what he considered an unflattering portrayal by Dunlap.[172] Though indubitably biased and on some points inaccurate, Dunlap contains a chapter on Trumbull that is especially useful in giving a sense of Trumbull's artistic reputation in the early nineteenth century.

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[171] Trumbull (1841).
[172] William Dunlap, *A History of the Rise and Progress of the Arts of Design in the United States*, ed. Rita Weiss (two volumes, New York, NY, 1969).

Cooper's catalogue for the Yale University Art Gallery's Trumbull show is by far the best recent source. It is the only scholarly publication that makes thorough and effective use of the copious primary source materials relating to Trumbull. Within this catalog, Prown's essay provides a detailed survey of Trumbull's historical sketches and paintings as well as his letters and autobiography.[173] Prown's discussion of the influence of West and Copley on Trumbull's work is also helpful in placing Trumbull's production in the context of developments in eighteenth century history painting in London. Unfortunately, Prown gives little attention to the engravings based on Trumbull's paintings and sketches. Gonda, however, provides a detailed and reliable account of Trumbull's long struggle to get his paintings engraved.[174]

There are several other articles and books which have been published recently, including those by Jaffe, Paulson, and Burnham. Jaffe and Paulson both undertake to discuss Trumbull's entire revolutionary series. The length and complexity of the series relative to the restricted formats within which these authors worked render their contributions less than definitive.[175] Burnham focuses on the first painting of the series, but the article's authority rests on the importance that she attributes to Trumbull's patriotic motives, which are inevitably difficult to prove.[176]

Trumbull was unlike Doolittle and Romans in executing his work long after the events he pictured. His earliest extant sketch for *Bunker Hill* dates to 1785, ten years after the battle, with the Revolution finally ended. By then, Bunker Hill was no longer to be thought of as an American defeat. Rather, it could be recognized as one of the first crucial

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[173] Jules David Prown, "John Trumbull as History Painter," in Helen Cooper ed. *John Trumbull: The Hand and Spirit of a* Painter, exhibition catalogue from the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, CT, October 28, 1982- Jan 16, 1983.
[174] Zsuzsa Gonda, "Noble and Generous Actions, by Whomsoever Performed," in ed. Zsuzsanna Dobos, *Ex Fumo Lucem: Baroque Studies in Honour of Klára Garas* (Museum of Fine Arts, Budapest, 1999), vol. II.
[175] Irma Jaffe, *John Trumbull: Patriot-Artist of the American Revolution* (New York, 1975); Paulson, op. cit.
[176] Patricia M. Burnham, "John Trumbull, Historian: The Case of the Battle of Bunker's Hill," in Patricia Burnham and Lucretia Hoover Geise ed., *Redefining American History Painting* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

steps towards ultimate victory, demonstrating that Americans could fight from fixed positions on equal terms against the British and exact heavy casualties. Indeed, Trumbull comments that Warren "expired with a Smile of...Triumph."[177] Any feeling of triumph would have had to reflect considerable hindsight—on Trumbull's part.

The frontispiece to a poem published in 1784, a year before Trumbull's first sketch, establishes a historical perspective that seems very close to Trumbull's. It begins with homage to the soldier patriots of Concord; proceeds to Warren's death, described, completely inaccurately, as precipitating defeat at Bunker Hill; and then looks ahead to the triumphs of Washington, and thus of a disciplined army and its capable leadership:

"...on Concord's fatal plain;/ There fell our brothers, by fierce ruffians slain./...Who now advanc'd to Charlestown/ Nor those would fly.../'Till Warren fell.../His Country's hope!/ and their leaders dead;/ Slow...the sullen troops retir'd/... When lo! To guide us.../ Beam'd the bright splendor of Virginia's Star/...and raptur'd thousands to his standard came."[178]

Trumbull's series of revolutionary works echoes the poem in emphasizing the decisive importance of Washington's role, the transformation it wrought in America's military fortunes.

A different but authoritative recent American view of Bunker Hill is that "The American hero was above all William Prescott."[179] Prescott's own account of the battle, written in August, 1775 in a letter to John Adams, gives still another perspective. Prescott acknowledges that he commanded the building and defense of the redoubt. Later, "The Enemy being numerous surrounded our little Fort began to mount our Lines and enter the Fort with their Bayonets, we was obliged to retreat through them...We having very few Bayonets could make no resistance."[180] Prescott never mentions Putnam or Warren at all in

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[177] Trumbull (1798).
[178] David Humphries, *A Poem Addressed to the Armies of the United States of America* (London, 1785), 11.
[179] Bernard Bailyn, "The Battle of Bunker Hill," http://www.masshist.org/bh/essay.html.
[180] William Prescott to John Adams, letter dated Aug. 25, 1775, manuscript in the collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

this letter, which is intended to respond to Adams' request for "a particular Account of the Action at Charlestown." His only reference to an order he received is the order to fortify "Breed's Hill." Prescott evidently intends to leave no doubt as to which hill he was ordered to fortify, or as to the fact that he fortified the hill he had been ordered to fortify. He comments neither on events during the retreat nor on casualties.

It is perhaps possible to read Prescott's account as not inconsistent with Warren's having fought throughout in the redoubt and dying in or near it when it fell, but if so it is highly surprising that Prescott finds it unnecessary to mention Warren, though he makes reference by name to five of his subordinate officers ranging from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. As the man who was responsible for the placement and building of the redoubt as well as for its defense in a losing battle, it would have been easy for Prescott to at least spread the blame, by assigning some responsibility or at least presence to Warren, who greatly outranked him. His choice not to do so suggests that Warren's role was very minor in relation to the defense of the redoubt and its fall—if, indeed, he fought there at all. Peter Brown's letter, previously cited, does not mention Warren but says that "I was in the fort when the enemy came in, Jump'd over the wall and ran half a Mile, where balls flew like hail stones." Maj. Gen. Heath's account makes it clear that Warren was never in the redoubt and that he was "on the hill as a spectator only."[181]

John Palmer's letter to John Adams of June 19, 1775, immediately after the battle and well before Prescott's report, views Bunker Hill as an American defeat that was much more costly to the British than to the Americans. In this context, he lays heavy and mournful emphasis on the death of "our worthy Friend, the great & good Dr W-----," but he says

[181] Major Général William Heath, *Memoirs of Major-Général William Heath*, ed. William Abbatt (rprt. 1798, New York, 1901), 12-14.

nothing of any fighting or heroism on Warren's part, nor does he describe how or where he died.[182]

Palmer was a member of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety and highly active politically. He did not serve at Bunker Hill and was not in the army, though he was to become a brigadier general in 1776. Palmer attributed the American defeat principally to lack of gunpowder (which resulted in lack of heavy artillery support), and does not place responsibility for the defeat on any officer. Another non-participant, Abigail Adams, writing to her husband John on the evening of the battle, gives first attention to Warren's death, praising his courage and example but not attributing any particular role in the battle to him.[183]

Trumbull's scene is a close up, limited to a couple of dozen people in and near the redoubt or bunker. It is difficult to reconcile with the participant accounts of the fall of the redoubt by Prescott and Brown, referred to above. In the *Key to the Bunker's Hill,* [1791] Trumbull identifies eighteen of the people he depicts (including the unnumbered Peter Salem, the "Negro servant of an American lieutenant," at the far right). (fig. 2.2) All of the numbered men are officers, ten American (of whom he identifies half as having been killed in the battle) and seven British (of whom only one was killed). Four of the seventeen are generals (including Putnam, mistakenly identified in the *Key* as a colonel), and a total of eight, almost half the total, hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. Some of the unnumbered persons shown in the *Study* are common soldiers, but there are at most a half dozen of these. For Trumbull, the Battle of Bunker Hill was evidently in essence a battle between officers, particularly high ranking officers. Bindman argues that Trumbull's visual projection of at least a rough parity in sacrifice and qualities between the officers of the two

[182] John Palmer to John Adams (June 19, 1775), manuscript in the collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
[183] Abigail Adams to John Adams (June 18, 1775), manuscript in the collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

armies conveys a major message of the work.[184] Other accounts suggest that in fact it is unlikely that any of the other three generals that Trumbull depicts, Putnam, Howe and Clinton, was anywhere near Warren when he died. Hence Trumbull in this respect (and in others) rearranged events to promote what was in essence a reconciliatory message.

Trumbull's vision that heroism and even participation was reserved almost entirely for officers would not necessarily respond to the sensibilities and political needs of the later 1780's and subsequent decades--even in the case of the Federalists, who tended to attract support from the more educated and wealthier classes from which officers were predominantly drawn. Political participation and consciousness progressively broadened as elections and debate focused increasingly on contentious national issues. The Federalist Benjamin Rush, seeking political involvement and support from veterans of all ranks, wrote: "Patriots...Heroes of 1777, 1778, 1779, 1780! – come forward! – your country DEMANDS your services...The revolution is not over!"[185] Recognition of the common soldier as patriot and hero could serve a pressing political purpose, whereas Trumbull's implicit negation of his contribution would likely have only a limited appeal.

The *Key* and *Explanation* provided by Trumbull contrast sharply with the very limited identification and text provided by Romans and Doolittle. The title of a topographic painting generally needs little additional embellishment in order for the scene to be understood. However, grand manner history painting is intended to inform viewers who may not be able to recognize the personages shown and their actions. But it is these specific people and their portrayed actions which carry the painting's intended message. It is because of this that more visual and verbal clues had to be provided by Trumbull. In fact, a participant in the battle, and specifically one who fought to the end in the redoubt, such as those we have quoted,

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[184] David Bindman, "Americans in London: contemporary history painting revisited," in Christina Payne and William Vaughn ed., *English Accents* (Aldershot, 2004), 11.
[185] Purcell, 76.

would be least of all able to recognize the scene Trumbull constructed. Contrary to Prescott's account, Trumbull does not show the Americans as either surrounded or retreating. The Americans at the extreme left and right foreground look as if they could be advancing.

Despite the predominance of Americans among the figures who are identified by name in the *Key*, the *Study* nonetheless gives the visual impression that the Americans were greatly outnumbered by the British. Trumbull accomplishes this by including unidentified, brightly uniformed redcoats particularly at the center and right, and by marginalizing the Americans, for instance at the left and right edges of the scene. The Americans are also shown as much more somberly garbed than the British. These techniques produce a visual effect akin to Doolittle's more direct approach of showing only a fraction of the Americans who were engaged, particularly in his print of the first clash at Lexington. The message in the case of both these works, quite contrary to Romans', seems to be that the Americans were so badly outnumbered that defeat and retreat were inevitable. This was very likely true at Lexington, though the relative numbers are greatly exaggerated by Doolittle. It was probably not true at Bunker Hill, except at particular places and times.

Trumbull pictures the decisive moment of the American defeat, when the Americans exhausted their ammunition and the British took the redoubt by storm at bayonet point, forcing the Americans to retreat. The walls of the bunker are not clearly depicted, except for a broken stone wall in the right middle ground, referred to inaccurately by Trumbull as "the feeble entrenchments."[186] In fact, these entrenchments, including the long rail fence, protected the Americans very well indeed during prolonged and intense combat. In the end, they were not breached or broken, they were overrun. Without this overnight fortification, the very first British charge against the right end of the American line, where the redoubt was built, would very likely have won the day. The erection of the entrenchments by Prescott and

[186] Trumbull (1798).

his men in a matter of hours was a remarkable accomplishment, which Trumbull negates. It foreshadowed the superior American ability to maneuver and to prepare positions which was many times of decisive importance later in the War, starting with the siege of Boston.

The relative heights of Trumbull's figures show that the action takes place near the crest of the hill, so that the tops of the men's heads and hats against the sky form an inverted U, from the top of which attention is focused directly down onto the dying Warren, placing him at the visual center of the image. Warren and the two Americans near him are shown in brilliant white despite the smoke and dust. In addition, Warren and the ground near him are uniquely illuminated, as if by a spotlight, or by the sun shining through a hole in the clouds and smoke. Perhaps the white clothing is emblematic of the innocence of the Americans.

The kneeling figure holding Warren is a "soldier" whom Trumbull does not identify. This "soldier" is the only man shown with bare feet, a remarkable touch which suggests the utter unpreparedness of the Americans for a battle which they had in fact provoked – or perhaps the humble class status of the American militiamen. This man must have come to war unshod, since it is hard to imagine how else to explain his bare feet. The conceit lacks verisimilitude, particularly because the terrain was difficult—rocky, and strewn with obstacles such as walls and fences.

Both this soldier and the American Capt. Knowlton, standing behind him and seeking to protect him with his rifle, appear to be older than Warren, an effect perhaps aimed at intensifying the feeling of sadness at the loss of such a young and promising life and also at emphasizing Warren's precocious accomplishments. The soldier is unarmed, while Warren was evidently fighting only with his sword, which has now dropped to the ground beside him. This is suggestive of the exhaustion of the Americans' ammunition, to which Trumbull calls attention in his *Explanation.* Consistent with this, Knowlton shows no inclination or effort to fire his weapon, which does not carry a bayonet. He seems to trying

to use the musket mechanically, to push back a British grenadier who is attempting to bayonet the dying Warren. The bayonet is poised over Warren's elbow, hardly a vital spot. It seems likely that the men who seek to restrain the grenadier from killing Warren have pushed back the bayonet from his chest before it could strike a blow.

Knowlton was to die a lieutenant colonel in the successful American engagement at Harlem Heights on Sept. 15, 1776. He was a highly popular and respected officer. Apart from what Trumbull wrote and painted, there is no evidence that Knowlton was present at Warren's death. In the case of Knowlton as well as the others shown, the roles assigned to them at Bunker Hill by Trumbull in 1785 might have reflected their exploits (or lack thereof) during the rest of the war, and hence the interest or opinions that prospective promoters or purchasers of the prints might have regarding them.

It is remarkable that most of the people depicted in the *Study*, including all of the named Americans at the upper left and Gen. Howe, seem to be looking not at Warren but at the grenadier. None of the British, other than the grenadier, are looking at Warren. Prescott, like several of the other American officers behind Capt. Knowlton, wears an expression of consternation—either because of Warren's approaching death or because of the grenadier's unchivalrous assault.

Thus, this is not merely a death scene. It presents a foreground contrast, and indeed a conflict between the American soldier trying to help Warren and the grenadier trying to kill him. Trumbull says that the grenadier "...in the Heat and Fury natural at such a moment, aims to revenge the Death of a favorite Officer, who has just fallen at his feet."[187] This officer, who is shown on the ground, is identified as Lt. Col. Abercromby. Abercromby was in fact the commander of the grenadiers at Bunker Hill. The grenadier is actually shown stepping across the prostrate Abercromby to attack Warren.

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[187] Trumbull, ibid.

Abercromby was not a character unknown to Americans. A play presented in 1776 presented him as depressed before the battle because the Revolution would prevent him from marrying his American sweetheart.[188] Trumbull's study shows the grenadier, not stopping to see whether his admired commander, Abercromby, is wounded and in need of assistance, but instead reaching over him to finish off the gravely wounded Warren—who carries no identification or insignia of rank, and indeed held no command. But in fact Abercromby did not die at Bunker Hill. He was wounded there but did not die until a week later, on June 24, according to Gen. Burgoyne.[189] Even if the grenadier was uninterested in trying to help his wounded commander, it would have made more sense for him to use his bayonet against one or more of the unwounded Americans, such as Capt. Knowlton—whose rifle might well have had one more bullet for him, and is in fact pointed at him. It is surely significant that Trumbull has taken such pains to provide the grenadier with an excuse to cover the unchivalrous nature of what is in fact a foolish and improbable action. But Trumbull may have been more concerned with chivalry than with plausibility.

A desire for revenge was certainly a plausible reaction on the part of the British troops, who had taken staggering losses. However, the execution of this revenge was very likely much less decorous than Trumbull imagines. A junior British officer, Lt. Waller, who was one of the first to enter the redoubt, after reeling off a list of the British officers and men lost earlier in the battle, which he evidently found highly relevant in explaining or justifying the scene he proceeds to depict, says that "I cannot pretend to describe the Horror of the Scene within the Redoubt...'twas streaming with Blood & strew'd with dead & dying Men

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[188] John Burk, *Bunker-Hill; or the Death of Général Warren. An Historic Tragedy in Five Acts. As Played at the Theatres in America, for Fourteen Nights with Undoubted [...]* (New York, 1776). In this play, Warren is depicted as ordering a retreat after all British assaults have been repulsed; insisting on being the last to retreat; and, being held by an American "grenadier" after being shot.

[189] Gen. John Burgoyne to Lord Stanley (June 25, 1775), published in London November 27, 1775. Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Prudently, Trumbull's *Explanation* does not categorize Abercromby either as killed (like Warren) or as mortally wounded (like Pitcairn)—presumably because he knew that Abercromby was not killed in the battle, but nevertheless chose to pretend that he had been.

the Soldiers [British] stabbing some and dashing out the Brains of others was a sight too dreadful for me to dwell any longer on."[190] The British troops evidently were not restrained from this butchery (aimed indiscriminately at American officers and soldiers) by their officers, including Lt. Waller. Their bayoneting had much more than one victim. An American said that "The regulars came so close into our entrenchment as to run some through with their bayonets."[191]

Trumbull's lone grenadier is, however, shown as restrained, although only very lightly, by British Maj. Small, who, Trumbull says "had been intimately connected with General Warren," and whose qualities of "Kindness and...Bravery" he praises fulsomely. Trumbull later acknowledged the falsity of these words as well as of the image, admitting that he had invented this incident of Small's protecting Warren. He protested however, that it was a proper tribute to Small's known humane character.[192] Trumbull also provided an alternative explanation for his inclusion of this element in the scene, which was that he was genuinely "concerned with the recognition of heroism on the enemy's part," or as he put it, with "noble and generous actions, by whomsoever performed."[193] This, is contradicted by the fact that here he admittedly depicted a "noble and generous action" which in fact had never been performed to his knowledge by anyone at all. These contradictions are representative of the defensiveness and self-justification displayed in Trumbull's Autobiography and letters. Trumbull's evident inability to discover any "noble and generous action" actually performed by a Briton in this battle, given ample time to research the subject in London, speaks for itself.

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[190] Lt. J. Waller, Adjutant, First Battalion of Marines (June 25, 1775), Manuscript in the Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
[191] *Diary of Benjamin Guild, Jr.*, cited in Bernhard Knollenberg, "Bunker Hill Re-viewed." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 72 (1957): 60, 99.
[192] Burnham, 45.
[193] Gonda, II : 223.

Immediately behind Small the *Study* shows a dying British officer who is receiving considerably better treatment than Abercromby. This is the same Maj. Pitcairn to whom Doolittle attributed a commanding role at Lexington. Trumbull describes him as "falling in the arms of his son," Lt. John Pitcairn.[194] The major's military jacket has been opened, though not removed. It is unlikely that there would have been an opportunity to do even this much for him as he was "falling in the arms of his Son," who has slipped his arm under the major's arm. Pitcairn is attended also by a nameless but hatted British officer. Although his figure is much smaller than those of Gen. Warren and of the two Americans protecting him, the opening of Maj. Pitcairn's coat makes him appear to be garbed in the same white as they are, establishing a parallel between Pitcairn and Warren.

By including the death of Maj. Pitcairn in this scene, Trumbull has juxtaposed events that occurred at differing times and places. Lt. Waller states that "the irreparable loss of poor Major Pitcairne, whose worth I never was sensible of till that day" occurred at least fifteen minutes before the British reached the redoubt with their bayonet charge--while they were still being held well below it by "very heavy and severe Fire from the Enemy in the Redoubt."[195] Lt. Waller also states that the redoubt was not surrounded, but taken by storm from the front, and that the breastworks held out a little longer than the redoubt. Unlike Warren, Pitcairn was a career professional, whose son has followed him into the Army. In showing Pitcairn, like Warren, dying and being mourned, Trumbull makes Warren less unique in his sacrifice, but more emblematic of a generous and universal ideal of sacrifice, one that is not solely American nor limited to military amateurs.

In addition to Maj. Pitcairn, the only other British soldier without a hat in this image is Gen. Clinton, who arrived late in the course of the battle, having volunteered to lead

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[194] Trumbull (1798).
[195] Waller, op. cit.

reinforcements. Apart from Knowlton, the American officers shown all seem to be uniformed, but diversely. Gen. Putnam, whom Trumbull places quite near the bunker, at the extreme left, wears an elegant green uniform jacket with red trim, similar to no one else's, with white trousers. He is shown apparently carrying a rifle, an odd pose for a commanding general. Trumbull says Putnam is "reluctantly ordering the retreat of these brave men."[196] There is nothing in the picture to indicate that he is doing this. He seems instead to be on the attack. In addition, quite implausibly, Prescott, who had been in the bunker until the end, as well as all the other Americans at the left whose faces are pictured, are shown as approaching the bunker from the direction towards which they would have retreated--rather than as retreating. Trumbull presumably placed them in this way in order to make it possible for him to paint their faces without allowing them to distract from the scene in the redoubt.

There is something oddly resonant about equipping Putnam with an elegant uniform that has absolutely no common element with the clothing of the men he commanded. Putnam had, indeed, come to Massachusetts equipped with his old uniform from the Great War for Empire more than a decade earlier, and he was commanding troops most of whom belonged to militias that until shortly before the battle had had no common element of supply or leadership. With the exception of Warren, no one in the picture except Putnam has white trousers. Putnam and Warren were the two highest ranking Americans.

Trumbull's depiction of Putnam has much in common with the same artist's much later sketch of him, [1790]. (fig. 2.3) We see the same fine white, curly hair, forming rolls at the height of the nose, high forehead and rounded, jowly jaw line. The Second Continental Congress appointed Putnam a major general of the Continental Army after choosing Washington as commander in chief, in the wake of Bunker Hill. Putnam was field commander at the disastrous Battle of Long Island in 1776 and shortly thereafter retired,

[196] Trumbull (1798).

reportedly after suffering a stroke. In 1785, he could not be seen as an architect of American victory.

Though their uniforms do not resemble his, two of the other men in this image are identified by Trumbull as belonging to Putnam's own regiment, the Connecticut 3rd. These are Capt. Thomas Knowlton at the left, and Lt. Thomas Grosvenor at the far right, the latter being identified as the possessor of the "Negro servant." Because of the slope of the hill and the strong major diagonal from upper left to lower right, the whole picture seems to slide down towards Grosvenor. He is holding his ground, though with apparent timidity, extending his right hand in front of the sword he holds in his left. Trumbull's *Explanation* says that Grosvenor was wounded in the right hand. The broadside based on Hide's account of the battle, cited earlier, also says that Grosvenor suffered a hand wound, and refers to this as the only wound suffered by the Connecticut officers.

The bizarre effect of his pose is intensified by the fact that none of the British soldiers seems to be paying the least attention to Grosvenor. Within the scale of the painting, he is very far away from them, seemingly fighting a private battle against an invisible enemy. The scene surely would be more coherent without his distracting presence. Oddly, it is Knowlton and Grosvenor, two American officers in dramatically contrasting garb, who face each other directly, standing at opposite edges of the scene—with Knowlton nearly surrounded by the enemy and gallantly protecting his fallen general, while Grosvenor fences with shadows. Perhaps they represent two polar extremes of the character of the American officer corps at Bunker Hill: Knowlton riveted on substance and results, stripped for action, and Grosvenor standing for pretension and militarily weightless presence. Knowlton can use his plain and homely gun as Americans did at Lexington and Bunker Hill, to kill the enemy, while the tactical uselessness of Grosvenor's aristocratic weapon, the sword, is rendered obvious by his isolated position.

Grosvenor is the only one of those shown here to wear a black jacket and a fancy, ruffled shirt under it. He also wears a wide brimmed, asymmetrical hat, tilted rakishly to the side and holding a conspicuous feather or feathers, while all the other hats shown are recognizable officer hats, apart from Prescott's round and featherless frontier hat. Particularly because Grosvenor is brandishing a sword in his left hand, the effect of his figure is exotic, suggestive perhaps of a French duelist. (Mme. De Brehan, a French woman who was a friend of Jefferson, later ordered and eventually obtained from Trumbull a sketch of this figure.)

Grosvenor was of distinguished lineage. An ancestor had owned all the land on which the town of Pomfret, where Grosvenor lived, was later built. His father had served as a captain much earlier under Israel Putnam. At Bunker Hill, Grosvenor was fighting under Knowlton. They and their men in fact were stationed far from the redoubt, along the fence. After the battle, Grosvenor continued to serve under Knowlton until the latter's death. Remaining in the Continental Army until demobilization, he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and was appointed Inspector under Baron Von Steuben. A Yale graduate, in 1785 he was a prosperous lawyer, judge and a member of the Governor's Council of Connecticut.

The Grosvenors had been a noble and wealthy family in England at least from the fourteenth century onwards. The British Grosvenors were important patrons of Benjamin West. However, it is hardly likely that they would have felt much sympathy for an American Grosvenor who, despite prosperity that depended upon defense provided for decades by the King's troops, had rebelled and fought as an officer against them.

The Black man identified as Grosvenor's "servant," Peter Salem, is shown apparently taking shelter closely behind him and with his head and eyes tilted to the left, towards the picture plane, and cocked upwards over Grosvenor's shoulder. Salem holds a musket pointing up into the air and seems to be roughly dressed with rather baggy pants, a shorter

jacket and a darker colored shirt than any of the others shown. Most likely Grosvenor has handed his own musket to Salem to hold for him after running out of powder or shot and having recourse to his officer's sword.

Slavery was an institution that during this period many in Britain had begun to identify with Colonial primitivism, inhumanity and perhaps also hypocrisy. Wilberforce's abolitionist efforts began around 1784. However, it was in 1772 that the Chief Justice, the First Earl of Mansfield had ruled, with almost Shakespearean expression, in a case brought in England by a slave transported there by his Virginian master, that slavery was "odious" and that "The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe, and so everyone who breathes it becomes free. Everyone who comes to this island is entitled to the protection of English law, whatever oppression he may have suffered and whatever may be the colour of his skin."

The ruling was law in Great Britain but did not apply to the colonies. By its own terms, which provided that slavery could be permissible only if established by "positive law," it could have been reversed by an Act of Parliament. No such law was proposed. Clearly, then, as regards slavery at least, Mansfield reflected the temper of his times—in Britain. In Connecticut, importation of slaves ended by law only in 1774, and declaredly for economic reasons (to deter further competition for work with poor Whites) rather than for humanitarian or principled ones.[197] Emancipation did not begin until 1797, and slavery continued until 1848, more than 70 years after Mansfield ended it in Britain. [198] His splendid words contrast painfully with the situation in Connecticut and also with the complaints of Americans in the later 1770's that Britain sought to "enslave" them--when it was in America and not in Britain

[197] "Whereas the increase of slaves in this Colony is injurious to the poor and inconvenient...that no Indian, Negro or molatto slave shall or at any time herearfter be brought or imported into this Colony, by sea or land, from any places whatsoever, to be disposed of, left or sold within this Colony." *Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut* (Hartford, 1887), XIV: 329.
[198] See Jeffrey Mead, *Chains Unbound* (Baltimore, MD, 1995), pp. 10-15.

that there were slaves.[199] Hence the gratuitous inclusion in the painting of a person exposed to danger who could be taken to be an American slave would have appealed to British taste, while not necessarily offending Americans, particularly Southerners.

In fact, however, Peter Salem was neither a slave nor was he a "servant" of or in any way related to Grosvenor. He was born a slave of Jeremiah Belknap in Salem, Massachusetts, and apart from military service lived his entire life in that state. He was sold to Lawson Buckminster and then permitted by him to enlist in the militia in 1775, which secured his freedom. After fighting at Concord and Bunker Hill (with Capt. Drury's company of the 5th Massachusetts Regiment), Salem continued to serve in the Continental Army, re-enlisting after Washington's initial order banning Blacks was rescinded. He died in 1816 in the Framingham, Massachusetts poorhouse, where his gravestone remains. "Tradition" states that it was Salem who fatally shot Pitcairn. The geometry of this image neither establishes nor contradicts this claim, though if Trumbull's Salem shot Trumbull's Pitcairn, it looks like he shot him in the back—an "uncivilized" action that Trumbull might well have attributed to a slave or ex-slave.

The question of why a strangely garbed American lieutenant (but one of impeccable family background) would be the only one among all those shown to be depicted (entirely contrary to fact) as bringing a servant to the battlefield is intriguing. Trumbull also seems to have taken particular pains with Grosvenor's image. A surviving sketch of an unclothed Grosvenor [1785] shows him much closer to Warren's feet, with Salem at a greater distance. (fig. 2.4). In this sketch Grosvenor's body is flexed farther back in defense, and his hand is extended further forward. A still more extreme version, with Grosvenor in apparent flight, seems to have been executed first and drawn over. In addition, a sketch for the entire *Study*

[199] For instance, "guard the rights of this dear-purchased soil,/ From Royal plund'rers, greedy of our spoil, 'Who come resolv'd to murder and enslave,/ To shackle FREEMEN..." Henry Brackenridge, *The Battle of Bunker Hill* (Philadelphia, PA 1776).

[1787] shows Grosvenor taking refuge behind the servant, rather than the other way around, and omits both the feather in the hat and the fencing posture. (fig. 2.5) Both these renditions seem more insulting to Grosvenor's military honor than the final one, which is somewhat more subtle in its adverse implications. Taken together with the painting, the sketches strengthen the impression of the artist's intent to ridicule Grosvenor.

Indeed, the treatment of the dandified Grosvenor, accompanied by Salem, could be taken as caricatural. Hats of the kind he is wearing were popular for soldiers in France 150 years earlier. (See the untitled etching from the series *La Noblesse* by Callot [1624]). (fig. 2.6) Callot's figure, with right foot advanced, is drawing his sword with his right hand.) As this print illustrates, swordsmen were always trained to have the foot on the sword side extended forward, whereas Grosvenor is doing the opposite. Attempting to ward with a naked (and wounded) forward hand would also have been ineffectual and was bad swordsmanship. Grosvenor's costume as well as his absurdly defensive posture, when no one was within reach of or coming towards him, together with the fact that he is backing towards the British rather than towards the American lines of retreat might also make him appear an elegant coward.

What Grosvenor could have done to merit such treatment is not clear, since his subsequent military career shows that he was considered to have acquitted himself honorably at Bunker's Hill and thereafter. Surely the Grosvenor and Trumbull families' paths had crossed in Connecticut society and politics. The artist's brother, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., was Washington's secretary and aide de camp beginning in 1781 and must have been in contact with Grosvenor. Later, as a Federalist, Jonathan Junior held various offices including senator, after which he was eleven times Governor of Connecticut. Grosvenor's lengthy service on the Governor's Council of the state would also have brought him into direct contact with Jonathan Junior. The elder Trumbull was Governor until his death in 1784. The

Trumbulls attended Harvard, whereas Grosvenor was a Yale graduate.

In the context of the 1780's, when this work was underway, it is possible to see grounds for strong animosity between the Trumbull and Grosvenor families. In July, 1783, the Society of the Order of the Cincinnati was founded at West Point. Composed of former Continental officers, it became a pressure group seeking financial advantages for these officers, including payment of commuted pensions, within a strongly Federalist framework. The Cincinnati, with 270 members in Connecticut, was suspected of undertaking to establish a hereditary aristocracy.[200] A Connecticut town meeting condemned the Cincinnati as "a clique of placemen and pensioners."[201]

Because militia officers, including Connecticut militia officers, would have been ineligible both for membership in the Cincinnati and for pensions even if they had served gallantly throughout the war, this situation rekindled the ardent conflict between militia and Continentals that had flared throughout the Revolution. While the militia were locally controlled and their officers tended to be local notables, the Continental command structure, running up through Washington to Congress, was largely independent of local influence, though it included many local dignitaries such as the Trumbulls. Washington made skillful and occasionally decisive use of militia elements in a number of battles, but his sympathy and interest was from the beginning with the Continentals—at it was with national authority and Federalism. In accepting at least nominal leadership of the Cincinnati, he sided again with the Continentals.

Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. was a prominent member of the Connecticut chapter of the Cincinnati. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, he commented to Washington that he was not elected a delegate because of "being in my particular circle, under the cloud of

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[200] David Humphreys to Thomas Jefferson (November 29, 1788) in Humphreys, *The Miscellaneous works of David Humphreys* (New York, 1790), 346.
[201] *Farmington Revolutionary War Records,* May 6, 1783, Connecticut State Library.

commutation and Cincinnati."[202] Trumbull's "particular circle" was seen by John Adams as a veritable aristocracy of a dozen powerful families which had dominated and continued to dominate Connecticut politics.[203] However the Trumbulls (who were traders), unlike the Grosvenors (who were landowners), had lost most of their wealth during the course of the War.

Thomas Grosvenor did not join the Cincinnati, although eligible to do so. In fact the Grosvenors, though wealthy and socially well-connected beyond the borders of Connecticut, were not one of the Colony's and the State's politically dominant families. To visit the Grosvenors in Pomfret, "fashionable belles and beaux came up from Providence and Newport."[204] Rhode Island was a hotbed of anti-federalism and was the last state to ratify the Constitution, which it finally did under some duress. It is not hard to imagine why Trumbull might, in this context, have chosen to depict a Grosvenor, with his far more prominent British roots, as a decadent, self-centered, slaveholding fop.

Clinton's image in the *Study* is similar to one by Thomas Day, which also shows his ears peeking out from under straight white hair that is thin and receding. (fig. 2.7) From the perspective of 1785, Clinton was significant primarily in his role as the last British commander in chief in America to prosecute the war. Clinton's over-caution and lack of timely initiative was a cause of the ultimate British defeat. His role in the war was subjected to severe criticism in Britain, and he received no subsequent active command. "Washington, the loyal press conceded, should receive a large share of the credit for the British defeat – but never so much as Sir Henry."[205] This is not so different from the casting of blame on

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[202] Christopher Collier, *All Politics is Local* (Hanover, NH, 2003), 100.
[203] "The state of Connecticut has always been governed by an aristocracy...Half a dozen families, or at most a dozen, have controlled that country when a colony, as well as since it has become a state." John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1850), VI : 530. Clearly, this was intended to contrast with Adams's perception of the greater diffusion of political influence in Massachusetts.
[204] James Gluck, "The Grosvenor Family in Connecticut." *Grosvenor Library Bulletin* I:3 (1919): 14.
[205] Solomon Lutnick, *The American Revolution and the British Press* (Columbia, MO, 1967), 189.

American officers at Bunker Hill by Romans. Common soldiers were evidently not regarded by some as important enough to be the cause of a defeat, whether in a battle or a war. Rather, their conduct was seen as reflecting the qualities or faults of their commanders.

The *Study* differs greatly from the Doolittle and Romans works considered earlier in that it in addition to focusing primary attention on the death of a single man, a general, and, it gives greatly increased and on the whole much more favorable attention than did Doolittle and Roman to officers as opposed to common soldiers. Doolittle had made only British officers prominently identifiable, and he depicted them as meriting disdain or ridicule. Romans was on balance negative in his treatment of American officers, at least as regards their effectiveness. He gives no prominence to any British officer, although some of them, including Howe, are reported to have displayed conspicuous leadership and gallantry. Romans does not make Warren, Prescott or any other American officer discernible in the redoubt, suggesting that their role in the battle was not an important one. Overall, Romans seems to suggest that weak leadership was a cause of the American defeat.

Doolittle and Romans can be seen as glorifying the sacrifices made by soldier patriots, that is to say, by volunteers who are not military professionals and who are thought to be motivated by patriotism rather than pay. Doolittle's militiaman is a townsman or farmer who fights as a common soldier, without rank and anonymously. Romans displays the American soldiers' ability to come to battle in large numbers, to stand up to the British regulars, fight toe to toe, and repel them.

Trumbull, however, shows little interest in such men and he certainly does not recognize their role as decisive. Oddly, it is clear without doubt that Trumbull's principal subject, Joseph Warren, also fought as a common soldier at Bunker Hill--but he lacked neither identity nor rank. Warren, age 35, was the scion of a distinguished family. He was a

highly popular physician and had done research on smallpox.[206] Although recently commissioned as major general to command the state's troops, he was without military experience. Warren was significant not as a general but as a principal political leader of Massachusetts and President Pro Tempore of the (illegal) Provincial Congress. As such he was a member of the social as well as political elite of Massachusetts and hence qualified to serve as the hero of a grand manner history painting. Equally important, it is possible to interpret this subject and image as designed to promote recognition in Britain of the conciliatory idea that those who fought for America were not a rabble or mob, but rather included and were led by educated gentlemen of comfortably upper class standing.

Cary says that on the day of the battle, Warren had insisted on serving as an ordinary volunteer at the redoubt on Breed's Hill, the place where the fighting was likely to be most dangerous. He refused to supercede more experienced officers such as Gen. Putnam, and he overruled the objections of colleagues who argued that his life was far too valuable to be risked unnecessarily.

"The firing was heaviest there and Prescott asked him [Warren] to leave. Warren refused and also rejected Colonel Prescott's offer to yield the command to him, declaring that Prescott was more experienced and that he came only as a volunteer. His example fired the men about him, and he stayed in the heavily attacked redoubt throughout the battle, treating the wounded, fighting as a common soldier..."[207] However, it is difficult to confirm any of the details of this account. Perhaps it is mere hagiography or myth.

Trumbull's painting, of course, does not show or even hint explicitly at most of this, any more than does Romans'. Trumbull seemingly did not seek to highlight the fact that

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[206] John Quincy Adams wrote that Warren had saved his finger from amputation when he was a small boy and that, aged 8 in 1775, he had cried at the news of Warren's death. Draft Letter of John Quincy Adams to Joseph Sturge (March 1846), Massachusetts Historical Society.

[207] John Cary, *Joseph Warren: Physician, Politician, Patriot* (Urbana, IL, 1964), 220.

Warren fought as a simple volunteer—a role that Trumbull evidently valued much less than that of the senior officers. For instance, Trumbull shows Warren's sword near his hand—but non-officers did not carry swords. Trumbull's image is intended at least in substantial part to memorialize the death in war of a man revered as a leader. However, as depicted by Trumbull immediately before his death, Warren would probably not have been recognizable to those who knew him, at least if we are to judge by Copley's portrait of him [1765]. (fig. 2.8)

Unlike Doolittle and Romans, Trumbull does not suggest even indirectly the possibility that a mass of soldier patriots could be attracted to enlist and fight for idealistic reasons—much less the possibility that the outcome of battles and wars might hinge on the ability to muster and motivate such an army of patriots. In fact, Trumbull does the opposite. Of the few non-officers he depicts, the most conspicuous, the one most engaged by the eyes and hands of others, is the grenadier who is attempting to stab the dying Gen. Warren. To stab a dying man evinces no bravery or patriotism and does not win battles. Perhaps Trumbull intends to convey that we can expect nothing much better than this from a common soldier.

If so, this is a view that could be comfortably acceptable to many or most members of the upper class. The common soldier, armed and trained, whether drawn from laborers in agriculture or shiftless inhabitants of town and city, was a potential threat to the established social and economic order. To imbue such soldiers with higher moral qualities would throw into doubt not just the stability but the rightness of the prevailing hierarchy of classes. This was something that neither Trumbull nor the American Revolutionary leadership had any desire to do. Indeed, they sought to shun and discredit any such idea. Trumbull's design is consistent with these intentions.

It is intriguing that apart from the series of revolutionary subjects, the only Trumbull history painting dating from the period preceding his Congressional commission in 1817, is *Peter the Great at the Capture of Narva* [1812]. (fig. 2.9) This is an obscure subject seemingly of little national interest to either Americans or Britons. Here, Peter has shown his greatness by magnanimously halting the rape and murder of women and children by his soldiers. He accomplished this by personally running through a few of his soldiers with the bloody sword shown in the painting. (The depiction of blood is very unusual for this period and artist—but it was necessary to convey the main point of the painting.) Here again, as in *Bunker Hill,* the qualities of a man worthy of admiration are established by contradistinction and conflict with the immorality and depraved or primitive nature of the common soldier. Such soldiers must be restrained and subjected to punishment. They can never be trusted to function on independent initiative or emotion rather than on order.

The unidentified American soldier holding Warren in *Bunker Hill* is, contrastingly, performing an act of kindness at some personal risk. However, he is closely supervised and guarded by Capt. Knowlton, and he, like the grenadier, is doing nothing to affect the course of the battle. In fact, this anonymous benefactor could even be an officer.

Maj. Small's chivalrous gesture, invented by Trumbull, may carry greater significance than that of the American soldier holding Warren, in part because it is not what the viewer expects in a battle scene. Perhaps it also constitutes a suggestion by Trumbull of the legitimacy and equality of standing of the American with the British officers. Both deserved and should expect to benefit from chivalry on the part of their enemy counterparts. The Americans were not outlaws or traitors, and they represented a nation—a message that colonial political leaders had been at great pains to promote not only during the War but for years thereafter.

Trumbull, in striking contrast with Doolittle and Romans, shows officers consistently as chivalrous and brave, whether they are British or American. Trumbull did not mean to suggest that all the officers he depicted, were heroes, like Warren. But these officers were, for him, distinguished individuals, worthy objects of attention and possible emulation. Even the idiosyncratic Grosvenor calls out for attention.

Compare Trumbull's image with Romans' "broken officer," or with Doolittle's scenes of burning houses and of the two British officers in the graveyard. Even Grosvenor, while he may be ridiculous, is shown neither as a man of doubtful loyalty nor a misleader.

Doolittle showed Maj. Pitcairn as leading from a position farther from the enemy than were his troops—a position suggestive of a lack of courage which would have been instantly recognized as dishonorable by both British and Americans. (After all, as recently as 1757, Adm. Byng had been court-martialed, found guilty of neglect of duty, and executed for leading his fleet from the rear, out of reach of enemy fire, at Minorca. At Bunker Hill, Clinton and Howe won praise for coming to the front line to rally their retreating and demoralized troops.) Warren was exemplary for Trumbull in part because he was depicted as fighting at the most dangerous spot but also perhaps because he sacrificed generously by abasing himself to the low level of a common solder—a status of which we are reminded by the image of the reclining Warren held by the kneeling and similarly dressed soldier. At risk to his own life, this anonymous soldier is defending a friend and equal. A hero wins the hearts of his men.

Trumbull places Pitcairn much more conspicuously than did Doolittle--though he played only a minor part at Bunker Hill. He is seen to have died bravely, at the head of the troops who are advancing up the slope and even in advance of his flag. It is particularly striking that Trumbull has converted Maj. Pitcairn from the willful murderer shown by Doolittle to a tragically sympathetic figure, redeemed by death. (Pitcairn always insisted that

he had not ordered his troops to fire at Lexington, and in fact had ordered them not to fire and to cease firing.)

Overall, Trumbull, in London, may have felt that his treatment of officers was benign. However, in America, by 1785 the controversies inspired by the Order of the Cincinnati and by proposals for commuted payments to former officers had moved a considerable body of popular opinion, particularly the anti-Federalists, to oppose the increasingly aggressive, cohesive and self-aware ex-officer class. At first, in 1778, Congress had appropriated for officers a seven year half-pay pension (with much less for enlisted men), but this was never implemented, In 1781 and 1782 proposals were made to commute this to a lump sum equal to full pay for five years, despite the fact Congress owed far more than it owned.

Officers were also attacked, not as Romans had attacked them, for dubious military ability and doubtful loyalty, but for their aristocratic pretensions as well as their financial demands. The Order of the Cincinnati was criticized as constituting "as rapid a Stride towards an hereditary Military Nobility as was ever made in so short a Time."[208] Even Gen. Henry Knox, a founder, admitted that "Public opinion already governs us...and it runs most furiously against our Society."[209] It fell to Washington as President-General of the Order to insist that these features be eliminated.[210] Nevertheless, "The Revolution seemed to many simply to have replaced one obnoxious elite with another."[211] These reactions, were widely diffused particularly in New England. James Warren wrote to Adams in 1784 that "Nothing seems to be a more General Subject of Conversation than the Cincinnati Clubb."[212] Resentment of officers' post-War activities would have tended to limit American demand for

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[208] *Observations on a Late Pamphlet, Entitled, "Considerations upon the Society or Order of the Cincinnati"* (Philadelphia, 1783), 20-21.
[209] Knox to Gouvion (July 2, 1784), cited in Francis Drake, *Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts* (Boston, 1873), 30.
[210] Wallace Davies, "The Society of the Cincinnati in New England 1783-1800." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 3.5: 1 (1948), 15.
[211] Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic* (New York, 1969), 399-400.
[212] James Warren to John Adams, letter dated March 10, 1784, in *Warren-Adams Letters,* II:237.

works such as those of Trumbull which treated the Revolution as having been fought by an officer elite.

There is no evidence that the artist took a stand in these matters or in other domestic political issues that arose during his years as an expatriate. As an artist, Trumbull needed the support of men as disparate as Jefferson and Washington. He himself would not have qualified for a pension in any case because of his short service, but he was very proud of his military role. Washington's position on these issues was nuanced and flexible. From the paintings, we may surmise that Trumbull's point of view was not very different from his brother's—favorable to the demands and pretensions of the officer class—but he was reticent to make this explicit.

Trumbull's nearly exclusive focus on a few identified, notable participants in his scenes, whether or not this would appeal to the purchasers that he sought, reflected his appreciation of portraiture as the core module for artistic expression. To a significant degree he was always at heart a portraitist, sensitive to the demands or desires of sitters – even though he wanted to sell engravings to buyers most of whom obviously could not have been among his subjects. While working on *Bunker Hill,* Trumbull had written that he hoped "in this way to reconcile the pleasures of historical painting with profit."[213] (One of these pleasures probably was to arouse appreciation for American officers, especially senior officers, of whom he was one.) He sought with great vigor to have demand for his engravings awakened and amplified by the endorsement of his illustrious subjects. Washington himself appeared in a number of the paintings that followed the *Study* in Trumbull's revolutionary series, always in a leading and positive role. Washington's name was first on the list of early subscribers to the first set of engravings, marked as ordering four

[213] John Trumbull to John Eliot (March 4, 1786), Andrews-Eliot Papers, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

sets. Jefferson and Hamilton (2 each), John Adams and other American leaders were high on the list of subscribers, and Trumbull emphasized this in his advertising. At least some of these men had been exposed to trends in history painting in Britain and even France.

Bunker Hill is undeniably carefully composed and forcefully and fluidly executed, much more so than Doolittle and Romans. It is not only the struggle to control the grenadier's bayonet that contributes a strong sense of drama and presence. Clouds of white and black smoke obscure the horizon at the middle and left, and dark shadows dominate the extreme foreground. Three large flags are waving, in the hands of both British and American troops who seem to be racing to the scene from the background and right. At least two anonymous corpses are indicated in the foreground, in addition to the other bodies on the ground. At the right, Grosvenor seems poised for instant action. Warren's apparently unsupported head lolls backward and he loses consciousness, as the falling and mortally wounded Maj. Pitcairn on the right is barely supported by his son and a soldier.

Testimony of the emotions that Trumbull's painting was intended to arouse and did arouse, at least from women of high class, comes from Abigail Adams: "Looking at it my whole frame contracted, my blood shivered, and I felt a faintness at my heart."[214] A member of a leading family, it is evident that she identified with the officers depicted by Trumbull.

Contrariwise, however, Americans who identified with any of the hundreds of common soldiers wounded or killed in the battle might have had a different and quite negative reaction to Trumbull's image. Rejection of the work could be triggered both by Trumbull's implication that common soldiers played a negligible or inglorious role at Bunker Hill and by the painting's glorification of an officer class that many might consider even after victory as incompetent and irresponsible in incurring unnecessary losses during the War – and dangerously ambitious thereafter. A critical veteran might also be disgusted by

[214] Abigail Adams, *Letters of Mrs. Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston, MA, 1841), I: 126f.

Trumbull's apotheosis of a notion of chivalry between officers of the opposing sides that he had never seen or heard of on the battlefield—a chivalry from which only officers could expect to benefit.

Quite simply, the near total absence of common soldiers may help to explain why this image might have had only limited appeal, beyond the rather narrow circle of the officers it ennobled and those who focused admiration and gratitude on them. Trumbull's engravings, despite their list of distinguished subscribers, were not a commercial success. He spent much of his time from 1790 to 1793 traveling the East Coast. He sought, with only limited success, to stir up interest in the first two engravings, and he also gathered portrait images for the later ones.

3. The Wider Context.

There were limits to the sacrifices depicted by Doolittle and Romans early in the war. Doolittle did not show anyone as dead or dying. Romans showed only British casualties. This was not mere prudery. Images of dead soldiers don't generally inspire a desire for emulation and enlistment. Such images are not used in recruiting materials, though they can be effective in stirring popular anger and distancing the population psychologically from the enemy.

Doolittle and Romans probably wanted to encourage recruitment and win the war. Still, at least to the modern eye, there is something more deceptive than naïve in Doolittle's and Romans' images. After all, Trumbull, who showed the dead multiply and conspicuously, was much more subject to strict canons of propriety and taste than was either of the others. (None of them showed wounds—even on a dead or dying man such as Warren or Pitcairn.) Since Trumbull was working after the war was over, it was motivating for him to focus on sacrifice including the sacrifice of life.

In the immediate aftermath of Lexington and Bunker Hill, Doolittle's focus on the common soldier as a patriot was widely shared. There was a burst of American praise for the minuteman military model, which sought to make a virtue of a momentary but pressing necessity. "A writer in London says: 'Though the American soldiery may not be so regularly disciplined as the king's troops, yet it must be considered that there is a very material difference between a man who fights for his natural liberty, and the man who only fights because he is paid for it. The former defends himself in a just cause; the latter is the mere dupe of power. The former is animated by the zeal of his attachments to the public weal; the latter has no attachments at all, except to his pay for slaughter and bloodshed.'"[215] Although purporting to cite a British author, one might suspect that these comments were written for the New York market, where they were published.

It was also possible to look at this difference between the armies from the opposite vantage point. Thomas Falconer wrote home to England: "The Bostonians have all the barbarity which false zeal can inspire."[216] Thus, both British and Americans asserted that the citizen soldier had shown himself superior in motivation and hence perhaps in effectiveness. This once again became a quasi-official view in the aftermath of the Revolution, when American leaders sought to explain their victory in ways that could contribution to national cohesion. As Ramsay, a very early historian who received exceptionally strong support from Thomas Jefferson put it, because the Americans "believed their cause to be just, and that heaven approved their exertions in the defence of their rights [hence, the] zeal originating from such motives, supplied the place of discipline; and inspired a confidence and military

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[215] New York Gazette, July 3, 1775, quoted in entry for July 3, 1775, in Frank Moore, *Diary of the American Revolution from Newspapers and Original Documents* (New York, NY, 1863), I: 106.
[216] Quoted in Stephen Conway, "From Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners: British Perceptions of the Americans, circa 1739-1789." *William and Mary Quarterly* LIX:1 (2002), par. 37.

ardour, which over-leaped all difficulties."[217] William Smith sums this up as "Unlike European government wars this was a war for the minds of men; a people's war."[218]

In a people's war, it is the common soldier who determines the result. This is the opposite to the view implied by Trumbull, which is that it was the courage and skill of American officers, especially senior and general officers, which won the war. There is a third view, held at least implicitly by historians such as Jon Butler, arguing that separation was inevitable in any case and that exceptionally zealous soldiering or superior generalship might accelerate progress towards this goal, but neither was necessary to its ultimate achievement.[219]

The idea that achievement of nationhood required soldiers motivated to fight as patriots was in keeping with thinking, as yet not carried into practice, that had emerged in prior decades in Europe. Glorifying Lexington and Bunker Hill, Paine in 1776 had projected onto the minutemen the conceptual schema for an army of citizen soldiers. This was a powerful idea, new in its extension from theory to actual combat and powerful in its subsequent reverberations. Previously, soldiers and, indeed, their officers, had often been depicted as mercenaries who fought for pay and booty when they could get them. Common soldiers, even in contemporary Britain, were despised, or viewed with contempt. But, Paine and Doolittle offered an idealized, oversimplified and perhaps cleansed foretaste of who was to fight on the American side in the Revolution, and what would motivate them to fight.

If it is true that history is written by the winning side, it is perhaps equally true that, at least in the 18th century, the most influential history was written, and painted, by those whose views were acceptable to national leaders. Trumbull's painting seems to stand for the proposition that heroic sacrifices are made and outcomes are determined, not by the quality,

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[217] Ramsay, II:17.
[218] Charles Smith, *The American War from 1775 to 1783, with Plans* (New York, NY, 1797), 57.
[219] Butler (2000).

will and aggregate fighting power of common soldiers, but by senior officers. This in fact was the doctrine that came to be accepted from an early point in the Revolutionary War after Washington assumed command until its end, and at times thereafter.

Washington's scathing early characterizations of his army as motivated only by material rewards was in deliberate contra-distinction to the image of himself as an American Cincinnatus that he wanted and needed to promote. "To woo colonists and fulfill his own sense of how a commander should behave, Washington fashioned himself as a citizen soldier, ever ready to fight for his country without any expectation of material reward."[220] Indeed, Washington plainly stated during the War that he had been "a planter in the state of Virginia" before the War and would be again when it ended. [221]

This is also how Trumbull saw Warren, without a uniform. But Washington did not see his men as sharing his motives, and indeed his social and political outlook were not democratic. This is entirely consistent with his consistent praise of and support for Trumbull's heroic model of military success, with its emphasis on the extraordinary and selfless individual leader and its tendency to devalue or ignore the common soldier.

Washington, as was the case for Wellington later, showed grace and gratitude in describing his soldiers only at moments of victory. Immediately after Yorktown, he stated in writing that "officers and men so universally vied with each other in the exercise of every soldier-like virtue." (This should not be taken to mean that the men vied with the officers.) As to Rochambeau's command, he praised the "distinguished merits of the officers and soldiers of every corps."[222]

Trumbull, at least late in life, was in accord verbally as well as artistically with Washington's disparagement of the American volunteers who fought in the early

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[220] Troy Bickham, "Sympathizing with Sedition? George Washington, the British Press, and British Attitudes during the American War of Independence." *William and Mary Quarterly,* LIX:1 (2002): 101-122.
[221] Gary Wills, *George Washington and the Englightenment* (London, 1984), xx.
[222] New York Packet, November 15, 1781.

engagements. In his Autobiography, he refers to the militias at Lexington as "enthusiastic men, brave, but undisciplined." Furthermore, in the months between Lexington and Bunker Hill, "Little was or could be done...to reduce this assemblage to order and discipline." He asserted that the loss of Canada resulted in part from Col. Enos's "yielding to the clamors and despondence of his men" and turning back.[223] Thus, verbally as well as visually, Trumbull the former colonel advanced the elitist view that the officer corps, more than any patriotism to be attributed to the common soldier, was the indispensable determinant of military effectiveness, whether of a militia or of an army. This implied acceptance of Washington's model of a professional army, since officers could not achieve "order and discipline" in the ranks of men who were not subjected to a stable command structure.

After the War ended, events such as Shay's Rebellion resonated with earlier fears that the soldiery were dangerously volatile and lawless except when under civilian political control in wartime. There was to be no significant standing army. In addition, the activity of Continental officers who sought to define themselves as a class and who became a political pressure group also stirred resentment and controversy, though leaving Washington unscathed. If officers, apart from Washington, had shown themselves in the eyes of some to be selfish, class-oriented and partisan rather than patriotic in their motives, then clearly there might be room for the image of the Lexington minuteman to shine again.

4. Memorializing the Patriot Soldier: Elkanah Tisdale and Cornelius Tiebout.

The events of Lexington focused attention on the militiamen as soldier patriots resisting overwhelming British aggression. These men tended to be depicted favorably, for instance, by Doolittle. Bunker Hill, a battle fought on American initiative and involving far more men over a much longer time period, could serve to illuminate the role of the officers. Romans highlighted the derelictions and inefficiency of the militia officers, suggesting their

[223]Trumbull, 410, 414.

responsibility for the loss of the battle. Contrastingly, much later, after this battle had come to be seen as a key step towards ultimate British defeat and American independence, Trumbull portrayed American and even British officers as brave and chivalrous individuals.

Lexington [1797], engraved by Cornelius Tiebout after a drawing by Elkanah Tisdale, echoes Doolittle's emphasis on the patriotism of the common soldier. (fig. 2.10) While Doolittle and Romans worked at a time when political controversy centered on the legitimacy of the Revolution and the uncertainty of carrying it to a successful conclusion, Tiebout, like Trumbull, addressed a quite different audience, a generation later.

Some evidence as to the tastes and desires of this audience can be gathered from the fact that in the same year, 1797, the General Court (legislature) of Massachusetts made an appropriation, which was increased the following year, at the request of citizens of Lexington for a monument in the form of a stone obelisk to be erected on Lexington Common, where the battle had taken place and where memorial festivities took place each year. This request had been made without favorable response since 1791.[224] The monument, erected in 1799, was to carry the name of each of the "sons" of Lexington who had "sealed and defended" the cause of liberty by giving their lives.[225]

This may have been the first American military monument to carry the names of deceased common soldiers. It evidenced a returning consciousness not just of the decisive importance of common soldiers to the emergence and defense of the nation, but also of the need to recognize their individual identities, humanity and dignity. This was far from the prevailing view during the intervening years, when militias were often viewed as contemptibly undisciplined and incompetent, and regular soldiers as domestic mercenaries.

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[224] Edward Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and their Battlefields* (Urbana, IL, 1991), 13.
[225] Purcell, 125.

Memorialization became a tradition. By 1801, a commemorative speaker paid tribute to "The most dignified object which a free people can witness–the patriot soldier."[226]

Cornelius Tiebout's date of birth is unknown. He was apprenticed to a silversmith in New York, where he learned line engraving. A number of his early works survive, including two maps from around 1790, which are unremarkable and do not include any images. His talents and availability as engraver were advertised by his employer, the New York printer, John Burger, in 1790.[227] In around 1794, he went to London, where he learned stipple engraving and engraved a few portraits. He worked in New York until 1799 and then in Philadelphia until 1825.[228] It is said that he was the first American to go to London for instruction in engraving.

Elkanah Tisdale was also in New York in the late 1790's, working there as an "engraver and miniature painter." He was a native of Lebanon Connecticut, the same town as Trumbull, although there is no evidence that the two men knew each other. However, in 1795 Tisdale designed the plates for a new and complete edition of *M'Fingal,* a poetic work on revolutionary themes by John Trumbull's second cousin, also named John Trumbull, of which the first canto had been published in 1776. *M'Fingal* was a highly popular satire, ridiculing the excesses both of Tory partisans and of popular opinion during the Revolution.

Both verbally and through Tisdale's illustrations, *M'Fingal* tended to minimize the damage inflicted by Americans on the fleeing British. "For did not ev'ry Reg'lar run/ As soon as e'er you fir'd a gun."[229] Fig. 2.11, one of Tisdale's nine small engravings cut in copper with the burin, shows the British in apparent good order. None of the engravings gives evidence of British casualties. There were at least twenty editions of *M'Fingal* over the

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[226] William Austin, *An Oration Pronounced at Charlestown at the request of the Artillery Company* (Charlestown, MA, 1801), 29.
[227] New York Weekly Museum, Jun 26, 1790, 4; reprinted in July and August editions.
[228] Stauffer, 271-2.
[229] John Trumbull, "M'Fingal" (1782). In *The Satiric Poems of John Trumbull*, ed. Edwin T. Bowden (Austin, TX, 1962), 22.

years, most of them unauthorized. Clearly, the picture of Americans as disunited and the British as a rather cowardly though vicious foe had great appeal to many Americans.

Later in his career, Tisdale's production ranged from vignettes for banknotes to an image which coined a word still in common use: the cartoon appearing in the Boston Gazette on March 26, 1812, illustrating the "gerrymander" of Massachusetts electoral district lines by Gov. Elbridge Gerry. However, in O'Brien's view, *Lexington* remained Tisdale's "most notable work."[230]

The course of the French Revolution, particularly from 1793, subsequently showed how hopes of liberation could turn to fear and internecine violence. Many Democratic-Republicans nevertheless continued to favor a French alliance and opposed Jay's treaty, while the Federalists increasingly differed from them in stressing the need to accommodate the British and support them against the French. Noah Webster expressed a widely held view when he wrote in 1794 that the French Revolution demonstrated a truth applicable also to America: "that party spirit is the source of faction and faction is death to the existing government."[231] The American Constitution had not anticipated party government, and the contested Presidential elections of 1796 and 1800, in which Jefferson was elected first vice president and then president, resulted from this—or, in Webster's evident view, from the unfortunate emergence of parties.

In this context, the memory of Lexington could become a potent symbol and rallying point, insofar as it resonated with the Democratic-Republicans' vision of the common citizen and soldier as the wellspring of political legitimacy and merit. This point of view was not limited to one party, particularly since national unity was almost always declared to be a superordinate goal. As Charles Smith put it, obviously with some wishfulness, in 1797, "The

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[230] Donald O'Brien, "Elkanah Tisdale." *The Connecticut Historical Society Bulletin* XLIX:2 (1984): 88

[231] Noah Webster, *The Revolution in France Considered in Respect to Its Progress and Effects by an American* (New York, 1794).

blood of those who were killed at Lexington had proved the firm cement of an extensive union."[232]

That Tiebout and Tisdale saw the significance of Lexington in these terms is further supported by a pair of their other works from this period: a scene of the Battle of Jemappes, an early battle of the French Revolution, and a plate of *Despotism Vanquished by Reason and Liberty*. The first of these is subtitled "Republicans Victorious." It shows Fame in the clouds above the battle, blowing a trumpet carrying a ribbon with the wording "CA IRA. ETC-A" ("Ca Ira, Etcetera"). "Ça Ira," virtually a theme song of the French Revolution, includes verses such as "Les aristocrates, on les pendra! / Le despotisme expirera / La liberté triomphera / Ah! ça ira, ça ira, ça ira." This was a view with which Tiebout and Tisdale evidently identified.

The second print shows Tyranny falling, the crown dropping from its head. Above are two flying figures, one with a liberty cap on a pike and the other with a torch with radiating rays, over the inscription "Men dare to think! Nations arise! Tyrants, Disappear!" If men "dare to think," they are likely to decide for themselves and seize the initiative, rather than merely follow the orders of their officers.

From this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the intent of *Lexington* was not to provide a detailed visual record of events, but rather to accord glory to the citizen soldier and hence to the common citizen, who, in the spirit of Jefferson, was to be seen as man who would "dare to think," rather than as a mere instrument to be manipulated and applied by officers and generals. On July 4, 1801, Tiebout published in Philadelphia an engraving of a portrait of Jefferson as newly-elected President, after a painting by Rembrandt Peale. Here Jefferson points to a copy of the Declaration of Independence (of which he was primary author) but is accompanied by materials associated with his scientific interest as well as by a

[232] Smith (1797), 6.

bust of Franklin, also known for his experiments in science. This engraving was intended to be of the same size, and hence evidently to accompany a recent engraving of a Stuart portrait of Washington.

It is interesting that this work makes little or no visual reference to any political engagement or accomplishment of Jefferson's during the 25 years following the Declaration of Independence--although he had been intensely active in government during most of this period--for instance as first Secretary of State under Washington; then Minister to France; and finally Vice President. This was a judiciously reticent choice of composition, given that it was clear that roughly half the voting population (very roughly corresponding to those who were potential buyers of graphics) disliked or detested Jefferson's populist policies. The Declaration of Independence, like Lexington, had become an icon for legitimacy, patriotism, and national unity. Science was an endeavor which few would find distasteful.

Tiebout appears to combine on one plate in *The Battle of Lexington* at least six distinct scenes, all of which have some connection with the day's events, but which cannot rationally be seen as closely unified by time and place. Unlike Doolittle's and Romans', Tiebout's work is without geographical landmarks, it is not topographical. Furthermore, despite the advertised title, the print's content appears to relate, not to the encounters in Lexington, but to the American attacks on the retreating British column later in the day. Tiebout, like the other three engravers, places the Americans in the foreground. Indeed he does more to diminish the British: he reduces them to tiny figures, far smaller than accurate perspective would seem to demand. Unlike the Americans, they also are bleached to a consistent white (apart from their darker hats), a portrayal that further diminishes their humanity.

Tiebout's representation of the terrain of action also slants the visual communication. The image contains few if any verticals. Neither the trees nor most of the people are truly

upright. The ground slopes downward, in front of the wall, from the left and right borders, but in addition, it slopes generally downward from the wall to the foreground, but with some exceptional lumps along the way. The result is a sense of disequilibrium, with the British seeming to descend into, and then seek to escape from a pit. Almost all of the Americans seem ready to slide down behind the closest point of the wall, located at the center right, which is roughly the point where the escaping British make almost a 270 degree turn away from them. The trees generally pointing towards and the smoke blowing in the direction of this same point also intensify the effect, which is one of convergence towards pursuit. This might be seen as a skillful compositional touch, were the elements of the image better integrated and more readily interpretable within an overall scheme.

The most pervasive element of this composition is the smoke, which is billowing from various areas of the background in several different tones of black and gray. Smoke is also coming from two more compact area that are farther forward along the British line of advance.

There are numerous trees, all of which seem to have lost not only their leaves but also all except their largest branches. This could not have been the result of fire, however, for a large, inhabited house is in the right foreground. Apart from this no other dwellings are clearly visible. Hence it is not clear whether the smoke is coming from homes or other combustibles which the British have set on fire, or at least partly from the firing of guns in battle. At Lexington, after meeting Lord Percy, the British burned three homes which offered possible shelter to American shooters.[233] But, in any event, Tiebout's depiction of fires far ahead of the foreground groups all the road serves to emphasize the large number of

[233] According to an American militiaman from Groton, MA, who fought at Lexington, "much hurt was Done to the houses thare by braking glas And Burning Many Houses." Farnsworth, 82.

British troops, and the fact that the scene shown takes place significantly later than the arrival of the first retreating British at this spot.

The most legitimate reason for the British to set fire to houses is actually illustrated by Tiebout, though without emphasis. At the far right, a balding man, with another figure behind him, perhaps a woman shielded by his bulk, is standing in the doorway and firing a rifle at the British. He, like the other Americans who are shown firing, seems to be taking very careful aim. He does not fire in haste or panic. Furthermore, like the other foreground figures, he sees no need at all to take cover, presumably because there is no return fire.

Rushing from a smoky area in the center background and moving towards the viewer and somewhat to the right, come a disorderly body of men. Approaching a stone wall in the foreground, they seem to turn and disappear to the right, moving again somewhat towards the background. These are evidently the British. None seems to be firing a weapon towards the Americans in the foreground, and most seem to have abandoned their guns in the course of their flight. Those who are closest to the viewer and the wall at the turning point seem to have been hit and to be falling, although none are on the ground or being supported or carried. Those who are farther ahead, to the right, may be in better order, and include two officers on horseback, and a flag. One officer jumps the wall at the right, behind the house, to rejoin the column.

Tiebout shows at least three American wounded (but no American dead) on the ground. However, in keeping with the convention of the time, Tiebout, like Doolittle, Romans and Trumbull shows no wounds at all, but only the effect of these wounds. Near the wall, one of the wounded Americans is holding his chest and another his abdomen. Tiebout emphasizes the man's isolation by sheltering him, alone, in a high rocky outcropping that has no topographical credibility. There are no other naturally occurring rocks here, which heightens the sense of separation of this figure from the rest of the scene. His disturbing

presence so close to the viewer, in a scene of American victory, seems intended as a reminder of the unhappiness and loss that any war, even a just and successful war, will inevitably entail. It may also suggest the nation's duty to succor surviving Revolutionary veterans (not just ex-officers), while indicating in addition that those who fought in 1775 might have been terribly disillusioned had they been able to foresee what the risks and sacrifices they incurred would bring, twenty years later, with serious internal cleavages and the threat of another war. In 1786 Washington wrote: "No morn ever dawned more favorably than ours did, and no day was ever more clouded than the present."[234] However, of the many participants in Tiebout's scene, only one is plainly melancholy, and he is walled off, unable to transmit his feelings to the other participants, or even to see how the action is proceeding.

Armed Americans have been arriving on Tiebout's scene from the left background, to join a small number of shooters already present. In sharp contrast with the British, none of the Americans seem to be moving. Those who are arriving have stopped and at least three of them are firing or preparing to fire at the fleeing British. At the back of the party, a couple of men have seemingly not yet come within range and sight of the British, and are not taking aim at them.

It is possible to interpret those arriving as constituting a frame in a sequential narrative. Perhaps these are the same men who will later advance to the wall, and both cause and take casualties. The man cradling his rifle at the wall towards the center might, for instance, be the officer who led the group. The wounded man to his right might be the bare-headed, dark jacketed fighter towards the far left. However, this sequential interpretation obviously would not explain any of the other scenes shown, and it is not needed to make sense of the action. Furthermore, the arriving men have stopped and two of them have kneeled, and the officer surely is not pointing them towards the wall.

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[234] Washington to Madison (November 5 1786), Manuscript in the Collection of the Library of Congress.

Although they are all carrying rifles, there is nothing military or consistent about either the order or the clothing of the shooters. They are well and cleanly dressed and have evidently seen no battle. Two horses, presumably belonging to their officers, have been tethered to a nearby tree.

At the head of this group is its leader, an officer. He is an older man, the only figure in a tricorn hat, a mark of middle or upper class status. His feet are facing away from the British, and his head is turned even further away from them. His left hand rests the butt of his rifle on the ground, while his right hand points in the general direction of the house, not towards the British--whom, in any event, the men near him can plainly see. They seem to be paying him no heed, and to be focused instead on shooting at the British. It is unclear what he wants his men to do, but whatever it is, they do not appear likely to do it.

True to the political convictions that were explicit in the other prints, Tiebout seems here to be showing us, as Doolittle implied and Romans made more explicit, that at least before Washington took command of the militia and established the Continental Army on July 3, 1775, American officers were ineffectual and somewhat ridiculous. However, it is important to bear in mind that "The militia...were furnished with officers of their own choosing," that is, elected officers.[235] To attribute a capacity for effective leadership to these officers, to accord them credit for favorable military outcomes, would have pleased neither the "professional" officer class with which Trumbull identified himself nor those of a more democratic bent who lionized the patriot soldier.

Whatever was accomplished by the American fighters (in this scene their accomplishment evidently amounted to inflicting casualties on troops who were already in flight) was not the result of effective leadership, but rather was the product of the initiative and resolution of the common soldiers.

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[235] Bolton, ed., 3.

The officer at the head of the militiamen is not the only figure in this print to be making a dramatic hand gesture. Behind him, another armed man, perhaps a subordinate officer, points his right hand straight upward, with the palm facing backward, presumably a signal for the men following him to halt. This is not a sensible command, since these men are not yet in a position to fire on the British, and should, instead of stopping, move forward in order to be able to do so.

A similar but more dramatic hand gesture is made by a hooded woman at the right near the house. Her other hand holds the extended elbow of a young boy, presumably her son, which is an awkward arrangement for running. Her extended hand seems to represent either an involuntary and futile gesture to ward off danger, or a wave aimed at someone we cannot see. The boy shows no sign of fear.

Seemingly fleeing in panic, the woman, with her son, are the only Americans in this print who are plainly in motion. Despite their proximity to the house, it does not seem plausible that they are running from it. The house is undamaged and is protected by the rifleman in the doorway, who surely would not have encouraged them to run out in the open where they would be much less safe than within the house.

It seems more likely that they inhabit a space of their own, separated from the other people and action of the scene. Their presence may be intended, not to integrate with that of the other figures, but instead to symbolize the fact that the British were endangering, and the Americans defending, the lives of their wives and children. This element in Tiebout's composition would also humanize the American role, which otherwise amounts to an attempt to mow down an enemy who has already turned its back in flight and poses at least no immediate danger. The fear and even panic shown by the British regulars is counterbalanced, but not symmetrically, by the fearfulness of the American woman and child—a parallel that does the British no honor.

Another bizarrely detached action element in Tiebout's *Battle of Lexington* comprises the man and woman shown closer to the center foreground. The young woman, with long and beribboned hair down her back, is sinking to one knee as she seeks to restrain the man, holding his hand with one of hers and placing her other hand around his back. With a rifle precariously balancing against his waist in order to leave no doubt as to his prospective role, he extends his arm, with his thumb and forefinger pointed towards the arriving American militia. The plow placed conspicuously in front of him seems intended to indicate his customary occupation. However, he is not dressed for plowing.

The incongruousness of this action, at least from the standpoint of temporality, is even more marked than that of the fleeing woman and child. For, the head of the British column has gone far past this locality. Americans have been shooting at them over the stone wall long enough for several of them to be wounded. Additional men, evidently from another town or unit, are finally arriving. This, then, would hardly be the time for a resident farmer to finally take up his rifle.

It is more likely that at least in this instance Tiebout has followed the time-honored practice of bringing together sequential elements of a related narrative to form a single composite image, even though they may have occurred in different locations. Although not dressed identically to any of the other militiamen depicted, the farmer is intended to be seen as one of those who, earlier in the day, converted from a civilian to a military role. The restraining hand of the woman reminds us of the dangers to which these volunteers chose to subject themselves—and of the distress which their death or wounding would entail.

Combining these narrative elements, the story that Tiebout tells is that of a citizen soldier who leaves his home, risking death or wounds and goes with his company to another town or to the countryside, to attack the British who have been victimizing his fellow citizens, including women and children. Under the general but ineffectual guidance of his

officer, but without resort to formation tactics, he attacks the retreating British with individual initiative, and they flee.

This is a reasonable historical condensation of the day's events, though, particularly by including the scene of the farmer, his plow and wife, it telescopes many hours into one. But, according to a British participant, "As the Country for many miles round...had by this time had notice of what was doing, as well by the firing, numbers of armed men on foot and on horseback, were continually coming from all parts guided by the fire, and...we were fired at from all quarters but particularly from the houses on the roadside, and the Adjacent Stone walls."[236]

Tiebout's treatment of this scene can be contrasted with that of Doolittle, in 1775, but also with a French engraving of intermediate date, Godefroy's 1782 *Battle of Lexington* [1782]. (fig. 2.14) This was the only one of the images in Ponce's *Recueil d'estampes Representant les Différents Evenements de la Guerre qui a Procuré l'independance aux Etats Unis de l'Amerique,* printed in Paris, to be concerned with the early events of the Revolution. It seems to reflect less engagement with the battle than either of the other versions, and Fowble criticizes it as inaccurate.[237]

Here, we see the British retreating in seemingly good order, with their cannons and at least one flag, across a seemingly broad front. They are apparently confronted or pursued by a single line of Americans, with rifles at the ready but pointed upwards, and backed up against a row of buildings. No such scene is shown by other artists, or mentioned by historians. The Americans harassed the retreating British from the sides of the road, but they did not come behind them. Although the two groups as shown by Godefroy are quite close together, the Americans seem motionless, while the movement of the British is emphasized

[236] Frederick MacKenzie, Diary entry for April 19, 1775, in Rhodehamel, ed., 8.
[237] Fowble, 435.

by setting the bodies of at least some of them at a slant. There are a couple of wounded, presumably British, in the extreme foreground.

This depiction shows three British cannon, where in fact there were two, both brought by Lord Percy's relief column during the afternoon. They were used effectively from time to time during the retreat to compel the Americans to hold their distance, but Godefroy does not depict this. Neither Doolittle nor Tiebout show the cannon in their views of the retreat. This is the only respect in which Godefroy's may offer some partially accurate specificity. Apart from this, it could be a generic scene of an army retreating.

In contrast with Doolittle and Godefroy, Tiebout explicitly highlights the officer, showing him as present but ineffective. Tiebout's treatment contrasts with Doolittle's in other ways as well. *Plate IV. View of the South Part of Lexington*, the last of Doolittle's four engravings, shows the Americans firing from behind stone walls at the retreating British. All three artists refer to this action as occurring at Lexington, although such firing continued through miles of countryside and towns all the way to Charlestown. It is true that as both Doolittle and Tiebout showed, the light infantry originally positioned as flankers had been exhausted and no longer provided protection. "...with Difficulty they could keep out their Flanking Partys to remove the Enemy to a Distance, so that they were at length a good deal pressed."[238] But Doolittle shows the Americans nonetheless firing from a great distance, probably ineffectually, while Tiebout shows them close to the enemy and firing with great effect.

Unlike Doolittle, Tiebout and Godefroy see no need for topography to strengthen the impression that his was, indeed, a picture of Lexington. Over the course of twenty years, Lexington had taken a place in the American consciousness that was entirely independent of geographic reality. Tiebout calls the scene "Lexington," even though it is seemingly beyond

[238] Thomas Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, April 22, 1775, quoted in Rhodehamel, ed., 20.

or on the outskirts of Lexington, simply because that was the title by which people knew and referred to these events in the generation following the War.

Godefroy, in a depiction marked by much smoke and flame, with sharply contrasting areas of black and white, seems to show a house burning at the extreme right. Doolittle makes it quite clear visually that the British have been burning houses in the town, but does not show Americans shooting from any house. Tiebout makes the opposite choices: he evidently sees much less need to justify American rebellion by British provocation. His audience already knew about the burning of houses by the British, and many would have identified the smoke as having this origin. With the war long concluded and in the face of further provocations and tensions with Britain, they would at any rate take it for granted that it was justifiable, indeed, morally right and necessary for Americans to seek to kill British soldiers at Lexington. There was no need to make this justification graphic and explicit.

Doolittle's and Tiebout's presentation of the American shooting is likewise very different. Doolittle's visual characterization of the comportment of the militiamen in the afternoon, after the first fighting at Lexington and the events at Concord, is almost as casual, detached and individualistic as it was for the first skirmish with Pitcairn's men in Doolittle's *Battle of Lexington*. They seem to be interspersed along the wall with casual strollers. No one, either American or British, is seeking shelter from the bullets. The distance between the Americans and the British is great, and one would have to look hard for any sign of British casualties. Apart from the drama of the fires, this could be mistaken for a picture of a holiday parade.

Working soon after the events, Doolittle was at pains to minimize the perceived organization and effectiveness of the American firing as the British retreated. Tiebout, however, emphasizes the collective and seemingly unanimous armed militancy of the Americans, the effectiveness of their attack on the British, and the fact that they attacked

bravely at close quarters and resolutely persisted despite casualties. This is emblematic of the national unity of purpose and Revolutionary action which so many Americans felt by 1796 to have been irretrievably lost – despite the fact that the essential goals of the Revolution (retrospectively seen as including stable and consensual government, a modest and hardworking rather than speculative citizenry and economy, and international acceptance and respect) had not yet been achieved.

Contemporary historians interpreted the motivation for and accomplishments of the Revolution in a similar light, sublimating or effacing the conflict between Americans Whigs and Tories (which was, however, treated with popular success in more imaginative works such as *M'Fingal*). Ramsay, perhaps the most immediately popular of these historians, asserted that "I write not for party but for posterity."[239] According to M'Culloch, writing in 1795, "The love of liberty, or property, and an idea of their own strength, spirited up the Americans to a determined resistance."[240]

Chipman, in a more analytical tome published in 1793, pointed to the conditions which had brought together "The germ of that general union of counsels and sentiments, which produced the American Revolution."[241] Overall, these historians' "...approach to history demonstrated a calculated effort to use historical writing as an instrument of public policy."[242] Tiebout supports this effort. Unlike Doolittle, he shows no spectators. Every American is participating in, or at least fully engaged by the attack on the British.

Perhaps in order to broaden its appeal, even to Federalists, Tiebout's print, like Trumbull's, was advertised as being accompanied by a portrait of Washington (who was not present at either battle, but who, almost alone, stood above faction as an object of near

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[239] Ramsay to Jedidiah Morse, Aug. 12, 1807, in Robert Brunhouse ed., "David Ramsay, 1749-1815: Selections from his writings." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, LV:4 (1965): 160.
[240] John M'Culloch, *Concise History of the United States* (Philadelphia, PA, 1795), 35.
[241] Nathaniel Chipman, *Sketches of the Principles of Government* (Rutland, VT, 1793), 241.
[242] Shaffer, 12.

universal national veneration and admiration), and was to form the first of a series of engravings (in Tiebout's case, six pairs), each associating a battle with a military or political figure. These were to include the two British surrenders and the Hessian surrender at Trenton, with portraits of Franklin, Adams and Jefferson. According to the advertisement, the purpose of this publication is that "Posterity will learn the first exertions of our patriotic citizens at Lexington with wonder... every mind must be impressed with the most lively emotions of political gratitude, toward those who were the authors of our political happiness and glory. "[243]

Thus, the declared purpose of the work is in part moral, to provide a historical example from which the viewer will learn and which it is hoped that he will wish to emulate or at least honor. However, it also aims to inspire gratitude. If we are to judge by the content of the print itself, the intended object of gratitude is the patriot soldier, not the officer. And if it was in fact the soldiers who were "the authors of our political happiness," then it was obviously right for their views, as represented by the Democratic Republicans of Jefferson, to govern.

This moral view of history and is not very different from Reynolds views on history painting, cited earlier. It motivated historical writing as well. Mercy Otis Warren, the only one of the major early American historians who had been an anti-federalist and who had initially opposed to the adoption of the Constitution, wrote to John Adams in 1780 that "the 'giddy multitude' was sacrificing all the gains of independence, by failing to adhere to "the manners that would secure their freedom." In a later letter, in 1807 she wrote him that she wished "only to cultivate the sentiments of public and private virtue in whatsoever falls from her pen."[244] And for written as well as visual versions of history, it was recognized that such

[243] The Time-piece, and literary companion, May 26, 1797, 132.
[244] Warren to Adams, Dec. 28, 1780 and August 15, 1807, *Warren-Adams Letters,* 183 and 453.

normative motives, in what had become a highly partisan era, would cloud any hope of accurate depiction. Thus, it seemed for John Adams that "The world will go on always ignorant of itself, its past history, and future destiny."[245]

The advertisement for the prints, indicating that publication would be by Tiebout and his brother, Alexander, did not mention Tisdale. It merely asserted that the prints of the series would be "From original paintings and drawings, by the first American Artists." The price was to be five dollars for the battle scene and portrait pair, or three dollars for subscribers to the series.

Although Tisdale had executed some engravings from drawings by others, he could not have been well known as an artist. Tiebout, like Doolittle, sought to trade on and advance his own reputation rather than that of the draftsman when he took on the role of publisher of the works he had engraved. However, as was the case for Trumbull, who had the benefit of much more prestigious backing and significant advance sales, Tiebout failed to sell a profitable volume and the series was discontinued. Only *The Battle of Lexington*, the first of the six battle prints that had been advertised was ever completed, and it was sold without the accompanying portrait of George Washington with which it had been advertised.[246] An of evaluation of *The Battle of Lexington* was that it had: "no claim to praise. It is feeble."[247] This is despite Dunlap's opinion that Tiebout returned from his instruction in London "very much improved."

In fact, whatever the merits of this print, the market for visual history, like the market for history books, seems to have been oversupplied during the period after the British were defeated. Failure of a book or print does not need to be explained by any lack of individual merit. Ramsay's *History of the Revolution in South Carolina* "sold no more than 825 copies

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[245] John Adams to Benjamin Rush, August 31, 1809 in John A. Schutz and Douglass Adair, eds., *The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813* (San Marino, CA, 1966), 152.
[246] Donald O'Brien, "Elkanah Tisdale," The Connecticut Historical Society Bulletin, ILIX: 2, Spring 1984, 88.
[247] Dunlap, II:156.

and lost over $1500," though it was praised by critics and bought by libraries and its author was highly reputed.[248] This is in sharp contrast to Paine's sales of hundreds of thousands of copies of *Common Sense* in the early days of the Revolution. It is hard to find examples of financial success in the publishing of either history books or prints in the eighteenth century after the end of the Revolution. The attention of the public, if not of the artists and writers seeking mightily to find lessons in the past for the present, had evidently turned forward towards more recent events in America, where conflicts were political rather than martial. But the virtues of the patriot soldier continued to be written, sung and painted, and it is ultimately this image which has dominated the American vision of the Revolution.

[248] Shaffer, 161.

Fig. 2.1: John Trumbull, *Study for The Death of General Warren at Bunker's Hill,* 1788, oil on canvas, Yale University Art Gallery

Fig. 2.2: John Trumbull, *Key to the Bunker's Hill*, 1791, engraving, Yale University Art Gallery

1. Gen. Warren
2. Putnam
3. Col. Prescott
4. Gardner
5. Lt Col. Parker
6. Major Knowlton
7. McClery
8. Moore
9. Lt Grosvenor
10. Rev. McClintock
11. Gen. Howe
12. Clinton
13. Col. Abercrombie
14. Major Pitcairn
15. Small
16. Lt Pitcairn
17. Lord Rawdon

Fig. 2.3: John Trumbull, *Israel Putnam*, 1790, ink on paper, Collection of Putnam Phalanx, Hartford

Fig. 2.4: John Trumbull, *Sketch of Lt. Grosvenor*, 1785, ink on paper, Historical Society of Pennsylvania

Fig. 2.5: John Trumbull, *Sketch for Study for The Death of General Warren at Bunker's Hill*, 1785, ink on paper, Collection of Susan Silliman Pearson, New Haven

Fig. 2.6: Jacques Callot, Untitled print form the series *La Noblesse*, 1624, engraving, Australian National University

Fig. 2.7: Thomas Day, *Sir Henry Clinton*, undated, engraving, National Portrait Gallery

Fig. 2.8: John Singleton Copley, *Joseph Warren*, after 1765, oil on canvas, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

Fig. 2.9: John Trumbull, *Peter the Great at the Battle of Narva*, 1812, oil on canvas, Collection of the Yale University Art Gallery

Fig 2.10: Cornelius Tiebout after Elkanah Tisdale, *Battle of Lexington*, 1797, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig 2.11: Elkanah Tisdale, Illustration from John Trumbull, *M'Fingal*, 1795, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 2.14 : Godefroy and Ponce, *Journée de Lexington*, plate 3 from *Recueil d'estampes representant les différents événemens de la Guerre qui a procuré l'indépendance aux Etats Unis de l'Amérique*, 1784, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Chapter III: The Citizen-in-Arms Is Recognized as *Vainqueur de la Bastille*: July 14, 1789

There is no vigor in the military state if the nation is not a part of it...Everything changes if war becomes the business of the nation and if the soldier becomes a citizen, and the citizen a soldier.[249]

1. Introduction

The "French Revolution" was actually a series of revolutions, occurring over a period of years starting in 1789. A signal event in the first of these revolutions in Paris was the taking of the Bastille by men opposed to the Government on July 14, 1789. This event was immediately preceded by the taking of arms from the Invalides which, in turn, followed repression by Government forces of demonstrations during the immediately preceding days.

Those who took the Revolutionary side in this initial conflict included soldiers—men who had been trained and paid and who had a continuing, vocational military commitment. The citizen-in-arms or citizen soldier also fought, for example at the Bastille. These were people with a non-military vocation who did not fight as members of an established military unit, but who were motivated to enter battle as ordinary fighters primarily because of their desire to advance or defend the cause of the nation or people. The citizen-in-arms appears rarely if ever in French art of the decades preceding the Revolution. If there were actually citizens-in-arms in France during this period, they seem to have left scarcely a mark either in words or in images.

Artists of the time had, however, already created images memorializing or referring to civilians who in the past had left civil life to undertake high military responsibility. David's Oath of the Horatii [1784] and even Gillray's satirical Cincinnatus [1782], according credit to Cincinnatus in order to denigrate Burke by comparison, can be seen in this light. But these ancient examples were not citizens-in-arms. Cincinnatus (and Burke), like the Horatii, were national leaders, not ordinary fighters.

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[249] (Il n'y a pas de vigueur de l'état militaire si la nation n'y a pas part...Tout change si la guerre devient l'affaire de la nation et si le soldat devient citoyen et le citoyen soldat.) Guibert, 23.

I will evaluate in this chapter the hypothesis that the image of the citizen-in-arms first appeared in representations of contemporary French events when it was depicted in art relating to the crucial Revolutionary conflicts which occurred over a period of several days culminating in the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789. According to this hypothesis, the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille*, a group embodying the men thought to have led the capture of the fortress, were exemplary among those depicted as citizen soldiers. Indeed, the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille* were specifically described as *citoyens-soldats* or citizen soldiers-- in contemporary pamphlets, perhaps the first formal application of this term to specific people in a contemporary context.[250]

Images of these events show men both in uniform and in civilian dress, making common cause to fight against French and foreign soldiers representing the royal government. Although some images created before the Revolutionary period show conflict between civilians and soldiers, few if any show soldiers who have defected to join civilians in opposing Government troops. Citizen soldiers may thus be understood as a force comprising both civilians and defecting soldiers. This commingling of men with and men without uniforms can suggest the citizen soldier's commitment to an overarching national cause, broader than that of any government—the cause of the people. The association of civilians with the anti-government soldiers also helps to distinguish the Revolution from a military coup d'état in which soldiers take over the state.

I will also put forward evidence that the collaborative action of uniformed men and civilians, together to be taken as representative of the emergent nation, "the people," constituted the initial iconography for the citizenry which recognized themselves as a body having preeminent rights, and sought to exercise these rights. Such citizen soldiers appear in

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[250] *La Journée Parisienne ou Triomphe de la France,* July, 1789, pamphlet quoted in Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink and Rolf Reichardt, *The Bastille: A History and a symbol of Despotism and Freedom*, trans. Norbert Schürer (Durham, NC, 1997), 86.

Revolutionary images from this point onward for several years. The Garde Nationale, which was to become a constellation of units raised and commanded locally, came into being immediately after the storming of the Bastille. It was much later, in 1793, that a unified army under Revolutionary control was finally established. During this period, beginning with works executed after the Bastille, civilians who fight are almost always depicted as fighting against the established order, whereas soldiers are divided between Revolutionaries and Royalists. In some of the early images of these events, civilians continue to be portrayed primarily as victims rather than as fighters, which is the role to which they had been relegated during the days preceding the outbreak of fighting. Perceived victims already of hunger and of aristocratic privilege, they became victims of the King's soldiers as well.

The citizen soldier, in contrast to other soldiers, can be conceptualized as an individual who (though he may subsequently join a military unit as a professional soldier) initially comes spontaneously straight from his civil activity to join the fight. Thus, he would still be wearing his civilian clothes when he entered the conflict. Visually, the citizen soldier therefore could be symbolized by a figure who fought without a uniform. Citizen soldiers can be distinguished from both professional soldiers and civilian rioters if they are shown fighting alongside soldiers who have defected from Government units. Although much had been written about concepts of the citizen soldier before the Revolution began, these can be the most practical means for identifying him visually, at least in the absence of accompanying text. It remains, of course, to demonstrate the citizen soldier's presence in the vocabulary and images of the time.

A preliminary word as to the significance accorded to the Bastille in 1789 and later may be helpful, particularly since July 14 was not the first time during this period that troops loyal to the Government had been opposed and compelled to withdraw. (For instance, on July 12 *Gardes Françaises*, a regiment of the regular line army that was quartered in Paris

and was sometimes known as the *Gardes Bourgeois*, fired on and forced the withdrawal of a detachment of the *Royal Allemands* that sought to keep them confined to their barracks in the Chaussée d'Antin.)[251] However, the text accompanying an engraving of the taking of the Bastille nevertheless begins: "The taking of the Bastille! That is the day, the instant, at which began the revolution." It adds that two days earlier (July 12) "all Parisians had become soldiers"—citizen soldiers.[252]

The symbolic importance to the Revolution of the taking of the Bastille in part reflected the fact that this was the first armed conflict which resulted in the permanent wresting of control of a strong point from the Government—and, indeed, in its subsequent utter destruction. The event symbolized the Government's irretrievable loss of control—a loss that at first was hoped to be and subsequently proved to be permanent.

The fortress itself, however, was no longer of much military or governmental importance in 1789. But this was an edifice that for decades had been emblematic of the strength of the Government's hold on the capital and the country, a position seemingly founded on unassailable military strength. With its eight towers, it might have been seen as giving the Government the means to control and punish the nearby and particularly anti-Government Faubourg St. Martin with artillery fire. (It was in this district that the Réveillon Riots, one of the most serious public disturbances in the months preceding the Bastille, had occurred.) The fear that the Bastille artillery were being arrayed and prepared to fire on the people in this district could have been a motivating factor in their assault. As described by in the commentary accompanying a contemporary engraving, "They can see the canons directed towards the city..."[253]

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[251] The term Gardes Bourgeois can be found, for instance, in the *Lettre de Barnave*, Versailles, 6-8 Octobre.
[252] "La prise de la Bastille! Voilà le jour, l'instant d'où date la révolution. [...] Tous les Parisiens devinrent soldats." Chamfort, *Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1791-1794), Tableau #16 : Prise de la Bastille.
[253] (On aperçoit les canons dirigés contre la ville...), Chamfort, ibid.

The fact that the Bastille was razed to the ground by the Revolutionaries in the ensuing months enhanced the perceived significance, the assured permanence, of what became in prevailing mythology the first significant Revolutionary victory. As a symbol, its resonance and relevance was also to prove permanent. The destruction of the Bastille, to which the storming was the crucial antecedent, came to represent the destruction of the *Ancien Régime*. Nevertheless, Furet boldly asserts that this was a victory that "no one at the time realized how decisive it would turn out to be."[254] This would be literally impossible to prove and seems in fact to be contradicted by the events which quickly followed, such as the designation of the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille* and the rapid appearance of a very large number of different engravings of the event. Furthermore, some artists, such as David with his *Tennis Court Oath* [1791], or Prieur, for whom the "Revolution" began with the calling of the *États Generaux*, have identified entirely different and earlier events as decisive trigger points for the Revolution. The summoning of the *États Generaux* was in turn at least in part the consequence of the heavy financial losses resulting from French participation in the American Revolution. These may be more sophisticated readings of events, but the Revolution was an armed conflict and prevalent myth described this conflict as starting at the Bastille.

The fall of the Bastille has also long been an event of great interest to historians. A number of books describing the circumstances surrounding its fall appeared around the time of the bicentennial in 1989.[255] Of these, Lüsebrink and Reichart's magisterial *The Bastille: A History of a Symbol of Despotism and Freedom,* cited above, provides a thorough analysis of contemporary accounts of the Bastille in both pamphlets and newspapers. This work also

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[254] (Dont personne sur le moment n'a fait le moment decisif qu'il est devenu.) François Furet and Denis Richet, *La Révolution française* (Paris, 1988), 120.
[255] See for instance Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *La Bastille est prise. La Révolution française commence* (Bruxelles, 1988).

traces in careful detail the emergence and subsequent evolution of the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille*.

In evidence of the rapidly condensing sense of the Bastille's pivotal importance, there are an unusually large number of different images of *"La Prise de la Bastille."* 121 of them are in the collection of the Bibliothèque Nationale, which is a great many compared with the number of representations of previous and subsequent Revolutionary events. For instance, there are only 32 images in this collection showing the skirmishes of July 12, 1789. There are only 3 images depicting the *Déclaration de la Patrie en Danger*, in 1792 – an event that was not only significant to the course of the Revolution, but also charged with attractive pictorial possibilities. *"La Prise de la Bastille"* has constituted a high peak of artistic interest in the saga of Revolutionary events.

A very large number of the Bastille images are undatable and many are of unknown origin, factors which would tend to render it impractical or of limited value to attempt a comprehensive analysis of them. I will give principal attention to the works of a few artists, primarily those who authored narrative series on Revolutionary subjects, executed principally in the print medium, or in painting. To do this will require attention to questions of the relative timing of events, preparation of plates and publication, as well as to proximity or distance of the artist and publisher from the action. These questions are complex because under Revolutionary conditions, images were sometimes drawn, painted or engraved, and even displayed or advertised, long before an edition was actually placed on sale or an original was formally exhibited. In the interim, changes could be made. Later or modified images should be expected to reflect changing political perspectives and anticipated buyer interests and tastes. At the same time, basic iconographic elements established earlier needed to be maintained in order to facilitate identification of the scene and acceptance of it as an authentic view.

For example, images of the taking of the Bastille are almost always composed from the vantage point of the attackers outside the fortress, before they gained entrance to it. This is likely to be because the viewer is expected by the artist to identify with the assailants, who he knows will be victorious. Just as was consistently the case in the works of Doolittle, Romans, Tiebout and Trumbull considered earlier, placing the Revolutionaries in the foreground here facilitates a more detailed depiction of them as well as the viewer's identification with them. While it may seem that the American citizen soldiers in the earlier works were depicted as defenders while the French were seen as attackers who assaulted the Bastille, the difference is illusory. French commentators insisted that the crowd had come to the Bastille to peacefully take weapons, as they had earlier at Les Invalides, so that it was the government that had treacherously launched an attack against the people. For instance, as described in the text accompanying Prieur's depiction of the taking of the Bastille, "A new crowd comes asking for arms and munitions. "[256] To the same effect, Adrien Duquesnoy, a Deputy from Bar-le-Duc, described how "we approached the Bastille with a white flag and a drum, the signs of peace."[257]

It is necessary to consider social as well as political identification of artists and publishers, as well as of the intended buyers of the prints, all of which can motivate and influence not only choice of subject but also representation. For instance, with the capture of the Bastille as a fait accompli, in order to be marketable and indeed acceptable, an image would probably need to show the activity of the insurrectionists in a favorable light. It follows from this that depicting the Revolutionaries collectively as ruffians or bloodthirsty killers was unlikely to please opinion and the market. Indeed, where conspicuous acts of revenge and murder were known to have occurred and were shown, they were often

[256] (Une multitude nouvelle vient demander des armes et des munitions), Chamfort, ibid.
[257] (On s'approche de la Bastille avec un drapeau blanc et un tambour, on fait des signes de paix) Adrien Duquesnoy, *Journal d'Adrien Duquesnoy, Député du tiers état de Bar-le-Duc, sur l'Assemblée Constituante* (Paris, 1894), 207.

attributed visually to people represented very differently from typical members of the crowd of Revolutionaries. A typical example is Jean-Francois Janinet's, *Ile Evenement du 14 Juillet, 1789* [1791], which shows soldiers directed by de Launay firing on unarmed civilians within the confines of the Bastille. (Fig. 3.5) Considerations such as these narrowed the scope of prevalent depiction substantially, and favored the establishment and increasing prevalence of standard iconic elements, both people and objects, to facilitate immediate and accurate reading of the sense of the works by the viewer. The understanding of these elements will be crucial to the analysis of the art.

2. The Print Series and Related Works.

The narrative print series purporting to represent a series of connected historical events seems to have come into flower during the French Revolution. However, a slightly earlier example is Anne-François David's engravings based on the work of an anonymous artist, *Histoire de France en Figures* [1788]. In addition, lengthy series that did not follow a historical sequence but were published in installments and available by subscription had long been popular. Jean-François Janinet coordinated the production of and engraved many of the 176 plates illustrating Le Vacher de Charnois's *Costumes et annales des grands théâtres de Paris* [1786]. Laborde's *Le voyage pittoresque de la France avec la description de toutes ses provinces,* containing 380 prints, appeared in an eight-volume edition beginning in 1781.

Some of the Revolutionary series, unlike most prints sold individually, are accompanied by historical narratives and preceded by detailed prospectuses or discursive advertisements which give further evidence of the publishers' intentions, points of view and orientation to the print market. For any series to continue through dozens of emissions also gives evidence of successful adaptation to demand. It would be much harder to estimate the circulation of single prints, for instance on the basis of the number of examples that survive, or from contemporary comments about print sales—the latter are very scarce for this period.

The body of the present chapter will be divided into four sections, dealing first with the print series, taken, so far as possible, in the order of the initial appearance of the images. This will provide a broader context for consideration of images depicting particular subjects and events. The next section deals with the *Vainqueurs*, who can be viewed as a first group of citizen soldiers identified by name; next with the fall of the Bastille; and finally with depictions of the events of the immediately preceding days in July which triggered and facilitated the attack on the Bastille. This is, of course, opposite to the chronological order of events, but it can be helpful in tracing the citizen soldier back from his most dramatic and marked appearance early in the Revolution to the antecedent events which made possible this appearance.

In discussing the images of a particular event, I will generally try to present them in the probable order of their execution or entry onto the market. Most of the visual materials of this chapter depict events occurring within a span of only a few days while preparation and publication of prints begun soon afterwards often took months—and in some important instances, years. Hence, respect for chronology of publication will not be compromised by the order of presentation adopted here.

A table at the end of the chapter summarizes the available dating information for the principal series and some other works. This information is not definitive. In some cases works may have been advertised as available when they were not yet ready. In other cases, drawings and even engravings may have been undertaken long before it was possible to place them on sale. David's *Tennis Court Oath* provides an interesting point of comparison. If David had intended the work for public display, the changing composition and loss of public confidence in the Third Estate, indeed the execution and flight of some of its members, might also have militated against any expectation of success even for prints derived from the painting. "The lesson of David's experience is that when the artist foresakes the distance of

the metaphor, the actual public sphere will perpetually escape representation. This was the fate of the Tennis Court project. To finish it would have required an impossibly stable political consensus...This process of historical change would not stand still to accommodate the atemporal and time-consuming medium of painting."[258] Yet David and others executed other paintings of Revolutionary subjects which were acclaimed and which have stood the test of time.

Small prints of the same scenes, generally within historical series, which could be bought by small proprietors and artisans, were sold from 1790 onwards, but this certainly was not among the most popular subjects. For instance, the subject was included in one series, the *Tableaux Historiques,* which was reprinted in successive editions from 1791 through 1817.

The first of the print series to begin to appear was probably Révolutions de Paris, which began to appear either during late 1789 or at the very beginning of 1790. (140 periodicals began operation in Paris during 1789, of which only thirty-four survived for more than a year.)[259] The prints in Révolutions de Paris are of poor quality both in terms of design and of printing. There are errors in perspective, and the lines show naïve conception and uncertain, tremulous execution. Hasty preparation may have been a factor.

The table at the end of the chapter lists the four prints from the Révolutions de Paris series relating to the events surrounding the fall of the Bastille that I have seen. The fifth print shown in the Table is documented as having been presented in the 1793 Salon. Apart from this, Tourneux lists two other prints depicting events of July 13, but it does not appear

[258] Thomas Crow, "Classicism and Romanticism: Patriotism and Virtue--David to the Young Ingres." In Stephen Eisenman, Ed., *Nineteenth Century Art, A Critical History* (New York, NY, 1994), 30-31.
[259] Jeremy Popkin, *Revolutionary News* (Durham, NC, 1990), 33.

that he saw them.[260] He says that all of the prints were by Sergent, but the one showing the taking of the Bastille shows Dupin as engraver. Neither artist is well known.

The events run from the *Charge du Royal-Allemand* (the charge of the Royal Allemand Regiment against demonstrators on July 13), in which prosperous-looking civilians appear as victims who do not fight back, to the taking of the Bastille, in which the attackers appear all or nearly all to be uniformed soldiers. Thus, although the series covers a period of only a few days and includes only a small number of images, some of which have numerous civilian participants, the story it tells seems to focus on the decisive importance of soldiers who changed sides to seek to overthrow a Government that had already attacked its people—Parisians who had until then been prosperous and calm, rather than starving and fractious.

A series of four paintings on similar subjects, which may well have been intended to be engraved, was executed by Jean-Baptiste Lallemand in 1789-90 and displayed at the 1790 Salon.[261] These Revolutionary works came in the latter part of Lallemand's career, when he was already over seventy years old. While the paintings are often reproduced (there has been very little research concerning them), the sole published work devoted to this artist is a small exhibition catalogue, published over fifty years ago, which does not even mention the series.[262]

Lallemand's series, like Révolutions de Paris, begins with an image of Lambesc's charge. The remaining three images depict the pillage of Les Invalides, the taking of the Bastille, and the last work is the arrest of de Launay. (All except the last of these four events

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[260] Maurice Tourneux, *Bibliographie de L'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1900), I : 59.

[261] Lallemand was born in Dijon in 1716, where his father was a tailor. He moved to Paris in 1739, obtained his Maitrise in 1744, and afterwards spent fourteen years in Rome. Lallemand painted, drew and also engraved many architectural works and landscapes, including monuments of antiquity and imaginary landscapes. These included 140 views of Burgundy. During his early Paris years, he exhibited at the Academie de St. Luc (until its suppression, before the Revolution), and not at the Salons, although he had contact with the Academie Royale at least through his collaboration with Greuze. He died in Paris in 1803.

[262] Pierre Quarré, *J-B Lallemand Paysagiste Dijonais du XVIIIe Siècle*, exhibition catalogue from the Musée de Dijon (Dijon, 1954).

are also represented in Révolutions de Paris). It is intriguing that neither of these series, unlike others that will be considered here, continued for more than a few emissions. An inference, I believe, is that demand for Revolutionary subjects developed only gradually, as the significance and implications of the Revolution became clearer. In this particular instance, being first to market had little value, particularly if it was not sustained by staying power, the authority and acceptability conveyed by a continuing series of examples. The later presence of larger numbers of works on similar subjects may actually have stimulated demand, making such prints virtually a necessity at least in some households. Prints based on Lallemand's paintings could well also have become popular somewhat later.

Lallemand's first two images emphasize both the respectability and the peacefulness of the Parisians. All the violence comes from the Government troops. In the latter two paintings, Lallemand diverges from Révolutions in emphasizing the role of civilian insurgents, giving them more light and foreground space than the insurgent soldiers. He seems to impute to these insurgents a mixed class background, and some of them may be of lower class status. In proposing such a idealizing, unifying view, Lallemand seems to have been in advance of then-current thinking, which largely focused both on the need to co-opt more of the King's soldiers over to the Revolutionary side, and on the need to distinguish between, on the one hand, "the people," who were Revolutionary without seeking unfair personal gain, and on the other the violent opportunists of the lower classes who sought wealth dishonestly under cover of the Revolution. For example, "According to Pitra's memoirs, as Hulin was returning from Les Invalides he met in the place Dauphine 'two companies of *gardes-francaises* surrounded by citizens. He recognized among these several officers of that regiment, in civilian dress, who were trying to persuade their soldiers to

follow them and desert the people's cause.' Hulin soon got rid of these officers by loudly exposing the motives that had brought them there."[263]

A third series which is also of relatively early date, though it includes events through March, 1791, is Jean-François Janinet's *Gravures historiques des principaux événements depuis l'ouverture des États-Généraux de 1789.* There are 52 aquatints, including a silhouette of La Fayette, which were issued successively by subscription, mostly one by one. Eight of them concern the events of July 14. Janinet himself appears to have been artist, engraver and co-publisher for the whole series.[264] Each engraving is accompanied by a text of unknown authorship, generally of four pages but some as long as 8-10 pages, forming a booklet intended to be issued weekly to subscribers. No prospectus or advertising seems to have survived apart from the prints. The series has received little attention from modern scholars. Other than a few brief references, there have been no articles or books devoted to it.

This artist (b. Paris, 1752; d Paris, 1 Nov 1814) was highly successful both before and after the revolutionary period in his execution of works which were primarily reproductive, including a series of famous actors and actresses in costume (176 plates) and series of architectural views (83 plates). He also engraved mythological scenes, and country genre pieces, such as *The Friendly Peasant Girl* after St.-Quentin [1779]. During the Revolution he reproduced the allegories, *La Liberté* and *l'Égalité* of Moitte [1793].

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[263] (D'après les mémoires de Pitra, alors que Hulin retournait des Invalides, il rencontra sur la place Dauphine 'deux compagnies de gardes-françaises entourées de citoyens. Il reconnut entr'eux plusieurs officiers de ce régiment, habillés comme citoyens, qui essayaient de convaincre leurs soldats de leur suivre et abandonner la cause du peuple.' Hulin fit fuir rapidement ces officiers en exposant bruyament leurs motivations. 'Mémoires inédits de L.-G. Pitra,' in Jules-Gustave Flammermont *La Journée du 14 juillet 1789* (Paris,1892), 35.

[264] Jean-François Janinet, *Gravures historiques des principaux evénémens depuis l'ouverture des États généraux de 1789. Tome premier (*Paris, 1789). There is no evidence that a second volume was ever published. I have examined a bound copy in the NYPL and there is also one in the BNF. The printed publication date of 1789 is obviously erroneous, since events through March 5, 1791 are depicted. Publication could not have occurred before 1791. The book contains no introductory text.

However, no drawing or painting by another artist has been identified as a source for his Revolutionary series.

The prices varied from four livres to six livres ten sol per month (with the highest price for larger size and wove paper). Individual booklets were at times sold for less than one livre. It was in part by using relatively simply designs, avoiding depiction of large crowds and complex architecture or natural features that Janinet brought high-quality engravings within the reach of a much larger audience. The variation in size and hence price may have made it possible for Janinet to attract many purchasers who would not have been able to afford a regular subscription—or who decided to subscribe by buying one of the more modest emissions. Thus, he necessarily emphasized individual experience over depictions evocative of the mass following that the Revolution attracted. "The People," if present, were represented by a small number of relatively prosperous individuals.

Clearly, La Fayette and the liberal Royalist tendency with which he came to be identified are favored in Janinet's work, which was probably published from 1791 on. He (or close associates) appear in five of the prints, and are always represented favorably—for instance, in preventing or punishing a lawlessly violent act. The meeting of the *États Généraux* with which the series opened was an event that directly engaged the participation of members of the educated elite.

At the least, the pivotal role accorded to La Fayette would be likely to have made the series unsaleable and politically dangerous no later than the time of La Fayette's flight to Austria in August, 1792 – but his popularity had declined earlier. Indeed, by mid-1790 Marat was already gaining influence and was demanding the execution of hundreds of aristocrats. This growing political intolerance is probably reflected in the fact that in the final emission of this series Janinet proposed to subscribers two new series (evidently to replace the current one) each of which would be much less contentious and risky. One, apparently

never pursued, was to be a publication of the code of laws of the *Assemblée Nationale*. The other, of which eleven numbers were actually issued, was a *Mémorial Historique de la France* depicting the most important events since the reign of Henry IV.

Outstanding among the narrative series for the French Revolution, and the last to be offered for sale of those considered here, is *Les Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Française* which ultimately included in its main body 144 prints. This series stands apart from other print series published during the Revolution in part because of its outstanding success, marked by publication in five successive editions, but also because of the attention it has received from modern art historians. While a number of these prints have been reproduced in general art historical works about the Revolution, both Claudette Hould and Warren Roberts have also written extensively about them. Hould's remarkably detailed work has enabled art historians for the first time to assign precise dates to the majority of the works included in the series. Her discovery of the several Prospectuses issued to announce the inception of the series are furthermore invaluable in understanding the publishers' perceived goals.[265]

This production was much more expensive than the Janinet series. With its larger format and frequent introduction of heavily labor-intensive elements such as the large crowds and complicated physical features, this series was probably considerably more costly to produce. At six livres per pair of engravings, these were works that small proprietors or skilled artisans would have been able to afford, but probably not poorer people, who would have had to work for nearly a week to earn this much money.[266] (The least expensive Revolutionary prints sold for only six sous. The average price per print for Revolutionary subjects has been calculated as six livres each, twice the price of the *Tableaux*.)

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[265] Hould (2000).

[266] Journal de Paris 68 (June 10, 1791): II, supplement to No. 161.

Advertisements for the *Tableaux* emphasized their "superfine wove paper" and "the consummate beauty of Didot's typesetting."[267]

The prints were accompanied by commentary, generally a few pages in length, by Claude Fauchet who was a priest and later bishop, and Sébastien Chamfort, both of whom had been well-known writers under the *Ancien Régime* and who were politically moderate. One of the series' prospectuses described Fauchet, who was to play the role of "historian," as "a patriot, an eye witness, himself an actor in the principal scenes."[268] Assertions of participation supported claims not just of authenticity, but of adhesion to the Revolutionary cause—identification with the right side. The content and presentation of the prints suggest that they were intended to appeal primarily to those who favored the overthrow of the Royal government, even though at least until the flight of the King to Varennes, many such people, especially those who were wealthy, continued to support some limited form of monarchy.

The commentaries appear to have been prepared after the images were drawn by Prieur, but these texts were not necessarily consistent with the images. The narratives may well have been intended by their authors to be accurately reflective of events of this period even if the engravings were not.[269] Their intended audience was an educated, literate public who would also appreciate the high quality paper and skilled workmanship. Indeed, they were described in the *Prospectus Maréchal* as "works worthy of being handed down to our nephews...The genius of the artists will enhance their faithful representations."[270]

There are few if any instances in which commentary text seems to refer to elements of Prieur's image rather than to the underlying event. Instead, the text often drew attention to

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[267] (des plus beaux caractères de Didot l'aîné) *Prospectus de 1791*, Paris, Archives Nationales : Collection Rondeau AD VIII 15 B ; AD VIII 14 Bibliographie C, pièce 6.
[268] (historien...un patriote, témoin oculaire, acteur lui-même dans les scenes principales.) *Prospectus de 1791*, ibid.
[269] Roberts, 62.
[270] (tableaux dignes d'être transmis à nos neuvuex...Le génie des artistes s'allumera la peinture fidelle), *Prospectus Maréchal*, BnF 8o Lb41 20 et La 32 19 C (2 copies), fin 1789, 1.

aspects of the event that are not present in the image. For instance, the text accompanying #16, referred to earlier, comprising more than three very large pages, says that "fifteen cannons stood on the ramparts"--but none are shown in the engraving. Likewise, "children of seven years of age were picking up balls that were still burning hot, which they brought back to the grenadiers," a dramatic word picture that is likewise not represented in the engraving.[271]

It is noteworthy that although the commentary shifted with political sensibilities, the prints themselves never did. No print was ever reworked or removed from the series. As far as is known, this is true of the other series as well. Evidently there was continuing demand for a visual record of dramatic, recent events. Neither the unpopularity of a particular subject, nor the failure of the artist's treatment of the subject to arouse viewers' interest or sympathy was ever so clearly demonstrated as to make a backwards step appear profitable to the publisher.

Prints were added to the series, however, and sometimes the additions reflected events occurring prior to some of those that had already been depicted. This could be evidence of a shift in the prevailing historical perspective, or of the publisher's expectations as to buyer interests. However, it could also result merely from the perception of additional demand which would justify expanding the series. This last possibility is particularly plausible, since a new print seemingly never replaced an old one.

The *Tableaux* and commentaries in their final form depicted events from 1789 to 1799. The first print included in the early editions is of the *Jeu de Paume*, 20 June, 1789. The first consolidated edition, in 1798, contained 80 of these prints, showing events through early June, 1793. Editions after 1800 (with the last being in 1817) inserted ahead of the

[271] (quinze canons bordaient ses ramparts [...] des enfans de sept ans ramassent des balles encore brûlants, qu'ils remettent à des grenadier) Chamfort, Tableau #16.

prints in the earlier editions first seven and then nine introductory prints, prepared later by different artists and engravers, showing events from 1787 through April 1789. These introductory prints, because of their late date, will not be discussed further here.

The first 69 of the 144 engravings in the main body were drawn by Jean-Louis Prieur, and 67 out of the 69 were engraved by Pierre-Gabriel Berthault. Prieur was probably born in 1759 in Paris, and never exhibited in the Salons. He illustrated events through September, 1792 for this series, but then stopped his work on it and was appointed to a revolutionary tribunal in 1793. In 1795, consequent to the end of the Terror, he was guillotined after being accused of having "a most violent character" of the Jacobin judges. The Clerk of the tribunal testified that Prieur condemned prisoners without having listened to the proceedings, instead using the time to make drawings of the heads of the accused—drenched in blood. He had allegedly ordered the execution of at least sixty people, the decisions to condemn and execute having been made in advance and marked on a list. Prieur's rather feeble defense reportedly was that his caricatures were merely "little messes...foolishness"[272] But considering the nature and context of such proceedings at the time, the prevailing thirst for vindication and revenge, not much weight can be given either to the charges or to any defense that Prieur could have offered.

When asked by the Court to state his occupation, Prieur said he was a "history painter," but nothing is known of any history paintings he may have done. Apart from these, his only known work is a portrait of Marie Antoinette—to whom many members of the public, particularly in Paris, harbored a strong aversion. Evidently Prieur's artistic skills, whether or not he was paid for exercising them, afforded him a way of expressing his resentment and hatred of those who opposed the Jacobins. The more moderate Fauchet and

[272] (le caractere le plus sanguinaire [...]cochonneries... petites betises) Emile Campardon, *Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris* (Paris, 1866) II : 191, 323.

Chamfort had been guillotined during the Terror (in 1793 and 1794, respectively), of course before Prieur himself was condemned as a terrorist. Like Prieur, they were executed for alleged crimes which seemingly had nothing to do with their work on the *Tableaux*. Their execution could have resulted from their intense, public political activity. (Fauchet was convicted on the ridiculous charge of having inspired the murder of Marat by Charlotte Corday.) This background gives some sense of the climate of risk and unpredictable change in which these men worked during the Revolutionary years. Nothing comparable occurred during the American Revolution, though Revolutionary publishers and artists feared with reason the possible consequences of their falling into the hands of the British.

The *Tableaux* were first advertised for subscription to monthly emissions in July, 1791, the month after the King's unsuccessful flight to Varennes. It is impossible to say when, prior to that time, Prieur and Berthault worked. It seems unlikely that if even two prints had been ready for sale much earlier, their promotion would have been postponed because of delays in assembling the text or because of the political situation.

The series had been announced by their publisher as intended to glorify the Revolution.[273] As described in one of the series' prospectuses, "freedom...from now on, your temple is in Paris...the genius of artists will from now on alight itself at the fire of patriotism."[274] The third tableau shows Camille Desmoulins giving a speech on July 12. According to Furet, this speech motivated the crowd that had gathered to hear him to move out to barricade the streets and take arms.[275] Subsequently, this crowd closed the theatres of the city (an event also shown in one of the *Tableaux)* and then carried the busts of Necker and Philippe to the Place Vendôme, which led to Lambesc's charge.

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[273] Maurice Pellison, *Chamfort: Etude sur sa vie son caractere et ses ecrits* (rpt 1895, Geneva, 1970), 268-9.
[274](Liberté...Désormais, ton temple est à Paris...Le génie des artistes s'allumera désormais au feu du patriotisme.) *Prospectus Maréchal*, 1.
[275] Michel Winock, *1789, L'année sans pareil* (Paris, 2004), 133.

The Tableaux are remarkably accurate in depicting the topography of Paris at the time, giving rise to the suggestion, for which there is no evidence, that Prieur, like Lallemand, had experience in architectural drawing. But structures such as the Bastille and Les Invalides (and for that matter, a statue such as that of Louis XV) stood for the institutions they sheltered or represented. Precise depiction of these sites, would be very helpful in lending verisimilitude to illustration of events, particularly conflicts, that had taken place at them.

Although Prieur's images were topographically precise, at least initially some of them incorporated historical inaccuracies which would have been obvious to a great many contemporary viewers. For instance, *Tableau 17*, as originally titled, purported to show the death of de Launay, Governor of the Bastille. However, it positions this event in a courtyard of the Bastille. That is not accurate. De Launay was killed in front of a large crowd, subsequent to being marched to the Hôtel de Ville, which was many blocks distant from the Bastille. The *Tableau* could be, and in subsequent editions was, correctly described as showing the arrest of de Launay rather than his death. Literal accuracy of depiction may not have been the most important goal of the series. The *Prospectus* asserted:

"...A series of exact depictions...will leave in ones soul a deeper and more durable impression than that produced by an exact description of the facts...It is a debt of honor that we are contracting with our fatherland ; since, we finally have one."[276]

This formulation seems to play with the idea that the *Tableaux* may make a more profound impression if they are in fact less precise than "an exact description of the facts"--and there is no claim that the accompanying text will provide such a description. Such a statement of purpose seems close in spirit to the goals expressed by Reynolds and others for grand manner history painting in Britain—and to those exemplified in Trumbull's scenes of

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[276] (...Une suite de tableaux exacts...laissera dans l'ame une impression plus profonde et plus durable que celle produite par un récit exact des faits...C''est une dette d'honneur que nous contractons envers la patrie; car, nous en avons une enfin) *Prospéctus Maréchal*, 1.

the American Revolution. Reynolds had insisted that the goal of such art was to arouse appropriate feelings in the viewer, rather than to provide a historical record that was precise as to details. This, of course, is what Trumbull had done in depicting the death of Warren, inventing or pulling together elements that were not factual. It is evidently also what Prieur was asked to do. The *Prospectus* thus provides a firm link between the motives and methods at least of Trumbull and Prieur, as well as others, probably numerous, who held similar views.

The assertion in the Prospectus that "we" had not had a *patrie* under the *Ancien Regime* is a particularly important one. In fact, the use of *patrie* to refer to an object of loyalty akin to the Roman *patria* came into common use only after the start of the Revolution. Previous references were generally to the *nation,* which was represented by the King. The idea of popular sovereignty, or even of a French people who had rights as citizens of the nation-state which they constituted, and which by right they controlled, lacked currency before 1789. Under the *Ancien Régime,* the prevailing view was that "The king...subsumes and incarnates all of the individuals who make up the nation."[277] As Rousseau put it, "A citizen owes the State all the services he can render it as soon as the sovereign requests them."[278]

Thus, until the Revolutionary period began there had been no need for an iconography which attributed a clear, much less a decisive role to "the people" acting together. To create such a means of representation, particularly under Revolutionary conditions, constituted a considerable artistic challenge. Prieur was called upon to vindicate visually Chamfort's view of the assault on the Bastille (undoubtedly consistent with his own opinion) that "Nothing proves more [than the assault on the Bastille] that there exists among

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[277] (Le roi...subsume et incarne l'ensemble des corps qui constituent la nation), Furet, 94.
[278] Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in ed. Roger Masters, *The Collected Writings of Rousseau* (Hanover, 1994), IV: 148.

all classes of citizens a register of opinions common to all, to which the inhabitants of this big city, despite being divided by differences in opinions and interests, can rally."[279]

In spite of the explicit expression of this ideal, it is difficult to find, in the *Tableaux* depicting the events of July 12-14, 1789, instances in which an individual who is identifiable by dress or otherwise as a member of the lower classes (those who lacked stable employment and income) is given a conspicuous and favorable role. In those instances where their garments are clearly depicted, revolutionary fighters who took risks under fire are shown in these prints as dressed in the clothing of the reasonably prosperous.

Indeed, there was no established imagery for members of the lower classes before the revolution. However, in depicting elements of revolutionary ideology that were appealing to some and frightening to others, there emerged, for instance, in Thevenin's *Le marquis de Launay, gouverneur de la Bastille, capturé par les assaillants le 14 juillet 1789* (fig. 3.8), a visual language to describe members of the lower classes. Thevenin's men appear poorly dressed, wearing shirts without jackets, torn pants, and lacking shoes. There had been no precedent for this, but such figures appeared with increasing frequency throughout the revolution, culminating in the emergence of a new category, the *sans culotte*.

In July, 1789, the electors who organized the *Garde Nationale* sought to overturn the Royal government, but at the same time to control and repress "individuals without professions and petty thieves" who were seen as a danger to all property interests. The latter were excluded from membership in the *Garde Nationale*, and efforts were made to disarm them. Thus, "The greatest part of the Parisian militia is drawn from the solid bourgeoisie (*bonne bourgeoisie*), and it is that characteristic that makes it as reliable with respect to

[279] (Rien ne prouve mieux qu'il existoit entre toutes les classes de citoyens un ordre de sentiments communs à tous, auxquels se rallioient alors les habitants de cette grande ville, divisés depuis la différence des opinions et des intérêts.) Chamfort, Tableau #16.

public order as formidable with respect to tyranny."[280] The term *bonne bourgeoisie* as used here may reflect the resentment and fear of the settled Parisian population towards the poor and restless country-dwellers (*vagabonds*) who had flocked to Paris during the years of poor harvests and who appeared not only to compete for employment and food, but to threaten the safety of residents and their property.

In the first Prospectus, this particular *Tableau* had been projected to appear in January, 1790, within six months of the events depicted. One additional engraving was to appear every week thereafter, with a subscription price of nine livres per month, for four prints. But the publication, intended to result in an illustrated *Histoire de la Révolution Française,* fell far behind this ambitious schedule from the very beginning. Even the earliest *Tableaux* were not advertised for sale until the autumn of 1791. Those showing the pillage of Les Invalides and events at the Bastille were not advertised for sale until July 21, 1792, immediately prior to the taking of the Tuileries and the internment of the King. The extreme tardiness of this entry into the market is illustrated by the fact that of the 121 images of the Bastille in the Bibliothèque Nationale collection, 92 are from 1789.

It had seemed in 1789, as another prospectus for the series put it, that "Never has a revolution occurred so quickly, and cost so little blood."[281] As the Revolutionary process dragged on and became bloodier, the prematurity of this early judgment became apparent. While Prieur, Fauchet and Chamfort sought to serve and glorify their vision of the Revolution, this mandate and the rapid succession of events placed them in a delicate position as to both objectivity (and departure from known facts), and as to the emphasis to be given to the various events. Revolutionary excesses were to be glossed over, excused, or

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[280] (les gens sans aveu et les voyous ... La plus grande partie de la milice de Paris est bonne bourgeoisie, et c'est ce qui la rend aussi sûre pour l'ordre public que formidable pour la tyrannie.) Archives Nationales, W 12, fols. 197-8.

[281] (Jamais la révolution s'est faite avec autant de rapidité, et ne coûta moins de sang.) *Prospectus Basset*, BnF Fol. La32 18, 1789, p. 1f.

ignored. It was in this context that Chamfort complained, not unreasonably, that "In the first instants of the Parisian insurrection, the multiplicity of simultaneous, or rapidly successive events, creates a more or less irritating dependence, because of which one encounters a subject at times too fertile, and at times too sterile."[282]

At least into 1791, however, many of those who wished to overturn Government authority, and then the monarchy itself, sought to maintain this perspective-- aiming to justify or defend the insurgents by showing that they shed blood only when attacked or resisted. This is a consistent characteristic of several depictions of the Bastille.

A new Prospectus for the *Tableaux,* issued in 1791 and quoting a price of eight livres per delivery (two prints), called attention to David's work and to the importance of the Revolution to "contemporary artists."[283] Clearly, the publisher was conscious of coming to this market relatively late. But later prints of the same Revolutionary subject often were not mere emulations of earlier ones. It is difficult to find instances in which artists who published late, such as Prieur, recapitulated visual details from the Révolutions de Paris or other prior images. It is principally the typology and role of the human actors which changes. Nevertheless, the vantage point, treatment of identifying physical features and overall composition of scenes such as the Fall of the Bastille, their basic iconography, often remained strikingly and remarkably consistent between artists and over time. This served to render the subject of the scenes immediately recognizable. Landes' comment that "republicans sought to impose order and discipline on images," if taken as applying to artists

[282] (Aux premiers moments de l'insurrection parisienne, la multitude des tableaux simultanés, ou rapidement successifs, sert à une dépendance plus ou moins gênante, rencontrant un sujet tantôt trop fécond, tantôt trop sterile.) P. R. Auguis (Ed.), *Oeuvres de Chamfort* (Paris, 1824), II : 267.
[283] (les artistes de ce moment.) *Prospectus l'Epin,* 1791, Paris, BnF, 2 exemplaires, reliées avec BnF Fol. La 32 18 and BnF Fol. La 32 19 C1, p. 2-4.

and publishers, is not a very compelling explanation of the tendency towards standardization of the compositional structures.[284]

It is easier to concur with the contemporary Athanase Détournelle that "Engraving is a money-making art."[285] That is, artists and particularly publishers are likely to be substantially motivated in choice and treatment of subjects by their expectations as to prospects for sale. Demand for prints of popular subjects depended in part on the artist's making the subject easy to recognize, so that the buyer could see that the print displayed the subject he visualized and wanted, and it also could depend on his facilitating his intended viewer's desired identification with certain of the participants.

Revised commentaries in later editions of the *Tableaux* reflected changes in political outlook, and the textual modifications show how differing inferences can be drawn from the same image of the same event. Revisions in 1798 and afterwards, after the Terror ended, made the commentaries more critical of the Jacobins and hence less supportive of the aspirations of those who sought redistribution of wealth. For instance, the original text for Tableau #3, *Motion Faite au Palais Royal par Camille Desmoulins, le 12 Juillet 1789* [1791], praised Desmoulins's courage. The revised text added that he "surely must regret his delirious writings from this period, and most of all, having sold himself to the Duc d'Orléans," proceeding, however, to praise him for his courage in ultimately reversing himself to favor clemency and an end to the Terror (as a result of which he and his wife, Anne, were guillotined in 1794--she simply for the crime of being his wife).[286] These changes reflected the evolution of the political environment after the end of the Terror. The same image of Desmoulins, accompanied in a new edition by new words, could convey changed attitudes and sentiments.

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[284] Joan B. Landes, *Visualizing the Nation* (Ithaca, 2001), 35.
[285] (La gravure est un art luctratif) Journal de la société républicaine des arts, 1794.
[286] (a sans doute à se reprocher le délire de ses écrits à cette époque, et surtout d'avoir été vendu au duc d'Orléans), Chamfort (et al.), Tableau #3 (Paris : 1817).

Likewise, the revised text for the Tableau #16, *Prise de la Bastille,* for instance, added the words: "...could one then have predicted that, under Robespierre, one hundred thousand Bastilles would replace the one that we had just overthrown."[287] This addition relativizes the achievements of July 14 and may suggest that the viewer see the insurgents as naïve men whose actions perhaps did more harm than good. It is no less compatible with Prieur's image than is the earlier version.

The revised commentary repeatedly refers to Orléanists as using money to incite license and fear. (Philippe Égalité was guillotined in late 1793, making it safe to vilify him.) Although the text denigrates the Terror, which was a leveling force, it is even more scornful of the nobility than was the original version. As to the "death" of de Launay and specifically the role of Pellepont, it adds the words: "his name was the marquis of Pellepont, since the ridiculous titles of the noble caste had not yet been abolished."[288] Thus, overall it would seem that the revised version is more tightly attuned to the interests of prospective buyers—who at this particular time were predominantly neither supportive of aristocratic pretensions or advocates of a redistribution of property by terror and proscription. Orléanism was to rise again, but during this period it was not at all in favor.

3. *Les Vainqueurs de la Bastille*

The *Vainqueurs de la Bastille*, which included the first individually identified citizen soldiers of the Revolution, were celebrated for their exploits on July 14. I will now discuss the emergence and history of this group, and their representation in the art of the period, before turning to consider more broadly the context of the events on July 14 in which the *Vainqueurs* participated, and images of these events which may reference the citizen soldier

[287] (...eut-on pu alors prévoir que, sous Robespierre, cent mille Bastilles remplaceraient celle qu'on venait de renverser?), Chamfort (1817), Tableau #13.
[288] (son nom était le marquis de Pellepont, car les titres ridicules de la caste nobiliaire n'avaient pas encore été abolis.), Chamfort (1817), Tableau #17.

type less explicitly. In this way, the attributes of the larger citizen soldier group may be illuminated by those of the *Vainqueurs*.

At least in the Paris of 1789, a prevailing belief soon after July 14 seems to have been that the assault on the Bastille had been carried out by civilians and soldiers together – and by a very limited number of them. For instance, a colored etching sold in Paris in 1789 showing dozens but not hundreds of men with clothes of several different colors rushing across the bridge into the Bastille, stated in its caption that "success was due to the bravery of the citizens joined with the *Gardes Françaises*." It identified two men, Arné and Humbert as leaders of the attackers.[289] Another etching, also published in 1789, showing men leaving the Bastille after the surrender, said that it had been taken by "the citizens and the heretofore *Gardes Françaises*."[290] In effect, the idea of citizen soldiers came to the forefront, perhaps in part because bringing over remaining *Gardes Françaises* to the insurgent side was of critical importance in the aftermath of July 14, and an obviously promising way to do so would be to convince them that they were already committed to and acclaimed for having done so.

Just a few days after the event, it was proclaimed that "the fatherland owes its salvation to the citizens of the *Faubourg Saint-Antoine* and the *Garde Nationale*"—that is, to both civilians who fought as citizen soldiers, and to defecting soldiers.[291] This was encapsulated and personified in the popularly held view that the first two men to penetrate the fortress had been, first, the grenadier Joseph Arné, who was from Dôle in Franche Comté and second, the watchmaker Humbert from Langres in Burgundy. It may be misleading to think of Humbert as a peaceable artisan, since by his own account he came to the Bastille armed with his own loaded musket, and had enough bullets to share some with other people

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[289] (le succès fut dû à la bravoure des Citoyens réunis aux Gardes Françaises.) *Prise de la Bastille*, etching and wash (Paris : J. Chereau, 1789), Musée de la Révolution Française, Vizille, 84.14.
[290] (par les citoyens et les ci-devant Grades Françaises), *Prise de la Bastille, le 14 Juillet 1789*, etching (Paris, Mondhare et Jean: 1789), Bibliothèque Nationale EST Qb1 1789 (14 juillet).
[291] (La Patrie doit sa salut aux citoyens du Faubourg Saint-Antoine et à la Garde Nationale) *Les Lauriers du Fauxbourg Saint-Antoine, ou le Prix de la Bastille renversée* (Paris, Monday, 20 July 1789), 6.

he encountered along the way.[292] Perhaps to emphasize his civilian status in contradistinction to Arné, images of Humbert nevertheless do not show him with his gun.

These two could also serve as exemplars to vindicate the claimed national (rather than Parisian) character of the Revolution. It was Arné who was said to have grabbed the sword from de Launay's hand and arrested him, while Humbert, immediately behind him, disarmed a threatening Swiss Guard and put a cannon out of commission. According to a purported eyewitness account that is generally consistent with this, "an individual...cried out: *There is the Governor getting away.* As soon as these words had been said, a *Garde Française* and a bourgeois caught him."[293]

Other accounts, claiming to have been written and approved by participants immediately after the events, did not mention Arné and Humbert and designated other individuals, a civilian named Hulin, an officer named Elie, a sergeant of the *Gardes Françaises*, as having commanded the siege and been the first to enter the Bastille.[294] Thus, "Messrs. Elie and Hulin..entered the Bastille first."[295] There was an immediately perceived need to identify leaders and heroes, even if the identification was to some degree arbitrary and contentious—and the heroes needed to include both soldiers and civilians in any case.

Very soon after the fall of the Bastille, Arné was drawn through the streets in a chariot, *char*, in imitation of the triumphs that Rome presented to its victorious generals.[296] To treat an ordinary soldier as if he were a general was Revolutionary indeed. Arné received "from the hands of the assembly of citizens of Paris, and in the name of the nation, a civic

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[292] *Journée de J.-B. Humbert, horloger, qui le premier a monté sur les tours de la Bastille* (Paris, Volland, 1789).

[293] (un particulier...s'écria: Voilà le Gouverneur qui se sauve. A peine cette parole eut-elle été dite, qu'un Garde-Françoise et un bourgeois lui ont mis la main sur le colet.) J. Rouel, *Relation Véritable de la Prise de la Bastille* (Paris, 1790), 6.

[294] For instance, Jacques Cousin, *Précis Exact de la Prise de la Bastille, Rédigé sous les yeux des principaux Acteurs qui ont joué un rôle dans cette expedition*...(Paris, 1789).

[295] (MM. Elie et Hulin...sont entrés les premiers à la Bastille.) "Motion de M. Bailly à l'Assemblée des Electeurs de Paris," in *L'Achille Français; le Héros de la Bastille ou le Brave Élie Récompensé* (Paris, 1790), 5.

[296] Pierre Prillard, "La Glorification des Vainqueurs de la Bastille." *Actes du Congrès national des sociétés savants: Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 100 (1977) : 469.

crown and a cross of the royal and military order of Saint Louis, which the treacherous governor of the Bastille had been wearing."[297] These had been stripped from de Launay shortly before his death, and given first by the crowd to a man named Henri Dubois, who passed them on to Lafayette because he did not feel he had done anything to earn them.[298] Lafayette presented them to Arné. The medals made Arné in some sense his successor, and in doing so they demonstrated that the victory at the Bastille was not merely collective. It was the soldier Arné and not the civilian Humbert who was singled out for these special honors.

Shortly afterwards, Arné became the hero of the first of several plays on the taking of the Bastille that were successfully produced in Paris. This was *La Fête du Grenadier,* which premiered on September 3. He received an ovation when he appeared on stage at this performance. Arné and Humbert later wrote a pamphlet giving their version of the events at the Bastille.

In an anonymous engraving of the two [1789], Humbert, on the left, has been equipped with a sword, a tricolor cockade, and an elegant red jacket and large hat (although he belonged to no military unit). (fig. 3.15) Arné is bareheaded except for a wreath, and wears a blue jacket with chevrons resembling the uniform of the Gardes Françaises. Both have elaborate hairstyles. At a minimum, this image accords solid respectability to both men and places the two on an equal plane. Neither were dressed like the lower classes thugs shown as killing de Launay and Pellepont.

Another anonymous engraved image, probably from a broadsheet or newspaper [1789], shows the two men shaking hands, as *Vainqueurs de la Bastille.* (fig. 3.16) Humbert, here on the right, again has a sword and cockade, while Arné has his distinctive Grenadier's

[297](des mains de l'assemblée des citoyens de Paris, et au nom de la nation, la couronne civique et la croix de l'ordre royal et militaire de saint louis, que portoit le traître gouverneur de la Bastille.) Révolutions de Paris, I :1 (1789) :17.
[298] Lüsebrink and Reichardt, 86.

hat. Below is the Bastille, apparently with the surrender of de Launay taking place at the top. At the foot of the walls are several severed heads, a partially draped torso, several bystanders, and a pile of cannon balls.

Arné and Humbert arrived at the Bastille as individually inconspicuous members of a crowd, but left it as heroes. The victory of the People was to be attributed to the leadership (in at least a literal sense of going first) and possibly the heroism of a smaller number, with glory extended to both soldiers such as Arné and civilians such as Humbert.

The title *Vainqueur de la Bastille* was soon extended to a much larger number of participants, eighty three of them, who for a time functioned as a group and claimed various military privileges including special and individualized arms and equipment. Each asserted the right to write *Vainqueur de la Bastille* after his name, as part of his signature. Mythology rapidly gathered around them. "An army gathered in twenty-four hours has its cannons and its heroes! And the Bastille has been taken! Would you have believed that these people, who like to sing and laugh, had the courage of a Hercules and the bravery of a Pirithous?"[299] The initial eighty three recognized *Vainqueurs* expanded to 863 and then to 954 in June, 1790. However, the singling out of the *Vainqueurs*, the awarding to them of honors and privileges, and their incorporation into a military unit—all these actions were to rapidly provoke heated debate and in some cases reversal. As I will shortly show, objections were made on behalf of various different interests and on wide-ranging grounds.

Many of those who had attacked the Bastille accompanied the captured de Launay and some of his officers and men who had surrendered from the Bastille to the Hôtel de Ville. Here, those coming from the Bastille were described as "this horde of men of all

[299] (Une armée rassemblée en vingt-quatre heures a ses canons et ses héros! Et la Bastille fut prise! Auriez-vous pu croire que ces personnes, qui aiment chanter et rire, aient le courage d'Hercule et la bravoure de Pirithous?) *La Journée Parisienne ou Triomphe de la France* (Paris, July, 1789).

conditions, armed in such diverse manners, all breathing vengeance and carnage."[300] Although they were accompanied by some of the Electors who had previously tried to negotiate with de Launay, the crowd had no leadership.

A quite different image of the *Vainqueurs* can be seen in *Un Vainqueur de la Bastille,* a painting by Thévenin [1789]. (fig. 3.17) This elegant fellow is shown walking away from the Bastille, accompanied by a drummer leading a column of armed soldiers, one wearing a metal helmet. Above them, on the parapet of the Bastille, a larger number of men than ever fought there seem to be celebrating, perhaps cheering him, some of them firing their guns. With his wide golden waistband and gloves, the red piping running diagonally across his chest, the knife in his belt and his high, black fur hat—but with no badges indicative of rank or unit—the man could be taken for an aristocratic senior officer of the Ancien Regime. He is out of scale not only with the people behind him, but with the entire scene, taking on an almost superhuman grandeur.

The painting resembles some commissioned portraits because of the heroic pose and the prominence given to the principal subject and his accoutrements. It can be compared, for instance, Jean-Baptiste Le Paon's *Général Lafayette* [1783]. (fig. 3.18) Le Paon's attention to the general's ceremonial sword and to his groom's costume is striking. Thévenin's subject's head is turned (much more so than in the Le Paon portrait, and rather awkwardly) to give a profile, and the subject's face is placed (again, somewhat artificially) in shadow. Both of these features would have made him harder to identify and thus make it less likely that this was intended as a portrait of a specific individual. Gainsborough's portrait of Capt. William Wade [1771] and Reynolds's romantic portrait of Capt. Robert Orme [1756] show a similar gesture with the sitter's left hand, and comparable atmospheric effects. Van Dyck's splendid

[300] Jean-Baptiste-François Pitra, cited in Jacques Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille July 14th, 1789,* tr. Jean Stewart (New York, NY, 1970), 355.

portrait of Charles I [c. 1635] had provided an influential example. Portraits of single anonymous sitters to be seen as representative of a group or class are, of course, much less frequently encountered.

Perhaps Thévenin's image was intended to be engraved—providing a representation that could appeal to all who identified with the *Vainqueurs*. This may explain why the face is seen only in profile and in shadow: the buyer of the print could imagine that it was his own face, or that of a friend or family member.

A quite different image of the costume of a *Vainqueur*, with pistol and lance, is shown in the anonymous engraving *Costume de Vainqueur de la Bastille* [ca. 1789]. (fig. 3.19) This image probably comes from the artist's imagination, but it is based on the Assembly's decision on July 19, 1790 to grant a special personal uniform to each *Vainqueur*. It is perhaps significant that this decision occurred immediately after the first *Fête de la Fédération*, July 14, 1790, an event which invited attention to the fact that the capture of the Bastille has been achieved by men of different regions and class, soldiers and civilians, fighting for the same cause.

The belt on the blue uniform shown bears the words "Peace to the cottages, war on the castles." The words on the lance shaft are "The tyrants are Dead." On the helmet is "victory or death"[301]

The emergence of the *Vainqueurs* aroused hostility. Some questioned whether older privileged orders been abolished only to be replaced (as it happened, through an action taken on the very same day by the National Assembly!) with a new one. Opponents of the Society of the Cincinnati in Trumbull's Connecticut had raised similar arguments. Their objections were more obviously relevant because the war had ended and the Cincinnati were ex-officers,

[301] (Paix aux chaumières, Guerre aux châteaux...Les tyrans sont murs...vaincre ou mourir) *La Révolution Française et l'Europe*, exhibition catalogue from the Grand Palais (Paris, 1989), Vol. 2, 400.

generally of elevated social background. In fact, the concern that honors and privileges granted to the *Vainqueurs* would create a new aristocracy had a respectable philosophical origin. Montesquieu saw "honor" as the motivating force of the *Ancien Régime*. As he wrote in *L'Esprit des Lois:* "The nature of honor is to demand preferences and distinctions."[302] That is exactly what the *Vainqueurs* did, repeatedly and insistently.

Marat and others increasingly objected to the treatment of the *Vainqueurs* as a corporate body and the granting of privileges to them. He insisted that the victory belonged to the People as a whole and not to any smaller group, certainly not a militaristic one made up of citizen soldiers. In his view, "It is beyond doubt that the revolution originated in the rebellion of these simple people; and it is no less beyond doubt that the storming of the Bastille was mainly accomplished by ten thousand poor workers."[303] Historians such as Furet, Winock, Bertaud and Tulard do not estimate the size of the crowd. Furthermore, Marat's "simple people" roughly corresponded to or at least could not fail to include the very classes of which the wealthier citizens represented by the *électeurs* were so fearful. These inherently contradictory identifications of class interests (as well as urban versus rural and other cleavages of interests) baffled the hope of an all-embracing *confédération* and, once the prior principal of monarchial authority had been thrust aside, made it difficult to bring the Revolutionary experience to closure.

Individual heroes or small groups of heroes with military and possibly broader leadership pretensions could have been a threat to the authority not only of populist political leaders but also of established military commanders (for instance, Lafayette). For instance, a

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[302] (La nature de *l'honneur* est de demander des préférences et des distinctions) Montesquieu, *L'Esprit des Lois* (Paris, 1748), Livre III, Chapitre 7.

[303] (Il n'y a aucun doute que la révolution commença avec la rébellion de ces simples gens et il est néanmoins sans doute que la prise de la Bastille fut accomplie par dix mille pauvres laboureurs) Ami du Peuple 155 (7 June 1790) :169; (30 June 1790), 387f.

few months later, one of the original *Vainqueurs* influenced the crowd that marched on Versailles—although Lafayette evidently would have preferred that the march not take place.

Insofar as the Revolution's success was conceived of as both resulting from and legitimized by its character as a popular and mass movement, the glorification of individual heroes would have been dissonant. The Assembly vacillated and ultimately although individual *Vainqueurs* were accorded personal privileges, the *Vainqueurs* were dispersed into multiple regular army units—initially, into 103d, 104th, and 105th regiments of the *Garde Nationale* and in the summer of 1792 into units of the 35th Gendarmerie Division, which saw action in the Vendée. In June, 1790, they "voluntarily" surrendered their decorations. They were deprived of the right to meet as a group and hence of the right to act collectively by a decree of the Paris Commune on December 28, 1790.

What is notable and perhaps particularly contentious is the fact that the designation of the *Vainqueurs* as a corps and the provision of a special uniform for them (including inscribed swords cast at the expense of the State) would convert them all into soldiers. With uniforms, they would look like soldiers—and perhaps therefore begin to think and act as soldiers—a result horrifying to Marat and others who sought to enhance the power of the "simple people" who were not soldiers.

Transforming the *Vainqueurs* into soldiers would obliterate the formerly sharp distinction between citizen soldiers in mufti such as Humbert, who were soldiers only for a brief time and retained their civilian métier, and the quite distinct *soldats de métier* who chose to fight on the side of the People, such as Arné. For Marat and other radicals, at least in 1790, in order to be legitimate and successful the Revolution had to continue to be actively waged not only by (turncoat) soldiers who had served in Royalist units and soldiers of new Revolutionary formations, but also by civilians-- such as those who had pillaged Les Invalides, some of whom then turned on the Bastille. As Marat wrote,

> "What should be done to put a stop to our fear of the army? The size of the army must be reduced and reign of terror must end. We should for a very large national militia, and give arms to any citizen who is not in some way suspicious."[304]

If soldiers remained separated from citizens, then the Revolution could degenerate into no more than a revolt and seizure of power by elements of the Army—which might be led by aristocrats, such as Lafayette. It would be subject to the whims and interests of soldiers and their leaders, rather than under the control of the population as a whole, who were far more accessible to persuasion by political figures such as Marat, if only because they could not be confined to camps and garrisons. Hence, at least some of the citizen soldiers needed to maintain their character as civilians rather than disappearing into the Revolutionary army.

The traditional concept of *métier* as a source of identity was particularly deeply ingrained in Paris, where series of engravings of the *Cris de Paris* had been produced at least since the fifteenth century and into the eighteenth.[305] These images, reflecting the even earlier role of the guild system in regulating commerce and employment, highlight the role of dress and accoutrements in defining a man's role and what was to be expected of him. The representative of each métier pictured in the *Cris de Paris* seems to accept his role passively and without question. He is defined by what he wears and carries, which identify his economic activity. This was a system of castes and sub-castes which in its medieval origins had been largely hereditary. The soldat had a *métier*. For instance, the seventh verse of the Marseillaise, dating from 1792, states that: "We will enter into this career! When our elders

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[304](Que faire pour n'avoir rien à craindre de l'armée, se demande-t-il ? La réduire et arrêter le pouvoir par la crainte du pouvoir. Il est donc indispensable de former une milice nationale très-nombreuse, et même d'armer chaque citoyen non suspect.) Jean-Paul Marat, *La Constitution ou Projet de déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, suivi d'un plan de constitution juste, sage et libre. Par l'auteur de l'Offrande à la patrie* (Paris, 1789), 60 .

[305] See Massin, *Les Cris de la ville. Commerces ambulants et petit metiers de la rue* (Paris, 1978), and Vincent Milliot, *Les Cris de Paris ou le peuple travesti: Les représentations des petits métiers parisiens (XVIe -XVIIIe siècles)* (Paris, 1995).

are no longer there..."[306] A *carrière* is a *métier*. However, the *métier* of soldier was not an honored one under the *Ancien Régime*. In the early 1790s, "A...placard meant to discourage draft resistance stated simply, 'The profession of arms used to be considered as dishonorable, today it is considered a profession.' "[307] Anyone who engaged in a steady line of work and was not a soldier had, in principle, a different *métier*. A change of *métier* was not normally to be thought of, any more than a knife sharpener could begin to sell spinach. Neither was it possible to have two different *métiers*: this would be like wearing two different costumes at the same time.[308]

Thus, one of the most revolutionary dislocations that occurred in July 1789 was that a man's uniform no longer sufficed to identify the side for which he would fight—and men without uniforms fought alongside soldiers, who had been seen as a separated caste largely composed of non-citizens. The tyranny of *métier*, which had largely blocked the practical application of philosophical and strategic theories favoring the citizen soldier, had, like the tyranny of the King, been shaken if not immediately overthrown by the events of July 14.

It is not surprising, then, that as early as 1789 there was opposition to the *Vainqueurs* on grounds quite opposite to Marat's: it was argued that the Revolution needed an army composed solely of *soldats de métier*, from which citizens with other *métiers*, who were not soldiers (such as Humbert) must be excluded. Representatives of the newly formed Paris *Garde Nationale* petitioned the National Assembly to rescind its original decree recognizing the *Vainqueurs*.[309] In their view, military honors such as those accorded to Arné and Humbert properly belonged only to those who fight in an army under military discipline, true

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[306] *(*Nous entrerons dans la carrière / Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus...*)*.
[307] (Une affiche avec l'intention de décourager la résistance à la mobilisation affirma simplement, 'la profession des armes était auparavant considérée déshonorable, aujourd'hui c'est une profession.') Cited in Jean-Paul Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée* (Paris, 1979), 128.
[308] See Steven Epstein, *Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe* (Raleigh, NC, 1991) and Victor Fournel, *Les Cris de Paris* (Paris, 2003).
[309] *Exploits glorieux du célèbre Cavanagh* (Paris, 1789), 8.

soldiers. This is reminiscent of Washington's view that no reliance at all should be placed upon (nor should honors be attributed to) units made up of amateurs or part-timers, since this would merely distract from the need to recruit a professional, full time army.

Hence, it was argued that the *Vainqueurs*, since they could not be readily disposed of, should be placed within and share their rewards with a national army. "You have to make simple citizens of these supposed *Vainqueurs*, who must be linked with and integrated into the national army, and will there learn to serve the fatherland without pride.'"[310] In this view, the soldier is, of course, a citizen (though lacking many of the rights of other citizens, because of his subjection to military discipline). In this limited sense he is a "citizen soldier." But he is a citizen without any civilian identity, until he retires.

In fact, however, it was to take until 1793 for such an army to be created, in part because in Revolutionary France a variety of "armies" including the Royal Army already existed. This had not been the case in America, where the Continental Army was raised as a unique national force. Until there was a single national army, the soldier's identification with the Revolution and hence with the nation would remain uncertain, as the loyalties of particular units flickered and soldiers tended to feel greater attachment to their own units than to any higher authority. The difficulty of melding the regiments into a unified force was illustrated when, immediately after the Bastille, it was decided to dissolve the *Gardes Françaises* and merge its men into the newly recruited and larger *Gardes Nationales.* A contemporary pamphlet suggested that "to incorporate them in the Garde Bourgeoise is to treat them poorly, to denature them. Let them form a separate Corps...let them be forever the first Regiment of France."[311] Since the *Gardes Françaises* had a unique history

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[310] (Il faut rendre simple citoyens ces supposés Vainqueurs, qui doivent être reliés et intégrés à l'armée nationale, où ils apprendront à servir la patrie sans orgeuil) "Fermentation occasionée par le décret relatif aux 'Vainqueurs de la Bastille,' " Courrier des LXXXIII Départements, XIII :27 (27 June 1790), 349f.

[311] (Les incorporer dans la Garde Bourgeoise, c'est en les mécontenant, les dénaturer. Qu'ils forment un Corps à part...qu'ils soient à jamais le premier Régiment de France.) *Les Gardes-Françoises à l'Avenir, Gardes de la*

stretching back for centuries, to abolish them (especially after praising them) was indeed revolutionary.

There was also fear, at least on the part of the Jacobins, that the *Gardes Nationales* themselves could become an instrument of oppression. Robespierre argued that "should such Honor triumph, you will see the *Garde Nationale* degenerate into a military aristocracy, as docile in oppressing citizens, as prompt to prostrate itself before the will of the monarchy."[312] "Honor" was a concept firmly linked to monarchy and its attendant aristocracy, and therefore particularly abhorrent to Robespierre and his allies.[313] This could easily become an argument against allowing any single national army to emerge, at least until there was assurance that it would avoid creating a hierarchy of "honor" and would identify with the nation as a whole, including the lowest classes, and not just with the higher classes.

If a unique army distinct from the civilian population were to be formed, there was fear that this could exacerbate the adverse consequences of the long standing pre-Revolutionary isolation of soldiers from citizens. As early as 1774, Marat had written :

"Destined to act against the country, when the time is right, we distance soldiers from the commerce of citizens, we require them to live among themselves, we put them in barracks : then, we lead them to detest all states save the military and to make them feel the preeminence of the military, we award them several marks of distinction. Accustomed to living far from the people, they lose their spirit : accustomed to hating the citizen, they soon ask only to oppress him : we leave the citizen exposed to all of their violence, and they are always ready to rush to the part of the state that would like to rebel."[314]

Nation (Paris, 4 Août 1789), 2-3.

[312] (si cet Honneur triomphe, vous verrez la Garde Nationale dégénérer en aristocratie militaire, aussi docile à opprimer les citoyens, aussi prompt à se prostrer devant la volonté de la monarchie) *Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre*, ed. Marc Bouloiseau and Albert Soboul (Paris, 1958-67), Discours, 7:476.

[313] "Monarchical government supposes, as we have said, preeminence of ranks, and even a noblesse d'origine. The nature of honor is to demand preferences and distinctions; it is therefore, by the thing itself, placed in its government." (Le gouvernement monarchique suppose, comme nous avons dit, des prééminences, des rangs, et même une noblesse d'origine. La nature de *l'honneur* est de demander des préférences et des distinctions; il est donc, par la chose même, placé dans ce gouvernement.) Montesquieu, "L'Esprit des Lois," Livre III, Chapter VIII, *Oeuvres Completes*, ed. Daniel Oster (Paris, 1964), p. 538.

[314](Destinés à agir contre la patrie, quand il en sera temps, on éloigne les soldats du commerce des citoyens, on les oblige de vivre entre eux, on les caserne: puis, on leur inspire du dédain pour tout autre état que le militaire et afin de leur en faire sentir la prééminence, on leur accorde plusieurs marques de distinction. Habitués à vivre loin du peuple, ils en perdent l'esprit : accoutumés à mépriser le citoyen, ils ne demandent bientôt qu'à l'opprimer : on le laisse exposé à toutes leurs violences, et ils sont toujours prêts à fondre sur la partie de l'état qui voudrait se soulever.) Jean-Paul Marat, *Les Chaînes de l'Esclavage* (Paris, 1792), 128.

An optimistic but rather compressed view of the dilemma which this situation imposed in 1789 is represented in an anonymous etching, *Le Grand Pas de fait, ou l'Aurore d'un beau jour, 1789* [1789]. (fig. 3.20) This depicts a soldier armed with a sword and a bayoneted musket, who has stepped out from Les Invalides to the Bastille (a drawing captioned *Prise de la Bastille).* At that point, he is far from any safe and solid place, in the midst of what appears to be a wilderness of water. That is, he had no place in society where he could be assured of legitimacy in his new role.

In these circumstances, a rather aristocratic figure wearing a sash of political office, in the light of the rising sun across the water, is helping the soldier along the unsteady path over the rocks. This personage is perhaps reminiscent of Lafayette, an aristocratic leader who, until 1792, was often seen as embodying the hope that the Revolution could be consolidated into a stable and just society. The path the soldier follows leads to responsible citizenship, represented by a tablet text of *La Loy* (The Law), an olive branch of peace, and a citizen's hat. This speaks for the necessity of subjecting the soldier who has newly liberated himself from Royal authority to a new authority which is legal rather than tyrannical and which proposes peace with honor. Thus the soldier can become a citizen and function within the authority of the new state along with his fellow citizens--rather than as a perpetual and dangerously armed separate body. But, the path he is to follow, the path back, is not an easy one and he will require both his own determination and the guidance of civil authority to bring him along it in the right direction, without losing his footing.

As the image suggests, this process could be a difficult and uncertain one, taking time and incurring risks of a serious slip. In this sense, as the image implies, the evolution in thought and behavior which ultimately was to make the revolutionary citizen soldier subordinate to the same legitimate authority as was the civilian had only begun at the

Bastille. As proposed by the image, and as seen in America, the desired coming together might eventually be achieved not by accentuating or even accepting the alleged dual, military identity of the civilian, which had been displayed at the Bastille, but rather by assuring that the *soldat de métier*, as a good citizen, was received under and subordinated to the civil authority of the State.

4. The Fall of the Bastille.

As the previous discussion has shown, the original *Vainqueurs de la Bastille* emerged from that bastion almost immediately after it was taken on the afternoon of July 14. Images of other events on that day, before and after the capture, help to establish the contextual matrix within which these citizen soldiers were placed. We now consider in more detail the events of July 14, on which the claims of the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille* depended.

On the morning of July 14, a crowd began to assemble at the gates of the Bastille. Later, people arrived with weapons, including cannons, taken earlier, without violence, from Les Invalides, located a couple of miles away—a long distance to drag a cannon. There they were joined by others, primarily from the immediately adjacent Faubourg St. Antoine. Some believed that at the Bastille they could take powder, which they needed for their weapons and had not found at Les Invalides.[315] The Bastille's armory held over thirty thousand guns. But the Bastille was a fortress, unlike Les Invalides which was a monumental structure. Furthermore, the Bastille was defended, though by only a small detachment. If in fact this mob had had no powder, they could not have expected to be successful at the Bastille against armed resistance.

Other accounts say that the attack on the Bastille was not motivated by a desire for powder (although it was found afterward that very large quantities of it were stored there) or

[315] See, for example, John Lynn, "French Opinion and the Military Resurrection of the Pike, 1792-1794." *Military Affairs* XL:1 (1977): 4. Also, Roberts, 40.

arms. Rather, popular representatives came there to demand that de Launay remove and surrender artillery that had been placed on the roof and which threatened popular quarters of the city, particularly the Faubourg St. Antoine.[316] When he did not respond to this demand, they attacked.

Many of those who attacked the Bastille in 1789 probably still supported some version of monarchy and directed their opposition against Governmental tyranny rather than against the King. Thus, according to Elie, an officer who was (as mentioned previously) prominent among the attackers, "when I was rushing to the siege of the Bastille, I was sure that I was defending the glory of the King."[317] The insurrectionists did not at that point foresee that they were initiating a conflict which would later overturn the state. St. Just wrote, after having been present at the Hotel de Ville when the heads of De Launay and Fleselles were waved on poles, that he had heard "the cries of joy of the people: 'Long live liberty, long live the king and M. d'Orléans!'"[318] Rudé has shown that the great majority of the Revolutionaries at the Bastille were men with *métiers*, with trades or at least semi-skilled employment. Hence it is implausible that they sought social breakdown or anarchy.[319]

In this connection, it may also be significant that members of the crowd believed that prisoners taken in the Réveillon riots in April, 1789 were held at the Bastille. The Réveillon rioters (suspected on reasonably strong grounds of having been paid by the Duc d'Orléans) were generally similar to the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille* in class origin, and also in being denizens of the Faubourg St. Antoine. Thus, the opportunity to liberate these men may also have motivated some of the attackers.

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[316] *Récit relatif à la prise de la Bastille* (Paris, 15 Août 1789).
[317] (lorsque je volai au siége de la Bastille, j'étois sûr que je défendois la gloire du monarque.) "Discours de M. Elie, ancien officier du régiment de la Reine, infanterie, et capitaine du district de St.-Jean-en-Grêve, à MM. Les Electeurs de Paris," in *L'Achille français*, 9.
[318] (les cris de joie du peuple: 'Vive le liberté, vive le roi et M. d'Orléans!') St. Just cited in Winock, 65.
[319] George Rudé, *La Foule dans la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1982).

The Bastille, though it had walls eighty feet high and fifteen feet thick, was defended only by a garrison of thirty regular soldiers under Lt. Deflue and eighty four veterans who were unfit for regular duty ("invalides"). De Launay, the commandant, was described afterwards by Deflue as "a man without much knowledge of military matters, without experience and of little valour," an opinion that is uncontested.[320] In a sense, de Launay's office was hereditary, since his father had also been Governor.

Some early images seem to assume that the Bastille, given its great strength, could have been taken only by organized, uniformed troops. The persona and image of the citizen soldier as a civilian who fights beside soldiers had not yet been implanted. One such image is J.-B Letourmi's *La prise de la Bastille* [1789]. (fig. 3.11) This seems to have been published in Orleans. It appears to be closely based upon another engraving, *Prise de la Bastille* by an anonymous artist [1789] which, according to its text, was printed in Paris on July 17. (fig. 3.12) The Paris print differs in that it provides substantial historical text at the bottom. It also does not contain the trees, tower windows and other decorative elements included in the Orléans engraving. The artist seems to have lacked knowledge not only of perspective but also of the geometry of the Bastille structures.

These prints shows the defenders on the roof being assaulted from front and rear, and appears to identify all of the Revolutionaries as soldiers. Each has the same neat uniform, including hat. This image minimizes the importance of the artillery (such as those dragged from Les Invalides), although it depicts them. The surrender has already occurred and the invaders have reached the parapet, where they have arrested de Launay, who is about to give up his sword and whose office is symbolized by his wearing the largest hat.

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[320](un homme sans grande connaissances des sujets militaires, sans experiences et ayant peu de courage.) Letter from Lt. Deflue to his brothers, in Flammermont, lxvii-lxviii.

The accompanying text says that the capture of the Bastille resulted from the courage of two grenadiers of the *Gardes Françaises*—which is consistent with the purely military peopling of this image. (Presumably, Humbert the clockmaker, generally regarded at the time as one of the two men who were the first to enter the Bastille, has been transformed into a grenadier for the occasion.) Evidently the authors of these prints, utterly unlike Lallemand, did not see un-uniformed citizen soldiers as having played a role in the victory, or even as having witnessed or encouraged it from nearby. Other contemporaries thought likewise. "By bursting the chains of despotism themselves, the *Gardes Françaises* gave us a courageous example of how to take by storm the diabolical dungeon..."[321] The notion of a citizen soldier who had become a soldier only through the pressure of events had not yet achieved wide currency.

Another Parisian image which likewise sees the insurrectionists as military men (and extremely numerous), but does not seem based on firsthand observation is Jean and Joseph Campion's *Prise de la Bastille, 1789* [1790]. (fig. 3.13) Apart from Prieur's, this is one of the few images of the taking of the Bastille that shows a large number of attackers. Both Letourmi (and his unnamed Parisian precursor) and Campion seem to have worked before the iconography of the Bastille as a building and of the order of battle there had become established.

The viewpoint of this image is similar to that of the modern historian Chagny: "It is to armed patriots, the *Gardes Nationales* and even more so to the *Gardes Françaises*...to whom all of the merit in the taking of the Bastille is attributed."[322] But Chagny's formulation begs the questions. Most of the patriots who armed themselves at Les Invalides and then assaulted

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[321] (En rompant les chaines du depsotisme eux-mêmes, les Gardes Françaises nous ont donné un example courageux, démontrant comment prendre par la force le prison diabolique) *Réflexions d'un Citoyen adressées aux Gardes-Françoises, au sujet de la belle action qu'ils ont fait* (Paris, 1789), 4-5.

[322](Ce sont les patriotes armés, les Gardes nationaux et plus encore les Gardes Francaises... auxquels on attribue parfois...tout le mérite de la prise de la Bastille.) Robert Chagny, "La Symoblique des Trois Ordres." In Michel Vovelle ed., *Les images de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1988), 276.

the Bastille were not members of a uniformed unit. If it was turncoat *Gardes* who took the Bastille, as Chagny and Campion suggest, then they were not representative of the broader group of "patriots."

Campion's composition has a layout so different from other representations (and so inaccurate, with its clockwise canting of the gate to the bridge, and the single uniform low building) that it seems unlikely that the artist was familiar either with the site before its destruction or with the many early graphic representations of it. An enormous number of closely packed men, all carrying pikes or lances and belonging to no orderly formation, crowd out from the courtyard towards the path to the fortress. Because of the uniformity with which they are shown, they appear to all be soldiers, with the exception of a few carters in the left foreground. The main building itself and the ornamental gate leading to the bridge are shown as entirely undamaged, although half of a long, low outbuilding has been destroyed. Apart from this rather meaningless destruction, Campion makes it appear that the capitulation of the Bastille is going to be achieved by sheer force of numbers—large numbers of trained and equipped soldiers.

Another early image, Janinet's *2e Evenement du 14 Juillet, 1789*, [ca. 1789] likewise departs from iconographic convention in depicting an event that occurred immediately preceding the fall of the Bastille. (fig. 3.5). The second of seven images by Janinet of the events of July 14, this print was probably first issued in 1789. It is captioned "The governor of the Bastille after having had the first draw-bridge lowered and having allowed a large number of Citizens to enter into the first courtyard, has them shot."[323] In this image, a line of at least three soldiers, looking like a firing squad, is shooting a small crowd of unarmed civilians who are already fleeing, some looking over their shoulders. Three of their bodies,

[323](Le gouverneur de la Bastille après avoir fait baisser le 1er Pont-levi et laissé entrer un grand nombre de Citoyens dans la 1ere cour, les fait fusiller.) Caption for Fig. 3.5: Janinet, *2e Evenement du 14 Juillet, 1789*, ca. 1789, New York Public Library.

possibly dead, are on the ground. None of the civilians have weapons or try to defend themselves in any way. Janinet has reversed the choice of Letourmi and Campion and visualizes the Bastille as having been attacked, not solely by men in uniform, but solely by unarmed civilians. These, too, are not citizen soldiers.

Like the early images of Lambesc's charge, this one shows casualties only on the insurgent side, and portrays the insurgents as unarmed and unwarlike. They are citizens, but in no way resemble soldiers. Each of these images accuses the Royalists of a massacre, in part, apparently in order to justify revenge that was to be taken by citizens against Government functionaries and soldiers just hours later. (The need for such justification fell away as ensuing Revolutionary events unfolded, so that later series such as Prieur do not show these scenes.) Had any attackers in uniform been shown in Janinet's image, this would not have been a massacre of civilians by the Government, but rather a conflict between two groups of soldiers (with their civilian supporters).

Scholars such as Godechot suggest that Janinet's caption describes an event that never occurred.[324] The Governor did not order the first bridge to be lowered. His men did not lower the bridge. Rather, some of the insurgents gained access to the building housing the bridge mechanism, and lowered the bridge so that they could approach the gate of the Bastille. Alternatively, they may have accomplished the same result by cannon fire aimed at the bridge mechanism. There is no doubt that the defenders fired at least briefly on the attackers once they had crossed the bridge, though probably only from above rather than in the way that Janinet pictures. De Launay had earlier retired his forces from the ground level, where they had been based until the previous day.

The great majority of the images of the taking of the Bastille, unlike Janinet's atypical one, place the artist in the *Cour du Passage* facing *the Porte de l'Avancée* and the second

[324] Godechot, 355.

bridge to the fortress. These images reflect the identification of the artists with the insurgents, who are shown in the foreground, rather than with the defenders, who are generally in the extreme background. The most frequently depicted action occurs around the time that the garrison surrendered, after shots and artillery rounds had been fired by both sides. This was the climactic moment. It also marked the emergence of the figure, the myth of the citizen soldier on the Parisian scene, and what was to be seen as his first decisive and widely acknowledged victory. The prevalence of images having this compositional structure suggests the pivotal importance accorded to the citizen soldiers who took the Bastille – at least in the early Revolutionary period, before a unified national army under Revolutionary control had been assembled.

Lallemand's *Prise de la Bastille* [1789-90] is representative of these works. (fig. 3.6) Clouds of smoke obscure the sky, as defenders fire from the top of the fortress, where a small number of them show their upper bodies in silhouette. Much more smoke from gun and artillery fire is rising from the ground level, not just in the foreground but from a large mass of men who assault the front gate of the Bastille (the bridge having been lowered), and others to the right. The solidity of the fortress's structure is apparent, and it appears undamaged. But the defenders are heavily outnumbered—signifying the numerical superiority of the Revolutionaries over the few paid defenders of the Government.

Of particular interest is the foreground group, where an officer in a red uniform seems to be directing civilians who are firing their big howitzers, aiming them far up at the top of the building, at the enemy firing positions. The insurgent gun crews are working energetically, quickly and competently. Another soldier in blue uniform joins the men storming over the first bridge to add to the group in front of the gate.

Since, of course, there was no organized Revolutionary military force at this point, the attackers in uniform are individual turncoats, perhaps some from a Royal regiment, but

primarily from the *Gardes Françaises*. They were seen as "citizens rebelling against their masters...but faithful to the nation."[325] Or, with some exaggeration, "we have seen three thousand soldiers, just like Brutus, sacrifice themselves to the public cause, and, breaking their oath to be faithful to honor."[326]

The image thus makes it clear, both that at least some Government soldiers have joined the insurrectionists, and also that their skills and perhaps their discipline were needed in order to make the besiegers militarily effective. Furthermore, some officers joined the insurrection with their men. Other officers did not. Earlier in the day, officers in civilian dress had sought to persuade two companies of *Gardes Françaises* in the Place Dauphine not to side with the Revolution, but were driven off by a "Bourgeois." He accomplished this by "loudly exposing the motives that had brought them there."[327] Hundreds of Gardes Françaises came over to the Revolutionary side.

Yet, in Lallemand's image it is the civilian attackers rather than the turncoat soldiers who are in the great majority. The few casualties shown on the ground or being carried away are civilians. Indeed, the attention shown by the attackers to their wounded is one of the distinctively humanizing features of this image. As in Janinet's image, the presence of the casualties is also important because the massacre of some of the defenders and their leaders after their surrender was explained or justified by the assertion that they merited execution because they had not only fought against "the people," but had wounded and killed some of them.

There is also a woman spectator shown against the wall on the right, serving to emphasize even more strongly the implication of human beings with domestic identity, and

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[325] (Citoyens rebelles à leurs maîtres...mais fidèles à la nation.) J. P. Rabaut, *Précis historique de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1792), 96.
[326] (Nous avons vu trois mille soldats, commme autant de *Brutus*, s'immoler à la cause publique, & perjures au serment, pour être fidèles à l'honneur.) *Mort héroique d'un grenadier* (Paris, 1789), 2.
[327] (exposant bruyamment les motifs qui leurs avaient ammenés jusqu'à ce point) Pitra, 35.

not just soldiers or fighters, in the Revolution. The universality of the Revolutionary ideal was explicitly seen at least by some as embracing both sexes, if not all classes. Hence, the depiction of a woman or women watching the action was to become a common and even typical element of images of the Revolutionary conflict. In this instance the woman's commitment may be underscored by the fact that she is standing without any cover close to the ground where combatants have been killed or wounded. She is in the line of fire (from above), a prevalent eighteenth century cliché that is seen, for instance, in British grand manner history painting such as Copley's *Death of Major Pierson* [1782-1784].

At the extreme right foreground is a boy, perhaps the son of this woman, who seems to lean down, cowering, with his back to the conflict. These elements also help to suggest the unnaturalness, the wrongness, the unexpectedness of the battle—which, from the point of view of the civilians who took up arms against the Government--should have been avoided by the Governor's opening the fortress (as Les Invalides had been opened) before a shot had been fired. To support this idea, the image succeeds in communicating both the overwhelming aggressiveness and commitment and also the number of the attackers--hence the universality and irresistibility of the cause to which they contribute their efforts—but also the diverse but specific human identities and roles of the different individuals in the foreground. The people are united, yet differentiated.

A more ambiguous image, also titled *Prise de la Bastille* [1792] was engraved by Berthault after Prieur. (fig. 3.14) This one shows a great many closely packed people, but it does not appear that very many are soldiers, and most may be bystanders who at most are encouraging the attack. To the left in the extreme foreground is a woman reclining on a kind of invalid chair, heavily wrapped below the waist. She appears to be enfeebled or paralytic rather than a battle casualty, but she is being carried away from the Bastille as she peers curiously into the crowd. This figure is so striking and so far forward that she largely sets the

tone for the entire image. She is brightly illuminated while most of the people around her are not. The implication may be that the only citizens who would not participate in the mass movement against the Bastille, the only ones who would move counter to the direction of the crowd, were those suffering from total physical incapacitation. She is not mentioned in the accompanying text.

At the far rear of the crowd are men carrying scythes and in some cases lances or bayonets, while at the top of the rightmost house a man seems to be bent on demolishing with a pick ax the roof on which he is sitting. The men crossing the bridge to get to the open gate to the Bastille seem even more well-assorted and tightly wedged together, with one of them leaning far over the edge of the bridge. There are no wounded, and no firing by the assailants, as the cannon are dragged towards the bridge, but one assailant seems to be about to fall or to be pushed off a rooftop, at the far left. The defenders are scarcely visible, and their firing may be producing nothing but harmless puffballs of smoke.

What this image appears to convey is that the fall of the Bastille was achieved through the common commitment and involvement of everyone of all classes. This was a popular myth: "A breach is made, the mass of fighters advances like a flood; everything that tries to block their way is cut down; tremendous bolts shatter, iron doors are forced open with axes."[328] Already in 1790, "our heroes push forward...everything that tries to block their way is cut down...they advance everywhere, and the holy flag of freedom waves."[329]

Here, as in the other Prieur prints, there is little or no use of class iconography and little distinction between soldiers or civilians. The shared determination of all brought about a rapid and nearly bloodless victory. The goal was not to kill a few aristocrats, but to bring

[328] (une brèche est faite, la masse des combatants s'avance comme une inondation ; tout ce qui entreprend de bloquer leur passage est abattu ; d'énormes boulons s'éclatent, les portes on fer sont forcés à la hache) *Les Fers brisés* (Paris, 1789), 18.
[329](nos héros s'avancent...tout qui bloque leur route est abattu...leur avance est partout, et le drapeau sacré de la liberté est agité.) Chamfort (1791-4), *Tableau* #17.

power to the people. The effectiveness and the necessary engagement of the citizen in this endeavor does not depend on his becoming a soldier either temporarily or permanently.

As time passed, the magnitude of the popular force assembled at the Bastille was progressively exaggerated. By 1796, verbal images had moved beyond Prieur. It was said that "Fifty to sixty thousand men were divided into orderly battalions. The Bastille was taken by storm."[330]

There are numerous images also of the action in the immediately following moments, when de Launay and other captured defenders were escorted out through the gate into the *Cour de Passage* by Arné and Humbert, along with others. One such image is Lallemand's *l'Arrestation du Gouverneur de la Bastille* [1789]. (fig. 3.7) Here both sides are still firing, although the artillery at ground level seems to be directed across the courtyard rather than at the top of the fortress. De Launay is being escorted across the bridge into the courtyard, by Arné in a blue uniform on his right and Humbert in a light colored suit on his left. Although both have their hands on de Launay, he does not seem to be getting harassed. Interestingly, the soldier, Arné, is depicted as much taller than Humbert, who is shorter than de Launay. Soldiers may have been thought of as more physically imposing than civilians. As the first of the two to enter the Bastille, according to the prevalent myth, Arné also was metaphorically the larger figure in the action.

Behind this first row of the column come a number of soldiers dressed, like Arné, in the blue uniform of the *Gardes Françaises*. It is quite clear that they are victors rather than prisoners—hence turncoats. Apart from the importance of their military skills on July 14, it was argued in 1789 that "their promises justified by the facts, have impressed an organized bravery upon the rest of the Citizens."[331] Many of the *Gardes Françaises* had disobeyed

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[330](cinquante ou soixante mille hommes furent divisés en bataillons ordonnés. La Bastille fut prise par force.) Philippe-Jacques-Etienne Guilbert, *Almanach des gens du goût pour l'an V de la République* (Rouen, 1796), 24.
[331](Leurs promesses justifiées par les faits, ont imprimé une bravoure ordonnée au reste des Citoyens.) *Les*

orders to destroy and jettison their weapons on July 13-14, orders given to prevent their carrying these weapons to the rebel side.[332]

Two drummer boys precede the group with de Launay. At the right, a cluster of women and children, are looking across towards the viewer, away from de Launay and the Bastille. If there have been casualties, they are barely hinted at. The center of the courtyard is fairly empty though a number of men are shown at the left middle ground, against the low buildings.

This is not an image of continuing armed conflict. Rather, it is ceremonially triumphal, and seems to mark the end of an era. It is reminiscent of images depicting the humiliating exit of defeated British forces from their Yorktown fortress—a defeat which was to prove final and which was achieved only through France's strong naval support.[333] Lallemand's close attention to the architecture and his generous provision of gun smoke (utterly illogically, because the surrender has already occurred) actually heighten this effect, as do the women and children, whose demeanor suggests that they are watching a parade. The alliance of civilian and military men, represented by the central roles of the soldier Arné and the clockmaker Humbert, seems understated, but its iconography would have been instantly interpretable by any contemporary viewer. A conclusive victory was ritualized to make it seem easy and bloodless.

Charles Thévenin's version of this same scene, *La Prise de la Bastille* [1790], is dated in its original (and possibly entirely different) form to 1790, when it was advertised for sale and shown at the Salon of 1795. (fig. 3.9) The related painting was exhibited at the Salons of 1793 and 1795, but was, at least in an initial form, displayed and reviewed as early as

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Gardes-Françoises à l'avenir, 2-3.

[332] *Mémoire des Gardes-Françoises à M. le Marquis de La Fayette* (Paris, 1789), 2.

[333] See for instance Louis-Nicolas Blarenberghe, *Siege of Yorktown*, gouache, 1784, Château de Versailles.

1790.[334] (fig. 3.8) The etching is generally known as *La Prise de la Bastille* and the painting as *Le marquis de Launay, gouverneur de la Bastille, capturé par les assaillants le 14 juillet 1789.* There is no evidence that Thévenin did not modify the works in the intervening period, or even that the pieces that went to the Salon were based upon those shown earlier. Although these works are undoubtedly among the most frequently reproduced images of the fall of the Bastille, the artist has as yet received very little scholarly attention.[335]

Thévenin's works differ greatly from Lallemand's (probably) earlier and quite genteel treatment of the same event, though both have almost the same point of view. Thévenin's images evidence the fact that, at least by 1793 (during the second period of the Terror), if not earlier, academic painters could acceptably present scenes of great violence.

The most conspicuous difference of the print from the painting is that the print shows an attacker with a very large tricolor flag, whereas the painting shows this flag as white. The white flag had been used to call for a parley with de Launay in order to demand his surrender before the shooting started.[336] Depicting it could serve to recall the peaceable intentions of the insurgents, their desire to avoid a battle--but it could also give the impression that the Revolutionaries were, honestly or dishonestly, offering to surrender. (Doing this may have enabled them to get inside the Bastille, and then open the gates to those who followed them.) From a later perspective, or for the broader audience of the print, the tricolor asserted the courage of the attackers in rallying to a national cause and hence provided a far more vivid image.

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[334] See Vivian Cameron, "Reflections of Violence and the Crowd in Images of the French Revolution." At http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/imaging/essays/cameron.pdf, p. 9.

[335] Thévenin, who had been a student of the distinguished academician François-André Vincent, was only twenty seven years old in 1791, when he won the Prix de Rome. (Unsettled circumstances prevented his receiving the stipend.) His work shows many evidences of academic training and concerns, transmuted by Revolutionary events.

[336] (On s'approche de la Bastille avec un drapeau blanc et un tambour, on fait des signes de paix) Duquesnoy, ibid.

The flag bearer is stepping forward confidently and wears tight fitting pants and shirt which reveal his strong musculature. Although he is the largest and most mobile of the figures, the lighting and composition make him less prominent than the man in the incongruously blinding white shirt, at the center, whose dress suggests that he is a member of the Parisian lower classes.

In the right foreground, Thévenin shows an angry young workman, pictured in profile, about to bayonet a Government soldier in the throat. The victim, with one hand on the shaft of the weapon and the other extended into the air, is grotesquely positioned with one leg upended over a stump of wood like a stake, and with his head poised upon a pile of logs and a stack of brush, as if he were being prepared for immolation. Behind him, shown darkly in shadows, as they stand against archways, are shown a group which includes at least one workman with a lance and two women in bonnets. The stone building is, in fact, on fire, with smoke pouring out of an upper window, where flames are visible. Between these groups, a cannon is exploding, discharging much smoke and some fire—seemingly disturbing or scaring no one amidst this chaotic action.

All of this suggests that the violence is varied in nature, extreme in extent, but ultimately individual and random in its origin and impact. Those who do not actively participate in it seem to watch it with satisfaction, even at the cost of some personal risk. However, at the extreme left foreground is a neatly and colorfully dressed, attractive young woman with a white ribbon in her long, brown hair. She seems to be comforting a wounded civilian, while one younger man leans over him and another sits nearby with his head on his hand. This suggests that where there is violence, there will be victims, not all of whom deserve what happens to them.

The complexity of Thévenin's image, so different from Lallemand's, reflects the horror, strong emotion and chanciness of war. It may also reflect the war weariness and the

growing tendency to question Revolutionary violence that had begun to appear by 1793, when Thévenin first exhibited at the Salon. His image would be most likely to appeal to the more affluent prospective buyer who has at best a mixed reaction to the events July 14 in the perspective of subsequent developments. The Terror proceeded, aimed primarily at those who opposed the current political orthodoxy, but a terrorist might well have felt that Thévenin had done well in crediting the early, condign and successful application of Revolutionary violence.

Towards the center, a tightly packed mass of men emerge from the Bastille with seemingly irresistible force. Some carry lances or guns with bayonets and in the middle of the front row is the middle aged de Launay, wearing a red suit and grabbed at by hands which encircle him from all directions. His expression is one of consternation more than fear. The scene is rendered anticipatory and perhaps poignant by the viewer's knowledge that de Launay is unaware that he is soon to be killed.

The frequent prominence of de Launay in depictions of these events reflects the popular belief that it was he who had ordered the soldiers to fire on the attackers after they had crossed the first bridge to the Bastille. The fact that there were, consequently, 98 insurgent fatalities at the Bastille, versus none at all at Les Invalides, also placed de Launay in a most unfavorable light.[337] Furthermore, having been born at the Bastille at a time when his father governed it, de Launay's identification with the detested building may have been particularly strong. Demolishing the fortress brick by brick and cutting off de Launay's head were acts both of which reflected utter detestation and rejection of the *Ancien Régime*, its honored officials and its institutions, that this edifice and its commander had come to embody.

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[337] Jean-Paul Bertaud, *La Révolution Française* (Paris: 2004).

The most dramatic and dynamic element of this scene is another young man, evidently a member of the lower classes, who confronts de Launay from immediately in front, apparently pointing a bayonet at his body. Leaning forward with his bare feet widely separated and his hand on de Launay's chest, this man seems by himself to break de Launay's momentum, and thus that of the entire column behind him. Like other workmen depicted in images of Revolutionary events (and particularly by Thévenin), this man is young, probably in his early twenties, has a very muscular body and arms, curly hair of medium length, and he acts independently.

A small group in the left center is reminiscent of Trumbull's *Study for The Death of General Warren at Bunker's Hill* [1786], which was previously discussed: a dead man lies on the ground, while immediately behind and touching him, a sorrowful, kneeling civilian seems to cradle a reclining, dying attacker in his arms. Although, as in the Trumbull scene, there are no wounds or dismemberment visible, the effect is both elegiac and reprobatory. Like all the other insurgents and sympathizers in this scene, with the sole exception of Arné, these appear to be civilians.

In this view, the Bastille has been won almost entirely by the bravery and strength of young civilian men who are, however, well equipped with military weapons as well as muscles. Of Arné, only the arms and head are visible coming from behind de Launay, and his uniform is scarcely identifiable as such. But it is the same *Gardes Françaises* uniform worn by the man being bayoneted immediately below him and to his right. This is a strong though somewhat veiled contrast showing how a man wearing a particular uniform, that of a Government soldier, might merit and receive either honor or death, depending only on his willingness to change sides and oppose the King.

In Thévenin's images, the importance of the building itself as a bulwark of defense is greatly de-emphasized in favor of the individual human actors. In part because of this, and

because the scene does not depict resistance by defenders, it would have been difficult for it to communicate a sense of conflict, rather than mere butchery and vengeance by members of the lower classes. Perhaps it is the latter that Thévenin wished to convey. Michel very incisively comments that what Thévenin here proposes is "a *consensual* – or even reactionary – image of the Revolution : each can recognize himself within it."[338] It is a more neutral or distant view, since the viewer is unlikely here to identify with the killers, who are very unflatteringly portrayed from the standpoint of both class and behavior.

When a work by Thévenin on this subject was advertised in March, 1790, the publisher (or possibly Thévenin himself) placed emphasis on its technical virtues, particularly its liveliness, rather than on its political content or historical veracity. A print could appeal to people financially capable of buying it by catering to their fear of the dangers presented by the well-muscled and vicious lower classes—perhaps without thereby incurring any counterrevolutionary stigma. The advertisement could contribute to this appeal, by virtue of its claim that the image is so convincing that the viewer will feel sure that the artist participated in the action (thus implying, of course, that he did not.)

Interestingly, the advertisement also touted the advantages of the etching medium over engraving for this subject. "The free, manly execution has all the liberty that only a lively point, a vigorous etching, can give, and cannot be expected from a cold graver, by the very fact of its purity."[339] The merit of this opinion can be assessed by comparing Thévenin's *Le Marquis de Launay* (fig. 3.8) with, for instance, Prieur's engraved images. According to a review by Renouvier in the same issue of the newspaper, "the energy and force of his drawing, the fierceness of his expressions, gives an idea of the shock dealt to a

[338](Une image *consensuelle* – sinon réactionnaire – de la Révolution: chacun peut s'y reconnaître.) Régis Michel, "L'Art des Salons." In Bordes and Michel, 31.
[339](L'execution libre et masculine a toute la liberté que seul un dessin animé, une gravure vigoureuse, peut donner, et ne peut être attendue de la part d'un graveur froid, par le fait même de sa purité.) Moniteur universel 66 (March 7, 1790) : p. 538.

student of Vincent who here surpasses David's students in spirited efforts."[340] Perhaps terms such as force, fierceness and shock made oblique reference to the content of the image. Another reviewer seems to damn the work with faint and remarkably unspecific praise: "It seems to merit esteem with respect to the art and the subject that it represents."[341] Neither complains about the wanton and seemingly warrantless violence. Perhaps they feared the consequences of grappling explicitly with the issues that Thévenin's depiction raised.

At the 1793 Salon, whose viewers may have become even more inured to violent depictions of recent and familiar events, the work as displayed seems to have passed without comment. In 1795, it was lauded for having "the merit of great pictoral devices."[342] That is, although it was a smaller work depicting a contemporary subject, it achieved an effect comparable to that of the large scale history paintings customarily displayed at the Salons, which often depicted violent events that were distant in time and place. It is particularly intriguing that although the work was seen at least in 1793 and 1795, it seems never to have been criticized either as to its representation of events or its political implications. Political orientations changed dramatically during this period. (Robespierre was executed in July, 1794.) One might infer that Thévenin expressed what many felt throughout this period: the rage of the laborer, striking out (reasonably, fairly, lawfully or not) with whatever came to hand, which ignited the Revolution and drove it forward to unforeseeable lengths and depths. But the elimination of the aristocracy as such, to which this image spoke, passed unregretted. At the 1795 Salon, Thévenin also displayed an image of Lambesc's charge, a highly anti-aristocratic (and therefore, in a sense, pro-Revolutionary) subject. Thévenin's works could

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[340] (L'énergie et la force de son dessin, la violence de ses expressions, donne une idée du choc accordé à cet étudiant de Vincent qui ici surpasse les étudiants de David avec ses efforts vifs), Renouvier in Moniteur universel, March 7, 1790, No. 66, p. 538.

[341] (Elle paroît mériter de l'estime du côté de l'art et du sujet qu'elle représente.) Journal de Paris (March 1, 1790).

[342] (le mérite des grandes machines pittoresques) "Beaux Arts. Exposition publique des ouvrages des artistes vivans, dans le Salon du Louvre, au mois de septembre, année 1795...," Magasine encyclopédique XVIII : 469 (1795) :452.

please people who viewed some of the events of the Revolution with more favor than they did others.

Le Massacre du Marquis de Pellepont, le 14 Juillet, 1789 [1789-90], which is attributed to Thévenin, illuminates these issues more harshly. (fig. 3.10) After de Launay was removed from the Bastille and immediately marched towards the Hotel de Ville, Pellepont tried to free him. The result, suggested here, was Pellepont's decapitation by hatchet. De Launay had already been decapitated and his head put at the tip of a pike, shown on the left of this image. Here again, there are extremely muscular young men representative of the poor of the city, one of them shoeless. De Launay's headless body, in a grotesque posture, is shown in the left foreground. It appears that someone has already stolen his shoes, but the socks remain. Another similarly dressed man is eagerly stepping on de Launay's corpse in order to get at Pellepont, who kneels on one knee and extends a hand, seemingly trying to reason with his assailant. In contrast with the violent, bestial fanaticism with which he is attacked, Pellepont's posture as well as the divine attention he has attracted make him seem more human than his attackers, and even positively noble.

One woman with a voluminous skirt and scarf is shown very close to the body, while others of varied ages are to be found amongst the spectators of these gory events. The celestial participants in this grim scene display a tablet of the ten commandments (presumably with attention to "Thou Shalt Not Kill," which appears to be at issue here)--but they are not going to intervene. This allegorical component is extraordinary in a depiction of a recent event, inviting comparison to mythological and history painting of antique scenes, and perhaps abstracting away from the troubling implications this image could have for the viewer.

At the right, a shoeless figures (which could even be female), wearing another skin-tight costume, walks briskly towards the center of the action—while looking in the opposite

direction. This suggests that the extreme violence of the scene both attracts (the feet) and repels (the gaze) strongly, which seems psychologically valid.

One could argue that Thévenin's *Marquis de Launay* conforms reasonably to the prevailing conception of the requirements for applying academic history painting to recent events. (fig. 3.8) A similar claim might be made for his *Massacre*, which shows Pellepont calmly laying down his life in consequence of his non-violent attempt to perform a generous action. (fig. 3.10) Yet, this is a scene of brutal, animal emotion and action, full of centrifugal distraction. Pellepont is not voluntarily sacrificing his life, and the viewer may have nothing that is morally enhancing to learn from his death. The killing, as in a similar scene in Janinet's series, is carried out by individuals not only identified as civilians, but seemingly as ruffians, assassins. Soldiers neither participate nor intervene.

Of course, an artist can create one work in a formal and academic style and another intended for a different audience, but surely that is not the case here. The *Massacre* stands as a challenging implementation of the academic ideal, faced with the challenge of a Revolution of mass violence where rights and wrongs were rarely clear. It gives visual form to the intense concerns and sharp distinctions that found verbal expression soon after these events: "Don't forget that these proscriptions outrage humanity and make nature shudder. Let us turn our gaze away from these scenes of horror that have afflicted us."[343] Thus, "in rousing Paris, the king was overthrown, but we were not able to save a citizen."[344]

It is very difficult to read the *Massacre* as evincing a sympathetic sense of participation in this Revolutionary event. It does not lionize the citizen soldier. Rather it depicts lawless violence and disorder against a man who seemingly has done no wrong in attempting an act of mercy and justice. Here more than in the scenes at the Bastille,

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[343] (n'oubliez pas que ces proscriptions outragent l'humanité et font frémir la nature. Détournons nos regards de ces scènes d'horreur qui nous ont affligés.) Loustalot, *Révolutions de Paris*, no. 2

[344] (En soulevant Paris [elle] a bien pu renverser le trône, mais elle ne peut sauver un citoyen.) Rivarol, Journal Politique National I (1789) :6.

Thévenin is emphasizing how the events of July 14 were determined by the bloodthirstiness of assassins, possibly only a small number of them, who took advantage of the breakdown of order to settle what they now saw as longstanding scores. These were not citizen soldiers, they were outlaws.

The stable element of the population with enough steady income to meet daily needs, who were the primary prospective buyers of prints had reason to be fearful of lower classes' lawlessness, which they felt would have to be contained by a force that supplanted the discredited and dissipated authority of the King. Images such as these played to these fears. "Starting in early 1789, armed formations were organized in some cities...Moreover the *Grande Peur* tied to the fear of bandits provoked the spontaneous and defensive arming of the population, and spread the movement of the *Gardes Nationales* throughout France."[345] Thus, the citizen soldier was seen as needed, even before the start of the Revolution, to repress the violent tendencies of the poorer classes of citizens in the face of a threatened breakdown of order as Royal authority disintegrated.

By 1794-5, after a stunning series of Revolutionary changes of regime, including the defeat and execution of Girondins, Hebertists and Jacobins--where heroes became villains while life remained brutal, difficult and uncertain--it may have seemed at times that there was precious little glory left to be awarded to citizen soldiers or to anyone else. In August, 1794, immediately after the execution of Robespierre, suspects were freed, the tribunals were re-organized, and an amnesty was ordered for the Vendéens. There were anti-Jacobin demonstrations and publications.[346] In this light, it is most probable that the *Massacre,* with its markedly unsympathetic treatment of Revolutionary violence associated with July 14,

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[345](Dès le début de l'année 1789, des formations armées s'organisèrent dans quelques villes...De plus la Grande Peur liée à la crainte des brigands provoqua l'armement spontané et défensif de la population, et généralisa les gardes nationales dans l'ensemble de la France.) Florence Devenne, "Création et evolution de la garde nationale." *Annales historiques de la Révolution Française* 283 (1991) : 50.

[346] Albert Soboul, *Dictionnaire Historique de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 2005).

dates from the Directoire period, perhaps 1794-5. However, there is no documentary evidence of the dating.

5. The Route To The Bastille: July 12.

The attack on the Bastille reflected occurrences during the preceding days, when Government troops clashed with civilians and some turncoat soldiers. Images associated with these events can help to establish the ways in which civilians and soldiers were seen before July 14, and how this was to change with the appearance of the *Vainqueurs*.

On July 12, German cavalrymen of the *Royal Allemand* Regiment led by Lambesc charged a peaceful crowd in what is now the *Place de la Concorde* (at that time called the *Place Louis XV*) and then attacked civilians in the Tuileries, across the street.[347] The non-French identity of the soldiers was a particular issue for Parisians, who were demonstrating in part to protest the King's dismissal of Necker as Finance Minister (and also, perhaps, the rumored exile of the Duc d'Orléans).[348]

A survey of the Bibliothèque Nationale's print collection through the its online cataloguing system revealed thirty-two different illustrations of Lambesc's incursion on July 12, ranking this as one of the most frequently depicted scenes from the early period of the Revolution, although much less so than the Bastille. It is not possible to date many of these works with confidence, much less to say which was the earliest to actually appear. For example, a rather naïve work by Jean Campion which brings into one image the cavalry sweep of the Tuileries and the earlier action around the statue of Louis is dated 1789. Campion was at best a minor artist, and there does not seem to be any documentary basis for the dating.

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[347] P.G. Spagnoli, "The Revolution Begins: Lambesc's Charge, July 12, 1794." *French Historical Studies* 17 (1991): 466-497.
[348] Dussaulx, *De l'Insurrection Parisienne et de la Prise de la Bastille* (1790), 7.

Royal regiments of Swiss and Germans had recently been concentrated in and near Paris, to defend against threatened insurrection and brigandage. There were also locally-raised troops from formations such as the *Gardes Françaises* and later the *Gardes Nationales* in Paris. Both of the latter were recruited primarily by and from among the more affluent and stable elements of the population, largely for the purpose of protecting themselves and their property from the increasing disorder that arose as the disintegrating Royal government encountered more violent opposition—opposition which, it was feared, would make it easier for irresponsible or criminal elements to take advantage of the breakdown of order. The attitude of poorer residents to these Parisian units was mixed and variable, but there were persistent and frequently successful attempts to attract *Gardes Françaises* to make common cause with civilians against the Government.

By 1789, over half the population of France could read.[349] For literate Parisians, many of whom had avidly followed the events of the American Revolution a decade earlier (when they brought about a substantial increase in newspaper circulation in Paris)--there was a glaring parallel between the use of foreign mercenaries, especially German mercenaries, by Royal governments in the American Revolution and in France. For instance, the "Gazette de Leyde," which circulated in Paris, had previously quoted approvingly the alleged American view that "The man who fights generously for the cause of his country...receives the applause of honest hearts...The man who fights for lucre (a vile mercenary) what is he?"[350] (We have seen that Washington at least in some circumstances chose to describe his troops as having to be paid to fight, rather than fighting generously for the national cause.)

The Gazette was an influential organ of the "extra-territorial" press, not subject to French censorship but tolerated in France. Frequent references to the German and Swiss

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[349] Popkin, 24.

[350] (L'homme qui combat généreusement pour la cause de son patrie...reçoit l'applaudissement d'un cœur honête...L'homme qui combat pour le lucre (vile mercenaire), qu'est-il ?) Gazette de Leyde (19 Septembre, 1777).

Royal troops in relation to Revolutionary events, and the depiction of their uniforms in images, reinforced the popular belief that citizens, whether or not they were soldiers, sought the overthrow of the Government – whereas the Government was dependent on unreliable and venal foreign mercenaries. Just as moral lessons had been drawn on both continents from Washington's dramatic defeat of "the Hessians" (depicted as drunk, inattentive and incompetent) at Trenton, so the German Royal forces in Paris and the Queen's Austrian bodyguards in Versailles in 1789, as well as the Swiss defenders of the King in 1792, were to be cast as brutes who did not hesitate to massacre unarmed civilians.

Le Prince de Lambesc entrant dans les Tuileries..., from Révolutions de Paris, showing Lambesc's charge in the Tuileries, with the *Place Louis XV* appearing in the background, suffers from the weak and perhaps hurried execution typical of this early-appearing series. (fig. 3.2) Here, civilians are portrayed only as victims, they are not shown as carrying arms or resisting. Respectably dressed, they are fleeing under fire. The innocence of their activities before Lambesc arrived is emphasized by the rustic surroundings, and the presence of the dog and the overturned chairs. One of the civilians lies wounded on the ground, evidently wounded but not killed. According to the text accompanying Révolutions de Paris, Lambesc "ran through with a sword with his own hands an unfortunate old man who was walking peacefully in faltering old age."[351] Lambesc serves to identify the soldiers with the hated aristocracy, thus stigmatizing the soldiers as enemies of the people. "Those cowardly soldiers, whom the *Assemblée Nationale* can incessantly punish and call despicable, dared fire on the people...At that same instant the prince Lambesc, their leader, that odious aristocrat, appeared... "[352]

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[351] (Sabra de sa propre main un malheureux vieillard qui promenoit en paix sa défaillante vieillesse.) *Introduction à la Révolution servant du préliminaire aux Révolutions de Paris dédiées à la Nation et au District des Petits-Augustins, avec gravures analogues aux différens évenements* (Paris, 1790), 69.

[352] (Ces lâches soldats, qu'incessamment l'assemblée nationale peut licencier et declarer infâmes, ont osé tirer sur le peuple...Au même instant le prince Lambesc, leur chef, cet odieux aristocrate a paru...) Révolutions de

IIe Événement du 12 Juillet 1789: Le Prince de Lambesc à la tête d'un détachement du Royal Allemand entre dans les Tuileries, is another image of Lambesc's rampage, this one by Janinet and probably published sometime between 1790 and 1791. (fig. 3.3) It also takes place in the Tuileries, which is much more often chosen than the *Place Louis XV* by artists depicting these events. Janinet's image is also typical, at least of the early depictions, in following the example of Révolutions de Paris by showing the people fleeing without any attempt to defend themselves. Here, the Prince is raising his sword to strike an old and respectably dressed citizen. Meanwhile, an equally well dressed damsel in distress who is dangerously near the horses' hooves, has evidently already been knocked down and raises herself on one arm while waving the other to ward off further aggression. Her air of naïve innocence suggests that she is both respectable and unoffending.

As in the Révolutions de Paris image, Janinet makes it difficult to imagine what these particular individuals could have done to merit their treatment by the soldiers. They do not look like rioters, and seem to be well dressed. They are shown as prosperous and in no way rebellious. Evidently in Janinet's view "the people" who suffer Lambesc's attack are not, or at least are not limited to the impoverished, nor are they a mob or a group of protesters.

A quite different and later print of this same scene by Janinet is to be found in his book, probably published in 1791 at the earliest (New York Public Library), hence most likely later than Fig. 3.3. The communication of this second print, also called *IIe Évenement du 12 Juillet 1789* is quite different. It would appeal to many who admired popular militancy to the point, perhaps, of projecting it back anachronistically to an event where it had not been seen. In it Janinet depicts some of Lambesc's intended victims as fighting back. Although a well-dressed man and woman are shown fleeing from Lambesc and his soldiers, two other men come at him from behind, at least one of them armed. According to the accompanying

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Paris I : 1 (1789) : 2.

text, "The people...scatter onto the two terraces, from which they throw chairs at the troupe...Young people hasten to attack him. "[353] Perhaps at the later date of this image, with assimilated hindsight contributed by subsequent events, there was greater public interest in asserting the combative response or even the fighting initiative of Parisian civilians on July 12, more than in the earlier efforts to establish their complete innocence and victimhood. Civilians who fight back or who assault Government troops may be seen as transitioning towards a role of citizen soldier, which the prevalent mythology had assigned to them at the Bastille.

Prieur's *Les Bustes de Mrs. D'Orléans et Necker portés à la Place Louis XV, le 12 Juillet 1789,* the fifth tableau of his series, is an even later image of the events in the *Place Louis XV.* (fig. 3.1) The central figure in Fig. 3.1 is the statue of Louis XV, on his pedestal. The *Place* is located within a central district which was predominantly inhabited by the prosperous rather than the poor, although on a Sunday it would have been visited by poorer people who lived in other neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the statue itself was widely reviled, and frequently adorned with graffiti, which had to be removed by municipal workers almost daily. Prieur's unusual choice to feature this statue in his drawing, not only served to identify the place and event, but also furnished a lightening rod for his audience's resentment of the monarchy, which, by late 1791, had become far stronger even than in 1789-90.

In Prieur's view, it appears that the events in the *Place* were so shocking as to cause even the statue to turn its head. The image suggests that the dead Louis is somehow watching or presiding over an event which Prieur and his intended viewers saw as despicable. Here, the statue looks at Lambesc, at the center, who is, slashing his way through the crowd. Lambesc was widely considered individually responsible for the mayhem his

[353] (Le peuple...se répand sur les deux terrasses, d'où il jette des chaises sur la troupe...Des jeunes-gens se pressent pour fondre sur lui) Janinet, *IIe Événement du 12 Juillet 1789: Le Prince de Lambesc à la tête d'un détachement du Royal Allemand entre dans les Tuileries par le Pont Tournant et frappe d'un coup de sabre un vieillard.*

men caused. Many casualties caused by his troops litter the ground here, particularly in the right foreground. An overwhelming cavalry force following Lambesc and entering the scene from the right will overtake the man carrying the bust in the foreground. They will smash the bust and, according to some accounts, kill the man (a peddler named François Pépin).

In a pamphlet published the following year, Lambesc insisted that he had executed specific orders only partially and reluctantly, and that he and his men had been assailed (and some of them injured) by missiles thrown by the crowd.[354] (Lambesc was subsequently tried and acquitted for his conduct.) Talismanic for Lambesc's anger in this print are the two busts referred to in the title. Necker and the Duc d'Orléans ("Philippe Egalité," elected President of the Constituent Assembly) were favorites of most of the Parisian population in 1789 because they were seen as sympathetic on the one hand to the popular aspirations for more food as well as greater liberty and equality of rights and status, but also to the need for sound fiscal management and credit—of signal interest to merchants and property owners. Necker had been dismissed by the King as Finance Minister immediately before, an action which focused and intensified public discontent.

But, as contrasted with the earlier images, Prieur's attributes a markedly different identity and action to the men attacked by the Government troops. At the center foreground, civilians are fighting back courageously. One of Lambesc's cavalrymen already has been unhorsed, and although he appears already dead, a civilian is at the point of striking him again. According to the text, however, the horseman was killed by a shot fired by a civilian who was a doctor (hence, certainly not a member of the lower classes). In the left foreground, a few *Gardes Françaises*, who have abandoned the Government side, are taking

[354] *Précis historique et justificatif de Charles-Eugene de Lorraine, Prince de Lambesc* (Trèves, 1790), 6.

aim at Lambesc. According to the text, one of them was killed by a Government infantryman, but then another *Garde Française* killed this infantryman.[355]

Thus, working as much as two years after the event, Prieur has done what the earlier artists did not do: he has brought civilians and turncoat Government troops, together into the picture, fighting together. Roberts says that none of the earlier images show the crowd fighting back and causing casualties among the attacking soldiers.[356] One might even think that Prieur, with the sure benefit of hindsight, has extended the mythology of the citizen soldier as a combatant back in time from the Bastille to July 12.

Prieur, utterly unlike the other artists, seems to suggest very large numbers of people in the crowd extending into the distant background, and he is deliberately vague as to the social class of the civilians, even those in the foreground, since their dress and accoutrements cannot be readily discerned. This is an image of "the people," not some faction or class, rising to confront oppression. Perhaps the implication is that the crowd in the background who, unlike those in the foreground, are vastly superior in number to Lambesc's men, "the People," will carry the day and indeed assure the overthrow of the government.

This is a far cry from Révolutions de Paris and Janinet, who personalize an outrage committed by the Government's troops, portraying it as an arrogant and misdirected reprisal which randomly punished individuals who were in no way politically engaged, but, quite to the contrary, seemed to have good reason to be satisfied with the status quo. The difference in typology and class signification is striking. Janinet represents "the people" as the more prosperous and stable elements of the population would wish to see them. Prieur's typology is universalizing and hence unifying, abstracting away from class as determinant of type and emphasizing weight of number.

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[355] Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #5.
[356] Roberts, 79.

Prieur's is the highly colored view of a Jacobin, but it could have resonated with the perceptions of many reasonably prosperous and settled Parisians who were the principal prospective buyers of these prints in 1791. These perceptions accorded the Government no right at all to use violence against citizens, and had long since reached the conclusion that any soldier or officer who did this or ordered that it be done should be subject to summary execution. According to Roberts, there may have been no civilians at all killed by the soldiers on July 12.[357] But Prieur chose to show that day's events as an unprovoked attack on peaceable people by the out-of-control soldiers of a discredited and brutal Government.

This attack was seen at least retrospectively as providing one of the justifications for the slaughter of Government officials by the Revolutionaries that was to follow on July 14. Indeed, Lambesc's charge, not the taking of the Bastille two days later, was sometimes cited as the first event of the Revolution.[358]

As noted, Prieur's treatment is unusual in showing some of the people trying to fight back against Lambesc's troops rather than fleeing. In the early days of the Revolution, the prevailing system of belief portrayed the civilian populace largely as original victims who fought only in self defense. (Thus, in the 1791 edition of Prieur, text at odds with image, "The procession of patriots without arms, shocked rather than afraid...").[359] As time passed and the conflict intensified, more radical views prevailed and then were repressed. Greater emphasis came to be placed on the violent initiative and darker motives of at least some of the citizens who fought the troops, and who could be stigmatized as stirred up or bribed by the Duke of Orléans. (The 1804 edition says that the cortège was made up "citizens and orléanists," adding the explanation as to the latter that "the goal was massacre, pillage, and

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[357] Roberts, 76.
[358] See, for instance, *Journées mémorables de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1792), 24-25.
[359] (La cortège des patriots sans armes, étonné plutôt qu'effrayé de cette course à bride abbatue...) Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #7.

anarchy")[360] The same image (indeed, mental images and interpretations of the same events) evidently could be read in both these ways, whatever may have been Prieur's or his publishers' original intent.

The task taken on by Prieur, of depicting "the people" as a combative force, was a newly conceived one . The pre-Revolutionary experience of French artists, including Janinet, in depicting "the people" acting collectively in the city had been extremely limited. Furthermore, there was no notable eighteenth century French artist who, like Hogarth in England, devoted substantial attention to the urban working class and the contradiction and conflicts spawned by a rigid class systems.[361]

This void in artistic experience and iconography challenged the artists of the Revolution, particularly because, especially in uncertain times, those with enough money to buy works of art, even typical engravings, might have difficulty distinguishing between poorer citizens imbued with civic virtue, on the one hand, and the "brigands" on the other. Prieur dealt with this problem of identification and characterization in part by resisting or avoiding individualization of the Revolutionaries, while Janinet depicted those in early conflict with Government forces as if they were prosperous – a scheme which would not only be unthreatening but in addition perhaps flattering to those who constituted the principal intended market for the prints—those who had some money for luxuries, but opposed the Government and were sympathetic to and even identified with those who fought the Government. Throughout the Revolution, unity was prized and sought after, while class division and factionalism was feared. Art might often seek a wider audience by depicting broad and even undifferentiated support for the principal events of the Revolution

[360] (des citoyens et des orléanistes...le but étoit le massacre, le pillage et l'anarchie) Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #5.

[361] Jack Censer and Lynn Hunt, "Picturing Violence: Limitations of the Medium and the Makers." At http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/imaging/essays/censerhunt2.html. Greuze, for instance, depicted some working class people, but he tended to use rustic settings and to sentimentalize his subjects.

There seem to be more images, like Janinet's, showing Lambesc and his horsemen striking unresisting citizens down in the Tuileries than there are images showing the immediately preceding conflicts at the Place Vendôme and the Place Louis XV, across the street. Perhaps this is because the Tuileries offered a wooded setting which facilitated depicting the victims as merely enjoying a stroll rather than carrying out a provocative demonstration. In fact, however, it was in the Tuileries that the rioters decisively turned the tables on Lambesc's troops by assaulting them with rocks and garden chairs so effectively that they forced them to withdraw. It was these people, not Lambesc, who "cleared" the Tuileries of hostile interlopers. In a sense, this was the first success of what was to become the Revolution. However, it is seldom or never pictured as such, perhaps because initially, Revolutionaries needed to use the events of July 12 to establish the unprovoked aggression by the Government as a predicate for what followed.

All these prints, as well as those depicting the fall of the Bastille, were obviously intended for an audience that viewed the Revolutionary events at least of 1789 in a favorable light – and could afford to pay for graphic works at prevailing prices. These buyers could include merchants and proprietors, skilled craftsmen, but also some aristocrats (such as Lafayette, and the Duc d'Orleans and their circles) who supported Revolutionary ideas at least for a few years beginning in 1789. These aristocrats were, however, much less numerous than the settled class of owners and artisans.

The fact that works of Prieur, Janinet and others tend to justify or glorify the fight against the Royal government reflects anticipations of the tastes of these prospective purchasers – as well as possible fear of the consequences of anything that could be interpreted as anti-Revolutionary expression. Few if any treatments of scenes of this period that are sympathetic to Royal authority have survived. On the other hand, treatment of scenes of mob violence, such as those immediately following the Fall of the Bastille which

were discussed above, do not glorify this violence. Many of those who could pay for prints were fearful of the danger posed by "brigands" and "vagabonds," who could take advantage of any disorder to attack people and property. These terms could have been freely applied to anyone who did not have excess income. For instance, "It is not foreign brigands who have committed these crimes. It is the lower third...the people are furious with them."[362] Here, I see "the people" defined so as to exclude "lower third" entirely, a further indication of the fact that a clear identification of and hence standard iconography for "the people" had not yet emerged. Many people in the lower third of the population had trouble getting enough money to buy food, and surely had none for prints. They did not constitute a group that artists and publishers could logically see as prospective buyers, and there was no need to portray them in a favorable or even neutral light.

Unlike other localized demonstrations and riots in Paris which had occurred in earlier years and again in 1778-9, the events of July 12 had profound, immediate consequences, in part because a representative body to which authority could be transferred was now in existence. July 12 gave rise, first of all, to the idea that the people needed arms to defend themselves against assault by Government soldiers. On July 14, a large crowd gained entry to the armory at Les Invalides. With no resistance from the small number of physically able troops and the larger number of "invalids" guarding the munitions, the crowd helped itself to guns and bullets. Large numbers of soldiers stationed only hundreds of yards away were not ordered to move to oppose the mob, because their officers were unsure of their loyalty.

At Les Invalides, no one was wounded or killed on either side, and the Government soldiers were not molested. This was in sharp contrast to the much more consequential events that occurred later the same day at the Bastille. Thus any image of Les Invalides

[362](Ce ne sont pas des brigands étrangers qui commettent ces délits. C'est le bas tiers...Le peuple est furieux contr'eux.) Letter of A. Bertholet, cited in Garcin, 16.

would necessarily have to take account of its perceived relation to the more crucial subsequent encounter at the Bastille. In this diachronic frame, narrow as it might be, Les Invalides could be seen as important because it made available the munitions used by the attackers at the Bastille – but even more so because it stood for the proposition that the people, the Revolutionaries, were peaceable and unaggressive, fighting only when necessary to defend themselves, for instance, when attacked by Lambesc, and at the Bastille. This image helped to justify the Revolutionaries' conduct, even their later atrocities – which could then be attributed to revenge for unprovoked aggression, or laid at the doorstep of groups or classes that were distinguished from "us." When taken in sequence, as they would appear in series such as Prieur's, Les Invalides and the Bastille lend support to this interpretation of events.

The events at Les Invalides were depicted by Lallemand in *Le Pillage des Invalides, 14 July 1789* [1789-90]. (fig. 3.4) It is dated by the Carnavalet to 1789-90, which seems early. Even if the dating is correct, this work was executed certainly after the fall of the Bastille, very likely after other events (such as the return of the King from Versailles in October) which implied the acquisition of military and governmental power by the citizenry—but well before the final suspension of both the King, the fall of the Girondins, and the coming of the Terror. During this early period of the Revolution, the pillage of Les Invalides and the fall of the Bastille were described as historic achievements, reflective of a unity of the People which must be maintained, extended and perfected, a unity which could transcend the role of the King as embodiment of the nation. The *Fête de la Conféderation* in 1790 was one of many attempts both to inspire and to claim such national unity. It is this spirit of union which seems to bring these images to life.

Lallemand's *Le Pillage des Invalides* presents several contrasts. In the background, Les Invalides appears immense, a strong, sophisticated and urban structure. A very large

number of people have come together in front of it. Yet in the foreground, there is what seems a rural scene reminiscent of the representations of the Tuileries invaded by Lambesc, with carefully drawn trees in full leaf and with a group at the left of respectably dressed citizens including women and children. They could almost have come to this pretty spot for a picnic, and they seem to be conversing with each other calmly, without any regard at all to what is taking place to their right and behind them. These people do not seem to be participants in the "pillage," yet it would be inaccurate to characterize them as spectators, since they show little interest in the main action – which is provided by a column of men, without women or children, that is moving away from Les Invalides following a tortuous trajectory. A dog runs from the group at the left to the column with his two front feet in the air, ignored by all. The dog is the sole but perceptually necessary connection between these two scenes, or discordant elements of action.

The column is led by two boys beating on drums, who are followed by a number of men, in close order and fairly narrow file, but without formation. Few if any of them are in any uniform—they are civilians. They drag with them at least three pieces of heavy artillery—pulled by men, not horses. In the midst of them, between two of the big guns, is a man on horseback with a gun on his right shoulder. In the middle ground, a few men run from the trees towards the building and the advancing column. To the left of the column in the foreground, two men seem to argue, gesticulating. Nowhere in this image is there any hint of an armed conflict that has taken place or will take place, nor of any casualties.

The dominant human motion and initiative here is of the column, with its drums and artillery. This group has purpose and mass, and they dominate the scene with vigor and purpose. They are certainly not soldiers, yet their possession of the implements of war and their cohesive motion suggests that they are equipping themselves to become citizen soldiers. They have not merely deprived the Government's Army of weapons which had become

instruments of oppression: they have seized these weapons with the evident intent to use them in an organized way, whether defensively or aggressively. Furthermore, these are not merely pike carriers or men with hunting guns. They are taking the principal instruments, including artillery, which distinguish the professional soldier and give him power. But they have not taken uniforms, which had always been the identifying mark of the soldier—a soldier who, if he was not a freebooter, was always in the service of the regime that was now so hated. They are citizens who can become citizen soldiers.

The human, natural and unremarkable nature of what these men are doing is reinforced by the presence of the group in the left foreground, who look as if they have come to this agreeable spot quite independently of the men who will become citizen soldiers. This is the core of the myth. What Lallemand portrayed as an atmosphere of tranquil purpose in a day of otherwise routine activities, the act of rebellion at Les Invalides, was no less than a mass movement to contest for military dominance of the State. It stood out sharply from the history of prior decades, where there had been little or no concerted, effective armed opposition to the Government in Paris. Although there was little violence, this act unquestionably took place in an atmosphere of rage, fear, dramatic rumor and frantic haste—precisely the opposite mood to that which Lallemand chose to create.

Lallemand invites the viewer to see both the men with weapons and the foreground group as neatly dressed individuals with a stake in society. They are not ragged, they are not beggars or vagabonds. The people depicted, both participants and observers, may well be typical of those to whom Lallemand might have hoped to sell engravings made from this painting. In a broader perspective, this representation asserts that the Revolution is not being made by (or handed over to) bandits and desperadoes—nor to a mob. Lallemand's work, while it may at first appear strange and refractory, is a remarkable testimony to both change

and doubt. It might also serve to evoke a crucial step towards the emergence of the citizen soldier as a central figure.

Another view of what happened at Les Invalides is provided by Prieur's engraving, *Taking of Arms from Les Invalides* [1791], which is Tableau 14 in the series and was advertised for sale in the Moniteur of July 21, 1792.[363] (fig. 3.5).

In *Les Bustes de Mrs. D'Orléans et Necker portés à la Place Louis XV, le 12 Juillet 1789* (fig. 5.1.1), Prieur had placed his huge crowd of faceless Revolutionaries in the background. Here, just two days later, they have moved forward to occupy most of the space not consumed by sky and the building. Yet even here, Prieur has pushed them back from the less densely populated foreground. The viewer observes them, he does not participate with them. And, unlike Lallemand's emergent citizen soldiers, Prieur's crowd remains of undefined class and without definitive engagement in events. Comparison with the works of Thévenin and Lallemand that have been previously discussed suggest strongly that this uniformity of representation was not an unavoidable consequence of the representational conventions that operated here.

These elements in Fig. 3.1 are typical of those noted earlier in other prints from Prieur's series. He establishes the weight exerted by the sheer number of Revolutionary participants—and by institutions represented by structures. Yet, he depersonalizes the participants by showing so many on so small a scale. They are always actors, not observers--they force events and they make history by mass action that cannot be analyzed in detail, rather than presenting themselves as individual victims or prime actors. (Another example of this is fig. 3.14.) Because even the opposition between civilian and military has been effaced by the continuous human mass, the citizen soldier can no longer be recognized. In fact, he was not perceived to be present until the Bastille.

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[363] Moniteur Universel 203 (July 21, 1792): 186.

In the case of Prieur's *Prise des Armes aux Invalides* [1792], most of the people are striding determinedly towards the targeted building. Even though, upon close inspection, it is possible to distinguish women and children in the crowd, to observe grand gestures and motion, nevertheless no single person is contributing in a differentiated way to the overall scene by doing anything meaningful--anything that does much more than contribute to a mass and textural effect. One reason such an event seems implausible is that the throng is so densely packed that there is scarcely room for its individual members to function independently. In fact, it is hard to imagine these people as capable of individual as opposed to collective thought and action.

Any distinction between insurgents who are soldiers and those who are civilians is largely obliterated along with most other individual characteristics. Prieur does not seem concerned with status, with differences of class, or with any specific role such as citizen soldier that is not central to the event he pictures. Perhaps he neutralizes such distinctions in order to maintain his focus on the Revolutionaries as a group that is more inclusive than any social or vocational class—a group which, it had become increasingly clear, could achieve coherence and stability only in the eye of the artist. While what seems to have been most important to Lallemand was that which made the participants distinctive and special, what may have been most important to Prieur was the opposite: that which made them melt into a teleologically homogeneous and unworkable mass with no identity other than "the people." If this is the case, it is perhaps unsurprising that Prieur never produced an image of the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille.*

MAJOR PRINT SERIES: BASTILLE		
Artist	Title	Date
	Révolutions de Paris	
Anonymous	Le Prince de Lambesc entrant dans les Tuileries le sabre à la main avec un détachement des on Régiment Royal-Allemand, abbat à ses pieds du vieillard et fait fuir tous les citoyens qui s'y prominent	From Introduction à la Révolution servant du Préliminaire aux Révolutions de Paris Dédiées à la Nation et au District des Petits-Augustins, Avec gravures analogues aux différens évenemens, (Paris: Imprimerie des Révolutions, 1789), facing p. 69
Anonymous	L'inquiétude du Citoyen fut cruelle; l'ennemi étant sur ses pas, quelques coups de fusil se firent entendre au travers du tocsin: on cria *aux armes*, et les boutiques des Arquebusiers furent enfoncées pour s'en procurer.	Révolutions de Paris, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 5
Anonymous	Vue de la Prise des armes aux Invalides, la Matinée du 14 Juillet 1789	From Révolutions de Paris, Vol. 1, No. 1, facing p. 11
Dupin	Prise de la Bastille	Révolutions de Paris, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1789
Anonymous	Vue du Chateau de Versailles à l'Époque du 5 Oct. 1789, the King, Queen and Dauphin Appearing on the Balcony...	Révolutions de Paris, October 25, 1789 No. 13
Anonymous	Époque du 1er Octobre, 1789. A Versailles.	Révolutions de Paris, December 12, 1789, No. 20
Anonymous	Vue de la Place d'Armes de Versailles. 6 Octobre matin 1789	Additional image included in Reprint of Révolutions de Paris, October 25, 1789; Published 6 March, 1790
Anonymous	Epoque du 6 Octobre, 1789. L'Après Diné à Versailles.	Additional image included in Reprint of Révolutions de Paris, October 25, 1789; Published 6 March, 1790
Anonymous	Représentation de la Cocarde Nationale	Additional image included in Reprint of Révolutions de Paris, October 25, 1789; Published 6 March, 1790
Anonymous	Siège de Nancy par M. de Bouillé, 31 Aoust 1790	Révolutions de Paris, No. 60, p. 365, 20 September, 1790
Anonymous	Proclamation du danger de la Patrie	Révolutions de Paris, No. 159, 13 August, 1792
Anonymous	Amphithéatres d'enrôlement dressées dans les places publiques	Révolutions de Paris, No. 160, 20 August, 1792
Anonymous	Évenement des champs élisées, le 30 Juillet	Révolutions de Paris, No. 160, 20 August, 1792

Anonymous	Burning of the Barracks of the Swiss Guards	Révolutions de Paris, No. 161, 27 August, 1792
Tableaux Historiques des Principaux Événemens depuis l'Ouverture des États Généraux de 1789		
Janinet	Événement du 20 Juin 1789: Entrée des Députés dans le Jeu de Paume	ca. 1791?
Janinet	IIe Événement du 20 Juin 1789: Serment des Députés au Jeu de Paume	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Événement du 30 juin 1789: Un des Gardes Francaises prisonnier à l'Abbaye St Germain ayant trouvé le moyen de faire parvenir une lettre au Caffé du Caveau, après qu'il en eut été fait lecture le Peuple se prote en foule à la Prison en enfonce les porters et en délivre tous les Prisonniers	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Événement du 8 Juillet 1789: Supplice d'un Espion de la Police	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Événement du 12 Juillet 1789 Le Matin: Curtius délivre les Portraits de Msr le Duc d'Orléans et de Mr. Necker qui furent portés en triomphe par totue la ville et le Peuple crioit *Chapeau Bas*, pour marquer sa profonde vénération	ca. 1791?
Janinet	IIe Événement du 12 Juillet 1789: Le Prince de Lambesc à la tête d'un détachement du Royal Allemand entre dans les Tuileries par le Ponot tournant et frappe d'un coup de sabre un vieillard	ca. 1791?
Janinet	IIIe Événement du 12 Juillet 1789: Incendie de la Nouvelle Barriere des Gobelins. Le feu fut mis dans le même instant à toutes les autres Barrieres: on en chassa tous les Commis et l'on en brula tous les Régistres	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Événement du 13 Juillet 1789: Le Peuple après avoir délivré les Prisonniers de la Force se porte en foule au Couvent de St Lazar,e pille tout en fesant perquisition dans la Maison et en enleve toutes les Farines qu'il conduit en triomphe à la Halle	ca. 1791?
Janinet	IIe Événement du 14 Juillet 1789: Le Gouverneur de la Bastille après avoir fait baisser le 1er Pont-levi et laissé entrer un grand nombre de Citoyens dans la 1re Cour, les fait fusiller	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Évènement du 14 Juillet 1789: Transport des Canons des Invalides, dont le Peuple et les Bourgeois s'étoient emparés	ca. 1791?
Janinet	IIIe Évènement du 14 Juillet 1789: Le brave Maillard sur une planche suspendue au-dessus du fossé de la Bastille, les propositions des Assiégés	ca. 1791?
Janinet	IVe Évènement du 14 Juillet 1789: Le Marquis Delaunay voulant mettre le feu à la Ste. Barbe est repoussé par le Sr. Ferrand	ca. 1791?

Janinet	PRISE DE LA BASTILLE par les Gardes Francaises et les Bourgeois de Paris, le Mardi 14 Juillet 1789. M. Delaunay qui en étoit Gouverneur fut pris et trainé à la Place de Grève, ou en arrivant il eut la tête tranchée, étant convaincu de trahison. Sa tête et son coeur furent portés en triomphe par toute la Ville	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Ve Événement du 14 Juillet 1789: Le Marquis Delaunay conduit à la Ville par les Volontaires de la Bastille	ca. 1791?
Janinet	VIe Événement du 14 Juillet 1789: Le Marquis de Pellepont voulant arracher le Major de la Bastille des mains du Peuple, est lui même près d'expirer sous les coups de haches d'un furieux	ca. 1791?
Janinet	VIIe Événement du 14 Juillet 1789: Mort de M. de Flesselles, Prévôt des Marchands	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Événement de la Nuit du 14 au 15 Juillet: M. de Laincourt se jette aux pieds du Roli, et lui fait le récit fidel des malheurs de la Capitale	ca. 1791?
Janinet	Événement du 17 Juillet 1789: Arrivée de Louis XVI dans la Ccapitale trois jours après la prise de la Bastille	ca. 1791?
Janinet	5 Octobre (Ier év). Les femmes voulant prendre l'abbé Lefèvre [d'Ormesson] et les hommes voulant incendier les papiers (cour de l'Hôtel de Ville)	ca. 1791?
Janinet	5 Octobre (IIe év). Les dames de la Halle et autres femmes partant pour Versailles	ca. 1791?
Janinet	5 Octobre (IIIe év). La Fayette descend de l'Hôtel de Ville avec les ordres de partir pour Versailles à la tête des troupes	ca. 1791?
Janinet	5 Octobre (IVe év). Les femmes parisiennes siégeant à l'Assemblée parmi les députés	ca. 1791?
Janinet	5 Octobre (Ve év). L'aide de camp de M. de la Fayette passant au milieu des balles pour remplir sa mission auprès du Roi	ca. 1791?
Janinet	6 Octobre. Le Roi paraissant au balcon donnant sur la cour de marbre dit: Mes enfants, j'irai à Paris, mais à condition que ce sera avec ma femme et mes enfants	ca. 1791?
Janinet	6 Octobre. Massacre d'un garde du corps à la porte de l'appartment de la Reine par des brigands	ca. 1791?
Janinet	7 Juillet. Travaux au Champ de Mars	ca. 1791?
Janinet	14 Juillet (Ier év). Passage des Fédérés au quai de la conférence	ca. 1791?
Janinet	14 Juillet (IIe év). Entrée des fédérés au Champ de Mars	ca. 1791?
Janinet	14 Juillet (IIIe év). Serment des fédérés au Champ de Mars	ca. 1791?
Janinet	3 août. Massacre arrivé à Nancy et trait héroïque du sieur Désilles, jeune officier au régiment du Roi	ca. 1791?
Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Francaise		
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 1: Serment du Jeu de Paume à Versailles le 20 Juin 1789	Advertised for sale in *Le Moniteur* , no. 182, p. 7-8 (July 1, 1791), and *Mercure de France*, p.

Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 2: Le Peuple Délivrant les Gardes Francaises à l'Abbaye St Germain, le 30 Juin 1789	120 (July 16, 1791)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tabeau 3: Motion Faite au Palais Royal par Camille Desmoulins, le 12 Juillet 1789	Advertised for sale in Le Moniteur, no. 220, p. 336 A(Aug 8, 1791), and le Mercure de France (Aug 27, 1791)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 4: Le Peuple Faisant Fermer l'Opéra, le 12 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 5: Les Bustes de Mrs. D'Orléans et Necker portés à la Place Louis XV, le 12 Juillet 1789	Advertised for sale Le Moniteur no. 259, p. 667, Sept 16 1791
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 6: Les Gardes Francaises Sauvant Mr. du Chatelet, leur Colonel, de l'effervescence populaire	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 7: Mr. de Lambesc entrant aux Tuileries, avec un détachement de Royal Allemand, le 12 Juillet 1789	Advertised for Sale Le Moniteur 276, p. 14 (Oct 3, 1791)and 303, p. 242 (Oct 30, 1791)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 8: Action entre Royal-Allemand et un Détachemnt de Gardes-Francaises, en Face du dépot, le 12 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 9: Les Troupes du Champ de Mars Partant pour la Place Louis XV, le 12 Juillet 1789	Advertised for sale Le Moniteur no. 332, p. 479 (Nov. 28, 1791)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 10: Barriere de la Conférence Incendiée, le 12 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 11: Paris Gardé par le Peuple, la nuit du 12 au 13 Juillet 1789	No advertisements identified
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 12: Pillage de la Maison de St. Lazare, le lundi 13 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 13: Pillage des Armes au Garde Meuble, le Lundi 13 Juillet 1789	Advertised for sale Le Moniteur no. 203, p. 186 (July 21, 1792)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 14: Prise des Armes aux Invalides, dans la matinée du 14 Juillet 1789	

Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 15: Mort de M. de Flesselles. Prévôt des Marchands de Paris, le 14 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 16: Prise de la Bastille, le 14 Juillet 1789	Advertised for sale Le Moniteur no. 203, p. 186 (July 21, 1792)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 17: Arrestation de Mr. de Launay, Gouverneur de la Bastille, le 14 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 18: Alerte de la Nuit, du 14 au 15 Juillet, 1789	Advertised for sale Le Moniteur no. 203, p. 186 (July 21, 1792)
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 19: Canons de Paris Portés à Montmartre, le 15 Juillet 1789	
Prieur inv. & del., Berthault sculp.;	Tableau 20: Le Roi arrivant à l'Hotel-de-Ville, le 17 Juillet 1789	No advertisements identified
	L'allemand Series	
Jean-Baptiste L'Allemand	Charge du prince de Lambesc à la tête du Régiment Royal allemand, le 12 Juillet, 1789	1789-90
Jean-Baptiste L'Allemand	Pillage des Invalides, 14 Juillet, 1789	1789-90
Jean-Baptiste L'Allemand	La Prise de la Bastille, 14 Juillet 1789	1789-90
Jean-Baptiste L'Allemand	L'arrestation du gouverneur de la Bastille, le 14 Juillet, 1789	1789-90

Fig. 3.1: Jean-Baptiste Berthault after Jean-Louis Le Prieur, *Les Bustes de Mrs. D'Orléans et Necker portés à la Place Louis XV, le 12 Juillet 1789,* Tableau #5, *Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Française,* 1791, engraving, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 3.2: Anonymous, *Le Prince de Lambesc entrant dans les Tuileries le sabre à la main avec un détachement des on Régiment Royal-Allemand, abbat à ses pieds du vieillard et fait fuir tous les citoyens qui s'y promenoit* (From Introduction à la Révolution servant du Préliminaire aux Révolutions de Paris Dédiées à la Nation et au District des Petits-Augustins, Avec gravures analogues aux différens évènemens, (Paris, 1790), facing p. 69, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 3.3: Jean-Francois Janinet, *Ile Événement du 12 Juillet 1789: Le Prince de Lambesc à la tête d'un détachement du Royal Allemand entre dans les Tuileries par le Pont Tournant et frappe d'un coup de sabre un vieillard*, from *Gravures Historiques des Principaux Événemens depuis l'Ouverture des États Généraux de 1789*, ca. 1791, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 3.4: Jean-Baptiste Lallemand, *Le Pillage des Invalides, 14 Juillet 1789*, ca. 1789-90, oil on canvas, Carnavalet

Fig. 3.5: Jean-Francois Janinet, *2e Evenement du 14 Juillet, 1789: le Gouverneur de la Bastille après avoir fait lever le 1er Pont levé et laissé entrere un grand nombre de Citoyns dans le 1er Cour, Les fait fusiller*, from *Gravures Historiques des Principaux Événemens depuis l'Ouverture des États Généraux de 1789*, ca. 1791, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 3.6: Jean-Baptiste Lallemand, *Prise de la Bastille*, 1789-1790, oil on canvas, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 3.7: Jean-Baptiste Lallemand, *l'Arrestation du Gouverneur de la Bastille*, 1789-1790, oil on canvas, Musée de la Révolution Française, Vizille

Fig. 3.8: Charles Thevenin, *Le marquis de Launay, gouverneur de la Bastille, capturé par les assaillants le 14 juillet 1789*, 1789-1793, oil on canvas, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 3.9: Unknown artist after Charles Thevenin, *Prise de la Bastille*, Completed ca. 1790, exhibited 1795, hand colored engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 3.10: Charles Thevenin, *Le Massacre du Marquis de Pellepont, le 14 Juillet, 1789*, 1789-1790, oil on canvas, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 3.11: J.-B Letourmi, *La prise de la Bastille*, 1789, colored engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale, de Vinck 1559

Fig. 3.12: Anonymous, *Prise de la Bastille*, 1789, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 3.13: Jean or Joseph Campion, *Prise de la Bastille, 1789*, 1790, engraving, Louvre, Collection Rothschild

Fig. 3.14: Jean-Baptiste Berthault after Jean-Louis le Prieur, *Prise de la Bastille*, Tableau #16, *Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Française*, 1791, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 3.15: Anonymous, *Portrait d'aprés nature du Sr. Humbert, Compagnon Horloger, natif de Langres, qui a monté le deuxieme à l'assaut à la prise de la Bastille, le mardi 14 Juillet 1789... Portrait d'aprés nature du Sr. Harné, natif de Dôle en Franche Comté, Grenadier aux Gardes Françoises qui a monté le premier à l'assaut et a arreté le gouverneur de la Bastille, le mardi 14 Juillet 1789*, 1789, engraving, Library of Congress

Fig. 3.16: Anonymous, *Portrait d'apres nature du Sieur Harné Grenadier aux Gardes Francaises, natif de Dôle en Franche Comté , qui délivra [...] la Bastille le 14 Juillet 1789...Portrait d'après nature du Sieur Humbert Horloger natif de Langres, qui a monté ,* 1789, woodcut, Bibliothèque Nationale, de Vinck, 1674

Fig. 3.17: Charles Thevenin, *Un Vainqueur de la Bastille*, 1789, oil on canvas, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 3.18: Jean-Baptiste LePaon, *General Lafayette at Yorktown attended by James Armistead*, 1783, oil on canvas, Lafayette College

Fig. 3.19: Anonymous, *Vainqueur de la Bastille,* ca. 1789, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 3.20: Anonymous, *Le Grand Pas de fait, ou l'Aurore d'un beau jour, 1789,* ca. 1789, Bibliothèque Nationale

Chapter IV: Citizens and Soldiers: Convergent and Divergent Images

1. Introduction

In discussing depictions of early battles of the American Revolution, I suggested that at the outbreak of the conflict, citizens who were not career soldiers were seen as fighting for the Revolutionary cause, often in uniform but sometimes not. Washington's appointment as Commander in Chief a few months later changed this situation because Washington insisted on fielding a unified, trained, full-time army, and had no faith in militias. He did not see his soldiers as motivated primarily by idealistic patriotism. They had to be paid to fight. Washington's mandate led to a clear-cut differentiation of the soldier from the civilian, with the fighting shown as being done by uniformed soldiers of the Revolutionary army.

Later American images, such as those of Trumbull, even if they depicted the earliest battles, tended to conform, perhaps anachronistically, to the norm established and consistently maintained by Washington. Those who fought for the Revolution were apt to be shown as indistinguishable from career soldiers, rather than as citizens in arms.

In France, the Bastille can be seen as the first major battle in a series of Revolutionary upheavals. Images of the Bastille considered in the preceding chapter show Revolutionaries who included both armed civilians and uniformed soldiers who fought against the Government either as individuals or in small units of no more than company size. Thus, whereas in America fighters could be seen in early images such as Doolittle's *Battle of Lexington* [1775] (fig. 1.1), as combining the characteristics of non-military civilians with some of those of soldiers, in France the citizen soldier's identity was initially referenced somewhat differently, as in Campion's *Prise de la Bastille, 1789,* [1789] (fig. 3.13), by celebrating the making of common cause between clearly differentiated armed civilians and turncoat soldiers, who became *Vainqueurs de la Bastille.*

Neither of these images depicted effective officer leadership and, in both the enemy was shown by the artists as a military force led conspicuously by officers (often, aristocrats), but with no civilian support. The *Royal Allemand* regiment, fighting against the Revolutionaries, inspired obloquy in France in part because, like the British Army in America, and particularly their Hessian mercenaries they were seen as foreigners.[364]

The Bastille was quickly followed in the summer of 1789 by a series of military reorganizations mentioned in the previous chapter, and by the selection by the *Assemblée* on July 15 of Lafayette, greatly celebrated in France for his accomplishments in the American Revolution, as Commander in Chief of the troops in Paris. The *Assemblée*, like the American Continental Congress, had limited authority and unevenly recognized legitimacy. This was exacerbated by the fact that neither body had access to any reliable revenue.

While in America it had taken only a few months to gain commitment to the establishment of a single national army, in France this step took four years, until the Amalgame in 1793. During the intervening period, France was plagued by uncertain, conflicting and multiple lines of military authority, and hence recurrent confrontations between units. This reflected the complexity of domestic military organization in France at the outbreak of the Revolution, a situation which had no parallel in America, where there had been no American army. To depict anti-Revolutionary civilian fighters would have been to concede that the people were disunited, a state of Civil War rather than revolution. This was seldom if ever acknowledged, since to accord popular legitimacy to those fighting against the Revolution might have been seen an anti-Revolutionary. Hence images showing civilians fighting on both sides of a conflict are rare or non-existent. The civilian, but not the soldier,

[364] As to attitudes towards the Royal Allemand in 1789 see Dussaulx, 7. As to the Hessians, see *Journals of Congress* (Philadelphia and Yorktown, PA, 1777-), V: 640, "And whereas, his Britannic majesty...has applied for aid to certain foreign princes, who are in the habit of selling the blood of their people for money, and from them has procured and transported hither considerable numbers of foreigners..."

is inevitably on the "right" side. The civilian was a citizen, while the soldier might not be, or might have only some of the attributes of full citizenship.

After the Bastille, the next major exemplifications of this view arose from a events occurring on October fifth and sixth, 1789 between Paris and Versailles. These events led to the King being brought back from Versailles as a virtual prisoner—to be followed by the *Assemblée*. I will refer to this as the March to Versailles, and it is the focus of the second section of this chapter. Some depictions of this incident remarkably expand the type of citizen soldier to emphasize the engagement of women, who played a significant part. Indeed, it may be that Versailles was seen at least by some, retrospectively, as inflating the category of citizen soldier to caricatural dimensions. If even women could be seen as citizen soldiers, then the absurdity or inappropriateness of depending on any civilian fighters at all was highlighted. From the time of the Bastille, the historical and art historical materials witness a long-continued endeavor to establish a natural and obligatory *fédération* of all the *citoyens actifs*, male adults meeting a minimum standard of income, into a single body with common interests. In the context of this struggle, the notion or image of women as citizens of any kind, much less citizen soldiers, was necessarily redolent with contradiction.

The evidence to be cited in the section on the March to Versailles will suggest that this incident could be of strong and continued pictorial interest because of rather than in spite of the fact that it lent itself readily to divergent and in fact contradictory readings. This could incite production of more images, created over a longer period of time, than is the case for events of more obvious and less controversial significance, such as the pillaging of the Invalides or, indeed the capture of the royal family at Varennes—a critically important event which received little pictorial attention. See, for instance, Jean-Baptiste Lallemand's *Pillage des Invalides* [1789-90], an image devoid of ambiguity or multiple interpretations, that is representative of the very small body of works showing this subject. (fig. 3.4)

As foreign threats crystallized, the need perceived by at least a majority of the *Assemblée* for a large, reliable and unified army grew even more intense. As Cessac and Servan argued before the Military Committee of the *Assemblée Nationale*, "public force must be able to make the Nation respected outside its borders, and maintain peace within it..."[365] This problem was crystallized in depictions of two quite different events that occurred in close succession during 1792, the *Déclaration de la Patrie en Danger* in July and the taking of the Tuileries in August. The question of the relationship of these events to the evolution of the image of the citizen soldier is the subject of the third section of this chapter. There, I will consider the hypothesis that these events further distanced and differentiated the civilian patriot from the soldier, thus nearly completing the progression, which had been much slower in France than in America, from the apotheosis of composite citizen-in-arms imagery suggesting a conscious blending of civilian and military elements, to a commitment to a unique Revolutionary army which enrolled citizens and transformed them into soldiers.

Depictions associated with the *Déclaration* were the first to show, through bold contrasts, the mass conversion of civilian citizens into soldiers. This was a demonstration both that soldiers were fundamentally differentiated from civilians, for instance by their discipline, arms and uniforms, and also that the former could be converted, by what was shown as a voluntary act of patriotism, into the latter. This occurrence was also shown as vindicating the notion, by that time considerably more contentious, that the people of France were united in their support of the Revolution and that their army, unlike the militias which had up to that time dominated Paris, could embrace men of all classes.

The *Déclaration* was closely followed by the taking of the Tuileries, which put an end to Royal power and placed the Government fully in Revolutionary hands. Here, for the

[365] (la force publique doit être capable de faire respecter la Nation au dehors, et de maintenir la tranquillité dans l'intérieur) Capitaine Cessac et Chevalier de Servan, *Projet de Constituion pour l'Armée Francois, présenté au Comité Militaire de l'Assemblée Nationale, par l'Auteur du* Guide de l'Officier en Campagne *et par celui du* Soldat Citoyen (Paris, 1792), 4-5.

first and last time, foreign Royalist troops fought until overrun, and the survivors were then annihilated. The images show Revolutionary civilians participating in the slaughter, but in the large these views emphasize the determinative role of the Revolutionary army.

In France, as in America, early images either did not highlight the identity and role of officers leading the insurgents, or else suggested doubt as to their competence or loyalty. In France in 1789, large numbers of soldiers owed their allegiance to the Government only through the commanding officer, the aristocratic leader of that particular unit. These commanders, including Lafayette and Bouillé, were successively separated or separated themselves from the Revolutionary majority in the *Assemblée* and were eliminated Even in 1792, three years after the beginning of the Revolutionary conflicts but prior to the *Amalgame*, officers were suspected of treason or at least incompetence, and generally were not highlighted as leading the Revolutionary troops.

Finally, in a brief fifth section, we will comment on the paucity of images of the citizen-in-arms associated with events subsequent to the taking of the Tuileries and thus seek to understand the disappearance of citizen soldier images from representations of these later events.

Historical materials relating to military events of the period covered by these events are numerous. Perhaps influenced by Goethe's famous statement about the battle of Valmy in 1792 that "From here and this day, there begins a new epoch in the history of the world," modern historians have often attributed many of the changes to the French army, and its resulting successes, to the emergence of a new kind of soldier, one who was motivated not by mercenary goals, but by patriotism.[366] This is, of course, in striking contrast to early histories of the French Revolutionary Wars which attributed military success primarily to the mistakes

[366] (von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus) Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Campagne in Frankreich," *Goethes Werke*, ed. GroBherzogin Sophie von Sachsen (1817, rprt. Weimar, 1898), XXXiii : 74).

of the enemy, rather than to the political commitment of the French soldiers.[367] Indeed, Goethe's comments on Valmy were not published until 1817, after Napoleon and Waterloo.[368] At best they reflected long hindsight, not the view from 1792.

Albert Soboul was among the first to highlight the importance of patriotic spirit: "In the Year II the war was charged with national and social significance...The army had been nationalized by the *Amalgame* of 1793; the war was nationalized in turn...In the ranks of the Army of the Year II, national fervor and revolutionary spirit were one and the same."[369] Jean-Paul Bertaud, similarly asserts that it was the ideas of patriotism and national duty that made the 1792 call to arms.[370] By using the *Armée du Nord* as an example, where soldiers fought close to home (with a remarkably low rate of desertion) and truly believed that they were defending their homes and families, John Lynn has also upheld the myth of the success of the citizen soldier model.[371] More recently, T. C. W. Blanning has highlighted the contrast between the French, who, at Valmy "believed that the very existence of the brave new world created by their Revolution was at stake" and the Austrians who believed that "they were engaged in a limited operation of international policing to restore order inside France," to explain the surprising success of the French army.[372] Despite its title, S. P. MacKenzie's *Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era: A Revisionist Approach*, offers very little in the way of new material, citing radical politicians such as Brissot, and the radical newspaper Père Duchesne as evidence of popular support for *levée en masse*.[373]

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[367] See for instance François-Emmanuel, vicomte de Toulongeon, *Histoire de France, depuis la Révolution de 1789* (Paris, 1801-1810), Vol. I or Antoine-Henri Jomini, *Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution* (Paris, 1820-24).
[368] Goethe.
[369] (En l'An II la guerre était chargée de signification sociale et nationale...L'armée avait été nationalisée par l'Amalgame de 1793 ; la guerre fut nationalizée à son tour...Dans les rangs de l'armée de l'An II, la ferveur nationale et l'esprit révolutionnaire étaient de même.) Albert Soboul, *Comprendre la Révolution* (Paris, 1981), 275-6.
[370] Bertaud (1979), 114.
[371] Lynn (1996), 35.
[372] T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars* (London, 1996), 80.
[373] MacKenzie, 34-35.

The 1989 bicentennial brought about a renewed interest in the subject, and with it a comprehensive re-examination of primary source material. Bernard Deschard has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses of the Revolutionary Armies, especially when compared to the tactical and organizational strengths of its royal predecessor.[374] Alan Forrest has analyzed immense quantities of military records, and soldiers' letters and has produced several well-documented books on the subject of common soldiers in the French revolutionary armies.[375] Forrest's most recent work is extremely valuable in understanding the political and theoretical underpinnings of the changes enacted on the army by the *Assemblée*.[376] Like Forrest, Michel Auvray has also sought to re-examine many of the myths surrounding the *levée en masse*, referring to it as "the legend of the 'volunteers of the Year II,'" and demonstrating that the armies of the French Revolution, like those that preceded it, were largely filled with the poorest members of society.[377] Samuel Scott has further contributed to the de-mythologization of the *levée en masse* through his comprehensive study of the experiences of common soldiers.[378] Owen Connelly has contributed a number of important articles to the field, analyzing, among other things, the historiography of the *levée en masse*.[379]

While the *Garde Nationale* was unquestionably had an important impact on the development of the citizen soldier image, it has received relatively little attention. Georges Carrot is by far the most comprehensive source on this subject.[380] Dale Clifford has convincingly demonstrated the importance of the *Garde Nationale* (and its uniform) in the

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[374] Deschard, op. cit.
[375] Forrest (1990); Forrest (1989); Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's men : the soldiers of the revolution and empire* (London, 2002).
[376] Alan Forrest, "La patrie en danger: The French Revolution and the First Levée en masse." In Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron eds., *The People in Arms* (Cambridge, 2003).
[377] (la légende des 'volontaires de l'an II,') Auvray, 80.
[378] Samuel Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1978).
[379] Owen Connelly, "The Historiography of the Levée en Masse of 1793," in Moran and Waldron, 43-59.
[380] Georges Carrot, *Garde Nationale* (Paris, 2002).

creation of a notion of citizenship.[381] Lynn Hunt's article is especially important for understanding the development of the provincial militias that later became the *Garde Nationale* units between 1789 and 1791.[382]

The bibliography relating to the historical events covered in this chapter is enormous, so I will only highlight important works relating to the events discussed in detail. A number of books have examined the representations of women participating in the events of October 5th and 6th, 1789. Among these, Catherine Marand-Fouquet's work is somewhat typical in its heavy reliance on secondary sources.[383] Vivian Cameron's work is unique in this area, offering novel interpretations of many of the engravings depicting the women marching to and from Versailles.[384] Madelyn Gutwirth's work is also exemplary for her comprehensive examination of contemporary source material.[385] Carla Hesse's book provides remarkable insight into perceptions of the *poissardes* both before and after the October 1789 events.[386]

The *Fête de la Fédération* has received comparatively little attention from scholars of the French Revolution, and Mona Ozouf's magisterial *La Fête Révolutionnaire* is unique in its careful description of the circumstances surrounding it.[387] Samuel Scott's short article on the Year 1790 is also essential in understanding the larger impact of the Fête on Paris and the Provinces. Scott convincingly argues that the Fête can be directly linked to the rash of mutinies that occurred later in the year.[388] François Macé de l'Epinay's article is equally

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[381] Dale Clifford, "Can the Uniform Make the Citizen? Paris, 1789-1791." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* XXXIV:3 (2001): 363-382.
[382] Lynn Hunt, "Committees and Communes: Local Politics and National Revolution in 1789." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* XVIII:3 (1976): 321-46.
[383] Catherine Marand-Fouquet, *La Femme au temps de la Révolution* (Paris: 1989).
[384] Vivian Cameron, "Women Imagery and the October Days, 1789." In *Gender and Political Culture in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*, Rockefeller Foundation.
[385] Madelyn Gutwrith, *The Twilight of the Goddesses* (New Brunswick, 1992).
[386] Carla Hesse, *The Other Enlightenment* (Princeton, 2003).
[387] Mona Ozouf, *La Fête Révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1976).
[388] Samuel Scott, "Problems of Law and Order during 1790, the 'Peaceful' Year of the French Revolution." *The American Historical Review*, xxxl:4 (1975): 859-888.

important for understanding the various modes of representation with within which depictions of the *Fête de la Fédération* operated.[389]

Despite the numerous books described above which discuss at length and in detail the historical events surrounding the *Déclaration de la Patrie en Danger* of July 1792, the *Levée en Masse*, and the *Amalgame* of 1793, there is no article or book discussing depictions of the subject, almost certainly because of there are so few of them. It is remarkable that this point is brought forward by none of the historians of the period, who nonetheless describe in great detail the newspaper articles, parliamentary debates, and pamphlets on these topics.

2. The March to Versailles.

Images of the events of the March to Versailles are extremely numerous and, unlike those of the Bastille, highly varied. They include occurrences that took place immediately before, during and after the arrival and departure of the women from Versailles. Because of the richness of these materials, and the limited electronic and paper search techniques currently available for the collection, it is difficult even to estimate the total number of different images relating to the incident that can be found at the Bibliothèque Nationale. However, I have tentatively identified over sixty of them. This is a relatively large number in relation to the number of surviving images of many other Revolutionary events. The images began to appear in newspapers in the days immediately following the march to Versailles.

Like the taking of the Bastille, the events which led to the King (with the *Assemblée*) being compelled to return from Versailles to Paris do not appear to have been the product of anyone's prior plan or agreement, though they surely reflected fundamental alignments of passions and influences. Very early on the morning of October 5, hundreds of women, initially gathered from Revolutionary quarters of the City, again with major participation

[389] François Macé de l'Epinay, "Autour de «La Fête de la Fédération», Charles Thévenin et la Révolution 1789-1799." *Revue de l'Art* 83 (1989) : 51-60.

from the Faubourg St. Antoine, marched to the City Hall, apparently motivated by outrage at their inability to buy bread, because of its scarcity and the resultant high price. According to Révolutions de Paris, which was consistently sympathetic to those who opposed and sought to control and limit royal authority:

"The almost complete lack of subsistences...has made clear to all citizens...that it is necessary to fight against the army of conspirers, that we must not wait for hunger to have completely unnerved us. [...] A new rope awaits a guilty man...or an innocent one."[390]

The narrative in a contemporary pamphlet described the attack as violent and focused on the Queen and the aristocracy

"...we want the queen...the *Gardes-du-corps*, we want M. Bailly, M. de la Fayette ; the representatives of the Commune, terribly insulted several days ago by a certain Mr. Marat, author of an incendiary paper, called *L'Ami du peuple*, run away; the *hôtel de ville* is attacked, pillaged, destroyed...We are in convulsions of despair, famine."[391]

The role of the women was in some measure relativized by emphasizing the anger directed by the attackers specifically against the Queen, a non-military and indeed only indirectly political target. The Moniteur reported that "...some said it was time to cut the throat of the queen, and to free ourselves of the cabal who were protecting her"[392] If the women were targeting the Queen, then they were not attempting the job of soldiers and it might seem fully acceptable even to men to have women carry out this violent popular judgment against a woman.

According to Janinet's later accompanying text, "The armed women...whose first intention had been to set fire to the *Hôtel de Ville* and to massacre the representatives of the

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[390] (Le défaut presqu'absolu des subsistances...ont rendu palpable à tous les citoyens...que s' il falloit se battre contre l'armée des conjurés, il ne falloit pas attendre que la faim nous eûte entièrement énervés. [...] une nouvelle corde attend un coupable ou...un innocent.) Prudhomme, "Mouvemens du Peuple et Départ de la Garde Nationale pour Versailles," Révolutions de Paris, 13 (12 Octobre, 1789) : 9.

[391](...nous voulons la Reine...les Gardes-du-corps, nous voulons M. Bailly, M. de la Fayette; les Réprésentants de la Commune, horriblement insultés depuis quelques jours par un M. Marat, auteur d'une feuille incendiaire, nommé l'Ami du peuple, se sauvent; l'hôtel de ville est assailli, pillé, dévasté...Nous sommes en convulsions de désespoir, de famine) *Le Coup D'Equinoxe d'Octobre 1789: Lettre de Monsieur P..., de Paris, à Monsieur M..., son Ami, négociant à Nantes* (Paris, 12 Octobre 1789), 3.

[392] (...on y disait qu'il était tems d'égorger la reine, et de se délivrer de la cabale qui la protégeaient.) (Déposition de) Nicolas Bergasse, Pièces Justificatives, *Moniteur*, 1789, p. 565

Commune..."[393] However, as this process got underway, the women came under the influence of an orator named Maillard, who was a leader of the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille.*[394] Maillard convinced them to leave the *Hôtel de Ville* and march to Versailles, a distance of 14 kilometers, to enter the presence of the King and demand his help in getting food. It may be that Maillard advanced this idea simply in order to distract the crowd from their rage directed at the *Hôtel de Ville* and its inhabitants—who were powerless to feed the city. As they proceeded from there to march through the city on the way to Versailles, the women gained in numbers, including men.

According to a newspaper bearing an Oct. 5 date:

"The Women of *la Halle*, joined together in a Corps...forcing all other women to follow them...the weapons storehouses...were pillaged...these new Amazons, dragging a Canon with them, set off."[395]

This may have been written before the King's return, when the women's march tended to be viewed sardonically and as an oddity. The reference to "Amazons" is unflattering. It would have been difficult in any case for the men of Paris to acknowledge later that their women had somehow gained a valuable achievement (perhaps with the help of men) which the men themselves had been unable to accomplish for weeks past.

Some hours later, Lafayette, vacillating as his predecessor Benzeval had vacillated on July 14, was finally compelled to gain the authorization of the city authorities to lead his large army also to Versailles, which he did with uncertain intentions. The women reached Versailles in the late afternoon, and the soldiers somewhat later. Although in proximity, these soldiers played no substantial role in the events that followed, nor did the regiments already present in Versailles. The end result of the incident, seemingly brought about in

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[393](Les femmes armées...dont la première intention avoit été d'incendier l'Hôtel-de-Ville & de massacrer les Représentans de la Commune...) Janinet, *Ile Événement du 5 Octobre 1789.*

[394] For Maillard's role, see *Rapport du 23 Août 1790*, BN, Il, 699 fol 134/137.

[395] (Les Dames de la Halle, réunites en Corps...forcant toutes les femmes de les suivre...les magasins d'armes...ont ete mis au pillage...ces nouvelles Amazones, trainant avec elles un Canon, se mirent en marche.) Courier national politique et littéraire 28 (5 Oct. 1789): 229.

large part by Lafayette's negligence and lethargy, in fact greatly enhanced his political power by making both the King and the *Assemblée* dependent on the protection of his troops in Paris.[396] The *Garde Nationale* of Versailles was added to his command, and the *Régiment de Flandres* was brought back to Paris and integrated with Lafayette's *Garde Nationale* there.[397]

In Versailles, a number of the women entered the *Assemblée*, and with Maillard as their spokesman, went into the seats to express their needs directly to individual members. A delegation of women and members of the *Assemblée* then spoke with the King, who executed all documents presented to him, thus calling for food to be delivered to Paris and ratifying acts of the *Assemblée*. After an uneasy and uncomfortable night, in the morning some members of the crowd gained entry to the Palace perhaps with the collusion of its guards, and sought to break into the Queen's bedroom. The Marquis de Ferrières reported that the women shouted with regard to the Queen: "We want to cut off her head, tear out her heart, fry up her liver, and it won't end there!"[398] This attack resulted in the death of two of the Queen's bodyguards, but the Queen had been warned and was not present when the assailants got into her suite. Later, the King, in the presence of his family, saluted the crowd from a balcony in the court of the Palace. He promised to come with his family to Paris, and left for Paris at 1PM on October 6, accompanied by the triumphant crowd (estimated at up to 30,000 people), which took care that he neither changed his mind nor was diverted towards foreign exile.

Thus, in a period of two days, many dramatic scenes took place, with the principal practical result that the King was compelled to take up residence in the Tuileries Palace in Paris, for the first time in many years. This underscored and strengthened the centrality of Paris's role in the government, which had been diminished by the residence of the King and

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[396] See Paul-Charles-FrançoisThiébault, *Mémoires du Général Baron Thiébault* (Paris, 1894-95), v.1, 239-251.
[397] Annales Patriotiques (7 Octobre 1789).
[398] (Nous voulons couper sa tête, arracher son coeur, fricasser ses foies, et cela ne finira pas là!) Marquis de Ferrières, *Correspondance inédite, 1789, 1790, 1791 et 1792* (Paris, 1901), 293.

Assemblée in Versailles. The King's presence also suggested that he would in some measure participate in or at least witness the economic suffering of Paris, and thus might be more motivated to alleviate the people's distress. Finally, it made the Royal family hostages to the will of any armed faction that could establish at least temporary military control of the city.

Initial reaction to the popular victory was euphoric, but dissenting voices could still be heard, regretting the deaths of the Royalist *Gardes*. Celebrating the one year anniversary of the event, Capitaine Cléry wrote: "What action is more worthy of being celebrated, than the generous devotion of these heroes who...sacrificed themselves to the faithfulness that they owed their king!"[399] It is not surprising that this version of events makes no mention of the role played by the women. For soldiers to have been killed by women (and their male accessories) would hardly have been considered heroic.

One of the earliest depictions of the October events, *Vue du château de Versailles à l'époque du 5 Oct. 1789, le Roi, la Reine et le Dauphin apparaissant sur le balcon...*, appeared in the October 25, 1789 issue of Révolutions de Paris, less than three weeks after the drama in Versailles. (fig. 3.1) This exceptionally rapid publication suggests that what had happened in Versailles was of extraordinary immediate interest to Parisians. (By contrast, the previous week the same paper had carried an illustration of an event that had occurred more than three months earlier.)

The caption for *Vue du château de Versailles* states that:

"The *Garde Nationale* of Paris and of Versailles, in the number of more than 20,000, without counting more than 12,000 men and women armed with different arms, who addressed the King with their complaints about the lack of bread in the capital, asking the King to come make his residence in Paris."[400]

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[399] (Quelle action plus digne d'être célébrée, que le genéreux dévoueemnt de ces héros qui...se sont immolés à la fidélité qu'ils devoient à leur roi!) Cléry, Ancien Capitaine du regiment de Soissons, *Hommage à la Mémoire des Braves Gardes-du-Corps, Massacrés à Versailles, à l'affreuse époque des 5 & 6 Octobre 1789* (Paris, 1790).

[400] (La Garde Nationale de Paris et de Versailles, au nombre de plus de 20,000 sans comprendre plus de 12,000 hommes et femmes armés de differents armes, qui adresserent au Roi des plaintes sur le manque de pain dans la capitale, et priant le Roi venir faire son séjour à Paris.) Text accompanying *Vue du Chateau de Versailles*, in

The image gives substantial attention to the architecture of the *château* and to the densely packed crowd in front of it, although the crowd shown seems to number less than 1000 people, not the 32,000 claimed in the caption. Like other prints of this rapidly-prepared series, this one is roughly drawn and shows little detail. The crowd has no evident leaders, although a couple of men on horseback are shown at the extreme left and right at the back of crowd. Women predominate in the back row of the crowd, which is closest to the viewer, but men can be seen beyond them, and the sex of most of those depicted is indistinct.

A single cannon, seemingly unattended, is aimed at the wall of the palace, but not at the Royal family--who are farthest from the viewer and hence entirely indistinct, unrecognizable. The crowd seems to be static and calm, though many of its members hold pikes or similar weapons, pointed straight upwards. They are not an immediate menace to the royals. They appear attentive, though it is hard to imagine how any words coming from the balcony could be audible to them.

Vue du château de Versailles, like other prints in the same series, might be termed journalistic and historical in category. It seems intended to bring to the reader and viewer an impression of the physical setting in which momentous recent events occurred and to roughly block out the forces shaping these events. Many readers were undoubtedly less familiar with Versailles than they were with Parisian sites such as the Bastille. Hence this was an image that could be expected to help sell newspapers.

The designs published in the Révolutions de Paris, however primitive their execution, deliberately echoed the formats traditionally used for scenes of history: horizontal format, with text at the bottom giving details about the event that the image represented. The tradition of publishing historic prints in series had a long history in France. In 1784,

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Révolutions de Paris 13 (October 25, 1789).

Godefroy and Ponce published an illustrated series depicting the American Revolution, which included *Journée de Lexington* [1784], which was Plate 3 of *Recueil d'estampes representant les différents événemens de la guerre qui a procuré l'indépendance aux Etats Unis de l'Amérique.* (fig. 4.3) Prior to 1789, however, there was no particular precedent for images published in newspapers, since none of the pre-revolutionary newspapers that I have found were illustrated.

The King's palace is shown in *Vue du château de Versailles* as immense, disproportionate to any needs of either family or government. Yet, the people investing it are so massive in numbers that they seemingly could, if they wished, take it by storm.

The primary visual communication made by this print seems to be one of unity: unity between men and women, between soldiers and civilians, and a newfound unity between King and people which, however, is somewhat remote and suggestive of a relationship in which the King is a central but background, essentially symbolic figure, whereas the people are in the foreground and have much more mass—sufficient easily to overwhelm him.

The projection of unity is particularly striking because it is invocatory nature; it runs strongly contrary to some of the prevailing beliefs and myths. The *Garde Nationale* of Versailles, explicitly stated in the caption as forming part of the composite mass confronting the King, had been and would be reviled by Parisians, including readers of this newspaper, as seduced by and complicit with the excesses and privileges of the Court.

In *Vue du château de Versailles*, the King is not visibly defended or protected by anyone at all, except perhaps for a handful of men standing in the open space between the balcony and the front of the crowd. There is nothing restraining the crowd from rushing towards the King or invading the *château.* They do not choose to do so presumably because they are satisfied by what the King says and does. The immense dimensions of the Chateau and its implied ostentation and wealth contrast sharply with the known penury and hunger of

the people—which, however, find no direct visual expression. The people are scarcely differentiated from each other and cannot be identified as to class.

This interpretation is supported by the text, which emphasizes primarily the size of the crowd, the fact that they were armed, and the fact that both men and women were included, soldiers and civilians. Despite the caption, a careful inspection of the figures suggests that none of the women are shown as armed. It is notable that none of the images of the Bastille had shown women as armed, despite the far greater spontaneity of the assault on the Bastille, and the danger to which it exposed everyone in the area including the women who were present.

To attribute the March to Versailles to the initiative of women could not, in the political and social culture of the time, have advanced its political importance and its likely benefits to the nation. In Revolutionary France, women, like children, could not vote or hold office, although under the *Ancien Régime* women who held a fief or exercised a *maîtrise* (generally widows) were voters. (Women were to gain the vote in France only in 1945.) This is not to say that there were not at least some women who thought and even wrote of Versailles as redolent of hope for their emancipation—as well as some men, probably a much larger number, who saw these events as posing a potential threat to the retention of their dominant roles in the family and in society. According to the women's magazine Les Etrennes Nationales des Dames,

"Last October 5 the Parisiennes proved to men that they were at least as courageous as they, and just as enterprising...We suffer more than men, who with their declarations of rights leave us in the state of inferiority and, let's be truthful, of slavery in which they've kept us so long. If there are husbands aristocratic enough in their households to oppose the sharing of patriotic honors, we'll use the arms we've just employed with such success against them."[401]

[401] (Le 5 Octobre dernier les Parisiennes ont prouvé aux hommes qu'elles étaient tout aussi courageuses qu'eux, et tout aussi entreprenantes...Nous souffrons plus que les hommes, qui avec leurs déclarations de droits nous laissent en un état d'infériorité et, soyons honnêtes, d'esclavage dans lequel ils nous ont gardées depuis tellement longtemps. Si il existe des maris assez aristocrates pour opposer le partage des honneurs patriotiques, nous utiliserons les armes que nous venons tout juste d'utiliser avec tant de succès contre eux.) Les Etrennes Nationales des Dames (Paris, November 30, 1789).

Evidently, the parallel between "aristocratic" privileges, which were to be abolished, and male privileges, which were to remain in force, did not go unnoticed, at least by women. However, the issue of whether the Revolution could bring greater equality of rights and political participation to women never really reached the *Assemblée*'s agenda. It even seems plausible that, to the extent that the progress of the Revolution depended on actual violence, such as had occurred at the Bastille but only marginally at Versailles, it was likely to make some men more violent and thereby to extend their dominance over women.

This social context may suggest why, in the initial euphoria generated by the King's return to Paris, women's role in the incident, once it had resulted in a positive outcome, could have passed without any special visual emphasis by those who viewed these events as salutary for citizens, namely men. This may help explain why *Vue du château de Versailles* does not accord any particular initiative or predominance to female over male participants.

A second implication of this image is the impressive political and hence social strength generated by the unity and numbers of the citizens who rose to demand changes in government. This strength coerced the return of the King to Paris, which was clearly sudden and involuntary. In fact, the move to Paris was so unexpected that the Royal family found themselves required to inhabit the Tuileries Palace, which was in a quite dilapidated state after its long abandonment.

The transfer of the King to Paris is shown as achieved, not by political discourse or through representatives, but by direct, mass, frontal armed action. If this action had some collateral effects, such as casualties, these are discarded as incidental, unworthy of note. Popular impetus seems to be expressed in this image by clear, overwhelming, physical threat, including the cannon, but not, as at the Bastille, through bloodshed. The success at Versailles could engender a reasonable hope that the powerful initiative taken there would

soon gain the participants and those who supported them at least the bread that they sought--which they clearly saw as within the power of the King to accord them.

This could be read as conveying the message that armed, the People can function as citizen soldiers and pursue and achieve their common interests—even though many of them, a day or two earlier, had been engaged in entirely civilian pursuits. Images of the Bastille can express a similar idea. What seems new here is the explicit integration of women into the image as highly visible participants, not just spectators.

However, this perspective on events might have been recognized even at the time of publication as teleological. The Parisians had not gone to Versailles for the purpose of bringing the Royal family back to Paris. That was an unplanned consequence of the confrontation, and yet it could be seen as somehow immanent in the People's unity, numbers and desperation. His return to Paris had been a popular demand in earlier months, and he had never given it credence or apparent consideration, much less acceded to it.

The exclusion of major elements of the Versailles action from this pictorial account is equally significant. The violence against the Queen's bodyguards is not shown, nor is there any hint of the animus felt by at least some of the crowd against the Queen. Rather, the Royal family is treated as a unit, just as the crowd is treated as a unit.

Rumor, fear, or wishful thinking could alter some of the details, but not perhaps the basic thrust underlying *Vue du château de Versailles*, to arrive at a considerably more threatening and apocalyptic conception. *Female Perils* [ca. 1790], is an anonymous British print which exemplifies such a transformation, turning the scene into a caricature. (fig. 4.3) Here, a neat line of women in bonnets fires their muskets at the *château* (though not directly at the Royal family on the balcony, where the King, Queen and Dauphin are more plainly visible), while another woman carries a drum, one raises a severed head aloft and another, bare-breasted, waves a hatchet in the air. There are some wounded on the ground at the

bottom, at least one of whom is a woman. (Depictions of women as casualties are extremely rare.) A few of the immense crowd are scrambling over the wall to the *château*, which is defended by some men with swords. Meanwhile, a much smaller number of armed men, presumably Lafayette's *Garde Nationale*, is arriving at the upper left, destined to contribute very little to the female-dominated mob's overwhelming numbers and strength.

This print both intensifies and feminizes the violence considerably. It builds upon a prevalent British habit, long antedating the Revolution, of depicting the French as weak, unmanly—and poorly fed. An example from this period is Gillray's caricature *French Liberty / British Slavery* [1789]. (fig. 4.2) The exaggerated contrast between the diet, clothing and physique of the Briton and the Frenchman make them seem to belong to two entirely different races. The French soldiers shown fleeing the women in Fig. 4.3 are notably spindly, in the spirit of Gillray's imagery. *Female Perils* reflects a very different view of what happened at the same place and time shown in *Vue du château de Versailles*. Surely this alternative, caricatural image would resonate with some viewers in France as well as in England.

Scenes of the return to Paris on October 6 facilitated an even more explicit celebration of national unity than did the confrontation with the King at Versailles. Copies of a print of unknown authorship, *Triomphe de l'Armée Parisienne réunie au peuple à son retour de Versailles à Paris, le 6 Octobre, 1789*, [1789] exist both at the Carnavalet (untitled) and in the Bibliothèque Nationale with the title. (fig. 4.4)

Some somewhat later sources, such as Mercier's 1799 revolutionary history, emphasize the disorderliness of the return to Paris, and the disapproval with which the violence in Versailles was received. According to Mercier, "Two hundred thousand men on the road, laughing, howling, dancing, yelling, saying: 'We've got him!' Each soldier holding

a prostitute by the arm; the fishwives seated on the cannon."[402] (An engraving by Janinet, Fig. 4.7, to be discussed below, shows a fishwife seated on a gun barrel.) This is an alternate perspective on the role of women in these events, one which relegates them to their traditional place as well as identifying them with the *poissardes*, widely regarded as an ignorant and credulous class.[403] Furthermore, according to an anonymous early report,

"The troup that turned towards Paris with the heads of the two Gardes-du-Corps...paraded around with these terrifying spoils...the People of Paris did not receive these heads with joy...On the contrary, they demonstrated their indignation..."[404]

In contrast to such views, the image of the reuniting of the Parisian army with the people reminds the viewer that the army had been separated (and hence was obviously thought of as distinguishable) from the people, who were viewed as civilians (both men and women). This separation on October 5 was brought about by Lafayette, himself an aristocrat, when he tardily marched his regiments to Versailles hours behind the mob of civilians, thus preventing the two groups from acting in concert at least initially—as they do here a day later, at the end of the episode, where the relationships indicated are intimate and coordinative. This is consistent with the insistence, after the fact, that what was obtained at Versailles resulted from the armed action of military and civilians, men and women—although, even more than in July, the soldiers had contributed principally through their inaction.

It is notable that what is shown here is described in the title of the print (hence, by the unknown author or publisher) as an "army," a military formation like the Minutemen at Lexington—though both depictions convey a complete lack of any leadership or discipline.

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[402] (Deux cent mille hommes en route, riant, hurlant, dansant, criant, disant: 'Nous l'avons!' "Chaque soldat ayant une prostituée au bras; les poissardes assises sur les cannons.) Louis-Sébastien Mercier, *Paris pendant la Révolution ou le nouveau Paris 1789-1798* (1799, rpt., Paris, 1962), 90.

[403] Hesse, 10-23.

[404] (La troupe qui se détacha vers Paris avec les têtes de deux Gardes-du-Corps...faisoit parade de ces horribles dépouilles...le Peuple de Paris ne reçut pas ces têtes avec la joie...Bien au contraire, il témoigna son indignation...) *Le Tout sur les Evenements de Paris & de Versailles, d'Octobre 1789 par un Observateur Impartial* (Paris, 17 Oct. 1789), 6.

Lafayette and his officers have lost their grip on events, and this may in fact reflect the view that these men contributed nothing to the result at Versailles. The distance between King and people and the downscaling of the King's importance that was displayed in *Vue du Château de Versailles* has now advanced to a complete elimination of the King from the scene--although many participants and observers considered it highly important that the people had accompanied the King back to Paris in a body. The subject here is not the King, it is, as in *Vue du Château de Versailles*, but the uniting of the People to dominate events by force, so that all, even women, are in some sense, at least for the moment, citizen soldiers, even if civilians and military men are clearly distinguished.

The postures in the image, reflective of success, are smug and relaxed, indicating pleasure rather than aggressiveness. Soldiers and male civilians, but not women, hoist aloft on pikes what are presumably the two severed heads of the Queen's bodyguards, as well as a loaf of bread. "...the presence of the bloody heads makes the image a celebration of past violent acts, with the revelers," and indeed the viewer, "complicit in those."[405] But these have become mere static props, emblematic of victory, rather than evocative of anger and intended to incite fear. Indeed, brandishing the bread rather than devouring it suggests that there will be plenty for all now that the King is coming to Paris. The bread itself has thus become a symbol rather than an object of immediate desire and rapacity. This is the consequence of a victory that has been achieved and a peace apparently obtained at the price of only a small amount of bloodshed—two deaths, both on the enemy side. The image is not a militaristic one. It even suggests that the citizen soldiers, including those in uniform, can soon return to their normal, peaceful lives.

The role of the women in this scene is ambiguous. One of them is straddling a gun barrel very comfortably, while looking down intently between her legs. This hardly dignifies

[405] Cameron, 13.

the women's alleged role in the victory. In fact, they might be seen as mere camp followers by anyone unacquainted with the earlier myth. The women are accompanied by a larger number of men of the *Garde Nationale*, in blue uniform, as well as by a few male civilians. Some of the men are fraternizing suggestively with the women. There are gray lines amidst exotic greenery which indicate that this assemblage, which is progressing to the right of the picture, extends laterally far into the background. The "people," if not the "army," are overwhelmingly numerous.

The image may seem actually to leave open the question of which members of this motley and well integrated assemblage of guardsmen and civilians constitute "the Army." Perhaps the term could be applied narrowly, only to those in uniform. But, although the "people" are verbally differentiated from the army in the title, the image speaks more persuasively of their shared interests and actions once reunited. If this is an "army" of mixed sex, it is far from clear that it is the traditional male element that actually dominates the mood and sentiments of the assemblage. To the extent that it is the women who set the mood, they do this by exerting their conventionally acknowledged charms, rather than by deploying the physical and psychological power of amazons.

A concept of citizen soldier so broad as to give equal or higher place to women versus men could not achieve serious and lasting acceptability in Revolutionary France because of the overwhelming strength of prevailing social conventions and roles that relegated women to subordinate status. Thus, while in a sense images such as this one promoted a universally encompassing soldier-citizenship, in fact they seem more likely to have provoked negative reactions. Furthermore, if it was unacceptable to think of women, even if they marched together, carried pikes and sat on gun barrels, as thereby becoming any kind of soldiers except caricatures, then perhaps this image actually implies a suggestion that the time had come to draw back to a more narrowly limited conception of citizen soldier, one which might

exclude casual civilian participation even by men, but certainly by women. Class is also a significant issue. The images to be considered here will reflect that fact that the women of the March to Versailles were typically represented and referred to as market women or fishwives—women of low social status, reputed to be of loose morals.

As the limited and short term results of the popular movement that had brought the King and *Assemblée* to Paris came to be seen from a greater distance and with less enthusiasm, the origin and leadership of the October movement might be accorded diminished credit. The result seems to have been a further shift in focus of the visual narrative, with increased receptivity in France to images which placed the role of the women in a still more grim and doubtful light. If the movement had failed, then perhaps it had been led by women after all.

The people who came from Paris to Versailles could be denigrated as naïve and feckless. They could be seen as having trusted the King and settled for too little, gaining only an incomplete resolution of the crisis. Such implications might be projected by bringing the women again to the foreground, raising sexual issues more sharply, and emphasizing their sanguinary propensities.

But one reason the subject of the women's march may have remained popular for years is that this is one of very few scenes of the French (as had been the case for the American) Revolution where women could be seen as protagonists. For anyone who wanted to produce or acquire Revolutionary scenes which featured women, the choice of material was extremely limited. Two such scenes are represented in *The Patriotic Donation of September 7, 1789* [1791] and, *Trait de Courage Heroïque* [1793], which depicts "the widow of St.-Mithier" in the Vendée, who threatened to blow up her house when confronted by counter-Revolutionary marauders. (fig. 4.5 and fig. 4.6) The first of these scenes lacks the drama of physical conflict, although when it occurred it was admired as emblematic of the

Revolutionary solidarity of even wealthy women.[406] It generated a number of images despite the difficulty of giving visual form to its content.[407] The exploit of the widow, unlike the March to Versailles, could not be seen as having significant consequences for the future of the Revolution.

Consideration of some of the possible factors driving interpretation and representation of the events in Versailles may facilitate understanding of Janinet's *IIe Évenement du 5 Octobre, 1789: Les Dames de la Halle et autres Femmes partant de Paris pour Versailles* [1790-1791].[408] (fig. 4.7)

The picture is dominated by the fairly small number of women shown, but a few armed soldiers of the *Garde Nationale* appear in front of them and at the left. One woman lies astride a gun barrel, pressing her legs together in a sexually charged gesture, while another waves gaily. (Mercier, cited above, identified the women who did this as *poissardes*.) Most of the others seem to be chatting with each other in pairs in what seems a conventionally feminine form of socializing that is independent of any specific context, while a couple of them apparently are dragging the cannon—or perhaps merely demonstrating the absurdity of their attempting to do so. All are neatly dressed, and unarmed. They do not look as though they have been working at the markets, but there is certainly nothing soldierly or violent about them.

This particular image might be read simply as showing the women following (not leading!) the soldiers to Versailles, were it not for the extremely provocative pose of the girl

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[406] See *L'âme des Romaines dans les femmes Françaises and Suite de l'ame des romaines dans les femmes Françaises* (Paris, 1789), as well as the *Journal Inedit* de Madame Moitte, ed. Paul Cottin (Paris, n.d.), 1-3.
[407] Vivian Cameron, "History: The Case of the Donation of September 7, 1789, and Its Images." *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 19 (1989): 413-32.
[408] While we cannot be sure of exact dates for Janinet's works, the prints were published at regular intervals. The last event known to have been depicted by Janinet was that of March 5, 1791. The prints and relevant text were published together in book format at a somewhat later date, and given the (obviously false) date of 1789. By 1792, Janinet seems to have given up on this series and was involved in trying to publish two new series as well as allegorical single sheets, such as "Liberté" (BNF, dated 1792). See discussion of Janinet in the previous chapter.

atop the gun barrel. One could hardly picture whatever this group was doing as giving rise to a major historic event, nor could they reasonably be characterized as citizen soldiers. Indeed, they would be recognized as neither citizens nor soldiers, but perhaps as imitators or even aspirants to both statuses. They don't look serious about what they are undertaking, and the image demythologizes and attenuates their role.

The singularly iconic image of the woman astride a cannon is repeatedly associated with these events, detracting from the alleged purposefulness of the women's march, and implying the unnatural and reprehensible consequences of this and presumably any attempt by women to act independently of men. It can be argued that "Also, the woman astride the cannon suggests the threatening usurpation of male power so routinely attributed to Amazonian *femmes-hommes*."[409]

The tendency of such women to take more interest in each other than in men or in the task at hand, which is symbolized by the within-group focus of their gaze and the intensity of their chattering, is, along with their identification as *poissardes* (or more generally, as market women from Les Halles), a widely disrespected class, a prevalent means of more collective denigration in these images. A contemporary newspaper reported that "the districts are arming themselves, which has not prevented 1200 *poissardes* & other women from going to Versailles."[410]

'À Versailles, À Versailles' March of the Women on Versailles, Paris, 5th October 1789, [ca. 1789-1790] by an unknown artist, gives considerable emphasis to the bantering among the women, which literally turns their heads away from their goal. (fig. 4.8) The woman just in front of the trident at the rear left is, for example, turning to chat with a friend. In the front row on the right, there are at least two conversations between pairs of women

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[409] Joan B. Landes, "Representing Women in the Revolutionary Crowd." At http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/imaging/essays/landes2.html, 2.

[410](Les districts s'arment, ce qui n'empêche pas 1200 poissardes & autres femmes de se rendre à Versailles.) Bulletin de Paris (Lundi 5 Octobre 1789, à minuit) : 1.

pulling the cannon. In each instance, what we see is neither an oration, a monologue nor a group discussion. It is a communication between two women. There is something peculiarly feminine, hence unmilitary and perhaps caricatural in this. Gutwirth regards this print as "our best visual version of the scene," but she does not say why, nor in what sense this version is "best."[411]

In the extreme left foreground, a woman with a large hat, far more elegantly dressed than all the others and the only seeming bourgeoise, is standing still, facing away from the column. Another woman grabs her arm while leaning forward to draw her into the line of march. This exemplifies the women's endeavor to swell their number by co-opting the participation of any person, or at least any woman, found in their path—evidently without regard to class or political orientation. The women "dragged with them all of those that they could grab in the streets."[412] Indeed, it is said that they threatened to cut the hair or any woman who refused to join them.[413]

These details considerably conflict with the ostensible sense of cohesive power inherent in the indefinitely large numbers of these women, the density of their armament, and their pretensions to unity and determination. Indeed, the distraction and multiplicity of force lines generated by the pairwise activity can leave the viewer doubtful that this column of women is actually moving, or that it is capable of applying force against its objective. The extraordinary individualization of the women, extending even to their headgear and the colors of their dresses (as well as the extraordinary diversity of their primitive and relatively ineffectual weaponry, ranging from a sword to pikes and the trident) is redolent of a narcissism evidently inconsistent with anything approaching military discipline, subordination and good order—hence, effectiveness. Alternatively, Govier suggests that the

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[411] Gutwirth, 241.
[412] (entraienent avec elles toutes celles qu'elles peuvent saisir dans les rues), Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #29.
[413] Marand-Fouquet, 74.

women are "masculinized" which "may allude to anecdotes that some cross-dressing men took part in the action."[414] In either case the depiction detracts from any claim that women could have been or could ever be effective in using force or the threat of force .

The women also may have had some apologists and defenders:

> "The women who have just completed that which we are celebrating are, you say, harrangers, and what sentiments of honor can they have?...a neglected and vulgar education...draws them to vices...but give them a more sweet and honest existence...and you would see vertue grow and gain support among them."[415]

Perhaps this expression is ironic, if not purely speculative. But it may illustrate the perceived need to find some satisfying rationalization for what might have been viewed as the extraordinary fact that a righteous action with a significant positive result had indubitably been initiated by women rather than men. If women had done this, what else might they be able to do?

In the same series as Fig. 4.7, Janinet depicted respectfully these women's activity in the *Assemblée* on October 5, in a print titled *4eme Évènement du 5 Octobre 1789: Les Femmes Parisiennes siégeant à l'Assemblée Nationelle parmi les députés* [ca. 1791]. (fig. 4.9) Here, backed by magnificent ornamental architecture, indicative of the august role of this body, we have a scene seemingly dominated by the women, as a result of their numbers, their passion, and perhaps even their garrulousness. To the modern viewer, they seem to be more than holding their own. One stands with the presiding officer, apparently restraining him with her arm. Another towers over a long table crowded with men and women, leaning forward emphatically. Others speak with individual members, while in the foreground

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[414] Louise Govier, "Disabling the Fury: A Re-examination of the Sabines as a Symbol of Revolutionary Peace." In Ian Germani and Robin Swales ed. *Symbols, Myths and Images of the French Revolution* (Regina, Saskatchewan, 1998), 128.

[415] (Les femmes qui viennent d'effectuer celle que nous célébrons, sont, dites-vous des harangères, & quelles sentimens d'honneur peuvent-elles avoir?... une education negligee et grossière...les ramène à des vices...mais procurez-leur une existence plus douce & plus honnête...et vous verrez les vertus croître, & se soutenir parmi elles.) *Les Héroïnes de Paris ou L'ENTIERE liberté de la France, par les Femmes. POLICE qu'elles doivent exercer de leur propre autorité....Le 5 Octobre 1789* (Paris, 1789), 2.

several gesticulate to gain attention and one even kneels. The dramatic nature of this episode is echoed in a contemporary source: "[the women] addressed to the Assembly this touching and heart-rending prayer: Please, give us BREAD."[416]

The text accompanying this image is considerably less melodramatic: the women "explained their complaints, & the *Assemblée* promised to take them into consideration," after which the women proceeded to the Chateau.[417] Evidently the women made no attempt to coerce a vote of the *Assemblée*. But what is remarkable here is the irruption of non-members onto the floor of the *Assemblée* (the visitors' gallery is also shown), an exceedingly rare event, as well as the depiction which (contrary to the text) shows the women arrogating to themselves the right to take over the proceedings entirely.

If in their march the women took cannon and other weapons and went where men would not go until the women opened the way, then their claim was to be super-soldiers. If in the *Assemblée* they went where their menfolk could not go, and took over, for a time, the political process, then their claim was likewise to be super-citizens. The parallel was clear, and each of these two tableaux was as implausible and uniquely momentary as the other—and, indeed, represented events which were not to be repeated, even in myth. If not a caricature, this image seems almost surely an exaggeration. In some viewers it might arouse shock, if not horror, at what the women did. Janinet, looking back many months later, found these events bizarre.

Prieur's view of the women was far less reflective of the individual emotion and action that had been utilized to minimize the scale and significance of their activity. His version was titled *Les Dames de la Halle partant pour aller chercher le Roi à Versailles* [ca. 1792-1793], which in itself is an anachronism perhaps encouraged by its relatively late date

[416] (elles adressoient à l'Assemblée cette touchante, & affligeante prière: *qu'on nous donne du PAIN.*) *Assemblée Nationale, Séance & suite des nouvelles de Versailles, du 6 Octobre 1789* (Paris, 1789), 1.
[417] (expliquèrent leurs griefs, & l'Assemblée promit de les prendre en consideration) Janinet, *4eme Evenement du 5 Octobre 1789.*

of publication (between July 21, 1792, when Tableau 17 and 18 were advertised, and August 8, 1793, when Tableau 35 and 36 were advertised). (fig. 4.10) He has converted the subject into a handsome landscape with hills, many trees, and a pleasant suburban environment which makes it hard to think that thousands were afflicted with hunger. The stated subject is confined to less than one-sixth of the picture area, in the foreground separated from the landscape by a high wall. This both dwarfs and limits the relevance of the women's action.

Within the confined band allotted them, Prieur's women and their companions form a dense mass, moving to the left. At least three ranks of troops in good order are shown to their right, following them, and behind, most conspicuous at the left but extending from there to the right edge of the print are a larger number of people, probably civilians, armed with pikes or other cutting weapons on high poles. At the right these seem to be standard issue pikes (which had not yet been produced), whereas on the left they are more varied and seem to include scythes. Looking at them individually, these people could be either men or women, or a mix. While it seems far more likely that these are men (probably of the *Gardes Nationales*), if only because of the uniformity of their weapons and the way they are being carried, the difficulty in recognizing their sex is itself significant.

In front of this throng, in the middle, is a very large coach, in front of which stand two groups of women in rather formal, colored dresses, looking as if they were posing for the artist. Some are talking to each other and facing away from the march. It seems that at least some of the fairly small number of women shown will go to Versailles by carriage, and one of them climbs up to look into the carriage, which is already full with two women riding on the roof and leaning back to back. Another is decorously mounted side saddle on a horse that is harnessed to the carriage. Farther forward is a covered wagon carrying a small number of women. Few if any of the women is armed, and their demeanor is not forceful, much less combative. They are highly feminine without being sexual, and they do not banter with the

men. In the left foreground, male civilians have climbed up to watch and wave—perhaps to a woman on the wagon who waves back.

Based on this image alone, even a viewer who was convinced that the Versailles events of October 5-6 were highly significant would find it hard to imagine that the women had had very much to do with them. Prieur has minimized the women's role, perhaps because he fears its implications or because he was so distant from these events that he has given reign to his imagination about them. They are incurring neither discomfort nor risk.

In *Le Roi promettant de venir à Paris avec sa famille, salve d'artillerie devant le Château de Versailles, le 6 October 1789,* Prieur depicted, much later, the same scene shown in Révolutions de Paris. (fig. 4.11) By the time Prieur's image was published, probably in 1793, the King had almost surely already been deposed, so that the importance imputed to his role in these events was diminished. He was no longer an issue. By this time also Revolutionary military forces had been strengthened and to some degree consolidated, so that the importance of the civilian fighter or citizen in arms had diminished. The role accorded to women in bringing about these results had receded as Versailles was contextualized by later, more violent and conclusive events.

Comparing the two images, it is apparent that Prieur has both heavily militarized and de-feminized this climactic event. While *Vue du Chateau de Versailles* showed no identifiable troops, and certainly no formations of them, Prieur's action is dominated by large numbers of massed soldiery, not only outside the palace courtyard, but within it as well. Most of them are stationary, but some are marching out of the courtyard while others approach in the left foreground. Many of the soldiers outside the courtyard are firing towards the palace, producing clouds of smoke. The soldiers are in neat uniforms and formation bearing arms. At the left foreground a crew, seemingly skilled in this operation, is firing a cannon towards the palace, producing massive clouds of smoke.

Prieur's scale is vastly expanded, much less intimate. The *château* is a great deal grander, though not much more heavily ornamented. One result of this is that the Royal family on its balcony has become entirely lost to sight, although the engraving is titled "The king promising to come to Paris with his Family...Artillery Salvo..."[418] In Prieur's more distant perspective on events, the importance and individuality of the King has been virtually effaced. But far more than in *Vue du Château de Versailles*, the unmistakable impression is that the King's promise has been coerced by armed force—an anti-Royalist shift in perception since it deprives the King of any possible credit for good intentions. Because Prieur does not visually distinguish the various line and guard regiments, the story he tells, anachronistically, is of a unified military acting on behalf of a unified people.

The careerism of the army, the sharp distinction and separation between these soldiers and earlier images of citizens in arms might also be suggested by the positioning, and activity of the civilians shown here. All are within a confined space in the foreground and thus are distinguished from the soldiers not only by clothing but by position. The role of a very few of the civilians is to cheer on the troops, showing support and solidarity with them. For instance, a woman on the left raises both arms high as she faces the line of soldiers, in a gesture of triumph and encouragement. At the left extreme foreground and in the center just to the rear of the formation, a woman is reaching out to touch a nearby soldier, a closer association which, however, tends to emphasize rather than to deny the wholly non-military role of the women.

Conventionally, the viewer is expected to identify with the foreground figures, while the "enemy" is shown at a greater distance. This suggests that Prieur expects us to see

[418] (Le Roi Promettant de Venir à Paris avec sa Famille...Salve d'Artillerie...) Title for Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #30.

ourselves among the disorderly, disengaged and departing civilians who have separated themselves from the much larger, static formation of attackers.

Most of the civilians seem almost indifferent to the extraordinary action unfolding in front of them. The covered wagon, with one woman sitting in it facing to the left, is headed off towards the right, with a number of men rushing to follow it. At the extreme left and also to the right of and behind the woman with raised arms, groups of five or more people are engaged in conversation, inattentive to the military activity. To the extent that Prieur visualizes this confrontation as having historic importance because it brought the King back to Paris, it can be argued that he is, in hindsight, crediting this result to the people's army as a unified force, rather than to any civilians, and certainly not to women. He leaves little doubt that the civilians are, in the majority, disengaged and even uninterested. They are near the soldiers, but not of them, and the soldiers act for them or independently of them rather than together with them. This disengaged foreground presence of civilians is not required by the conventions that Prieur followed in other Tableaux depicting military action. For instance, there is no such presence in No. 19, showing the arrest of de Launay at the Bastille, nor in No. 8 showing an engagement between the *Royal Allemands* and the *Gardes Françaises*.

Prieur's image and in particular the primary and aggressive role he assigns to the troops is not only at odds with other images of these events, such as *Vue du Château de Versailles*, but also with contemporary written accounts, which treat the soldiers, not the civilians, as passively removed from the conflict. This, in fact, is the story told by the text accompanying Prieur. According to this source, it was only after many riotous civilians had entered the virtually unguarded Palace in the morning that "The Garde Nationale was introduced. M. de Lafayette presents it to the King who calls it his liberator."[419] They

[419] (La Garde Nationale est Introduite. M. de Lafayette la présente au Roi qui l'appelle son libérateur.) Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #30.

engaged in no military action whatever, but seem to be credited with protecting the royal family against the rioters.

Prieur's view, prepared by and for Revolutionaries, also appears to understate vastly the continuing animosity and confrontation associated with these events. The effacement of longstanding bastions and symbols of legitimacy and authority by the Revolution inevitably brought into question all relationships of hierarchy and subordination, including those of class and of gender. The category of soldier was one of many that were thus opened to doubt or examination, and the women's march to Versailles was an actual event that served directly as a source of images highlighting these concerns, as we will now see.

Le Grand débandement de l'Armée Anti-constitutionnelle [1792] marked a new departure because "Up until now political pornography had remained the realm of the patriots," characterized for instance by prints of Marie-Antoinette with her alleged lovers.[420] [421] (fig. 4.12)

In this scene, we see the army of the "Emperor," the King, on the right, thrown into total disarray when confronted by the bared hindquarters of an opposing "army" which includes identified aristocratic women sympathetic to the Republican cause, led by Théroigne de Méricourt and including Mme. de Staël, followed by *sans-culottes*, *Jacobins*, and other men waving phallic sausages and hams high on their pikes—while remaining safely to the rear of the women on the front line. These elements echo the events of October, 1789. The Marquis de Villette, a Revolutionary sympathizer often accused of sodomy with male partners, is also identified with the Republican forces shown.[422] The idea of a loathsome minority of the aristocracy joining forces with or even leading lower classes ruffians,

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[420] Journal de la Cour et de la Ville (February 19, 1792).

[421] (Jusqu'à present la pornographie politique demeurait l'apanage des patriots) Claude Langlois, *La Caricature Contre-Révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1988), 142.

[422] Villette was described with some bitterness by a contemporary as having "made a public profession of sodomy with impunity." Charles Pierre Coste d'Arnobat, *Anecdotes curieuses et peu connues sur différentes personnes qui ont joué un rôle dans la Révolution* (Geneva, 1793), 27.

specifically Jacobins, in a successful confrontation with middle class constitutionalists, is what supplies the underlying venom and horror of this caricature.

More rationally, all this is suggestive of the principal role assigned by writers of the period to the Duc d'Orleans and his aristocratic faction in inciting and even paying rioters who sought to undermine and ultimately replace the King's authority. The text accompanying the *Tableaux Historiques* occasionally mentions this aggravating element as a cause of many of the events depicted. For instance, the text provided with Tableau #30, *Le Roi Promettant de venir à Paris avec sa famille, salve d'artillerie devant le Château de Versailles, le 6 Octobre 1789,* says that the people who entered the palace were "already irritated, either due to thirst or to hunger, or by men in the service of d'Orléans.[423] (fig. 4.11)

Faced with the despicable spectacle of the *Grand débandement*, the royalist in the foreground drops his rifle, while the royalist leader and others throw their hands forward and to the sides in warding gestures. This is an image scarcely more flattering to the royalists, portrayed as foolish and cowardly, than to the Revolutionaries, who are the tools of a despicable aristocratic faction. It also does not fail to make the point that by that time, it was the Revolutionaries who sought to overthrow the Constitution which the *Assemblée* had imposed on the King—a deed they accomplished later that year.

Of special relevance to the Revolution's de-legitimization and destabilization of group relationships were questions not of sex or even of class as such, but of military rank and hence legitimacy of leadership. In the American Revolution a militia officer class of doubtful military credibility but social and economic superiority was depicted by Doolittle and Romans. This class was supplanted by centrally appointed officers, as national will and military organization hardened. The respect and even idealization of Washington and to a lesser degree of his subordinates in the Continental army was visually expressed by Trumbull

[423] (déjà irritée, soit par la faim, soit par les hommes aux gages de d'Orléans.) Chamfort (1791-4), Tableau #30.

and others. Nothing of the kind happened during the 1789-93 period in France. Although a few senior officers such as Lafayette enjoyed flickering appreciation and trust, a new and more stable officer class did not emerge in images either of the Bastille or of Versailles and entered the scene only much later, after the *Amalgame*. The *Grand débandement* shows the Revolutionary forces as leaderless, and the Royalists as led by preening cowards and incompetents. Officers who commanded Revolutionary armies at least prior to 1794 tended to enjoy only very limited tenure. Some, such as Custine, Kellermann, Soubrany and d'Aoust were executed or removed because they were unable to turn their loyalties and policies to follow political events, others, for example Besenval and Bouillé, were eliminated because they were perceived as belonging to an anti-Revolutionary faction, and still others were disgraced and even, like Houchard, executed when they suffered defeats.

Published in an aristocratic journal, this image might suggest that normal men should rally to the King's colors rather than submit to the emasculating power of self-promoting women and homosexuals. The appeal is to class as well as gender issues and resentments, rather than to any national cause. The King, long since alienated from the aristocracy (and having consented to the abolition of their special exemptions and privileges by the *Assemblée*), is seen neither as a bastion of strength nor as representing a cause to be seriously defended. Fear and cowardice are stigmatized here, but not violence. However, the Revolution is identified with violation of sexual taboos, including but not limited to those which relegated women to subjection. The central fact which the *Grand débandement* seeks to deny is that long before its publication, even in July and October of 1789, the great majority though not all of the uniformed men, the military strength of France, had long since passed from the aristocratic to the Revolutionary side.

3. *Déclaration de la Patrie en Danger* and the Tuileries

On July 11, 1792, three months after war was declared by Austria, and following catastrophic French defeats, the *Assemblée* voted its *Déclaration de la Patrie en Danger*, an event which led immediately to the first centralized, nationwide army recruitment in French history. This followed a decree of July 5 which had established the procedures and consequences for such a declaration, but had not yet made it.[424]

The need for mass recruitment (which did not imply conscription) had been proposed and debated intermittently, but heatedly, since the outbreak of the Revolution. Dubois-Crancé had argued as early as 1789 that an army that was broadly representative of the people was needed to maintain order and suppress brigandage, but also to defend the Revolution by putting down remaining Royalist leaders and units. This was an ideal of universal service. "Every citizen should be a soldier and every soldier should be a citizen, if France does not wish to be utterly obliterated."[425]

Others, however, such as Robespierre, felt that any army by its very nature as such would be sharply distinct from and hence unrepresentative of the People. On December 5, 1790, Robespierre argued that "Some want to divide the nation into two classes, of which one would seem to be an army to suppress the other."[426] The implication was that such an Army would continue to be a tool applied by the wealthier classes to suppress the poorer classes, those with whom Robespierre identified and from which he drew his influence. If this were true, then the soldier not only could not be relied upon to function as a citizen or patriot: he would be disposed or used to suppress rather than to support the Revolutionary citizenry.

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[424] *Décret prescrivant les mesures à prendre quand la patrie est en danger* (Paris, 5 juillet 1792).

[425] (chaque citoyen deviendra un soldat et chaque soldat un citoyen, si la France ne désire point être entièrement obliterée.) *Archives Parlementaires*, x, 519 (12 December, 1789).

[426] (On veut diviser la nation en deux classes, dont l'une ne semblerait armée que pour contenir l'autre) cited in J. Massin, *Robespierre* (Paris, 1975), 275.

In 1790, all towns had been ordered to create a register of "*citoyens actifs*...for the *Garde Nationale* service."[427] Inscription in these part time local militias (which were maintained for only about a year) became a legal requirement for all these citizens, thus setting the stage for national recruitment of full time soldiers in 1792 and for the mandatory *Levée en Masse* of 1793.[428] But, the *Assemblée* had hitherto been reluctant to augment embodied armed forces that were held in very low esteem. Widespread opinion held that they might well prove politically unreliable and, indeed, repressive.

Dubois-Crancé described the soldiers of the *Armée de ligne* as "men without a fatherland," accustomed to being treated as animals, while the country as a whole was "riddled with secret, festering factions."[430] By June, 1790, the situation had deteriorated further and "reached a crisis point, with many whole units refusing to obey their officers."[432] It was even suggested that soldiers be employed in public works projects.[433]

Given the extreme difficulties the *Assemblée* had encountered in controlling the existing army and militia forces through 1792, it was only in the face of the Austrian assault that the *Assemblée* finally acted at the national level. However, one hundred thousand army volunteers had been raised in the previous year by local authorities, all coming from the bourgeois *Garde Nationale*, a part time militia.[434] Town and city authorities determined the qualifications for membership in these forces, which varied both according to the conservatism of the municipal leaders and differing local economic and political conditions

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[427](Citoyens actifs...pour le services des Gardes Nationales.) Archives municipaux de Romans, décret du 12 juin 1790.
[428] *Archives Parlementaires*, xvi, 14ff. See also Devenne, 55.
[429] Blanning, 82.
[430] (des homme sans patrie...criblé de factions secrets et malveillants) *Archives Parlementaires*, x, 519.
[431] Ibid.
[432] reached a crisis point, with many whole units refusing to obey their officers (était en crise, avec de nombreux détachements refusants d'obéir aux officiers) *Archives Palementaires*, xvi, 95.
[433] Segrettien, Jacobin de Melun, 1791, Archives Nationales F^9 1348.
[434] E. Deprez, *Les Volontaires Nationaux, 1791-1793* (Paris, 1908).

that affected recruitment. "Often, they were too divided to act," as had previously been the case at Paris and Versailles in 1789.[435]

Although now habitually associated with the events of 1792, the term *patrie en danger* was not a new one, and in fact had been used in official decrees for at least a year, well before the war began.[436] Even in name, the 1792 recruitment of perhaps 200,000 volunteers was in most respects not a unique event. One hundred thousand volunteers had already been recruited in 1791, the year in which the *Assemblée* had abolished the provincial militias.[437] These mass recruitments contrasted sharply with the careful selection in 1792 of the 20,000 *Fédérés* by provincial magistrates (presumably making use of political and social criteria), that was described in the introductory chapter.

What was new in the mass recruitment of 1792 was its military context: the immediacy of the threat of invasion by Austria. In the face of this threat, soldiers were needed at the frontiers, to protect both the *patrie* and the Revolution. In the evident interests of immediate military efficacy against the invader, the *Assemblée* decided in July that more than half of the recruits would be destined for *Armée de ligne*, which had been undermanned by at least 50,000 men even in the previous year. The fear that soldiers would oppose the Revolution or cause a civil war within the country was subordinated to this overridingly critical concern.

The July 1792 Declaration was accompanied by rhetoric invoking authorities from the ancient Greeks to Rousseau in support of the now familiar idea that every citizen should potentially be a soldier and every soldier a citizen. Lazare Carnot, a former engineering officer and highly influential in military affairs, proposed to the *Assemblée* on July 25 1792

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[435] (Souvent, elles étaient trop divisées pour agir) Carrot, 128.
[436] Archives municipals de Bourg-de-Péage, Registre des deliberations, 10 juin 1791.
[437] Murphy (1959), 158.

that "... every municipality [is] to manufacture and distribute arms to all citizens capable of bearing arms."[438]

As French military doctrine, the term *citoyen-soldat* can be traced back at least to Joseph Servan's tract of 1780. Servan, an officer and nobleman who was at the Ministry of War in 1792, argued against a mass army or militia and favored a career soldiery who also participated fully as citizens and identified themselves as such. Neither Servan nor the *Assemblée* advocated having every citizen become a soldier.[439] Thus, references made in France before and during the Revolution to ideal of the citizen soldier or to the identity of soldiers and citizens could and did advocate drastically different courses of action. The idea was a complex and indeed an elusive one.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1792 Declaration, thousands of men enlisted in Paris and tens of thousands in the provinces. Yet, in sharp contrast with the copious availability of graphic images of many other Revolutionary events from 1789 onwards, and particularly of other events in 1792, contemporary representations of the *Déclaration* and the recruitment it brought about seem to have been far from numerous. I have identified only a few of these among the hundreds of different images from this period in either the Bibliothèque Nationale collection, or the many hundreds of others I have surveyed in other places.[440] I have found no contemporary paintings of this event. Analysis of this visual record will support the documentary evidence that whatever importance the 1792 recruitment might have had was very quickly effaced.

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[438] (chaque municipalité doit fabriquer et distribuer des armes à tout citoyen capable de les porter) *Archives Parlementaires*, lxix, 473.

[439] Joseph Servan, *Le Soldat-Citoyen, ou vues patriotiques sur la maniere la plus advantageuse de pourvoir a la defense du Royaume* (Paris, 1780).

[440] There is also an undated "gravure d'après" the extremely prolific Duplessi-Bertaux showing Patrie en Danger recruitment on a small scale in an unnamed town. This is Fig. 4.15, *Enrôlement de volontaires à un carrefour après la proclamation de la Patrie en Danger* (N.D.), location unknown. Because its length is more than three times its height, this appears to be a book illustration, or part of a visual narrative, and may well have been executed considerably later than 1792. Duplessi-Bertaux continued to be active through the Napoleonic period, but the association of this image with him is in any case problematic.

Though hopeful lip service was given to the claim that national unity had already been attained and would support a coherent response to the Austrian threat, some who spoke and wrote publicly during this period placed little or no confidence either in any armed force, or in civil society as a whole. If the country was in danger, many people, (such as Marat) might see this danger as largely arising from within France, from classes of both soldiers and other citizens and particularly from generals and other officers, whom the soldiers might blindly follow to repress Revolutionary liberty. This concern could mitigate any disposition to glorify or memorialize events that threw the military-civil relationship into sharp relief, enlarged the army and hence the power of its officers, many of them still aristocrats, and sought to create a new armed force that might as easily be used for bad as for salutary purposes. A writer or artist fearful of domestic armies—a longstanding concern that had been widespread in America and Britain as well as in France—would be reluctant to emphasize and praise the dramatic expansion of the military that was made possible by the 1792 mass recruitment. Secondly, in the drastically changed perspective of ensuing months, the events of July were prone to dwindle into insignificance. The artist was overtaken by events. On August 10, the Tuileries were stormed and the King's Swiss Guards killed. The King was deposed and made a prisoner. On August 13, the first execution by guillotine occurred, initiating the Terror, which resulted in greatly diminished emission of prints.

Artists and publishers working in 1792 might not have had time to produce prints documenting the July events before what might have seemed in July to be crucial turning points were left far behind and out of sight by subsequent changes in the political scene such as the ending of the monarchy which in addition rendered publication much more hazardous. These later events surely shared some common causes (such as the threat of foreign intervention) with the *Déclaration*, but they were not seen as resulting from the *Déclaration*. The soldiers recruited as a result of the *Déclaration* were not at all those who overthrew the

King in August, a fact which drew attention and interest away from the relatively less dramatic events which were direct consequences of the *Déclaration*. Indeed, these soldiers may have contributed little to the victories at Valmy and Jemappes which were to be seen as crucial to the defeat of the Austrian campaign. Given the paucity of contemporary images recognizably depicting the *Déclaration* and consequent recruitment, it is not surprising that scholars of art history have had little to say on this subject.

One of the few depictions of this event is *Amphithéâtres d'enrôlement dressées dans les places publiques* [1792], from Révolutions de Paris, published soon after the event and after the Tuileries. (fig. 4.13) The lack of geographic specificity in this image and its title seems to convey the impression that the recruiting centers and hence the recruits were very numerous. This, in turn, implies that popular unity and patriotism prevail, at least in Paris. The text refers to the "ardent and passionate youth."[441] Yet the soldiers pictured are far less numerous than the civilians. The image also emphasizes the massive support and enthusiasm of civilians for the recruiting effort, as people are packed into the balconies of the buildings and most of the windows. The safety of the supportive mass of the people is to be confided in a few, whose self-selection must be ratified by the magistrates.

The image also emphasizes the disparity between civilians and soldiers, by sharply and systematically distinguishing their costumes and, even more so, their roles. It shows civilians opting to become and actually becoming soldiers, an act which converts the individual from an autonomous member of a crowd to a person with a prescribed place within a disciplined army. The physical separation between soldiers and civilians in the image, the utter lack of commingling between them, so unlike the earlier images of citizens in arms making common cause with soldiers, for instance at the Bastille, further highlights

[441] (jeunesse ardente et fulgeureuse) Text accompanying *Amphithêatres d'enrolement dressées dans les places publiques*. Révolutions de Paris 130 (September 1792): 68.

the sharp distinction between the military and civilian classes. Passage from one class to the other is to be accomplished only through the decisive, formal and consensual act of recruitment. No possible return from the military to the civil state is even hinted at here.

The visual distinction of military from civilian roles negates or relegates to an inferior plane any conception of the citizen in arms, a man with a civilian métier who joins soldiers in the heat of the action to fight with them. The image flatly contradicts the frequently stated "Every citizen a soldier." According to the *Amphithéâtres d'enrôlement*, a citizen can become, is encouraged to become, and in significant numbers does becomes a soldier removed from his former civilian occupation and subject to military orders. (fig. 4.13) He cannot become or can no longer become a citizen in arms, he cannot wander off to his workshop.

The civilians are far more numerous than the soldiers, perhaps indicating a nearly bottomless pool of motivated potential recruits. Although some soldiers guard the platform where the enrollment is occurring, the actual enlistment is visibly being conducted by civilians, magistrates of the city. This suggests, perhaps hopefully, an assertion of control by civilians over the composition and hence the loyalties of the force that was thereby created. Without the assent and cooperation of non-military leaders of the citizens, a man could not become a soldier on that day. The men in uniform coming down the stairs on both sides in front of the tent seem to imply the operation of a process whereby (perhaps in the tent) a civilian was simply transformed into a soldier. It might be imagined that the uniform would somehow render him competent as well as obedient and loyal.

Another of the very few depictions of these events is, an engraving by Prieur, *Proclamation de la patrie en danger, 22 Juillet 1792* [1796], #65 of the *Tableaux Historiques*. (fig. 4.14) This image actually may be read as supporting the hypothesis that in the months and years that immediately followed it, the *Déclaration* and its effects were not

considered to be of very high importance. The print was apparently not published until 1796, after Prieur's death, although surely executed much earlier. The most likely cause of the delay, which affected all pending prints in the series from 1792-5, was the Terror of 1793-4. During the Terror, which entailed frequent changes of government, scenes with political significance were dangerous to produce and distribute and production was low.[442] When there are long gaps between preparation and marketing, as in the case of the *Tableaux Historiques,* with no indication of revisions to the image during the interval, it is reasonable to conclude that the image was considered by the publisher to be marketable both at the time of preparation and of publication, although very likely not during portions of the intervening period, when it might have been considered politically dangerous. This seems to be the case here.

From the standpoint of 1793-6, this event was important because it was the first of what were to be a long-continued series of mass recruitments, in Paris and in the nation. These were to extend through the Napoleonic period. Thus, the *Déclaration* and the ensuing enlistments, even if they did not drive the most crucial developments of the months to come, the ending of the monarchy and the advent of the Terror, were, in the longer view, historic milestones.

Prieur's *Proclamation de la Patrie en Danger,* depicts enrollment of troops in Paris on July 22, 1792. (fig. 4.14) Like a great many of Prieur's Revolutionary prints, but in striking contrast to the *Amphithéâtres d'enrôlement*, it is topographic, showing a familiar view of the Seine and central Paris including the Tuileries in the right background. The foreground, comprising considerably less than half of the picture space, is occupied fully by the events of the day, while the background is entirely scenic and architectural, as is so often the case for Prieur. The contrast is stark. Later, when the purchaser sees the print,

[442] Hunt (1980), 13.

everything in the foreground—the tents, the parade, the recruit – will be gone from the city, very likely nearly forgotten. The background remains an accurate depiction, unchanged by intervening events. Beyond this, it is easy to understand that some of the *Tableaux Historiques'* affluent purchasers might not be happy about recruitment that would for the first time in Paris create a force which would neither have officers from the upper ranks of society, nor be formed, as was the *Garde Nationale*, by selection limited to men expected to be politically reliable. As Carnot argued, "...This force...created to defend liberty, holds within itself the radical vice which must unfailingly destroy it."[443] This is similar to the concern that had been expressed by Marat, mentioned above. Lafayette's attempt to use the army on the King's behalf in Paris in 1792 could be considered an example of its possible role in opposing Revolutionary liberty. Certainly, the Vendéens felt the army to be an instrument of repression. People holding such views would be receptive to a relatively negative, even cynical portrayal of the enlistment process.

In the foreground are three cheerful looking recruiting tents, a parade from left to right of *Garde Nationale* troops with horses and artillery at the bottom, and behind them a long single line of recruits, who appear to be walking in the opposite direction. The ephemeral nature of the foreground scene is emphasized by the fact that every person shown, even the civilians at lower right, seems to be in motion: they will vacate the picture space. The most dramatically mobile individual is the new recruit waving his arms and leaping down the steps from the tent just to the right of center. In the visual language of the time, this is an exceptional display of individual emotion--just as the subject of the print itself is a rare one.

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[443](Cette force...créée pour la defense de la liberté, renferme en elle-même le vice radical qui doit infailliblement la détruire.) *Décret de l'assemblée Nationale du premier Août 1792, l'an IVe de la Liberté, sur une fabrication de piques, precede du RAPPORT fait le même jour, au nom de la Commission Militaire, par M. Carnot, aîné* [...] (Paris, 1792), 4.

The man seems to be leaping from joyous individuality into a disciplined mass where he will be obliged to follow orders. The concern, repeatedly and strongly emphasized in the political speeches and writing of the period, for instance those of Jacobins such as Robespierre which we have cited, is: Just who's orders he is going to be following—and is he going to join the people's oppressors rather than become a liberator? It may well be that Prieur's views did not differ greatly from those of Robespierre.

Perhaps there is something ridiculous about this tiny figure, his dark clothing drawing the eye by its sharp contrast with the waters of the Seine (conventionally shown as white). If so, the print suggests the question of whether he really has something to cheer about at a time when the army is still led primarily by aristocrats—and whether he will still be in a mood to cheer by the time this image gets to the market. The figure's seemingly excessive enthusiasm can engender doubts and skepticism.

In the middle ground, the outlook is even more overtly threatening. Smoke from the firing of artillery fills the space and rises towards the sky. (The guns were actually fired just once each hour on that day.) The men form a mob rather than a disciplined square. In the visual language of the day, this is a very unfavorable depiction, particularly in a military framework. Momentary élan cannot for long take the place of organization and training. It is just these people, the sans culottes, who will need to become organized in order to become reliably effective militarily and hence politically. Prieur informs us that the July 22 recruitment may not have accomplished this.

Judging from the direction in which they lean, these men seem to be headed to the right—towards the Tuileries. This will surely remind the viewer that on August 10 (long before this print could have been expected to be available for purchase), newly organized soldiers from the provinces, the *Fédérés*, together with some Parisian civilians, attacked the royal palace there, and after a bloody battle, effectively exterminated the Swiss regiment

defending the palace and took the King and his family prisoner. Indeed, the *Garde Nationale* troops shown in the foreground are headed over the Pont Neuf towards the palace.

These events were not going to change the cityscape, the monumental structures, built predominantly of stone, which are faithfully depicted in the background of this print. However, these events would rapidly change the political and military contexts in which the *Patrie en Danger* was to be viewed. The Revolution, which by July, 1792 had already put an end to the hereditary aristocracy, was about to terminate the monarchy as well. In hindsight, it was the *Ancien Régime*, not the country as a whole, which was in most imminent danger on July 22. It was in danger not just from the *sans culottes* and peasants, but from solid members of the bourgeoisie such as Prieur himself.

Next to the civilians advancing towards the parade at the lower right are an array of empty pots and market baskets. The lack of food which had stimulated revolutionary fervor in 1789 was a constant in 1792. This poverty contrasts with the architectural richness of the Tuileries, other government buildings and aristocratic homes lining the river, but also with the finely arrayed cavalry officers parading in front of the civilians, who have advanced partially into the line of march, causing its leading elements to swerve slightly to the left. This adds a confrontational element to the scene and suggests an urgent need for the armed men to deal with problems at home, not just on the frontier.

When the drawing for the print was completed, there would no longer be tents or a parade, but there would probably still be empty market baskets. The contrast between the highly enthusiastic enlistees and the hungry civilians is striking, and suggests that recruiting and enlisting may not be effective ways for France and its citizens to combat hunger.

What Prieur depicts is a unique, seemingly festive civic event, which had been promoted by the *Assemblée* and approved by the King. It was an event which seemed to provoke at least for the moment feelings of unity in confronting a foreign enemy, as it

mobilized the entire city for a day. Yet, within a few weeks, there was again to be violent internal conflict and an overthrow of the established order. The foreign threat would remain, and grow, as would the economic distress. The activities of July 22 had little or no impact on any of these events.

Fig. 4.14, one of a very small number of contemporary prints that can be confidently identified as depicting the military enrollment, is just one out of the 144 *Tableaux* in its series, which was printed in five editions. This is in itself indicative of the relative lack of importance attributed to its subject. Evidently, apart from dedicated subscribers to the *Tableaux* (who would not have had to make a decision to buy this particular print, since it was not sold alone) publishers did not anticipate much demand for this subject during the hectic months that followed.

It was only with the passage of considerable time that the recruitment that followed the *Déclaration* came to be widely seen as historically important, as a first step towards the later *levées en masse* and the large national armies that were fielded afterwards, in the Revolutionary period and then by Napoleon. In 1792, the July enlistees were prone to be regarded with doubt and fear.

An example of the later re-interpretation of these events is Guillaume Lethière's painting *L'Enrôlement des volontaires, ou La Patrie en danger* [1799], which was submitted to the Salon of 1799, a year in which massive national recruitments was again undertaken under the Council of 500, which made the subject again timely. (fig. 4.16)

Apart from the seemingly explicit verbal reference to the 1792 events, *La Patrie en danger*, this appears to be a genre piece, pulling together many familiar elements and attributing them to the enlistment following the *Déclaration*. Whereas Prieur accurately depicted Paris, Lethière has chosen to show an unidentified and presumably imaginary coastal town. Lethière was by no means a provincial painter. He was *peintre du roi*, then

won a pension to Rome in 1786 (having been runner up for the prix de Rome) and returned to Paris only in 1792, painting primarily mythological and distant historical scenes. Ingres painted a portrait of Lethière's wife and small son. He was of mixed West Indian blood.[444]

The choice of the unidentified provincial locale would again seem intended to suggest the widespread if not universal support of the towns and their youth for the 1792 recruitment campaign. Engagement of the towns with the Revolutionary project had begun early. "Committees were created in twenty of the thirty French towns with populations over twenty thousand between July 13 and July 26" 1789.[445] Subsequently the towns raised *Garde Nationale* units and participated in the selection and dispatch of the *Fédérés*.

In the background of the image there is the sea and the masts of ships, a tower that seems Italianate, and then a verdant hill at the left, the whole suggestive of the Mediterranean. At the right, plainly dressed couples are arriving hand in hand, with the wife evidently encouraging the husband to enlist. At the center, an elegantly dressed young woman in white leans forward, embracing her husband and kissing him goodbye. To their left, a young boy carries a pike, and in the rear a great mass of pikes can be seen. Beyond him, an older man who seems to be wearing a toga approaches some trumpets and statues of naked boys. Perhaps all these classical accoutrements are intended to suggest the nobility and innocence of the enlistees. They were not joining up for the pay, or excitement, or to promote the political interests of one political faction over another, but rather to defend their country.[446]

This painting can be compared with Rude's much later design of a sculptural decoration for the Arc de Triomphe de l'Étoile, entitled *La Marseillaise, ou le Départ des Volontaires de 1792* [1833-36]. (fig. 4.17) Rude's treatment, in contract to Lethière's,

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[444] Mario Valdes, "The Blurred Racial Lines of Famous Families: Guillaume Guillon Lethière," at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/secret/famous/lethiere.html

[445] Hunt (1976), 324.

mythologizes an event then more than forty years past, depicting ancient dress, weapons, and tutelary deities, of which at least one, the *Génie de la France* presiding over the scene, seems to be visible to the soldier on the left.[447] Rude explicitly celebrates a myth, emphasizing its supernatural elements, whereas Lethière's work, while it may also be quite distant from any historical reality, can encourage the viewer's belief and identification through apparent verisimilitude.

The emphasis given to the solidarity of children with the recruitment in Lethière's painting and in earlier works was complemented later by images glorifying their participation as soldiers. Exemplary of the role later assigned to Revolutionary children are Joseph Bara and Agricola Viala who were honored by decree of the Convention in 1794, after their deaths in 1793 at ages 14 and 13, in separate incidents. Bara was apparently a drummer boy under General Desmarres in the Vendée, while Viala belonged to the *Garde Nationale* at Avignon.

The honors accorded them included a painting by David of the nude Bara [1794], and a *fête* in their honor planned for 10 Thermidor. (fig. 4.18) More commonly, Bara was shown in a military uniform.[448] Viala was typically depicted with his hatchet (which he used in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy a bridge across the Durance), as in, *Agricola Viala*, by an unknown engraver after Jean-Baptiste Verité [1793]. (fig. 4.19) It is notable that he is shown in full uniform—a child soldier.

Prior to 1793, there do not appear to have been works celebrating child soldiers (or women) as willing to sacrifice their lives, as "martyrs." But after the *Levée en Masse*, "Even children should have a role in the defense of their country," which seems to have been a new idea.[449] Evidently, as the legends and images of Bara and Viala show, the role assigned to

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[447] Joseph Calmette, *François Rude* (Paris, 1920), 82.
[448] J. J. Ranxin, *Eloge historique de Bara et Viala, prononcé le jour de leur fête : et dédié aux enfants des écoles primaires* (Paris, 1795).
[449] (Même les enfants doivent avoir un rôle dans la défense de leur patrie.) Réimpression de l'Ancien Moniteur (1792) 17: 475.

children in 1793 and thereafter (like the role that was to be assigned to adult men) was not as citizens-in-arms, but rather as members of regular military units, with their presence affirming the universality of the need for and willingness of citizens to join the army. This was not a novel concept engendered by the Revolution, since boys of thirteen and even younger had participated in the army, for instance as servants and drummers, for centuries. Women were not shown as combatants in this period, but the personage of the Widow of St.-Mithier, discussed in Section 2 of this chapter established their eligibility for heroic martyrdom. She was described in the caption of a contemporary print in glowing terms: "Her courage and her masculine attitude imposed on them."[450]

During and immediately after the Terror, the glorification of voluntary martyrdom to the Revolution, most strikingly the martyrdom of women and children as in these images, could have served to promote the political program of Robespierre. The ideal of such martyrdom could be reduced almost to a norm, suggesting that continued hunger or even the sacrifice of friends and relatives to the guillotine were small prices to pay for the advance of the Revolution. This motivation may in part account for the flowering of such images during the period.

As to the women enthusiasts who are conspicuous in Lethière's image, Forrest points out that "They were there to urge [the recruits] to put their love for the Republic" first. Women "also represented the spirit of self-denial and sacrifice...Their inclusion in Revolutionary imagery underscored the unity of civil society."[451] As discussed above, earlier images, both of the March to Versailles and of the Donation of September 7, 1789, had placed women in more active and initiatory, even traditionally masculine roles.[452] As

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[450](Son courage et cette mâle contenance leur en imposèrent.) Caption to J.F. Cazenave, *Trait de Courage Héroïque*, engraving, 1793, Bibliothèque Nationale.
[451] Forrest (2003), 20.
[452] See "Origines des dons patriotiques, faites a la nation." Révolutions de Paris 9 (September 5-12, 1789): 19-22.

attention turned, after the King was deposed, to the national army as defender and representative of the nation, women tended to be depicted in the role of supporting recruitment rather than as protagonists.

Even Soboul, a great believer in the ultimate patriotic enthusiasm of the troops, said that "The army had been nationalized by the *amalgame* of 1793; the war was nationalized in turn."[454] In 1792, these events were still to come, but perhaps the trend of events was already clear. Altogether, this work might be seen as little more than an excuse for the display of diverse painterly skills, ranging from drapery to landscape and architecture, in a patriotic and indeed Revolutionary context. The central subject can be assimilated with the familiar one of the soldier's patriotic farewell, so prominent in Revolutionary works dated at and after the later years of the decade, though much less frequently encountered in these contexts during the years through 1792.[455]

This theme is somewhat arbitrarily, and indeed incorrectly, tacked here to the *Patrie en Danger*. Without the aid of the title, Lethière's depiction could easily have been confused with the *Levée en Masse* or another recruitment campaign--whereas exactly the opposite is true of Prieur, who pictured an event that would have been unmistakably familiar to many Parisian viewers.

But Lethière's painting is very different in concept from the long-popular genre scenes depicting the individual soldier's farewell and then his return home. These appeared in Great Britain as well as France, beginning well before the American Revolution and continuing through the Napoleonic era. Implicitly, the soldier in this genre of images might serve merely as an excuse for a scene of rural celebration or familial solidarity.

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[453] Forrest (2003), 20.
[454](L'armée a été nationalisée par l'amalgame de 1793; la guerre fut nationalisée à son tour.) Soboul (1981), 275-6.
[455] Examples include Dutailly, *Our Country Needs the Sacrifice of the Deepest Affection*, engraved by Pierre-Charles Coqueret, 1795, Vizille and Watteau's painting, *The Departure of the Volunteers*.

Such works long antedated any interest in the citizen soldier ideal in modern France. Depicting *soldats de métier*, they in no way imply that these people will serve or have served the common good of the nation. (Indeed, as mentioned earlier, soldiers were widely felt not to do so.) Such images attribute to the participants no patriotic motives whatever, and they suggest no significant popular support for them, beyond the soldiers' immediate circle of family and friends. Consequently, these works will not be considered more extensively here.

Soldiers in the Royal line regiments of course had families. They were recruited. They left their families behind and sometimes returned to them. All of this could be and had been illustrated in prior years without in any way implying that the soldiers fought for anything more glorious than plunder and, indeed, without attributing to them any of the political attributes of citizenship. Lethière moves beyond this tradition in suggesting patriotic and indeed Revolutionary motives, not only by his title but by the visual context he provides for the recruitment scene. However, his depiction of the participants as well-dressed and relatively prosperous, is in keeping with the conventions of the genre.

In Lethière's view from 1799, France had a national army, and its soldiers defended the nation. However, that was not yet how things looked in 1792, even though philosophical and political lip service to the ideal or myth of the citizen soldier had begun decades earlier, before Servan and Rousseau.[456] The reality of 1792 was envisaged at the time as different from this ideal in several important ways. One was that although the *Assemblée* had made progress in effacing the separate identities (insignia, regions of recruitment and garrisons) of the old line regiments, and all units in theory operated under the authority of the nation as represented by the *Assemblée* , there was as yet no unity of command.

[456] R. Claire Snyder traces the philosophical roots of the Citizen-Soldier back to Ancient Greece. See R. Claire Snyder, *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors* (Oxford, 1999), 1.

In 1792, while military leaders in armed conflict with each other claimed to act for the Revolution—just as orators backing conflicting programs claimed to speak for the Revolution – it was hard to imagine an equation of all citizens with all soldiers. At the Champ de Mars and then at the Tuileries, both soldiers and secondarily citizens were in lethal conflict among themselves – identifying with differing classes and centers of authority.

The only trained and disciplined military force in 1792 was the *Armée de ligne*. Even this was not a unified organization. It was only in 1791 that serving soldiers' contracts were amended so that they ran to the State rather than to an individual commanding officer. Also in 1791, the special conditions accorded to foreign regiments were eliminated, so that all regiments would have the same responsibilities to the French state.

The men of the line regiments were sternly disciplined, poorly paid, mostly drawn from the lowest class of agricultural laborers, and were expected to make the army their career. But, when well led, these soldiers could function as disciplined careerists. Some historians give them great credit for the victories of 1792. But these were not the newly recruited volunteers, whose preparation, discipline and effectiveness were poor. Lethière's depiction is anachronistic as well as idealizing in its representation of the volunteers as cohering into an impressively fit and well presented force.

There are numerous prints celebrating the conflict at the Tuileries which, unlike the July Declaration, had overtly dramatic and lasting consequences. These images, of which Béricourt's *Prise des Tuileries* [1792], is an example, tend to emphasize the sanguinary nature of the conflict, and the fact that it was won by uniformed soldiers, while also attracting civilian participants. Basset's *Fondation de la République, le 10 Août 1792* [1792], for instance, highlights the leadership of the Gardes Nationales from Marseilles in the storming

of the Tuileries.[457] This emphasizes the reality that, as had so often been true from 1789 onwards, there was no unity even within the military, no stably established authority, and certainly no equation of citizens with the soldiers of the day. The visual rhetoric continued to favor depiction of citizens-in-arms fighting alongside organized troops—inevitably on the Revolutionary side. An early depiction of the assault on the Tuileries is the anonymous *Incendie de la caserne des suisses, au carrousel, le 10 Aôut* [1792], from Révolutions de Paris. (fig. 4.20) According to the text at the bottom, it was impossible to enter the Palace "without passing a burning truss, or stepping on a still-warm corpse."[458] The victorious Revolutionary army is shown at the left and also suggested in great number at the right. In the right foreground, a clearly identified civilian and another man, possibly a soldier, are showed putting two defenders to the sword, adding them to a small assemblage of corpses on the ground. The presence of the civilian marks the troops with which he is associated as Revolutionary. More significant, however, is the fact that the civilian role in these events is pictured as vanishingly small.

The same subordination of the civilian role is seen in *Prise du Palais des Tuileries, le 10 Août 1792* [1793] a painting by Jean Duplessi-Bertaux which was exhibited at the Salon of 1793.[459] (fig. 4.21) Here there are bodies heaped in the courtyard of the Palace, guns are still firing--and soldiers and a few civilians are putting wounded men to the sword. An officer on horseback, wearing a cockade, is among the attackers. A thickly massed contingent of troops at the right center, carrying pikes, seems to be advancing in disciplined fashion against intense defensive fire. The pike was visually as well as verbally associated

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[457] (tout Paris se trouvait, pour ainsi dire, rassemblée au Carroussel et lieux adjacents, les Marseillois en tête) all of Paris, so to speak, was assembled at the Carroussel and nearby places, led by the soldiers from Marseilles. Text accompanying Basset, *Fondation de la République: le 10 Août 1792*, (Paris, 1793), Bibliothèque Nationale.

[458] (sans passer sur une poutre encore enflamée, ou marcher sur un cadaver encore chaud.) Text accompanying Anonymous, *Incendie de la Caserne des Suisses, au carrousel, le 10 Aôut.* Révolutions de Paris 161 (1792): 238.

[459] Cited in *Salon des Artistes Français*, Paris, 1793, 35.

with the lower classes from the time that the *Assemblée* voted to arm the entire population with pikes, immediately subsequent to the *Déclaration*. Duplessi-Bertaux's work assigns them a greater role in the fighting than was described by many observers.[460] As the pike was the only weapon cheap and available enough to be distributed to all, it had taken on a mythic identity as "in some ways the weapon of freedom."[461] These men are soldiers, but they are represented as soldiers recruited, probably only recently, from classes that previously had not been accepted for service in Paris.

Neither print depicts the heroic resistance of the Swiss, who fought virtually to the last man to defend the King's home, even though he was not present at the Tuileries. In a sense, this closed a cycle of action. In the first days of the Revolution, the *Royal Allemand* Regiment had attacked civilians in a cowardly way, but had withdrawn virtually unharmed. At the end of this phase of the victorious Revolution, the Swiss, another foreign regiment, had been attacked by the Revolutionary army, and wiped out. This was the end of the monarchy.

These two works are a representative sample of numerous violent scenes showing the assault by soldiers on the palace in August. Civilians play a minor role, far less than the carefully equilibrated parity assigned to them among the *Vainqueurs de la Bastille*. With increased recruitment from all classes and progress towards a larger army subject to the orders of the Revolutionary legislative, the fighting role attributed to civilians is greatly diminished. The soldier is more representative of the citizenry, but the citizen in arms is no longer visualized as having significant importance in the fighting. The citizen in arms had been marginalized as the army became a tool of the Revolution.

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[460] For many examples of this, see John Lynn (1977), 5.

[461] (en quelque sorte l'arme de la liberté.) *Décret de l'assemblée Nationale du premier Août 1792, l'an Ive de la Liberté, sur une fabrication de piques,* precede du *RAPPORT fait le même jour, au nom de la Commission Militaire, par M. Carnot, aîné...* (Paris, 1792), 3.

It is particularly interesting that Duplessi-Bertaux's work was presented at the Salon within months of the event, whereas Prieur apparently never presented there. The official recognition given to Bertaux suggests that at this time, during the Terror, representations glorifying grisly scenes of conflict were tolerated and might even have been sought after in France. In Britain the same events tended to inspire visceral horror, which was expressed in powerful images such as those of Zoffany and Gillray. Zoffany's *The Tenth of August, 1792* [1795] depicts merciless, disorganized slaughter, seemingly inflicted by civilians. (fig. 4.22) This is a breakdown of civilized order, where hatred can progress to murder on a mass scale. There is no representation of the palace, nor indeed of any physical objective or purpose for conflict.

Gillray's *The Zenith of French Glory; The Pinnacle of Liberty* [1793], shows far fewer victims, but emphasizes the mass support of the civilian population for the killings. (fig. 4.23) Both artists seem to place the blame for these sanguinary scenes on the French people as a whole, rather than on any military force or underlying event.

The significance accorded to the Tuileries in France is elucidated by the caption under another print of exactly the same subject: *La Fondation de la République, 10 Août 1792.* (fig. 4.24) August 10 was marked at the time as the epochal date when the monarchy ended and the First Republic began, although the actual declaration of the Republic by the Convention took place a little later. But the July Declaration and the ensuing recruitment in Paris were never assigned such a title or role. In fact, the men who stormed the Tuileries in August and thereby cleared the foundation for the Republic were not those who had been recruited from the civil population in July.

5. The Disappearance of the Citizen-in-Arms.

After the *Déclaration*, the Revolutionaries faced armed opposition both from within and outside France, including the Vendéens and the Austrians. The first two important

engagements with the Austrians were at Valmy and Jemappes, in 1792. Both battles were won primarily by regular French line regiments. At Valmy, French artillery proved superior, and casualties were low. Jemappes was a bloody frontal engagement, where the French infantry proved its effectiveness in close combat. Superior leadership by French officers was a significant contributor to victory particularly at Jémappes. As the enemy was pushed back from its frontiers, France entered an era of expansionism which was to be extended by Napoléon.

In myth, these two battles could stand for the emergence of a Revolutionary army of patriots that could exercise the power of the French nation. Given this mythic role of these two battles, one might expect them to be richly represented in art. Of the Revolutionary print series, only the *Tableaux* continued long enough to include images of Valmy and Jemappes. These images contain no figure that is recognizable as a citizen-in-arms. In both scenes, the French are in the foreground, and their uniforms, arms and organized military deportment show them to be soldiers, not citizens in arms. This marks a very great change from the imagery used from the time of the Bastille that of the Tuileries (a period of three years), where citizen soldiers are shown fighting alongside uniformed troops.

The consistent though rare contemporary representations of the French army fighting in these two battles—similar in genre to those of scenes celebrating later French victories--can be contrasted with reactions to the events in the Vendée during the same period. The Vendée uprising, defeated in 1793, is particularly significant because it was seemingly spontaneous rather than the result of any centralized direction, occurring in an agricultural region that included only one city. It received widespread civilian support in that region. The revolt appeared to be motivated by resistance to conscription, and by religious loyalty and regional opposition to direction from Paris of a more centralized state that effaced local prerogatives. Neither outside forces nor leaders in Paris appear to have incited it.

Despite both the extreme drama and broad scale of the events in the Vendée, there are few if any contemporary images showing Vendéen civilians opposing or being attacked by Revolutionary troops. Representation of anti-Revolutionary citizens-in-arms seems to have remained entirely unacceptable. There are no images, either, of citizens-in-arms fighting in support of the Revolutionary regime against the Vendéens, although some surely did.

As these examples suggest, the citizen-in-arms seems to have had little or no place in the visual record after the monarchy was effectively ended by the assault on the Tuileries in August, 1792. Perhaps in part this reflected the declaration of the Republic six weeks later by the newly-elected Convention--the first representative body chosen by universal male suffrage in France. The citizen-in-arms was seen as opposing the Royal Government during the preceding three years, but once the Revolution and hence the people were finally in power, with mass recruitment for a reorganized military, this character left the scene. The defense of the Revolution, once Revolutionary power had been established, was attributed to a full time national army who needed no help from citizens-in-arms. Citizens were encouraged, repeatedly, to volunteer for the army rather than to fight as irregulars and it was the army rather than the civilian fighter that was to be accorded credit for victories.

A marked difference between the French and the American experiences was the rapidity with which Washington imposed the ideal of a disciplined, unified army fighting for the nation. Washington presented himself as a professional military leader who would command an army. He was by no means a citizen-in-arms.

It is as a national military leader (with some of the attributes of Roman dictators such as Cincinnatus) that Washington, by then President, was represented by the sculptor Houdon in 1785-96. The full length marble, greatly appreciated from its first appearance, has stood in

the Virginia State Capital Rotunda for over two hundred years.[462] (fig. 4.25) The statue depicts Washington in his Revolutionary War uniform, accompanied by symbols such as the discarded plow and the Roman fasces (with thirteen rods presumably representing the unity of the colonies). The fasces as well as the uniform mark Washington as a leader, not a mere citizen-in-arms.

Once Washington had determined that his battles would be fought by a full time force recruited to serve the Revolution and once authority had been claimed by Revolutionary political leadership, the citizen-in-arms vanished from depictions of subsequent events in America, and became markedly less prominent even in later depictions of antecedent events. In France, no military leader gained and retained authority and respect comparable to Washington's. Furthermore, no national army was truly conceived of until 1792, and did not fully come into existence until 1793.

[462] For the history of the statue and of critical reaction to it, see Tracy Kamerer and Scott Nolley, "Rediscovering an American Icon." *Colonial Willamsburg* 4 (2003).

MAJOR PRINT SERIES: VERSAILLES, DÉSILLES, PATRIE EN DANGER			
Artist	Title	Date	Text?
Révolutions de Paris			
March to Versailles			
Anonymous	Vue du Chateau de Versailles à l'Époque du 5 Oct. 1789	October 25, 1789	No
Anonymous	Vue de la Place d'Armes à Versailles: le 6 Octobre Matin 1789	October 30, 1789	No
Anonymous	Epoque du 6 Octobre 1789: L'Après Diner à Versailles	October 30, 1789	No
Anonymous	Epoque du 1er Octobre à Versailles	December 12, 1789	No
Déclaration de Danger de Patrie			
Anonymous	Proclamation du danger de la Patire	No. 129: July 27, 1792	No
Anonymous	Amphithêatres d'enrôlement dressées dans les places publiques	No. 130: August 3, 1792	No
Tuileries			
Anonymous	Incendie de la caserne des Suisses, au carroussel le 10 Août	No. 161: August 31, 1792	No
Gravures Historiques des Principaux Événemens depuis l'Ouverture des États Généraux de 1789			
March to Versailles			
Janinet	Événements des 16 et 17 Août 1789: M. Walche appaise des furieux, qui veulent ravager son Chateau de Chassenon, en leur faisant préprarer un repas		Yes
Janinet	1er Événement du 5 8bre 1789: Les Femmes voulant prendre l'Abbé Lefevre, et les hommes voulant incendier les Papiers (Cour de l'hôtel de Ville)		Yes
Janinet	Événement du 5 Octobre 1789: Les Dames de la Halle et autres Femmes partant de Paris pour Versailles		Yes
Janinet	3e Événement: M. de la Fayette descend de l'Hôtel-de-Ville, avec les Ordres de partir pour Versailles à la tête des troupes		Yes
Janinet	4e Événement: Les Femmes Parisienne siegeant à l'Assemblée Nationale Parmi les Députés		Yes
Janinet	5e Événement du 5 Octobre 1789: L'Aide de Camp de M. de la Fayette passant au milieu des balles pour remplir ssa mission auprès du Roi		Yes
Janinet	Événement du 6 8bre 1789: Massacre d'un Garde-du-Corps à la porte de l'appartment de la Reine, par des brigands		Yes
Note: No reference to Désilles in this series			
Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Francaise			
March to Versailles			
Prieur inv. & del.; Berthault sculp.	Tableau 27: Bénédiction des Drapeaux de la Garde Nationale Parisienne à Notre Dame, le 27 Septembre 1789		Yes

Prieur inv. & del.; Berthault sculp.	Tableau 28: Orgie des Gardes du Corps dans la Salle de l'Opéra de Versailles, le 1er Octobre 1789		Yes	
Prieur inv. & del.; Berthault sculp.	Tableau 29: Les Dames de la Halle Partant pour aller chercher le Roi à Versailles, le 5 Octobre 1789	No Advertisement Identified - published sometime between July 21, 1792 (when Tableau 17 and 18 advertised) and August 8, 1793 (When Tableau 35 & 36 advertised)	Yes	
Prieur inv. & del.; Berthault sculp.	Tableau 30: Le Roi Promettant de Venir à Paris avec sa Famille, salve d'Artillerie devant le Chateau de Versailles, le 6 October 1789		Yes	
Prieur inv. & del.; Berthault sculp.	Tableau 31: Le Roi arrivant à Paris avec sa Famille, escorté de plus de trente mille ames, le 6 Octobre 1789	No Advertisement Identified - published sometime between July 21, 1792 (when Tableau 17 and 18 advertised) and August 8, 1793 (When Tableau 35 & 36 advertised)	Yes	
Déclaration de Danger de Patrie				
Prieur Inv & Del; Berthault sculp	Tableau 65: Proclamation of the Danger to the Homeland, 22nd July 1792	Advertised for sale, 1796	Yes	

Fig. 4.1.: Anonymous, *VUE DU CHATEAU DE VERSAILLES A L'EPOQUE DU 5 8bre, 1789, Le Roi, la Reine et Mgr. le Dauphin paroissant au balcon donnant sur la cour de marbre : la Garde nationale de Paris et de Versailles au nombre de plus de 20,000, sans y comprendre plus de 12,000 [...] Braves Femmes arrivées de differentes parties, qui addressent au roi des plaintes, sur le manque de pain dans la ville, et prient au Roi de venir faire un séjour à Paris.* Révolutions de Paris, October 25, 1789, no. 13

Fig. 4.2 : James Gillray, *French Liberty/British Slavery*, 1789, colored engraving, British Library

Fig. 4.3: Anonymous British Artist, *Female Perils*, ND, etching, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 4.4: Anonymous, *Triomphe de l'armée parisienne à son retour de Versailles à Paris, le 6 Octobre, 1789*, ca. 1789, colored engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 4.5: Ponce after Borel, *National Assembly: Dedicated to women patriots; The chosen moment is the offering of the first patriotic donation made by women artists on September 7, 1789*, ca. 1789, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 4.6: J.F. Cazenave, *Trait de Courage Heroïque*, 1793, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 4.7: Jean-Francois Janinet, *2e Évènement du 5 Octobre, 1789: Les Dames de la Halle et autres Femmes partant de Paris pour Versailles*, *Gravures historiques des principaux evenemens depuis l'ouverture des États Généraux de 1789*, ca. 1791, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 4.8: Anonymous, '*A Versailles, A Versailles' Journée du 5 octobre 1789*, ca. 1789, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 4.9: Jean-Francois Janinet, *4eme Evenement du 5 Octobre 1789: Les Femes Parisiennes siégeant à l'Assemblée Nationelle parmi les Députés*, *Gravures Historiques des principaux Evenemens depuis l'Ouverture des États Généraux de 1789*, 1791, engraving, New York Public Library

Fig. 4.10: Pierre Gabriel Berthault after Jean Louis Prieur, *Les Dames de La Halle Partant pour Aller chercher le Roi à Versailles, Tableaux Historiques de la Révolution Francaise*, Tableau #29, 1792-1793, engraving, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 4.11: Pierre Gabriel Berthault after Jean Louis Prieur, *Le Roi promettant de venir à Paris avec sa famille, salve d'artillerie devant le Chateau de Versailles, le 6 October 1789*, Tableau #30, ca. 1792-93, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale
, 22

Fig. 4.12: Anonymous, *GRAND DEBANDEMENT DE L'ARMÉE ANTICONSTIUTIONELLE. Un detachement de principales caillette qui ont joué un role dans la révolution, elles se présentent aux troupes de l'Empereur pour les faire débander, ce qui leur reussit complettement et on cesse dêtre étonné de cette catastrophe lorsqu'on voit la demoiselle Teroig** qui leur montre sa Republique, et Mesdames Sta.. Dondon... Silles.. Calo.. Talmouse Condor... leur montrent leur Villette [...]* N.D., engraving, Musée Carnavalet

Fig. 4.13: Anonymous, *Amphithêatres d'enrôlement dressées dans les places publiques, le dimanche 22 juillet 1792, les amphiteâtres furent dressés dans les places publiques [...]* Révolutions de Paris, September 1792, no. 130, p. 68

Fig. 4.14: Pierre Gabriel Berthault after Jean Louis Prieur, *Proclamation de la Patrie en Danger, 22 Juillet 1792*, Tableau 65 of the*Tableaux Historiques,* 1796, engraving, Bibliothèque Nationale

Fig. 4.15: Anonymous artist after Jean Duplessi-Bertaux, *Enrôlement de volontaires à un carrefour après la proclamation de la Patrie en Danger*, engraving, N.D., location unknown

Fig. 4.16, Guillaume Lethière, *The Enlistment of the Volunteers, or the Country in Danger*, 1799, oil on canvas, Musée de la Révolution Française, Vizille

Fig. 4.17: Georges Rude, *La Marseillaise, ou le Départ des Volontaires de 1792,* 1833-36, Chérence Stone, Arc de Triomphe, Paris

Fig. 4.18: Jean-Jacques-Louis David, *Death of Barra*, 1794, oil on canvas, Musée Calvet, Paris

Fig. 4.19: Unknown engraver after Jean-Baptiste Vérité, *Agricola Viala, Commandant du Bataillon des Enfans agé de onze Ans, Des Marseillais rebelles s'étant emparés des pontons se préparoient à passer la Durance pour massacrer les patriotes desarmés. Il faloit couper le cable le feu de l'ennemi dirigé contre nos freres présageant une mort certaine, avoit suspendu leur zèle lorsque le jeune Viala n'écoutant que son courage s'élance sur une hache et frape de toute sa force mais il est atteint et dit je meurs pour la Liberté*, 1793, engraving, Westfälischen Landesmuseums für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Münster

Fig. 4.20: Anonymous, *Incendie de la caserne des Suisses, au carrousel, le 10 Aôut, Le Carrousel était comme une grand fournaise ardente: pour accéder au Château, il falloit traverser devant corps de blesses incandées dans toute leur longeur: on ne pouvoit y pénétrer sans passer sous une poutre enflamée, ni marcher sur un cadavre enflamé*, Révolutions de Paris, no. 161, p. 238, 1792

Fig. 4.21: Jean Duplessi-Bertaux, *Taking of the Tuileries, Court of the Carrousel, 10th August 1792*, 1792-3, oil on canvas, Musee du Chateau de Versailles

Fig. 4.22: Richard Earlom after Johann Zoffrany, *The Tenth of August, 1792*, 1795, etching, Michael Finney Gallery

Fig. 4.23: James Gillray, *The Zenith of French Glory; The Pinnacle of Liberty,* 1793, etching, Tate Gallery

Fig. 4.24: Anonymous, *La Fondation de la République,* 1792-3, etching, Musée de la Révolution Française 1988.169

Fig. 4.25: Jean-Antoine Houdon, *George Washington as Cincinnatus*, 1788, marble, State Capitol, Richmond, VA

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I have undertaken to review how Revolutionary events in America and then in France were described both in images and words that cast light on the character and role of the soldier patriot. For each country, the analysis focused first on the very earliest revolutionary events. In America, these were the conflicts at Lexington and Concord and then the Battle of Bunker Hill. In France the initiating events were the taking of the Bastille and the disorders of the preceding few days. This analysis can now enable formulation of tentative answers to the questions as to the emergence, role and effacement of the soldier patriot that were put forward in the Introduction.

Although the American images are both far less numerous and less sophisticated than the French, it is striking that both in America and later in France, the earliest images and writings strongly emphasized the role of the ordinary citizen who left his civilian occupation at least temporarily to fight against trained Government troops. These troops represented an authority stigmatized as engaged in brutally repressing, with excessive force, a newly expressed national will. Indeed, in both America and France the "foreign" or at least unrepresentative identity of the Government soldiers or of the interests for which they fought were at times emphasized. Thus, the citizen-in-arms felt called to respond in kind to the violence of an authority that had become illegitimate.

At the Bastille, at Lexington and even at Bunker Hill there was no revolutionary army. Nor was there a capable, consistent revolutionary leadership which could represent a counterweight to loyalist generals and power structures. Seen as spontaneously, unselfishly risking his life as an autonomous individual who expressed and supported the will of a nation-- rather than as a member of a formation and hence perhaps of a faction, acting under orders and military discipline--the soldier patriot carried on his shoulders the hopes and aspirations of his neighbors and fellow citizens.

But, once a Revolutionary Army under some form of stable political authority had been constituted, the figure of the self-motivated citizen in arms could come quickly to be seen as superfluous, irrelevant or even dangerous. George Washington did not intend or allow his Continental Army to become a hotbed of independent thought and action. He emphasized his own subordination to the Congress, and he insisted upon his men's commitment to carry out orders within a conventional military hierarchy where rank was determined by command decision rather than either by popularity, as in many militia units, or by ad hoc assertion of individual leadership qualities.

Romans's visual depiction of the feckless conduct of militia officers at Bunker Hill found an echo in Washington's derogatory references to "Massachusetts officers." Strong leadership by more professional and well chosen officers implied the reduction of the common soldier to a mass with a supporting, executory role, where the individual is likely to be seen as motivated by discipline rather than by patriotism. Thus, increasing positive emphasis on the role of officers was signaled even in Tiebout's work, and was a central communicative concern for Trumbull, who honored the valor of identified, highly-placed individuals rather than of self selected citizens in arms.

Once Washington took command, only a few months after the outbreak of the Revolution, the patriot soldier could not maintain a significant presence in contemporary words and images. His figure was resurrected decades later in romanticized versions of the early Revolutionary events that were reflective of much later social and political values and conflicts.

One might imagine that the effacement of the patriot soldier in America could have been a consequence of Washington's particular preferences and stature. Developments in France suggest that this was not the case, and that the citizen-In-arms is in nature a

transitional figure, embodying contradictions which cannot survive the emergence of a Revolutionary political authority and army, much less that of a Revolutionary state.

There are always rebels and revolutionaries. To suggest that any man may and should take arms to support what he believes to be a national interest is likely to be seen as subversive, particularly to newly established and hence shaky national authority. In America, events such as the Whiskey Rebellion and Shay's Rebellion shortly after the end of the Revolution quickly showed the citizen in arms as carrying a threat of anarchy.

In France, the role of the citizen-in-arms remained prominently at issue for a much longer period than in America. This was primarily because emergence of a unified Revolutionary army took so much more time there. In France, unlike in America, many thousands of men were already under arms at the beginning of the Revolution—and they did not form a single force. Successive waves of recruitment further complicated this fragmented picture, and political authority was divided and ephemeral. This engendered a widely-recognized risk of civil war.

Artists, some of whom, such as Prieur, were engaged in illustrating politically-oriented periodicals, highlighted these contradictions. The Vainqueurs de la Bastille, asserting themselves as preeminent citizens-in-arms, met rapid and increasingly determined resistance from people many of whom still placed their faith in aristocratic leadership such as that of Lafayette, while others saw Revolutionary soldiers as servants of an emergent political leadership. Neither group had much use for patriot soldiers who had license to think for themselves and to choose sides. Yet, the fact that in France, unlike America, officers were long identified with the increasingly unpopular aristocracy suggested continued tolerance there of an incoherent military structure where some, such as Robespierre, at times expected the patriotism of the common soldier to offset the potentially treasonable motives of his superiors.

The March to Versailles, just a few months after the Bastille, lent itself to a caricatural denigration of citizens impulsively marching with pikes--as well as to a nascent realization that an army of citizens of uncertain discipline and loyalty, such as Lafayette's, was unlikely to carry the Revolution to victory. The consequences of allowing armed citizens to act upon their own ideas of patriotism or justice were further highlighted by the Nancy mutiny in 1790. Here, too, those favoring either one side or the other—as almost everyone did--were horrified by the implications of the conflict. The legitimacy of the citizen-in-arms who decided for whom he would fight was thereby further undermined.

It was only after the elimination of the Royal authority in August, 1792, more than three years after the Bastille, that the widespread desire for coherent control of the military by civil authority could progress towards actualization. This led to the Amalgame, which was intended to embed the soldier in a much more homogeneous mass in which the individual will of soldier and officer would be dissolved. However, it was only the imminence of foreign invasion that brought to fruition in 1793-4 the concept of a single national army in which the individual soldier would have no choice as to when, for how long, or on what side to fight. He could then no longer be a citizen in arms.

In France as in America, I have undertaken to show that the visual record is consistent with what was written, but can add additional dimensions of understanding. In France, the patriot soldier was briefly hailed both in words and images for his role in the initial conflict. His much longer persistence on the French scene, however, was the subject of both pictorial and verbal denigration and concern.

These observations leave much still to be assimilated and analyzed. The enormous wealth of visual materials from the French Revolution, numbering in the tens of thousands, constitutes a challenge to scholarship that has not yet been systematically brought into focus. Even a less than synoptic view of this vast treasure could make possible a greatly improved

understanding of how differing political and class interests expressed themselves over time in shaping views of the soldier as patriot and citizen.

Another task, perhaps a more manageable one, is to trace the rise of the vision of a national army which, although paid and disciplined, is visualized as embodying qualities of patriotism and selflessness. Here, British materials, for instance those relating to the early colonial conflicts in India, could be of central importance. At the end of the eighteenth century, Great Britain was in some ways, as I have suggested above, a newly self conscious nation, like America and France. It was expansionist, as were France and America. To a degree, consciousness of nationhood is antecedent to patriotism. The citizen in arms was an early, transient exemplar of this patriotism, but slightly later views of the soldier seem likely to carry unmistakable but distinct patriotic content also.

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